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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement is a feature of most Canadian corporate statutes that allows 
the shareholders to, by creating an agreement meeting the necessary criteria, restrict the powers of the 
directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.  One possible justification for this is the 
"nexus of contracts" theory that all corporations are notionally reducible to voluntary agreements.  Three 
key areas of ambiguity surrounding unanimous shareholder agreements are examined in this dissertation, 
with specific reference to existing judgments.  The requirements for their formation are reviewed, including 
the exact meaning and strictness of the unanimity criterion and the necessity and validity of possible 
restrictions upon the directors.  Four competing approaches to their enforcement are identified and 
contrasted: the corporate constitutional approach that truly removes the board's powers, the contractual 
approach that treats unanimous shareholder agreements as contracts existing alongside the corporate power 
structure, and the directors' duties and oppression approaches that apply existing corporate law remedies to 
deal with violations.  The transfer of duties and liabilities that accompanies unanimous shareholder 
agreements is considered in the context of unusual power structures and stakeholder theory, revealing 
unaddressed and possibly unsolvable problems in the legislation.  It is concluded that, although the 
unanimous shareholder agreement may suggest a move toward a more contractual view of the corporation, 
it can also be understood as a specific tool within the statutory framework. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
 A Canadian corporation is, by default, a representative democracy.
1
  Shareholders elect directors.  
Directors have ultimate authority over the company,
2
 although much of that is delegated to officers and 
employees.  While their exercise of this power is subject to certain legal duties,
3
 they are otherwise 
afforded a broad discretion by the law to govern the corporation as they see fit, and within that, they are 
generally not subject to direct shareholder control, only the threat of removal and replacement.
4
 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement
5
 is an addition to many of the Canadian corporate statutes,
6
 
                                                          
1
 It is a representative democracy in that the members of a constituency elect representatives to 
make decisions on their behalf; this does not necessarily imply that this process fully reflects any given set 
of "democratic values".  In the present metaphor, the shareholders are equated with the voting citizens, or 
more precisely, the shares themselves are, given that votes are cast based upon the number of shares held.  
The assumption that such representation should be limited to them alone is questioned in Chapter Five's 
discussion of stakeholder theory. 
2
 In order to avoid excessive repetition of the central terms in this dissertation, the following 
commonly used alternatives are sometimes substituted, even though they may not be technically precise or 
completely accurate synonyms.  Throughout this work, unless context indicates otherwise, "company" 
means corporation, "investors" means shareholders, and "document" and "instrument" in reference to an 
agreement mean not just the physical object but also the legal arrangement it embodies. 
3
 Including duties of care and loyalty and a variety of other statutorily mandated responsibilities. 
4
 Although the law has provisions requiring approval for fundamental changes, and they are subject 
to some degree of control via the articles and by-laws.  For example, in the Canada Business Corporations 
Act, RSC 1985, c. C-44 (hereinafter C.B.C.A.), see sections 6, 103, 173, 174, 190, and 247. 
5
 Alternative spellings include "unanimous shareholder agreement", "unanimous shareholders 
agreement", "unanimous shareholder's agreement", and "unanimous shareholders' agreement"; French 
variations include "convention unanime des actionnaires", "convention unanime d'actionnaire", and 
"convention unanime d'actionnaires".  There is no legal difference between these terms.  Except when 
providing direct quotations, I use "unanimous shareholder agreement", the spelling in the C.B.C.A., 
regardless of what alternative(s) a given source employs.  The common acronyms are forms of the self-
evident "u.s.a." and "c.u.a.", and much more rarely "u.sh.a."  "Unanimous shareholder declaration" (or 
some variant) has sometimes been used to describe a written declaration by a sole shareholder that is 
deemed to be a unanimous shareholder agreement; I avoid this phrase, since the slightly different rules 
governing formation under such circumstances do not appear to me to justify a bifurcation of terminology.  
For reasons discussed in Chapter Three, "shareholder agreement" (and variants) is a broader term that 
includes but is not limited to unanimous shareholder agreements; in order to maintain this distinction, I do 
not use it as a synonym for unanimous shareholder agreement, and where it appears in this dissertation 
(outside of quotations), it is either to refer to that wider class of documents or to refer to a specific example 
which either is not or may not be a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Where a shortened term appears 
desirable for literary purposes, I prefer simply "agreement", also obviously a more inclusive one but less 
likely to inadvertently conflate two separate legal concepts. 
6
 Alberta Business Corporations Act, RSA 2000, c B-9 (hereinafter "A.B.C.A."), s. 146; Manitoba 
Corporations Act, CCSM c C225(hereinafter "M.C.A."), s. 140; New Brunswick Business Corporations 
Act, SNB 1981, c B-9.1 (hereinafter "N.B.B.C.A."), s. 99; Newfoundland and Labrador Corporations Act, 
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including the Canada Business Corporations Act,
7
 that allows shareholders to restrict the powers of 
directors,
8
 and it can be used to transfer those abilities (along with the corresponding responsibilities) 
directly to the shareholders themselves in whole or in part.
9
  This opens up the potential not just to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
RSNL 1990, c C-36 (hereinafter "N.L.C.A."), s. 245; Northwest Territories Business Corporations Act, 
SNWT 1996, c 19 (hereinafter "N.T.B.C.A."), s. 148; Nunavut Business Corporations Act, SNWT (Nu) 
1996, c 19 (hereinafter "N.B.C.A."), s. 148; Ontario Business Corporations Act, RSO 1990, c B.16 
(hereinafter "O.B.C.A."), s. 108; Quebec Business Corporations Act, CQLR c S-31.1 (hereinafter 
"Q.B.C.A."), s. 213; Saskatchewan Business Corporations Act, RSS 1978, c B-10 (hereinafter "S.B.C.A."), 
s. 140; Yukon Business Corporations Act, RSY 2002, c 20 (hereinafter "Y.B.C.A."), s. 148.  Throughout 
this dissertation, only the C.B.C.A. and the provincial and territorial statutes that authorize unanimous 
shareholder agreements will be cited when discussing general points of corporate law. 
7
 C.B.C.A. s. 146.  In the former Canada Business Corporations Act, SC 1974-75, c. 29, (hereinafter 
"C.B.C.A. '74-'75") the unanimous shareholder agreement was set out at s. 140. 
8
 Depending upon the statute, certain other matters normally within the powers of the directors can 
be dealt with in the corporation's articles or by-laws.  See e.g., C.B.C.A. s. 6(1), 103(1), 173(1).  However, 
in the current C.B.C.A., the scope of the unanimous shareholder agreement for this purpose is broader than 
that of the articles or by-laws, apparently encompassing any conceivable restriction upon the directors' 
power.  This does not, however, have to be the case; see  C.B.C.A. '74-'75, s. 6(2) and N.B.B.C.A. s. 4(2), 
which allow the articles to contain any provision found in a unanimous shareholder agreement.  (See also, 
e.g., the British Columbia Business Corporations Act, SBC 2002, c 57 (which does not include the 
unanimous shareholder agreement), s. 137.)  Even where the restriction in question is one that can be 
accomplished through these alternate means, doing so via a unanimous shareholder agreement may be more 
effective at creating a barrier against directors performing the restricted action (see Chapter Four), and a 
unanimous shareholder agreement is a better method for entrenching the limitations, especially if unanimity 
is legally required to amend it (see Chapter Three).   Gerald McCarthy, "Shareholder Agreements", in 
Meredith Memorial Lectures 1975 (Toronto: Richard De Boo Limited, 1975) 465, at pp. 469-470, drew a 
distinction between by-laws and unanimous shareholder agreements based upon the premise that the former 
can only restrict directors' powers but the latter can both do that and also restrict the board's "discretion" in 
how they use the powers they retain.  Before even considering whether this characterization of either is 
correct, an initial objection is that this distinction is artificial.  If a board's freedom as to how to use its 
power is restricted, then the power itself is restricted. 
9
 Throughout this dissertation, the term "unanimous shareholder agreement" refers to the type of 
instruments of that name created under Canadian federal, provincial, or territorial legislation.  Several 
American states and Australia have developed tools that fill a similar niche, allowing shareholders of 
closely held corporations greater freedom to agree to alter the corporate structure and/or assume powers 
normally held by the directors.  While the development of the Canadian unanimous shareholder agreement 
has thus not occurred in complete isolation, the law surrounding it has developed along its own path in this 
country, and an international comparison is beyond the scope of the current work.  A summary of these 
foreign counterparts was provided in Industry Canada, Canada Business Corporations Act, Discussion 
Paper, Unanimous Shareholder Agreements (Ottawa: Industry Canada, 1996)  (hereinafter "Industry 
Canada Discussion Paper"), at pp. 15-22.  Robert M. Scavone, "The Unanimous Shareholder Agreement: 
Opting Out of Statutory Norms" in The Future of Corporation Law: Issues and Perspectives: Papers 
Presented at the Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium 1997 (Scarborough: Carswell, 1999) 319, at pp. 
360-373 provided a lengthy comparison of how the questions surrounding such an innovation in corporate 
law have been approached in Canada and the United States, contrasting provisions of the C.B.C.A. with the 
American Revised Model Business Corporation Act.  Michael Disney, "The Unanimous Shareholder 
Agreement: A Promise Unfulfilled?" in Lazar Sarna, ed,  Corporate Structure, Finance and Operations, 
volume 8 (Toronto: Carswell, 1995) 83 at p. 89 fn 6 noted that the Canadian legislation concerning 
unanimous shareholder agreements had apparently developed without express reference to the American 
counterparts, but at pp. 94-98 provided a contrast between the scope of the Canadian unanimous 
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completely relocate power from directors to investors, but also to split it between the two groups in 
numerous configurations, including division by subject matter and the creation of approval/veto powers.
10
  
It has been described as shattering the traditional corporate structure that had stood unchallenged for more 
than a century
11
 and embodying "a shareholder-chosen contractual model of corporate governance formerly 
absent from Canadian law".
12
 
 Is the unanimous shareholder agreement therefore a break from traditional corporate law 
principles in this country, a reconceptualization of the corporation at the most basic level?  Or can it be 
understood as just one more tool within the established framework?
13
  The implications of these questions 
may extend far beyond the relatively small number of companies that are actually governed by these 
instruments. 
 It is unlikely, for obvious reasons, for a company with a very large number of shareholders to 
become the subject of a unanimous shareholder agreement, which may explain the relatively little attention 
the unanimous shareholder agreement has been given.
14
  But that is a practical limitation, not a legal one.
15
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
shareholder agreement and the options in the American Model Business Corporation Act.  Jean Turgeon, 
Les Conventions D'Actionnaires d'une Petite Enterprise (Montreal: Centre d'Edition Juridique, 1983), at p. 
208 made the opposite claim, that "[i]ncontestablement, le principe de la substitution ou du transfert des 
pouvoirs des administrateurs vers les actionnaires origine de droit americain".  (My translation: 
"incontestably, the principle of substituting or transferring the powers of the directors to the shareholders 
originates in American law".)  However, the summary provided by Turgeon of the available instruments in 
the United States at pp. 208-212 illustrates only some similarities to the Canadian unanimous shareholder 
agreement, not any direct link between the two; he made occasional further references to the American 
counterparts throughout, establishing both commonalities with and differences from the unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  Michael Dennis, "Corporations at the Crossroads" in Meredith Memorial Lectures 
1994/95 (Montreal: Faculty of Law, McGill University: 1995) 113 did not provide an in-depth comparison, 
but recommended that the C.B.C.A. provisions on unanimous shareholder agreements be amended in 
several ways to more closely resemble the American Model Business Corporation Act (at pp. 121, 124, 
127).  Trinidad and Tobago has adopted the unanimous shareholder agreement apparently based upon the 
Canadian model, although the exportation of this legal tool to that country is also not explored in this 
dissertation; see Daniel J. Fitzwilliam, "The Unanimous Shareholder Agreement: a Bane Or a Boon for 
Shareholders?" Trinidad Tobago Law.Com (website), online: 
http://www.trinidadtobagolaw.com/commercial/baneboon.htm, retrieved June 8th, 2008. 
10
 These arrangements are discussed in more detail in Chapter Five. 
11
 Paul Martel, "La Convention Unanime Des Actionnaires En Droit Federal et Quebecois: 
Considerations Theoriques et Pratiques" (1983) 14 R.D.U.S. 1, at p. 4. 
12
 Disney, supra note 9, at p. 118. 
13
 Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 242, took the position that because empowered shareholders assume the 
responsibilities that normally fall upon directors (see Chapter Five), this tool was created simply because 
"la loi accepte l'elimination des formalites tracassieres et inutiles et il ne s'agit que d'une innovation 
technique et non de la creation d'un nouveau concept juridique".  (My translation: "the law accepts the 
elimination of awkward and useless formalities, and the unanimous shareholder agreement is only a 
technical innovation and not the creation of a new legal concept".) 
14
 The practical limit on the number of shareholders involved should not be mistaken for a limit on 
the size of the business.  Corporations subject to unanimous shareholder agreements can have millions of 
dollars in assets. 
15
 Because unanimous shareholder agreements bind transferees, even the practical limitations are 
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These statutes do not even limit these instruments to non-publicly traded companies.
16
  In theory, according 
to the legislation, any corporation can have a unanimous shareholder agreement.  A theoretical model of the 
corporation that includes room for them thus should not be limited to only some subsection of companies; it 
is part of how we must understand all corporations in those jurisdictions. 
 The statutory provisions provide little help in navigating either the practical or theoretical 
implications of the powerful and versatile tool they are authorizing.  The legislation is, in all cases, almost 
shockingly vague, leaving even basic implementation issues ambiguous.
17
  If we are to comprehend the 
unanimous shareholder agreement as a component of corporate law, then, we must look to the case law and 
our own deductions. 
 An exploration of the unanimous shareholder agreement along those lines is thus in order, both to 
learn about the tool itself and about how it reshapes the law surrounding it.  The aim of this dissertation is 
to accomplish that.
18
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
weaker than they might first appear.  A company with a few shareholders can become subject to an 
agreement, which continues in force even as the number of investors multiplies. 
16
 With the exception of the Q.B.C.A., s. 219.  Although the observation that the C.B.C.A. (and some 
provincial and territorial versions) would theoretically allow a public company to have a unanimous 
shareholder agreement has been made by other commentators- e.g. Normand Ratti, "La Convention 
Unanime des Actionnaires" [1986] C.P. du N. 93, at p. 97; Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 257;  Disney, supra 
note 9, p. 115; Scavone, supra note 9, p. 339- the general consensus has been that it is for practical 
purposes irrelevant, since satisfying the criteria for the creation of a unanimous shareholder agreement is 
impossible in a public company.  One possibility that is more rarely discussed is that arguably a unanimous 
shareholder agreement could be created during a period when a company is closely held (either its early 
days or after "going private") and then survive a public offering.  This scenario was also spotted by 
Nathalie Beauregard and François Auger, "Les Conventions entre Actionnaires" Journées d'études fiscales 
(Canadian Tax Foundation, 2010), who acknowledged its theoretical validity but found it difficult to see 
any way that the advantages of maintaining a unanimous shareholder agreement in a public company would 
outweigh its costs and drawbacks.  Assuming that the power structures discussed in Chapter Five are 
legally permissible uses of this tool, though, there do seem to be interesting (and low-cost) implications of 
restricting directors of public companies to increase profits, promote corporate social responsibility, or 
serve other goals.  Paul Martel and Luc Martel, Les Conventions entre Actionnaires, Eleventh Edition 
(Montreal: Wilson & Lafleur, 2013), at p. 376 also identified this possibility in the C.B.C.A., and thus 
recommended that a unanimous shareholder agreement contain a clause that it automatically terminates in 
the case of public offering; they considered the scenario inherently problematic, although the only example 
they provided of an actual downside was the right of shareholders to annul the purchase of shares subject to 
an undisclosed unanimous shareholder agreement.  They warned that, absent such a term, a shareholder 
who refused to terminate the agreement could prevent a company from going public (since it was assumed 
that doing so with the instrument still in place was non-viable).  The wording of the C.B.C.A. and other 
statutes aside, whether or not securities law or securities regulators would allow this is another question, 
one beyond the scope of the current discussion. 
17
 The C.B.C.A. version, for example, provides no explanation for how they can be amended or 
terminated. 
18
 This dissertation is not exhaustive of all the legal questions posed by unanimous shareholder 
agreements.  Some issues that have sparked analysis by other commentators are, for space and thematic 
reasons, largely omitted here, e.g. what should be the default decision-making process for empowered 
shareholders (including whether it would be vote per-share or per-shareholder) or whether there are means 
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 Before the analysis turns to these particular agreements, Chapter Two provides a further 
explanation and critique of the "nexus of contracts" theory that it has been alleged unanimous shareholder 
agreements incorporate (no pun intended) into Canadian law.  While it would be extremely simplistic to 
reduce all the questions surrounding these agreements to whether or not they replace the statutorily-defined 
entity model of the corporation with a contractual one, many of the dilemmas posed by them arise in part 
out of the tension between the traditional corporate structure and the potential of these documents to alter it. 
 Over the course of Chapters Three through Five, that tension is illustrated through three key 
aspects of the unanimous shareholder agreement: their formation, their enforcement, and the transfer of 
responsibility that accompanies them. 
 In order for something to meet the statutory description of a unanimous shareholder agreement, it 
must be a written agreement amongst all the shareholders that restricts the power of the directors.
19
  This 
seemingly simple definition hides a web of subtle possibilities for controversy, as the examination of the 
case law in Chapter Three demonstrates.  But judicial interpretations of these criteria can reveal more than 
precedents for handling various odd technicalities; they tell us whose consent is required to make such 
alterations to the corporate structure, and what alterations are permissible. 
 The question of what a unanimous shareholder agreement is and how it should be enforced are 
fundamentally intertwined.  In Chapter Four, four separate approaches found in the case law will be 
considered: the "corporate constitutional" model whereby these documents literally remove powers from 
the directors, the "contractual" view that they can be treated as contracts with the directors regarding what 
decisions they will make, "directors' duties" analyses that treat the requirement that directors obey the 
restrictions upon them as akin to the obligations they already owe the company, and an "oppression 
remedy" based approach that considers unanimous shareholder agreements as part of the reasonable 
expectations which cannot be oppressed, unfairly disregarded, or unfairly prejudiced.  Each of these four 
represents a different understanding of what a unanimous shareholder agreement is, what principles govern 
its enforcements, and what the appropriate remedy for a violation might be. 
 Just as unanimous shareholder agreements can transfer power from directors to shareholders, so 
too do they move the accompanying duties and liabilities.
20
  Once again, a seemingly simple principle is far 
more technically complex in execution than it first appears, and Chapter Five examines some of its 
ramifications.  As the various assignments of power that these agreements can create do not all suggest 
obvious divisions of responsibility, resolving them requires considering afresh the underlying justifications 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of acquiring shares that escape the various wordings of the "transferee" provisions. 
19
 In some jurisdictions, including under the C.B.C.A., it must be also be "lawful", although there is 
debate about whether that criterion has meaning.  See the discussion in Chapter Three. 
20
 Arguably they did not always transfer both, if there is a difference; although currently all statutes 
specify that shareholders incur and directors are relieved of duties and liabilities, this has not always been 
the case.  C.B.C.A. '74-'75 s. 140(4) excused the directors of their duties and liabilities, but only explicitly 
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for directors' duties and liabilities.  The obligations that directors owe to the corporation pose perhaps the 
most challenging dilemmas.  It has sometimes been argued that the primary purpose of the directors' duties 
is to benefit shareholders, raising the question as to whether there is a point in imposing them upon those 
very investors.  But the Supreme Court of Canada has endorsed the opposite view, holding that those 
obligations are to the company itself and may take into account other stakeholders, a position that seems at 
odds with the investors' ability to utilize a unanimous shareholder agreement to assume power directly in 
order to pursue their own interests. 
 These issues get at the heart of the unanimous shareholder agreement, exploring its very nature, to 
what extent and on what basis it can alter or affect corporations, and what some of the legal consequences 
of doing so may be. 
 As a consequence, they also tell us much about the corporation itself.  The unanimous shareholder 
agreement can serve as a sort of "stress test" for the principles of corporate law.  By pushing the 
corporation in unusual directions, they demonstrate aspects of its nature that might otherwise remain 
obscured.  Assuming that the law is consistent,
21
 these agreements can teach us about not just the 
corporations that actually have one in place but also those that merely exist in a structural framework 
designed to include them, i.e. all corporations in the relevant jurisdictions.
22
 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement can help us understand whether corporations are best 
conceived of as a "nexus of contracts" that can be rewritten by the parties or whether they are better viewed 
as statutory creations, largely static structures subject only to limited customization.  The very existence of 
these agreements might suggest the former, but the specific requirements for their formation imply the 
latter; a careful review of those criteria can shed light on just how malleable this tool has rendered the 
corporation.  The enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements provides additional, conflicting 
information as to whether the corporate power structure can be truly and fundamentally reshaped by its 
shareholders or whether the default arrangement's entrenched status has proven resilient enough to absorb 
or externalize the instruments' effects.  The transfer of directors' duties and liabilities that accompanies the 
restriction of their power further demonstrates that these existing legal mechanisms, which presumably 
serve policy goals, are designed to operate within the default structure, causing tensions when it is 
rearranged.  Consideration of these issues reveals that, while the unanimous shareholder agreement by its 
very nature made the Canadian corporation more "contractual" in some ways, the creation of this legal tool 
has not in fact resulted in the re-conception of the statutorily-authorized entity as nothing more than a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
stated that the duties were assumed by shareholders.  See note 1680. 
21
 A debatable assumption in practice, but one which this dissertation will treat as a theoretical goal.  
It is acknowledged that some readers may disagree about the value of consistency even as necessarily 
desirable. 
22
 This includes public corporations, except in Quebec; the corporate law statutes do not exclude 
them from the unanimous shareholder agreement provisions, although practical factors and regulatory 
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"nexus of contracts". 
 In addition to such general questions about the nature of corporations, the unanimous shareholder 
agreement can shed light on specific aspects of them.  Examining the appropriateness of bringing an 
oppression claim to enforce the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement requires a reconsideration of 
what the general purpose of this remedy is and how it should coexist with other legal rights.  Exploring the 
restructuring of the directors' duties when these instruments are in effect, particularly their duties to the 
corporation, requires us to re-evaluate the purpose and effect of those responsibilities, not just when 
imposed upon shareholders, but also when still owed by the directors themselves.  Each interaction between 
the unanimous shareholder agreement and another aspect of corporate law can tell us something about both. 
 Because the law surrounding unanimous shareholder agreements is rife with unknowns, a useful 
place to begin their study is through a careful review of the case law, and so where possible, the analysis 
that follows is grounded in a review of actual judgments.
23
  This pseudo-doctrinal methodology is not 
intended to "settle" all the questions left unresolved by the statute through the force of precedent- even if 
that were the purpose, between the relative rarity of reported cases on any given point and the frequent 
contradictions between them, it is unusual that there is undeniable judicial consensus on any of these 
issues,
24
 although some trends can be identified and the data presented may be of benefit to readers seeking 
                                                                                                                                                                             
bodies might. 
23
 All of the cases cited in this dissertation can be found on either the Westlaw Canada, Quicklaw, or 
CanLII websites, as of the time of writing.  Except for the reasons specified below, all of the judgments 
herein that are portrayed as dealing with unanimous shareholder agreements referred to the documents in 
question at least once as a "unanimous shareholder agreement" or one of the synonyms listed supra at note 
5 (or specifically denied that they qualified as such).  These terms were taken as invoking the specific 
statutory tool of that name, even if no judicial determination was performed confirming the document met 
all the relevant criteria.  Many of the judgments discussed, despite specifically identifying the document in 
question as a unanimous shareholder agreement, also referred to it by the more general phrase at points, 
sometimes in a manner suggesting the two terms were synonymous, and for analytic convenience, I 
assumed that in that context only terms such as "shareholder agreement" were being used as an abbreviated 
form rather than a superset of "unanimous shareholder agreement" (similar to how this dissertation employs 
"agreement").  By contrast, cases that did not include one of those specific terms are generally not included 
in my analysis (unless they are being used to provide wider legal context); for example, a judgment that 
only used the wider term "shareholder agreement" (without the "unanimous") to refer to a document would 
not be treated as dealing with a unanimous shareholder agreement, even if my own reading of the facts 
suggests the document might have qualified.  Exceptions were made in order to review the full judicial 
history of cases or where a judgment was later cited as precedent regarding unanimous shareholder 
agreements, even if it did not use the term itself.  I acknowledged that this use of the specific terminology 
employed as a primary sorting mechanism is not without problems.  As mentioned, judicial usage of the 
terms has not always precisely distinguished the two, and judges have doubtless occasionally carelessly 
employed the phrase "unanimous shareholder agreement" or failed to use it when it might have been 
appropriate to do so.  To disregard the choice of terminology, however, would have muddied this attempt to 
understand the judicial view of unanimous shareholder agreements (the statutory tool) with their view of 
shareholder agreements generally.   
24
 The closest that exists is the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. v. 
R., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 795, 159 D.L.R. (4th) 457, 39 B.L.R. (2d) 1, [1998] 3 C.T.C. 303, 225 N.R. 241, 1998 
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specific precedents- but rather to shed light on the interaction between the unanimous shareholder 
agreement and the courts. 
 Both in consideration of individual judgments and for general prescriptive purposes, the critical 
perspective adopted emphasizes virtues internal to the law and legal system- logical rigour, consistency, 
clarity, certainty, predictability, ease of application, et cetera
25
- but wider social policy goals and concerns 
are taken into account through consideration of how the unanimous shareholder agreement can and should 
interact with the existing legal principles that serve as their presumed proxies, including the oppression 
remedy, the directors' duties to the corporation (particularly in light of the inclusion of stakeholder theory 
into those obligations by the Supreme Court of Canada), and the general array of regulations affecting 
corporations and their directors; some of the possible economic implications are also touched upon in that 
same discussion.  The scope of the following analysis does not extend, however, to an empirical study of 
whether unanimous shareholder agreements actually allow investors to better achieve their goals, whether 
those include greater profitability, minority shareholder protection, corporate social responsibility, or some 
idiosyncratic aim.
                                                                                                                                                                             
CarswellNat 750, 1998 CarswellNat 751, 98 D.T.C. 6334, [1998] S.C.J. No. 41 (S.C.C. May 28, 1998) 
(hereinafter "Duha SCC") and as explored in later chapters, subsequent decisions have both challenged and 
misapplied aspects of it. 
25
 I acknowledge that these priorities are neither value-neutral, apolitical, nor necessarily 
unproblematic. 
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Chapter 2: Nexus of Contracts Theory 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The first question posed by the unanimous shareholder agreement is the reason for its inclusion in 
Canadian corporate law.  The superficial explanation for it is that it has received legislative authorization 
and thus is part of Canadian corporate law.  Such an approach is unsatisfactory in that it provides guidance 
neither for application, interpretation, nor reform in this area.  Some further justification is therefore 
necessary on both theoretical and pragmatic grounds.  Looking to the Dickerson Report, the initial 
reasoning behind this tool was to let corporations operate more like partnerships.  "By expressly 
legitimating the device of a unanimous shareholder agreement in Part 11.00 we allow the closely-held 
corporation to avoid much of the formalism that is not appropriate to it, and to operate, in effect, as a 
partnership with limited liability."
26
  That also simply begs the question.  Why should a corporation be 
more like a partnership in this regard? 
 At least two general approaches to justifying the unanimous shareholder agreement suggest 
themselves.  The first is to search for specific policy goals that might be furthered by the provision.  
Possible answers range from the ideological- e.g. shareholder empowerment is inherently good because it 
advances democratic principles, property rights, et cetera- to the practical- e.g. companies operated in this 
manner are more efficient, conscious of the public interest, et cetera.
 27
  Such arguments may have merit, 
and they will be revisited in the discussion of stakeholder theory in Chapter Five.  For the present, however, 
a different justification will be examined, one allegedly grounded in corporate law itself. 
 This second approach develops from the premise that allowing unanimous shareholder agreements 
is consistent with the basic nature of the corporation.  There is an academic tradition that views the 
corporation as a "nexus of contracts".  This school of thought would hold that the "unanimous shareholder 
agreement" is not simply a tool of corporate organization created by specific sections of Canadian statures, 
but rather was the definition of a corporation all along.  The instrument set out in the legislation is a tool for 
amending this hypothetical pre-existing agreement. 
 Whether the "nexus of contracts" view of the corporation is convincing, and thus whether it and 
not more specific policy goals (if anything) justifies the unanimous shareholder agreement, is not a strictly 
                                                          
26
 R.W.V. Dickerson et al., Proposals for a New Business Corporations Law for Canada, Volume 1 
(Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971) (hereinafter the "Dickerson Report"), p.11. 
27
 These contentions are presented only as examples. 
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academic distinction.  As will be discussed in Chapter Three, one of the debates concerning unanimous 
shareholder agreements is the degree to which their potential subject matter should be restricted.  What 
justification the provision has would be a highly influential, if not determinative, factor in answering that 
question.  Similarly, Chapter Four explores the enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements, a topic 
that has become divided into approaches that either accept or reject the premise that these instruments 
fundamentally alter the corporate structure; the degree to which a "nexus of contracts" model of the 
corporation is accurate has relevance to that debate. 
 This chapter is divided into four sections.  In the first, the history and basic elements of the "nexus 
of contracts" theory of the corporation are elaborated upon.  The subsequent three sections deal with 
various criticisms of this approach as an explanation of the internal workings of the corporation, and 
specifically as an explanation of the relationship between shareholders and directors.  The second section 
concerns challenges that the "nexus of contracts" is descriptively inaccurate.  The third re-examines the 
alternative "concession" theory of the corporation.  The fourth covers the debate over whether the "nexus of 
contracts" view of the corporation, when combined with total contractual freedom, adequately protects 
shareholders. 
 An additional objection to the "nexus of contracts" theory is that it inappropriately disregards the 
interests of stakeholders in the corporation other than shareholders and directors.  Chapter Five will contain 
a general examination of the stakeholder debate and its relevance to unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 
2. The "Nexus of Contracts Theory" of the Corporation 
 
 The "nexus of contracts" theory of the corporation, like all popular academic theories, has a 
number of variations.  What all versions have in common is the view that the corporation has no separate 
existence as an entity unto itself.  Instead, the "corporation" is nothing more than a descriptive term for the 
set of notional contracts among the individuals who comprise it.
28
  Legal references to the corporation as a 
distinct entity would therefore be properly understood as convenient shorthand only, and it would be a 
mistake to give any further substance to the metaphor.
29
 
 Though the current "nexus of contracts" school has its roots in the 1930s and developed in full 
during the latter decades of the last century, there is nothing novel about challenging the legal notion of the 
corporate person and emphasising that, in reality, the corporation exists only through human beings.  Such 
                                                          
28
 Which individuals those might be is a matter of debate, as discussed later in this chapter. 
29
 see e.g. Robert Hessen, "A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and Private Property 
Model" (1978-1979) 30 Hastings L. J. 1327, at p. 1335; Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein, "Opting 
Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-Contractarians" (1990) 65 Wash. L. Rev. 1, at p. 3 fn 1; 
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, "The Corporate Contract" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1416, at 
p. 1426. 
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arguments have been made periodically throughout history.
30
 
 What distinguishes the "nexus of contracts" school from these earlier objections, if anything does, 
is that it was not originally based upon a preference for analysis in terms of real human beings over unreal 
legal entities.  Instead, it grew out of attempts to explain corporate activity in economic terms, the result of 
which has been the erosion of the entity concept until only discrete contracts remained.  Notwithstanding 
this differing origin, some advocates of the "nexus of contracts" approach, having arrived at the conclusion 
that the corporation is merely the sum of a set of contracts, have found advantages to this result when 
combined with a libertarian view of human freedom that might have proven more difficult to extend to non-
human entities, a point that will be returned to. 
 
2.(a) Historical Development in Economics 
 
 Three economic articles are generally viewed as having been influential in the development of the 
"nexus of contracts" theory.
31
  The first of these is Ronald Coase's "The Nature of the Firm".
32
  Prior to 
Coase, firms had been treated by economists as "black boxes" whose inner workings were not considered; 
they existed because some tasks required groups, and they simply produced or not in accordance with 
market conditions.
33
  "The Nature of the Firm" addressed the question of why firms existed at all, rather 
than allowing market price mechanisms to arrange every level of economic activity.
34
  In theory, if one 
party would require the same service to be performed repeatedly in the course of business,
35
 they
36
 could 
separately bargain for it each time: perhaps arriving at the same terms and perhaps not, perhaps with the 
same individual and perhaps not. 
 The conclusion reached was that firms existed because the market contained transaction costs.
37
  
                                                          
30
 William W. Bratton Jr., "The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from 
History" (1988-1989) 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1471, at pp. 1471-1472 and generally. 
31
 Ian Ayres, "Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and Fischel" 
(1992) 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1391, at p. 1395; Thomas S. Ulen, "The Coasean Firm in Law and Economics" 
(1992-1993) 18 J. Corp. L. 301 generally follows the development of the theory, but only used the first 
two; Melvin A. Eisenberg, "The Conception that the Corporation is a Nexus of Contracts, and the Dual 
Nature of the Firm" (1998-1999) 24 J. Corp. L. 819, at pp. 820-822; Bratton, supra note 30, p. 1477, 
although he placed the development of this line of analysis within a much larger historical context; William 
W. Bratton Jr., "The 'Nexus of Contracts' Corporation: A Critical Appraisal" (1988-1989) 74 Cornell L. 
Rev 407, at pp. 415-416; Robert Flannigan, "The Economics of Fiduciary Accountability" (2007) 32 Del. J. 
Corp. L. 393, at pp. 401-406. 
32
 R. H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) 4 Economica New Series 386. 
33
 Ulen, supra note 31, pp. 304-307; Bratton, supra note 30, p. 1496. 
34
 Coase, supra note 32, p. 388. 
35
 For example, a manufacturer of wooden tables might require someone to stain each one. 
36
 In order to be inclusive regardless of gender, I adopt the use of the singular "they" in this 
dissertation to refer to a generic individual. 
37
 Coase, supra note 32, p. 390. 
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When such costs were assumed to be zero, there was indeed no reason not to engage anew in a bargaining 
process each and every time one party required another to engage in some activity.  But given the reality 
that time, effort, and incidental expenses were costs of bargaining, there came a point where this 
outweighed the advantages of pricing each transaction in the market.  At that point, Coase reasoned, the 
firm would replace the market as the means of organizing affairs.
38
  Within the firm, instead of costly 
bargaining, there was only (relatively) costless hierarchical ordering.
39
  As the respective transaction costs 
of bargaining and inefficiencies of non-bargaining shifted, so too would firms expand and contract. 
 Coase's approach was challenged and developed upon by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz in 
"Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization".
40
  The firm, they argued, could not be said to 
be apart from the market, as transactions within the firm operated according to similar principles.
41
  A 
superior in the firm had no real authority over subordinates, because in the event that the subordinate did 
not agree to an order, they could refuse to follow it.
42
  That such refusal might entail a cost (loss of pay, 
termination, et cetera) did not undermine this observation because such costs were no different from the 
costs a party might pay in the market for refusing a potential contract.
43
  In this sense, then, relationships 
within the firm were constantly being reaffirmed or not in accordance with the same market principles that 
governed relationships outside the firm.  This approach has been subject to criticism on the basis that it fails 
to fully capture the real psychological and social conditioning that encourages conformity with firm 
hierarchies.
44
  That criticism does not displace the model of corporate employees as contractual performers, 
however; it only negates the position that they are free of all (non-economic) influence in deciding whether 
to perform, and that therefore they are not economic abstractions. 
 The insights of Coase and Alchian and Demsetz are several degrees removed from what would 
later become the "nexus of contracts" theory of the legal nature of the firm, which is normally more 
concerned with using a contractual analysis to understand the relationship between investors and the 
corporation than with the relationship between employees and the firm.  But they set the stage by opening 
up the corporation to internal examination.  The economic "black box" had its counterpart in an irreducible 
legal entity; once one discipline pried into the internal workings to find the separate relationships within, 
the other would follow. 
 Meanwhile, the place of investors within the economic corporate contract theory was also being 
developed, with Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling's "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, 
                                                          
38
 Ibid, pp. 394-395. 
39
 Ibid, p. 392. 
40
 Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, "Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization" (1972) 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 777. 
41
 Ibid, p. 777. 
42
 Ibid, p. 777. 
43
 Ibid, p. 777. 
44
 Eisenberg, supra note 31, p. 827. 
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Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure".
45
  It was in this article that the corporation was apparently first 
described as a "nexus for contracting relationships",
46
 a phrase shortened to "nexus of contracts" by 
subsequent authors.  It is worth addressing the exact meaning of the term as used here, since as discussed 
below, there are a number of different models operating under that banner. 
 Jensen and Meckling addressed the issue of why and how an entrepreneur (whom they call a 
"manager"
47
) seeking funding might choose between debt and equity,
48
 or more likely, how the ratio 
between debt and equity might be determined.
49
  In order to do so, they broke down debt and equity into 
packages of economic rights; significantly, they removed voting rights from equity for the purpose of their 
analysis.
50
  Thus considered, equity becomes merely a form of financial obligation, like debt but with 
different assumed terms, namely to "share proportionately in the profits of the firm".
51
  The relationship 
between the entrepreneur and the equity investors is therefore treated as contractual, and the "corporation" 
is termed a "nexus of contracts" because it is the sum of the entrepreneur's contracts with the investors. 
 While Jensen and Meckling's analysis may be highly insightful regarding the choice between debt 
and equity financing, caution must be taken when proceeding from there to a legal description of the 
corporation as nothing but a set of contractual relationships.  The model presented was not intended for that 
purpose, and includes a number of assumptions that make that leap problematic. 
 First, it bears repeating that for ease of analysis, Jensen and Meckling excluded voting rights from 
the equity investment contract.  It is possible to create an economic model that includes voting rights, and 
this has indeed been done.
52
  However, the presence of voting rights may be seen to create an ideological 
complication for the legal theorist.  While voting rights in the corporation might be economic tools with no 
moral component, an alternative view is that any system with voting rights should bear more than a passing 
resemblance to a functioning democracy.
53
 
                                                          
45
 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305. 
46
 Ibid, p. 311. 
47
 I prefer the term "entrepreneur" in this context, as the phrase "manager" may suggest that 
managing is occurring on someone else's behalf, the very opposite of the scenario that is being described. 
48
 "Equity" in this context refers to the form of investment described above.  It should not be 
confused with the principles of equity that originated in the Chancery Courts. 
49
 Jensen and Meckling, supra note 45, p. 306. 
50
 Ibid, p. 314. 
51
 Ibid, p. 312. 
52
 e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, "Voting in Corporate Law" (1983) 26 J. L. & 
Econ. 395. 
53
 e.g. Bratton, supra note 31, pp. 437-438.  The concept of "shareholder democracy" has been 
subjected to critique; see Nicholas Wolfson, "A Critique of Corporate Law" (1979-1980) 34 U. Miami L. 
Rev. 959, at pp. 991-994; Ralph K. Winter, "State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation" (1977) 6 J. Legal Studies 251, at p. 276; Daniel R. Fischel, "The Corporate Governance 
Movement" (1982) 35 Vand. L.Rev. 1259, at pp. 1274-1276; Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 52, 
generally. 
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 Second, Jensen and Meckling's assumption of a single entrepreneur, a "single manager... with 
ownership interest in the firm",
54
 is descriptively inaccurate for a large number of corporations.  
Interestingly, it might also call into question their analysis of the firm as a nexus of contracts, because one 
might say that they presuppose and equate the firm with their hypothetical single manager.  To avoid this, 
one must consider that it is not the manager seeking investment, but the firm.  This eliminates the 
descriptive problem, as it expands the model's viability to firms not governed by single entrepreneurs, but 
instead it ends up begging the question of what the firm is, and if it has an essence that cannot be reduced to 
individual contracts. 
 Third, Jensen and Meckling assumed for the purposes of their analysis no legal framework 
protecting the parties other than their own contracts.
55
  This is obviously descriptively inaccurate, but the 
more immediate caution is that it does not appear that Jensen and Meckling were making a normative 
suggestion that there should be no such framework or that their analysis demands such a conclusion. 
 Finally, it is interesting to note, in the context of the stakeholder debate that will be examined in 
Chapter Five, that Jensen and Meckling's analysis does not privilege the corporate contract(s) with 
shareholders, but instead explicitly places it on approximately the same footing as the corporate contract(s) 
with creditors; both are simply alternative "outside claims on the firm".
56
  This is in marked contrast to 
much, though not all, of the "nexus of contracts" analysis that follows.
57
 
 These articles, among others, transformed the economic view of the corporation as a "black box" 
into one where all the relationships within, be they between supervisors and employees or entrepreneurs 
and debt and equity investors, could be separately analyzed as contractual relationships subject to the same 
market forces as those outside the firm.  It was upon this basis that legal theorists proceeded to develop the 
"nexus of contracts" approach to corporate law. 
 
2.(b) Three "Nexus of Contracts" Models 
 
 Legal theory and practice have different requirements from economics.  As a result, when the 
"nexus of contracts" approach to the corporation made the transition from one field to the other, certain 
refinements were necessary in order for it to suit legal purposes.  It was not sufficient to say only that a set 
of contracts existed; it became necessary to provide descriptive and prescriptive analyses of what rights and 
duties those contracts entailed. 
 If the interior of a firm is comprised of nothing but a web of contractual relations, and at the 
                                                          
54
 Jensen and Meckling, supra note 45, p. 314. 
55
 More accurately, no legal framework other than one that enforces contracts. 
56
 Jensen and Meckling, supra note 45, p. 343. 
57
 Eisenberg, supra note 31, p. 833 noted that the "nexus of contracts" theory is commonly thought 
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boundary of the firm are also contractual relations, then it is ambiguous precisely which contracts constitute 
the firm.
58
  Further, since these alleged contracts must be inferred from characteristics of the metaphorical 
entity, it is left to the theorist to "discover" at least some of the terms.  As a result, there appear to be at 
least three ways of characterising the "nexus of contracts" firm.  I will refer to these as the entrepreneur-
centric, shareholder-centric, and decentred models.  The differences between the models is significant in 
part because the choice of characterization has influenced the normative arguments presented by various 
commentators regarding mandatory versus default legal rules of corporate governance.  It may also be 
significant when other legal principles, such as liability rules, are applied to corporations. 
 The entrepreneur-centric "nexus of contracts" model is derived from Jensen and Meckling.  In this 
version, the corporation is created and controlled by an entrepreneur or group of entrepreneurs who retain 
direct power, presumably becoming the corporate directors and management.  These entrepreneurs may 
seek to obtain capital by contracting with investors and exchanging equity rights (or some approximation 
thereof) in return for funding.  They may alternatively obtain funding through more traditional debt.  
Additionally, these entrepreneurs may be considered the principals who contract with employees to 
perform various tasks.
59
 
 The entrepreneur-centric model might have conceptual appeal to those who do not object to- 
indeed, who support on efficiency grounds- widely dispersed shareholders exerting little actual control over 
large corporations.
60
  This model also fits comfortably with corporate contracts that exclude traditional 
controls on directors, such as the duties of care and loyalty and even shareholder voting rights.
61
 
 The shareholder-centric model appears to be the dominant one in current legal "nexus of 
contracts" analysis.
62
  In this version, a group of shareholders enter into an agreement with each other that 
creates a corporation.
63
  They then contract with managers to operate as agents on their behalf.
64
  These 
                                                                                                                                                                             
to support shareholder primacy, yet actually would suggest the opposite. 
58
 See note 108. 
59
 Wolfson, supra note 53, pp. 972-973, without explicitly adopting the entrepreneur-centric model, 
rejected shareholder-centric views and classified shareholders as a form of lender; Eisenberg, supra note 
31, pp. 830-831 considered this approach. 
60
 William A. Klein, "The Modern Business Organization: Bargaining Under Constraints" (1981-
1982) 91 Yale L.J. 1521, at p. 1559, while not precisely subscribing to this approach, followed a similar 
logic. 
61
 Klein, supra note 60, p. 1560 discussed shareholders being completely uninterested in control; 
Robert C. Clark, "Contracts, Elites, and Traditions in the Making of Corporate Law" (1989) 89 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1703, at p. 1708 discussed the elimination or curtailment of voting rights. 
62
 This approach implicitly underlies any analysis in which the articles are considered equivalent to 
the corporate contract.  Klein, supra note 60, p. 1527 considered this explicitly, although his actual model 
is not shareholder-centric.  Manuel A. Utset, "Towards a Bargaining Theory of the Firm (1994-1995) 80 
Cornell L. Rev. 540, at pp. 550-551 outlined this as the "Agency Theory". 
63
 This is a theoretical understanding of the formation of a corporate "contract", and it should be 
understood as separate from the steps involved in incorporating under current law. 
64
 The relationship between directors and shareholders is often described as one of agency.  See e.g. 
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managers, in turn, may enter into contracts with other parties, including employees, but notionally they do 
so only as agents acting on behalf of the shareholders as principals.  The shareholder-centric model often 
equates the articles of incorporation with the corporate "contract".
65
  Any given shareholder may or may 
not have had input into the original articles of incorporation upon which the company was founded, but the 
acquisition of shares is presumed to include consent to the corporation's existing articles,
66
 and they are, of 
course, subject to amendment by the shareholders.  No other group need agree to changes to the articles, 
although for procedural reasons, it is essentially impossible to amend them without support of the directors. 
 The shareholder-centric model reconciles shareholder primacy with an opposition to government 
regulation designed to protect shareholders' interests.  While one of the principal challenges to the 
contractual model comes from those who believe that it does not adequately protect shareholders, as 
discussed below, this does not imply that the defenders of the contractual corporation tend toward the 
entrepreneur-centric model.  Instead, many of them automatically align themselves with the shareholder-
centric model, and assert that whatever privileges managers enjoy are those that shareholders have 
rationally bargained away in order to further their own interests.
67
 
 Finally, in the decentred "nexus of contracts" model, the corporation is truly a nexus through 
which contracts flow.  All participants in the corporation, be they shareholders, creditors, managers, 
customers, et cetera, are entering into a multilateral relationship with all other parties.
68
  The decentred 
model might be the only approach that truly transforms the corporation into a nexus of contracts, rather 
than identifying the essence of the corporation with a single group, be it the managers or the shareholders.  
However, it does not appear to be the version of "nexus of contract" theory used by most of its advocates, 
perhaps because it has implications at odds with their ideology.  It makes the concept of renegotiating the 
corporate contract more difficult- it would, for example, suggest that a "unanimous shareholder agreement" 
would be inadequate due to a failure to include all relevant parties- and it leads rapidly to stakeholder 
theory. 
 
2.(c) Libertarianism 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, "Corporate Control Transactions" (1981-1982) 91 Yale L.J. 
698, at p. 701; Roberta Romano, "Answering the Wrong Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory 
Corproate Laws" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1599, at p. 1602 fn 10. 
65
 Much of the literature on opting out of directors' duties makes this equation; see Section 4. 
66
 See the subsection "Initial Versus Amendments" later in this chapter. 
67
 See Section 4 of this chapter. 
68
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, "Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian Critique of 
Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship" (1996-1997) 82 Cornell L. Rev. 856, at p. 859 presented a 
description that may qualify as this type; Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, "A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law" (1999) 85 Va. L. Rev. 247, generally discussed a version of this model, 
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 If the corporation is nothing more than a set of contracts amongst shareholders and/or between 
shareholders and directors, then government regulation of corporations is the regulation of those contracts.  
It is this observation that has fuelled much of the normative prescription in the "nexus of contracts" 
literature. 
 The contractual approach to the corporation often, though not always,
69
 goes hand in hand with a 
libertarian approach to contract.  This view holds that the parties to a contract should be free to make 
whatever deals they wish, without government interference, and should be trusted to look after their own 
interests adequately, or alternatively be left to suffer the consequences of their own poor judgment.
70
  In 
short, it has no place for paternalism.
71
  An exception is sometimes made when the agreement might harm 
third parties, a phenomenon known as "externalities"; this is considered a special case when government 
intervention is appropriate.
72
 
 It is because of this libertarian view of contracts that the "nexus of contracts" approach has such 
appeal to some commentators.  If the corporation is a distinct entity- and in particular though not 
necessarily exclusively if that entity is created only by the state itself- then such an entity might 
legitimately be subject to regulation.
73
  Or it might not, but that would require arguments from base 
principles to demonstrate, with perhaps also reference to a wide range of policy goals and empirical 
evidence of costs and benefits of regulation.  If, however, contracts are assumed to "naturally" be free of 
government intervention, then once the corporation is equated to a contract, no further argument is 
necessary to demonstrate that it should be free of regulation.  At the very least, these "nexus of contracts" 
advocates assume that the burden of proof has been shifted to the regulators.
74
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
described succinctly at pp. 278 and 320. 
69
 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, "The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law" (1989) 89 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1395, at p. 1409; Klein, supra note 60, p. 1526; Eisenberg, supra note 31, pp. 823-824; Robert B. 
Thompson, "The Law's Limits on Contracts in a Corporation" (1989-1990) 15 J. Corp. L. 377, at p. 379; 
John C. Coffee Jr., "No Exit?: Opting Out, the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, and Special Case of 
Remedies" (1987-1988) 53 Brook. L. Rev. 919, at p. 924. 
70
 Bebchuk, supra note 69, p. 1397 presented this view without endorsement; Winter, supra note 53, 
p. 253; Ayres, supra note 31, p. 1396; Ulen, supra note 31, p. 322; Clark, supra note 61, p. 1714-1715 
summarized this position; Flannigan, supra note 31, p. 406 noted this argument. 
71
 Clark, supra note 61, p. 1718 is one of the few places in this debate where it was suggested that 
paternalism may have merit even absent market failures such as imperfect information, rational apathy, et 
cetera; the expertise of outsiders may sometimes allow for better decision making than non-expert affected 
parties could make. 
72
 Romano, supra note 64, p. 1616; Bebchuk, supra note 69, p. 1405; Winter, supra note 53, p. 253; 
Ayres, supra note 31, p. 1396; Eisenberg, supra note 31, p. 824, though not advocating free contract 
generally, noted externalities as a concern; Clark, supra note 61, p. 1706 described this as part of the strong 
form of the theory. 
73
 Hessen, supra note 29, p. 1328. 
74
 Butler and Ribstein, supra note 29, p. 64 noted that there is no good theoretical reason to put the 
burden of proof on one side or the other, and then proceeded to assert on the basis of an alleged historical 
trend that the burden of proof is on regulators. 
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 Not all advocates of the "nexus of contracts" approach take such a position; some note that, as 
contracts themselves are subject to regulation both in general and specifically according to type,
75
 then so 
too might the contractual corporation.
76
  But this appears to be a minority position, or at least a less vocal 
one.
77
  Instead, the "nexus of contracts" theoretical model of the corporation has become heavily associated 
with advocacy for free corporate restructuring.  To quote one commentator: 
 
Unfortunately, it has proved easy to confuse the positive proposition that the corporation 
is a nexus of reciprocal arrangements with the normative proposition that the persons 
who constitute a corporation should be free to make whatever arrangements they choose, 
without the constraints of any mandatory legal rules.
78
 
 
 Believers in a libertarian approach to contract on philosophical grounds would likely argue that the 
scale of the arrangements has no bearing on whether or not the government should interfere.
79
  Those with 
at least some belief in the wisdom of government regulation of private arrangements, however, might find 
that large-scale enterprises invite such interference more than small ones, due to the number of parties 
potentially affected.  Even ignoring immediate externalities upon outsiders, the ultimate social, economic, 
and moral costs of allowing widespread financial injury to large numbers of willing participants might be 
too great to ignore.
80
  Even if corporations are contracts, the size of public corporations might invite 
regulation that an arrangement among a handful of parties would not. 
 Such concerns do not factor into the libertarian approach to "nexus of contracts" corporate theory.  
Instead, the choices of the parties should be determinative of the content of the corporate contract.
81
  This 
position becomes slightly trickier when the contract is not explicit (or reasonably implicit) about all subject 
matter, a result that is inevitable given the long-term existence of the corporation and the impossibility of 
foreseeing all eventualities, let alone the cost efficiency of contracting for them all.
82
  These gaps must be 
filled, and it is the law that fills them.
83
 
 A criticism of this conceptual approach to judicial contract interpretation- that is, a criticism of 
                                                          
75
 e.g. consumer transactions. 
76
 See notes 151 and 152. 
77
 This observation is made somewhat informally, from my own review of the literature.  It must be 
noted, however, that it can be difficult to separate a pro-regulation contractarian from an anti-contractarian. 
78
 Eisenberg, supra note 31, p. 824.  See also, e.g. John C. Coffee Jr., "The Mandatory/Enabling 
Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618, p. 1619. 
79
 Hessen, supra note 29, p. 1328. 
80
 Most market crashes, such as the one in late 2008, demonstrate this. 
81
 See the discussion of mandatory and default rules below. 
82
 e.g. Fred S. McChesney, "Economics, Law, and Science in the Corporate Field: A Critique of 
Eisenberg" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1530, p. 1536; Coffee, supra note 78, p. 1621; Butler and Ribstein, 
supra note 29, pp. 28-29. 
83
 Explicit mandatory or default rules are not gap-fillers per se as they were known to be part of the 
agreement, per Flannigan, supra note 31, p. 418; however, judicial decisions may perform a genuine gap-
filling function. 
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treating judicial contract interpretation as consistent with a contractual approach to contracts themselves- is 
that it is unnecessary and inaccurate to resort to this rhetoric.  Judges may state that they are determining 
what the parties might be understood to have bargained for, but the truth is that they are attempting to 
balance the interests of the parties in a fair and welfare-enhancing manner.
84
  Framing this as what they 
would have bargained for is unnecessary and arguably misleading; advocates of freedom of contract frame 
the ideal role of judicial interpretation this way solely to support their metaphor of the corporate contract.  
Without actual consent, there is no difference between the imposed "contract" and regulation.
85
  This does 
not mean that corporations cannot be contracts, but it does remind us that even if they are, that does not 
mean that they are perfect instruments and expressions of the parties' wills subject to no other power.  No 
contract is.  Those who find contracts self-justifying on the basis that they are consensual instruments 
which further the parties' rational self-interest should bear this in mind. 
 
2.(d) Rules Regimes 
 
 Statutes and established common law principles which govern the corporation can be divided into 
two categories: mandatory and default rules.
86
  Mandatory rules are those from which parties cannot opt 
out.  Default rules are those which operate in the absence of a contrary agreement by the parties.  Most 
"nexus of contracts" advocates assume that default rules are preferable to mandatory ones.
87
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 Anthony T. Kronman, "A Comment on Dean Clark" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1748, at p. 1749; 
Ulen, supra note 31, p. 321 described this as the contract being inevitably "imperfect and in need of 
correction from outside the contracting process"; Lewis A. Kornhauser, "The Nexus of Contracts Approach 
to Corporations: A Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1449, at p. 1452 noted 
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 Kronman, supra note 84, p. 1750. 
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 Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, "Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules" (1989-1990) 99 Yale L.J. 87, at p. 87; Bebchuk, supra note 69, p. 1396; Utset, supra note 
62, pp. 607-608; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, "The Structure of Corporate Law" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
1461, at p. 1461; Coffee, supra note 69, p. 924; Coffee, supra note 78, p. 1618. 
87
 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 29, p. 1418; Romano, supra note 64, p. 1616; Ayres and 
Gertner, supra note 86, p. 89; Butler and Ribstein, supra note 29, p. 53; Jeffrey N. Gordon, "The 
Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1549, at p. 1551 identified this as the 
common position, although he disagreed; Bebchuk, supra note 69, p. 1396 identified this position; Ulen, 
supra note 31, p. 322; David Millon, "Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law" 
(1993) 50 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1373 at p. 1378; Kornhauser, supra note 84, p. 1457 identified this 
preference; Jonathan R. Macey, "Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder 
Constituencies From a Theory of the Firm Perspective" (1998-1999) 84 Cornell L. Rev. 1266, at p. 1270; 
McChesney, supra note 82, pp. 1536-1537. 
  
 
 
20 
 
 There is some variation in suggestions as to how such defaults should be selected.  One view is 
that the defaults should represent the bargain the parties "would have" selected themselves, possibly using 
assumptions such as bargaining costs being zero and the parties being rationally self-interested and fully 
informed.
88
  Some ambiguity exists as to whether these criteria are meant to be interpreted by a court 
generally or with regard to specific circumstances.
89
  In other words, if most parties to a corporate contract 
would have selected Term X, should it apply to parties whose specific circumstances would have likely 
caused them to select Term Y?  If yes, then the result cannot be premised upon (retroactive implicit) 
consent, as it is the imposition of a socially determined correct result, not the determination of the parties' 
self-interested rational bargain,
 90
 although as noted above, judicial determination of a contract's content is 
always different from contractual agreement. 
 At least three alternative guidelines to selecting defaults exist.  Generally undesirable default terms 
may be used, in order to better induce the parties to specifically contract around them, and thus reveal their 
own intentions.
91
  This approach stems from the belief that terms to which the parties have explicitly 
contracted are inherently better than defaults to which their assent is less clear.  Another potential principle 
in creating default rules is that they should be selected with a view to which parties are better situated to 
contract around defaults.
92
  For example, corporate managers might be in a superior position as compared 
to shareholders, so default rules should favour (non-controlling) shareholders.
93
  While in a theoretical 
world of zero transaction costs and equal bargaining power, this would be irrelevant, in the real world, such 
considerations may have bearing.  Finally, it has been suggested that where the parties may be faced with 
the option of selecting between a clear term and an ambiguous one (e.g. "good faith", "best efforts"), then 
the default rule should be the ambiguous one.
94
  This is because case law expounding upon the ambiguous 
rule is more likely to develop consistently with a consistent ambiguous rule; if the parties contract to create 
an ambiguous rule of their own, then their specific wording may make whatever case law results 
inapplicable to any other ambiguous contract and vice versa.
95
  Further, parties are relatively unlikely to 
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 Easterbrook and Fischel, supra note 64, p. 702; Ayres and Gertner, supra note 86, pp. 89-90; 
Gordon, supra note 87, pp. 1550-1551; Kronman, supra note 84, p. 1749; described by Ayres, supra note 
31, pp. 1396-1397; Ulen, supra note 31, p. 322; Bainbridge, supra note 68, p. 865; Kornhauser, supra note 
84, pp. 1453-1457 deconstructed these conditions; Coffee, supra note 69, p. 951; Easterbrook and Fischel, 
supra note 29, p. 1444. 
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 Ayres and Gertner, supra note 86, pp. 91-92; Ayres, supra note 31, pp. 1402-1403; Kornhauser, 
supra note 84, p. 1452. 
90
 Flannigan, supra note 31, p. 417, although he took the view that the result is guided by the 
consensus of society as a whole, not a (constructed) consensus of similarly situated parties. 
91
 Ayres and Gertner, supra note 86, p. 91 and generally; Ayres, supra note 31, pp. 1397-1400; 
Coffee, supra note 78, p. 1623 employed a variation. 
92
 Bebchuk, supra note 69, p. 1412. 
93
 Ibid, p. 1412. 
94
 Ayres, supra note 31, pp. 1403-1408. 
95
 Ibid, p. 1405. 
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contract into an ambiguous rule of their own making, due to the massive uncertainty involved, whereas the 
relative clarity of a standardized ambiguous rule may make it palatable.
96
  For these reasons, making the 
default rule the ambiguous one may be the only way to make ambiguous rules a viable choice for the 
parties. 
 
2.(e) Initial Versus Amendments 
 
 A distinction may be drawn between the amount of freedom that should be allowed in initially 
enacting corporate "contracts" and in later amending them.
97
  As the supporting analysis concerns publicly 
traded companies and public shareholders, the point of differentiation is actually when the corporation went 
public, and not its original formation; amendments prior to going public would likely be considered 
equivalent to initial terms (although they may raise similar issues).
98
 
 Shareholders who buy into a corporation when it goes public are all presumptively agreeing, 
according to the assumptions of "nexus of contracts" theory, to the corporate "contract" which precedes 
their purchase.
99
  Their purchase of the shares indicates their consent.  Therefore, whatever form the 
corporate "contract" has at the time it goes public is agreed to by the initial wave of purchasers and all 
subsequent purchasers or transferees.  This provides it legitimacy.
100
 
 However, subsequent amendments to the corporate "contract"- here envisioned as the articles- 
may be passed with less than unanimous support.  In such a case, some portion of the shareholders will find 
themselves parties to a corporate contract to which they never agreed.
101
  Whether their legal and economic 
options in such a circumstance adequately protect their interests, a question returned to below, one 
interpretation is not that their rights have been compromised, but that the corporate contract no longer has 
validity under such a circumstance, lacking the unanimous consent of the relevant parties as normally 
expected by contract law and philosophically required by some views of contracts.  Therefore, free 
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 Ibid, p. 1406. 
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 Gordon, supra note 87, pp. 1573-1585; Bebchuk, supra note 69, p. 1399; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, 
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amendments to the corporate "contract" might not be justifiable, even if total freedom is allowed at the 
formation stage.
102
 
 Assuming that the only relevant parties to the corporate contract are shareholders, then the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, even if enacted after a corporation's initial formation, avoids this 
problem, as by definition all shareholders must consent.
103
  However, as discussed in Chapter Three, in 
some jurisdictions it is possible that an existing unanimous shareholder agreement might be amended non-
unanimously, which reintroduces the problem. 
 
3. Descriptive Challenges 
 
 The first major objection to the "nexus of contracts" theory of the corporation is that it is 
descriptively inaccurate.  Such challenges tend to take one of three general forms. 
 The first, and most trivial, is that the libertarian vision of the corporation as an unregulated strictly 
private arrangement is false.  The corporation is currently subject to a wide variety of government 
regulation and thus is not solely a creature of contract.
104
  To quote Eisenberg, "The characterization of 
corporate law as a standard-form contract whose terms each firm is generally free to vary is belied by the 
great number of mandatory rules of corporation law."
105
  Proponents of the "nexus of contracts" school 
generally concede this, arguing that it misses the points that (a) they are describing the underlying 
justification for the corporation, and (b) they are making a prescriptive argument for less regulation.
106
 
 The second and third forms have more depth.  These are, respectively, that it is descriptively 
inaccurate to equate the corporation with the set of relationships within it and that it is descriptively 
inaccurate to equate the relationships involved in a corporation with legal contracts. 
 
3.(a) More Than the Sum 
 
 It is difficult to argue with the position that corporations include contracts, and moreso to argue 
with the position that they include relationships at all.  This does not, however, necessarily lead to the 
conclusion that the corporation is nothing more than the sum of those contractual relationships. 
 What is the definition of a firm?  Take first the premise that the firm itself is nothing but a set of 
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contractual relationships.  Then, at the boundary of the firm, one finds again contractual relationships 
between the firm and outside parties.  But because the firm is allegedly the aggregate of parties and their 
contracts, those are instead the contracts between inside parties and outside parties.  It then becomes 
questionable whether the boundaries
107
 of the firm are determinable at all.
108
  Given these premises, as Hart 
observed, "there is therefore little point in trying to distinguish between transactions within a firm and those 
between firms".
109
 
 From the perspective of theoretical economics, this might be an acceptable result.  But if the 
corporation is to operate within a larger legal framework, greater clarity is required.  Insofar as we allow 
corporate personality to have legal status at all, its delineation may be important.  The corporation can 
sustain legal liabilities, is subject to regulation, enters contracts and commits torts.  Prevention of 
monopolies, determinations of vicarious liability, enforcement of citizenship requirements, et cetera, all 
would be rendered more complicated, if not impossible, if we could not identify what was and was not 
within the corporation.  Defining the corporation as an identifiable set of contracts could allow for the 
relevant contracts and parties to be subject to the application of the law as needed; positing that the 
corporation might or might not exist at all as part of a mass of contracts each of which might or might not 
be a part of it does not. 
 Determining the boundaries of an enterprise is not a new dilemma, and in some cases, solutions 
exist.  There have been a variety of proposed tests to determine the difference between an employee and an 
independent contractor, for example, but these presuppose the existence of an employer.  Query, further, 
why a shareholder might be thought of as "within" the firm and a creditor "outside" of it.
110
  Alternatively, 
if a large debentureholder is brought "within" the conceptual firm, why not a supplier who extends trade 
credit or even deals with the firm on a regular basis?  And so on.  Taken to its extreme, this logic suggests 
either one all-encompassing firm or, alternatively, no firms at all, neither of which seems reasonable and 
neither of which is consistent with attempts to define the corporation in a legal sense. 
 It therefore follows that there is a way of distinguishing, at least intuitively, between contractual 
relationships that are within the firm from those that cross its boundary.  The question then becomes 
whether that distinction is found within the contracts themselves, or if it operates independently of them.  If 
                                                                                                                                                                             
note 29, p. 12. 
107
 The same boundaries do not have to apply for all purposes in order to be determinable for any 
given purpose. 
108
 Oliver Hart, "An Economist's Perspective on the Theory of the Firm" (1989) 89 Colum. L. Rev. 
1757, at p. 1764; Jensen and Meckling, supra note 45, p. 311; Ulen, supra note 31, p. 321; Eisenberg, 
supra note 31, p. 832. 
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 Hart, supra note 108, p. 1764. 
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the latter, then the firm has a pre-existing definition separate from the contracts.
111
 
 Assuming a shareholder-centric "nexus of contracts" model, one might limit the corporation to the 
shareholders themselves, who are all notionally considered parties to the articles (and who are all parties or 
deemed parties to a unanimous shareholder agreement), making it less a "nexus of contracts" than a single 
contract.  Anyone else, including the directors, managers, employees, creditors, et cetera, would therefore 
be outside the "corporation".  This result allows for a consistent interpretation of the principles involved, 
although the logical inference that the shareholders are the "principals" for legal purposes may have 
undesirable consequences. 
 If that approach is unsatisfactory, an alternative exists that could be applied to either the 
entrepreneur-centric or shareholder-centric corporations.
112
  In this version, the corporation would begin 
either with the entrepreneurs or the shareholders, and proceed from there to encompass all parties who are 
agents or employees (or some combination thereof) of the starting parties, but excluding anyone with any 
other sort of contractual relationship.  Problems emerge nonetheless.  A strict application would exclude, 
for example, a creditor who had bargained for substantial rights to have input into corporate business 
decisions.  Conversely, it might have difficulty distinguishing between, for example, a corporate vice-
president's executive assistant (normally considered part of the corporation) and the same individual's 
household servant (normally not), assuming both were personally hired by the vice-president; one cannot 
differentiate between the two on the basis that one was hired by the corporation and the other not, because 
that begs the question.
113
 
 A second argument that the firm is more than the sum of its parts, and a possible alternative 
solution to the delineation problem, is that companies have institutional cultures that bind them together, 
not just contracts.
114
 
 
More than a network of contracts, corporations are seen by realists as collective entities 
that have identities apart from those of any of the individuals who temporarily fill roles 
within them.  The history of such an institution, the 'culture' and values it comes to 
embody and the institutional goals it formally and informally moves toward affect in 
every sense (legal, social or economic) the relationships among those who participate in 
the corporate enterprise.
115
 
 
 If legal significance is attached to the institutional culture, then the "nexus of contracts" model 
becomes insufficient to define the corporation. 
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3.(b) Not All Relationships Are Contracts 
 
 The second problem of descriptive inaccuracy in labelling the corporation a "nexus of contracts" 
rests upon the meaning of the word "contract".  In the context of the "nexus of contracts" theory, the term 
"contract" has a meaning apparently derived from the field of economics.  It seems to indicate that the 
parties are engaged in a relationship presumed to be mutually beneficial and into which they are taken to 
have entered voluntarily.
116
  Easterbrook and Fischel, for example, declared that "[t]o say that a complex 
relationship among many voluntary participants is adaptive is to say that it is contractual".
117
  Some 
difficulties arise when translating this notion of "contract" into the legal sphere, where the term carries with 
it the implication of an entire body of principles.
118
 
 If the corporation is reducible to relationships but not contracts in the legal sense, then it follows 
that the appropriate body of law to govern it would not be contract law, or at least not entirely.  There is 
precedent for this: family law, for example, and many areas of fiduciary duty, which involve relationships 
subject to other bodies of law.
119
  Some of the areas where the corporate "contract" has been alleged to 
diverge from traditional contracts are discussed in this subsection. 
 A unanimous shareholder agreement is a contract.
120
  To the extent that it becomes integral to the 
corporation, it therefore lends credibility to a contractual description once it is in place.  But the formation 
of one of these agreements is not simply an amendment of the terms of a pre-existing contract.  It is 
arguably a change in the nature of the corporation from an entity whose foundation lies outside of contract 
law to one defined in significant part by a contract; if so, this invites debate about the justification for 
making such a reconceptualization possible, especially given the legal and policy implications.  The 
instrument also, in its current form, provides only an incomplete transformation in that regard; a unanimous 
shareholder agreement can only ever be one component of the corporation, not its entirety, existing as it 
does in the context of a larger legal structure and (depending upon one's interpretation of the boundaries of 
the corporation) relationships and contracts with non-shareholders. 
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3.(b)(i) Bargaining 
 
 Only shareholders who co-found a company have a real ability to "bargain" over the terms of the 
corporate "contract", in the manner of a traditional contract negotiation.  Purchasers of shares, either at an 
initial offering or secondary purchasers in the market, generally cannot negotiate for the rights or 
organizational structure they prefer nor offer concessions in exchange.  They must take or leave the shares 
and the corporation itself as they are.
121
  This is less true of potential purchasers who will be obtaining a 
substantial interest in the company, who may be in a position to demand changes in order to induce them to 
invest, but that is an exception. 
 Such a situation is not particularly problematic for contract law.  Conceptually, this is no different 
from a negotiation in which one party refuses to alter an initial position.  There is no requirement that 
contracts emerge from a give-and-take.  Indeed, many contracts are provided on a take-it-or-leave-it 
basis.
122
  So long as the standardized terms are neither hidden nor unduly onerous, the law will treat them 
as any other contract to which the parties consented. 
 The creation of a unanimous shareholder agreement does require bargaining in a traditional 
sense,
123
 but once the document is in place, the situation parallels all other facets of the corporate 
"contract", a situation that the legislation explicitly creates by deeming subsequent transferees to be parties 
to the agreement. 
 
3.(b)(ii) Certainty 
 
 In order for a contract to be completed, it must be determinable what the content of the contract is.  
While the relationships in the corporate context might be more complex, they are probably still certain 
enough to be acceptable. 
 More problematic is that the "nexus of contracts" approach to the corporation calls into question 
who the parties are contrasting with.  If an employee of a corporation is not contracting with a corporate 
entity, then with whom?  The decentred "nexus of contracts" model suggests that the employee is 
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contracting with an uncertain and ever-changing mass of individuals in a manner that has no parallel in 
conventional contract law.  Alternatively, the entrepreneur-centric and shareholder-centric models provide 
a more conventional second party to the arrangement (represented through agents), but at present, there 
remains some ambiguity as to which, if either, would apply in a "nexus of contracts" approach.  
Additionally, solidly identifying either group as the principals would call into question why they do not 
face potential liability as a result.
124
 
 If a unanimous shareholder agreement is treated as the primary (or even sole) component of a 
"nexus of contracts" understanding of the corporation, then the shareholder-centric model must be correct.  
The shareholders are the only required parties to the corporate contract, a position that would hold whether 
or not they had actually created such an instrument.  The premise is not necessary, however; it is also 
possible to view a unanimous shareholder agreement as only one contract within the "nexus", not its 
entirety. 
 
3.(b)(iii) Consent 
 
 A crucial element in a legal contract is the consent of all parties.  It has been argued that the 
corporation fails this test, because the shareholders do not consent to the corporate contract; they are, in 
fact, likely to be unaware of its content.
125
  Shareholders with diversified small investments will likely 
remain rationally ignorant of many of the details of the corporations in which they invest, even when such 
details are made public.  The benefits of informing themselves are insufficient to justify the effort.
126
  
Despite this rational ignorance, shareholders likely hold general assumptions as to the rules governing 
corporations in which they invest, which would lead to them being unpleasantly shocked to learn, for 
example, that a company in which they had purchased shares was permitting its directors to take valuable 
corporate opportunities for themselves.
127
 
 The counter-argument is that the market allegedly reflects all such value-reducing terms in the 
price of the shares,
128
 and that therefore the shareholders got what they paid for and implicitly consented to 
the full package.  Granting them greater rights is giving them more than they paid for, a windfall profit.
129
  
Whether price mechanisms are adequate to protect shareholders' interests is discussed below; for now, the 
question is whether such an implicit consent to unknown undesirable terms is exceptional in contract law. 
 It is not.  Such situations arise all the time in a wide variety of transactions, where parties find 
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themselves bound by "boilerplate" they did not read.
130
  Such contracts are sometimes voidable if one party 
was not given the opportunity to read the terms prior to entering the contract,
131
 but if the opportunity 
existed, the onus is on the party to avail themselves of it.  Their rational apathy is no excuse.  
Notwithstanding that, there may be a duty to draw attention to particularly unusual or onerous terms.  Were 
the law of corporations substantially changed to allow, for example, for the elimination of the duty of 
loyalty, it might then be required for corporations to make some effort to draw attention to that fact.
132
 
 The problem of consent is more complex with regard to changes to the alleged corporate 
"contract".
133
  The standard principles of contract law do not generally allow for the terms of the contract to 
be varied without the consent of all of the parties and consideration for said variation.  Assuming that the 
articles of a corporation are taken to be a "contract", then this contract is not subject to the rules that 
normally govern variation.  A majority (or super-majority) of participants is all that is required to change 
the articles, and such a change would bind parties who have not consented.
134
  The C.B.C.A. allows 
dissenters to some types of amendments (but not all) to have their shares repurchased, but the available 
remedy is to be bought out, not to block the change.
135
  The consequences of this would be stronger in the 
world desired by some "nexus of contracts" advocates, where the articles would be allowed to set 
essentially any and all terms under which the corporation would operate, but even within its current limits, 
a possibility for variation exists.  The lack of consideration is also problematic; one might answer that the 
"benefits" of any amendment are themselves consideration,
136
 but this is difficult to prove objectively and 
presumably the dissenting shareholders would dispute this subjectively.  Even shareholders who do not 
actively dissent, but merely fail to assent to a change, are not truly consenting to it.
137
  Such problems do 
not arise, of course, with the creation of a unanimous shareholder agreement, which requires the consent of 
all shareholders, but they might be created by an amendment to one if changes were permitted to occur 
non-unanimously, as some jurisdictions do. 
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4. Concession Reconsidered 
 
 The "nexus of contracts" theory is often presented as a superior replacement for the "concession" 
approach.
138
  The latter explanation presents the corporation as a creation of the state (or, in earlier 
versions, the sovereign), existing only by the state's authority, and therefore subject to whatever conditions 
the state might impose without further justification.  In other words, if there is no inherent right to 
incorporate at all, then there is no right to incorporate free of any particular rule or regulation, no matter 
how arbitrary. 
 This is not to say that the regulation that the state imposes cannot (or should not) be justified on 
some ground other than the arbitrary whim of the appropriate government body.  Indeed, the historical 
roots of the corporation tie its initial purpose (and therefore the justification of corporate regulation) to 
specific objectives of the state.  One might therefore divide the concession theory into two branches, one 
simply asserting that the state's unique authority to create a corporation is an authority to create a 
corporation on whatever terms it wishes, and the other that the corporation is a tool of the state (and by 
extension, in a modern democratic state, a tool of society) and should thus be designed to achieve the state's 
desired ends in the most effective manner. 
 
4.(a) History 
 
 The first corporations, in both Great Britain and the United States, were specifically chartered by 
the government for a stated purpose.  Classic examples include the Hudson's Bay Company in the English 
context and the early American corporations chartered to complete large engineering projects, such as 
bridges.
139
  In those early days, the view that all authority descended from the state was of political 
significance, and was encouraged by those in power for obvious reasons.
140
 
 Over time, general incorporation statutes replaced specific charters as the primary method of 
incorporation.  As these statutes generally did not grant government officials discretion to refuse 
incorporated status, it began to appear that incorporation was a right, not a privilege.  That corporations as 
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recognized legal entities are created by the state's recognition of them as such became obscured or, if one 
prefers, no longer true; the process of officially incorporating began to appear more a pro forma 
government acknowledgement of the independent fact that a corporation had been created by the parties 
involved.
141
  As a consequence of this, the idea that corporations were authorized for the purpose of 
furthering the state's objectives faded, replaced by the view that incorporation was a right of self-interested 
individuals seeking the advantages the form offered for their own enterprises. 
 Robert Hessen has argued that the true antecedent of the general incorporation statutes was joint 
stock associations, not charter corporations.
142
  In his view, the state had no choice but to open up 
incorporation to the public generally; there was too much demand for it, and if the state did not grant it, 
then the same results would be achieved through other methods.
143
  Whether this would actually have been 
possible is considered below. 
 The historical origins of a statute or a legal tool do not, of themselves, provide sufficient guidance 
to govern its current application.  Some measure of theoretical or practical justification should be provided 
in support of a given conclusion. Still, we can find in the history of the corporation the idea that it exists to 
serve a purpose; incorporation is not an inherent right.  The transition from specific to general statutes does 
not necessarily contradict that conclusion; it might instead suggest that the general statutes serve a generic 
purpose.  Most obviously, such a purpose might be wealth creation or perhaps the encouragement of 
productive activity.
144
  But if that is the case, then such a goal might legitimately be weighed against other 
goals until a balance is struck. 
 
4.(b) Levels of Assumptions 
 
 Proponents of the "nexus of contracts" view of the corporation have been accused of viewing free 
contracting between individuals as "natural" and thus requiring no further analysis, while they consider 
regulation "unnatural" and in need of justification.
145
  Within an economic analysis, it might be possible to 
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treat contracts as distinct from any artificial state-supported framework, but the legal theorist cannot help 
but be aware that contracts are enforced by the legal system.
146
  Taken further, there are at least four levels 
of legal structure that have at various times contributed to "nexus of contracts" doctrine, in each case as if 
these structures were natural and not the creation of the state, in contrast to the allegedly artificial 
regulation of the corporation.  The first two are inseparably contained within the basic premise that the 
corporation is a "nexus of contracts"; the third and fourth have been used by "nexus of contracts" advocates 
as they developed their position in response to critics. 
 Firstly, "nexus of contracts" theorists seem invariably to hold an unquestioning assumption of 
some form of property rights.
147
  It is beyond the scope of the current analysis to consider this issue in 
depth, save to note that there have been theorists (and governments) who have advanced the alternative 
view that property rights are not inherently natural, but are instead the creation of governments and 
societies, and nor are they inherently neutral.
148
 
 Secondly, most "nexus of contracts" theory rests upon the implicit assumption that agreements 
between parties are enforceable- either through enforced specific performance or some form of damage 
assessment and enforced payment.
149
  It is possible for some other mechanism than the state to be relied 
upon for this, such as reputational costs,
150
 but realistically, the assumption that the agreements being 
discussed are enforceable through resort to the legal system appears to underlie, at least implicitly, the 
arguments of most "nexus of contracts" advocates. 
 Thirdly, in response to accusations that the "nexus of contracts" theory might inadequately protect 
the parties to the corporation, some of its advocates have abandoned total freedom of contract in favour of 
the use of actual contract law principles.
151
  These might include undue influence, misrepresentation, 
unconscionability, et cetera.  These, it is argued, would suffice to protect parties to the corporate contract, 
just as they protect parties to contracts outside it.  Even Easterbrook and Fischel have argued that 
"[c]ontracts signed under threat of force displace voluntary arrangements and are unjust; force is therefore 
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illegal.  Fraud will vitiate an agreement.  Infants and others who do not know their own interest cannot 
contract."
152
  While each of these principles may be (and hopefully is) justified on theoretical bases, they 
also form a body of law and cannot exist separate from it.  There is no natural undisputed definition of 
"others who do not know their own interests", of "fraud", or even of "threat of force"; the terms only have 
meaning in the context of legal interpretation and judicial consideration.
153
 
 It is interesting, then, given that much of the advocacy for "nexus of contracts" theory seems to 
rest upon criticizing the imperfections of courts relative to markets as a means of determining how 
corporations should be structured, that the approach does not and cannot exclude courts from the process.
154
  
Even the simple enforcement of contracts requires judicial interpretation of what the contract is, both 
interpretation of its explicit provisions and filling any gaps that may result; the application of other legal 
doctrine to the contract compounds this problem. 
 Finally, as part of the argument that the existence of corporations need not rely upon a concession 
by the state, it has been suggested that something with all the features of a corporation could be constructed 
without resort to incorporation.
155
  In pursuit of this goal, all other aspects of the law except the statutes 
governing corporations seem to have been taken as natural.  In particular, features of the limited 
partnership
156
 have been relied upon.  While the trust, a creation of the courts of equity, might conceivably 
be argued to be a "natural" development- although this requires accepting that there is a pre-existing 
"natural" law that the courts are simply identifying, rather than determining, a premise that is certainly 
contestable- it would be extremely difficult to see how the limited partnership is.  Virtually any argument 
that the corporation exists only by the leave of the state through the process of statutory authorization 
applies in equal force to the limited partnership. 
 
4.(c) Features of the Corporation 
 
 Assuming that some portions of the law are not concessions of the state, but that the corporation 
might be, the question becomes what aspects of the corporation specifically are being alleged to be the 
product of this concession.  Alternatively, the exercise for the "nexus of contracts" advocate becomes 
demonstrating that these aspects of the corporation are achievable without resort to corporate law.  Four 
features that stand out in particular as emblematic of the corporation and thus subject to this test are the 
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corporation's status as a person for certain legal purposes, the eternal nature of the corporation, the ability to 
trade shares, and limited liability.
157
 
 
4.(c)(i) Person 
 
 The corporation's status as a person allows it, inter alia, to contract, to sue, and to exercise certain 
other rights granted to persons under whatever law is applicable.
158
  (For example, in Canada, a corporation 
has some but not all of the rights granted by the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,
159
 e.g. freedom of 
speech.)  Conversely, the corporation as a person can also be sued and be subject to statutory liability 
including the criminal law; it has been argued that this is a drawback to incorporation balancing the 
advantages,
160
 but this is not necessarily the case, since the corporate person may then be bearing these 
disadvantages partially or completely in place of individual participants.  Even when being held liable, it is 
presumably often convenient to be able to organize a defence around one entity, rather than a myriad of 
separate defendants, just as it is admittedly simpler for the plaintiff to sue that single entity. 
 It is doubtless advantageous for shareholders and directors that the corporation can function 
without needing some or all of its participants to personally be named and involved in these matters.  But 
ultimately, this is a procedural convenience only.  Allowing for agency, it would be relatively simple for 
corporate participants to designate a common agent for most of these purposes.  Even removing agency, it 
would still be possible for the appropriate corporate participants to contract, sue, and exercise other rights 
directly, rather than through the corporate entity.  In the case of constitutional rights, this might actually be 
more powerful: all Charter rights would be available in that case.  The corporate entity's status as a person 
for certain legal purposes might be a concession from the state, but it is a solely procedural convenience.
161
  
Anything that can be achieved through the corporate person could be achieved without it, at least in theory, 
by the shareholders and/or directors, albeit with more cost and inconvenience.  To tie that concession to a 
vast amount of regulation, while perhaps theoretically permissible, would create such a poor bargain that 
one might expect the corporation to vanish. 
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4.(c)(ii) Eternal Existence 
 
 Unlike a classic partnership, a corporation is a hardy thing, able to survive the withdrawal or death 
of the founders, and theoretically continuing indefinitely.  This feature has been identified as a possible 
"concession" by the state that distinguishes corporations.
162
  However, a partnership can be structured to 
avoid that problem by agreement.
163
  Of the features of the corporation, this is the least compelling as an 
argument for the "concession" theory. 
 
4.(c)(iii) Tradable Shares 
 
 A share in a corporation carries with it a number of rights, which usually include a claim to a 
proportionate share of the company's residual value, uncertain periodic payments at the discretion of the 
directors, the ability to vote for directors, and a number of statutory and common law rights and remedies 
that vary somewhat by jurisdiction, e.g. the oppression remedy.  It is likely that it would be possible to 
create a similar arrangement from scratch using contract law, although of course that would require the 
latter group of additional rights to be specifically enumerated in the contract.  Some care would need to be 
taken to ensure certainty of consideration; stripped down to just dividend rights at the directors' discretion, 
a problem might arise.  The claim to residual value might also result in problems of uncertainty of 
consideration, were directors free to divert it for themselves prior to the shareholders' claim being 
exercised; the contract would therefore need to include something akin to the duty of loyalty. 
 That such a claim should be saleable is also compatible with contract law.  However, the existence 
of a regulated market for such shares is not a "natural" phenomenon.  If one presumes that securities 
regulation is desirable, then it must either be provided privately or by the state; in practice, both occur, but 
arguably either might suffice.  It may prove difficult, though, to entirely divorce regulation of the sale of 
securities from any regulation of the corresponding corporations themselves. 
 Further, paralleling a point made earlier about entity size, it does not necessarily follow that 
because a single contract would be unregulated, therefore a large group of similar contracts should not be.  
Just as large enterprises might invite greater regulation by virtue of their potential to affect significant 
numbers of people, so too might securities markets composed of the sale of vast numbers of similar 
individual "contracts" be regulated where a single such contract would not be. 
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4.(c)(iv) Limited Liability 
 
 The primary attribute of the corporation which resists replication by contract is limited liability.
164
  
The potential liability of a corporate shareholder
165
 for the corporation's debts (contractual, tort damages, 
statutory fines, et cetera) is limited to the amount they paid for the shares they bought.
166
  That is to say, 
their shares may become worthless, but they have no potential for losses beyond that.  Additionally, 
corporate directors and managers are largely shielded from liability as well; they are not liable for the 
corporation's contract debts, they are not personally liable for many of the statutory sanctions it might face, 
and their liability for torts committed by the company is a subject of some uncertainty.
167
 
 Normally, the principals who control agents are responsible for meeting the obligations the agents 
incur in contracting on their behalf, and furthermore the principals have vicarious liability for torts (and 
similar harms
168
) perpetrated by their agents.  If the corporation is a shareholder-centric "nexus of 
contracts", then the directors, managers, and employees of the corporation are, in fact, all the agents of the 
shareholders; the shareholders should then have open liability for contract debts and other liabilities arising 
from the corporation's activities.
169
 
 The entrepreneur-centric "nexus of contracts" would instead place this open liability upon the 
directors, as the highest authority in the corporate structure.  However, determining vicarious liability in a 
strictly contractual setting is a fact-specific process, and the shareholders' voting rights might place them as 
the ultimate principals.  A unanimous shareholder agreement that transferred power from directors to 
shareholders would eliminate any ambiguity; the shareholders would definitely be the principals. 
 It would be possible to replicate limits on contractual liability by contracting for them.
170
  The lack 
of widespread guarantees of corporate debts might be taken as evidence that limiting liability to the 
corporate assets is "efficient" or at least acceptable to all creditors.
171
  This argument is not entirely 
convincing, as it ignores the real-world constraints and transaction costs that may make obtaining such 
guarantees difficult or impossible.  A minor trade creditor would have difficulty obtaining the guarantee of 
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its customer's entire board of directors, let alone of all its shareholders.  Contracting to obtain guarantees 
becomes yet more complex given that corporate participants may change over time.  It does not follow that 
creditors would normally be willing to limit their potential source of recompense to an arbitrary subset of 
the debtors' assets, rather than all available assets. 
 Limits on tort liability are almost impossible to replicate by contract.  If the likely tort victims 
could be identified beforehand, they might be induced to enter into contracts waiving or limiting liability, 
but it must be assumed that the ability to identify potential tort victims is always incomplete at best, and 
that conversely the number of individuals identified as likely victims but who are ultimately never harmed 
would be very high.  The potential tort victims would almost certainly demand something in exchange,
172
 if 
they were willing to limit liability at all.  And unlike voluntary creditors, who currently willingly contract 
with corporations whose shareholders are known to have limited liability by law and therefore might be 
presumed to be amenable to replicating that situation by contract, there is no reason whatsoever to assume 
that tort victims would ever accept such an arrangement. 
 The limits on liability supplied by the law, conversely, apply automatically to all involuntary 
creditors, and they have no direct cost
173
 to the corporation to obtain.  Similarly, voluntary creditors find the 
onus upon themselves to obtain guarantees, which might be costly, impractical, or impossible to obtain. 
 In short, limited liability cannot be replicated contractually. 
 This is a non-trivial conclusion.  Limited liability is one of the fundamental elements of the 
corporation, not a mere procedural convenience, and the advantages that it grants are difficult to overstate.  
If the success of the corporation as an economic vehicle is that it allows for dispersed passive investment, 
then that success is dependent upon limited liability.  It allows for investors to remain passive participants 
in the corporation, secure in the knowledge that their other assets are not potentially vulnerable should the 
corporation incur liabilities. 
 Daniel Fischel, one of the primary advocates of the "nexus of contracts" approach, has admitted: 
 
Other typical provisions of corporate law... such as limited liability in tort cases, could 
not be negotiated by private contract.  To this extent, corporations have attributes that 
would not exist absent state statutes.  But this does not make corporations creatures of the 
state.  Limited liability in tort cases is more accurately viewed as a subsidy to encourage 
a certain type of private conduct, forming corporations (particularly close corporations in 
which corporate governance is not an issue), than as a creation of the conduct itself.
174
 
 
 If limited liability is a subsidy to encourage the formation of corporations, that opens up the 
question of why governments would do that.  Despite Fischel's protest to the contrary, he invites the state 
                                                                                                                                                                             
obtain them. 
172
 Contract law would actually require that they received consideration. 
173
 Complex analysis of indirect dispersed social costs goes beyond the scope of this argument. 
174
 Fischel, supra note 53, p. 1274. 
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into the corporation and suggests a basis for arguing that corporations are not simply the result of contracts 
among self-interested individuals; they are concessions of the state designed to promote some policy goal.  
So long as corporations allow their participants to enjoy limited liability, they cannot claim to be solely the 
creation of contract and may have to accept regulation as a trade-off. 
 
5. Shareholder Protection 
 
 Much of the literature surrounding "nexus of contracts" theory concerns the question of whether or 
not that approach to corporations adequately protects shareholders from being taken advantage of by 
directors.  Strictly speaking, this concern is separate from whether the corporation can be viewed as a 
contract; it might be addressed by the position that the corporation is a contract between parties of unequal 
power and therefore must be regulated, much as consumers are protected by specific regulation.
175
  
Nonetheless, as the "nexus of contracts" theorists generally, though not universally, tie their conception of 
the corporation as a contract to a largely normative view that it should be a free contract, the two issues 
have become linked. 
 The obvious question is why shareholders would want to alter the corporate contract to allow 
directors greater latitude to take advantage of them.  As one commentator put it, "What sane shareholder 
would agree to license theft?"
176
  They might be induced to allow arrangements that are simply unwise,
177
 
but several explanations have been proposed for how such changes might be in shareholders' best interests.  
First, qualified individuals might balk at becoming directors due to concerns about an overly high standard 
of behaviour and resultant possible liability.
178
  Second, it would discourage other shareholders from 
launching frivolous suits against the directors, defence against which would waste corporate resources.
179
  
Third, a certain amount of allowed self-interest might be part of directors' agreed-to compensation 
package.
180
 
 It has also been suggested that, if directors have greater room to take advantage of shareholders, 
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this will be reflected in a lower share price.
181
  Shareholders who purchase at that lower cost are therefore 
inferred to have agreed to the factor that depressed the price, i.e. the possibility and/or reality of director 
disloyalty.
182
  The difficulty with this argument is that it substitutes price for consent; some portion of 
shareholders might not agree to the deal at all if they understood exactly what they were getting;
183
 this 
problem was discussed above. 
 Where advocates of freeing directors from their traditional duties have allowed for the possibility 
that this will occur without the unanimous approval of shareholders, they have argued that the "Wall Street 
rule" applies: shareholders unhappy with developments can sell their shares.
184
  One consequence of this- 
lower share prices- and the alleged incentives for directors to avoid this result, are discussed below.  
Despite that, presumably at least some of the time, director self-interest will still either occur or become 
likely.  One problem with the "exit" solution is that shareholders who sell presumably do so at a depressed 
price.
185
  Selling is therefore a way of cutting their losses, but it does not return them to the position they 
would have been in prior to the problem arising.  Alternatively, they may still consider the investment 
financially wise, but not as good, in which case the exit solution is not desired.
186
 
 The quintessential example
187
 of a corporate contract rewritten in favour of directors is their being 
excused from the traditional duties of care and loyalty.  Much of the debate has conflated the two duties, 
and has discarded the possibility that extra-contractual moral values or social norms may underlie them, in 
particular the duty of loyalty.
188
  Instead, the two duties have been interpreted as terms of the corporate 
contract designed to maximize value.
189
  Contractarians, having taken the position that, notwithstanding 
their current statutory status, the duties of care and loyalty were conceptually contractual in character- as is 
all of corporate law in their model- then proceeded to argue that if the two duties were excluded from the 
contract, there would still be mechanisms to replicate their affects.  Primary among these mechanisms are 
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the market for securities and the market for managers.
190
  Presumably, those who allege this genuinely 
believe it to be true, but it is unclear why they consider it supportive of or supported by a "nexus of 
contracts" theory.  It would appear unnecessary in that regard; any contract may leave one or more parties 
disadvantaged and vulnerable if they did not insist upon adequate terms to protect their interests.  The 
likely reason for this line of argument being advanced is a fear of paternalistic regulation designed to 
protect shareholders from "bad corporate contracts", rather than because it is necessary to prove that 
corporations are contractual at all. 
 The market for securities argument rests upon a belief that the capital market is efficient.  This 
means that the market, through the sum of trades of shares by both informed and rationally apathetic 
parties, will price shares accurately (or more accurately than any other method) and that, by corollary, any 
change in the value of the company will be reflected in a corresponding change in the value of the shares.
191
  
The logic then proceeds that directors will neither cause changes in the corporate "contract" (e.g. 
amendments to the articles) nor take any other actions that are value decreasing, even when such changes 
would favour themselves, because directors do not want the value of the shares to decrease.  They would 
wish to avoid this for four reasons: firstly, they may be shareholders themselves;
192
 secondly, they may 
eventually want to raise more capital through additional share offerings;
193
 thirdly, they wish to prevent a 
takeover that would occur if the shares were undervalued;
194
 and finally, changes in share prices affect their 
worth in the market for managers.
195
 
 There are some problems with this logic.  Most obviously, the hypothesis of efficient capital 
markets is vulnerable to challenge.  The contractarians, who believe that government officials cannot be 
trusted to accurately evaluate the wisdom of alternative corporate arrangements,
196
 have a curious faith in 
the market's ability to do so.  In order for this to be true, some subset of market participants must (a) be 
monitoring the firm for changes, (b) identify a value decreasing change, (c) price that change with a high 
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degree of accuracy, and (d) influence the market as a whole that their appraisals are correct.
197
  Even if all 
of this occurs, the impact of the directors' behaviour is felt in the context of every other factor affecting 
price, which may constitute "noise" that will obscure the effects of the self-interest.
198
  In a condition where 
the product market is proving kind to the corporation, share prices may be going up as the directors' self-
interested behaviour is occurring, even assuming the increase is accurately being lessened. 
 This is not to disparage the market's substantial ability to price shares; it can obviously do so a 
significant amount of the time with a significant amount of accuracy.   But it is trivial, and perhaps trite, to 
list the evidence from this past decade of companies which were incorrectly valued by the market for a 
substantial amount of time.  As Melvin Eisenberg has observed, there is a difference between a system that 
will discipline a self-interested director on average and one that holds all directors separately 
accountable.
199
 
 Assuming, however, that share prices do vary accurately in response to directors' self-interested 
behaviour, there is reason to question whether this serves to discipline them.  Let us reconsider the four 
factors enumerated above. 
 First, the directors might be shareholders and so share in the loss they cause.  But their share of the 
gain will usually be total (or divided up among a small group, e.g. the directors as a whole
200
) while their 
share of the loss will be proportional to their shareholding and thus presumably much smaller.
201
  Except in 
the rare case where the gain is much smaller than the loss (e.g. a multi-million dollar deal lost because the 
director took an afternoon off to play golf) the "rational" director would disregard the corporation's 
interests. 
 Second, the corporation might later need to raise additional capital by a new share offering.  Other 
than vague references to the directors' desire to empire-build,
202
 it is unclear why this would motivate 
them.
203
  An inability to make a new share offering would hurt the corporation, not the directors.  Unless 
the situation was so dire that the lack of new capital threatened bankruptcy, it is uncertain why the directors 
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would care if it were impossible.
204
  More likely, the corporation would remain solvent but obtain less 
capital, with no particularly strong drawbacks for the directors.  It has been suggested that, alternatively, 
the new share offering might be larger, obtaining the same amount of capital while diluting the interests of 
the older shareholders relative to a smaller offering.
205
  This is indeed possible, assuming the market for the 
shares exists, and again has no strong downside for the directors. 
 Third, there is the market for corporate control.
206
  A company whose value would be higher but 
for poor management is vulnerable to having its control purchased at the depressed price by a buyer who 
intends to replace the management and thereby attain the corporation's theoretical true worth.  Because 
directors wish to keep their jobs, they are motivated to avoid this.  Even setting aside the various 
impediments that directors may place in the way of a take-over, the so-called market for corporate control 
cannot function perfectly.  The costs of a takeover attempt,
207
 plus the uncertainty that there really is gain to 
be had with new management, create a window where a company may be performing sub-optimally but the 
divide is not large enough for a takeover to be judged worthwhile.  Within that window, directors may 
pursue self-interest without fear.
208
 
 Finally, there is the effect that share prices may have on managers' subsequent career options.  If 
the share price goes up, the managers may be presumed to be competent and be in high demand at other 
corporations.  Conversely, if the share prices tank, the managers may find they have few options.
209
  Again, 
there is the problem of "noise"; share prices may go up or down according to a wide variety of factors.  
Increases in the share price due to market success may hide self-interest; decreases in the share price may 
be blamed on market conditions.
210
 
 This leads to a wider discussion of the market for managers as a control on director self-interest.  
Free contract advocates argue that managers will behave in a manner designed to encourage the company's 
success, in order to position themselves to obtain further and better employment as managers.
211
  Even 
aside from the indirect evidence of the managers' worthiness that a company's success or failure provides, 
their directly observable behaviour may affect their prospects for subsequent employment.  For example, a 
manager known to engage in nepotism might find it difficult to obtain further employment opportunities, 
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even if the company was generally highly successful. 
 Whether or not managers do actually seek subsequent employment is crucial to determining 
whether the market for managers works at all, let alone efficiently.  It must be assumed that some subset of 
managers do not intend to seek subsequent employment, even if others do.  As the position of corporate 
director does not lead inevitably to sudden premature death,
212
 it follows that some notable portion are near 
to retirement.
213
  Advocates of the market for managers as a primary means of controlling self-interested 
behaviour do not seem to have fully considered this, that directors do not play the game indefinitely.  
Assuming that there are no legal (or social/moral
214
) constraints upon directors to prevent self-interest, only 
market forces, then these directors have no reason not to behave disloyally.  On the contrary, if they were 
truly self-interested rational individuals in the economic mould, doing so is practically mandated.  One can 
go a step further and, in the mode of the law and economics scholar, define the exact conditions under 
which this is the case.
215
  For any directors who intend their careers to be finite, there will always come a 
point where this equation favours disloyalty, although as noted, it may be in the twilight of their careers. 
 A consequence of the above is that shareholders would have a motive to favour young directors 
over ones closer to retirement, and to terminate the latter suddenly in favour of the former.  This could set 
off a chain reaction, as a lack of market for near-retirement directors would lead to a revised retirement 
horizon for slightly less old ones, creating a vicious circle.  Some form of strong prohibition on disloyalty 
might actually be necessary to keep the market for managers from so collapsing. 
 The possibility that directors may not seek subsequent employment is not the only flaw in the 
position that the market for managers should discipline director behaviour.  Consider that new directors are 
generally selected by existing ones, and shareholders only provide their approval in elections where rational 
apathy and free-rider problems exist.  Some level of self-interest may be overlooked by the hiring directors 
                                                                                                                                                                             
211
 Critiqued by Utset, supra note 62, pp. 555-556. 
212
 This observation is anecdotal. 
213
 Bebchuk, supra note 97, p. 1843 noted that many directors plan to stay with their current company 
until retirement, limiting the effects of the market for corporate control; Eisenberg, supra note 86, p. 1495 
noted that while lower management may seek later careers, chief executive officers are usually in their final 
position; Utset, supra note 62, p. 586 noted that managers close to retirement have different time 
preferences. 
214
 Eisenberg, supra note 31, p. 835; Coffee, supra note 69, p. 945. 
215
 Assuming that there is a 100% chance that self-interested behaviour will be discovered and result 
in total exclusion from the field (and that no other form of employment is possible) but that there are no 
other negative consequences, then a director should behave disloyally when the value of doing so exceeds 
the value of the highest future opportunity to behave disloyally added to the compensation for acting 
loyally in the interim less the leisure value of the interim time; the highest future opportunity may be 
discounted for the uncertainty of it actually arising as foreseen, as might the interim compensation and 
leisure cost due to the possibility of unexpected termination, but the present opportunity is certain. If the 
(estimated) chance of detection is less than 100%, then the value of the current disloyalty would include the 
value of not being detected (equivalent to the value of not being disloyal, as described above) discounted 
by the probability of that occurring.  If the severity of punishment is lessened, the incentive to behave 
  
 
 
43 
 
as part of a reciprocal understanding in the field.
216
 
 Finally, it bears noting that the correlation between manager salary and corporate performance 
(including, one presumes, whatever negative adjustment to corporate performance is due to self-interested 
behaviour), has been empirically shown to be extant but tiny.
217
  This casts into doubt the efficiency of the 
salary aspect of the market for managers, and therefore of its ability to affect their behaviour. 
 
6. Summary 
 
 The "nexus of contracts" theory of the corporation contains useful elements.  Many of the 
relationships within the corporation can be meaningfully compared to contracts; criticisms of the theory 
that rest upon differences such as a lack of bargaining or informed consent assume a too-narrow view of 
what a contract is.  Taken to its natural conclusion, however, the "nexus of contracts" approach renders the 
boundaries of the firm unclear.  This presents problems for certain types of legal analysis, in particular 
determinations of liability.  A possible solution to such problems is to take seriously the suggestion that 
there is no corporate entity, only individual contracting humans, and accordingly determine that those 
humans are the true principals involved.  Depending on the premises preferred, those humans would be 
either the shareholders (who notionally hire directors and managers as their agents) or the controlling 
entrepreneurs (who presumably are also the directors and managers). 
 Finding controlling entrepreneurs, let alone shareholders, liable for "corporate" acts might be seen 
as an undesirable consequence.
218
  Therefore, limited liability must be integrated into the model.
219
  
Attempts to suggest that it could be replicated contractually are unconvincing; it must be granted by the 
state.  The discredited concession model thus returns to relevance.  The concession model is also bolstered 
by the insight that there is no delineation between contract law as a "natural" phenomenon and corporate 
law as an "unnatural" one.  Even simple "interpretation" of a contract involves judicial determinations that 
substitute an outsider's views of what the parties should have done for their own consensual choices; the 
addition of other contract law principles only increases the divide.  At that point, it is unclear what is 
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problematic about adding specifically corporate law principles.
220
 
 Additionally, while not strictly relevant to the question of whether a corporation is a set of 
contracts, arguments as to whether directors' duties of care and loyalty should be default rather than 
mandatory rules have become intimately connected with the "nexus of contracts" debate.  Mechanisms such 
as the markets for managers and securities may help curb self-interested behaviour, but it is easy to 
overstate their utility; in practice, they operate imperfectly at best.  While mandatory rules would not 
operate perfectly either- if nothing else, detection problems always exist- there is certainly room to argue 
that they might usefully supplement market mechanisms as a means of controlling director self-interest.  
They may also function to maintain social norms.  In short, even if the corporation is a "contract" in some 
sense, it might be desirable to have it be a specially regulated type of contract, much as consumer 
transactions often are.
221
  This argument is given additional support when the interests of outside parties are 
factored in. 
 Clearly, then, the corporation is not and should not be a "nexus of contracts" if such is taken to 
refer to completely free agreements between self-interested parties whose own consensual choices are 
solely determinative of the agreement's content and who are ideally free from any state involvement 
whatsoever.  A legal framework inevitably surrounds these agreements, enforcing and supplementing their 
content.  A special privilege (limited liability) is granted by the state to some participants in this 
arrangement.  Finally, and debatably, paternalistic involvement in the form of mandatory features to protect 
the parties is not only a conceded fact but may be a justifiable supplement to imperfect market mechanisms.  
 Granting all of these indicia of state involvement, then the corporation remains a "nexus of 
contracts" in the sense that its participants enter it voluntarily, exchanging their contribution for an 
expected benefit.  It would be as inappropriate to ignore this motivation, or to fail to grant significant 
respect to the parties' actual ability to set their own preferences as to how to achieve their goals, as it would 
be to disregard the role that the state and its institutions play.  To do so would result in the demise of the 
corporation as a useful economic vehicle. 
 
7. "Nexus of Contracts" Theory and Unanimous Shareholder Agreements 
 
 The "nexus of contracts" theory, for all its flaws, may help to shed light on the origins of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement.  The Dickerson report, from which this tool sprung, took it as axiomatic 
that shareholders should be free to alter the directors' powers unless some reason to forbid doing so could 
be advanced, and it found none.
222
  The Alberta Report,
223
 which successfully recommended that that 
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province adopt the unanimous shareholder agreement, was even clearer in framing corporate law as a set of 
statutory default rules that shareholders should be able to freely renegotiate: 
 
The CBCA does, and we think the proposed ABCA should, lay down many rules about the 
conduct of the affairs of a business corporation and about the relationship among the 
shareholders, directors and officers.  However, the shareholders of a corporation may 
want a different rule or an additional rule, and if they all agree, and if the change would 
not prejudice outsiders, we see no reason why they should not have it; the shareholders 
are able to decide what rules will best protect their interests and promote business 
efficiency, and there is no apparent inequality in bargaining position which might require 
the law to protect shareholders who have addressed their minds to the subject and come 
to an agreement.
224
 
 
 The Industry Canada report was more cautious, noting that there was both a "contractarian" and a 
"statutory division of powers" model of the corporation, and that each had benefits and drawbacks.
225
  But 
it determined that "philosophically, permitting shareholders to contract out of the corporate governance 
rules is more consistent with the 'contractarian' type of corporate law than with the 'statutory division of 
powers' type of corporate law".
226
  Even when the respective merits of both schools of thought were 
acknowledged, it was assumed that the unanimous shareholder agreement was aligned with the contractual 
understanding of the corporation. 
 There is an obvious compatibility between the "nexus of contracts" theory and unanimous 
shareholder agreements.  These instruments fit well into this analytic model, indeed better than many of the 
other elements that are by default part of it; they are closer to classic contracts than the more abstract 
"contracts" usually discussed in the "nexus of contract" theory, more likely to be the product of real 
bargaining and informed consent.  But "nexus of contracts" theory and the unanimous shareholder 
agreement are not synonymous.  The former is a model for understanding the corporation not as an entity 
but as a group of (mostly hypothetical) "contracts", and the latter is a single
227
 actual document that affects 
the internal arrangement of the corporation.  The inclusion of these agreements in Canadian law, 
notwithstanding the original justification, neither requires nor necessarily provides support for the "nexus 
of contracts" theory; it is also possible to incorporate these documents into a model of the corporation as a 
statutory entity.
228
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 This chapter has examined and ultimately rejected the idea that the corporation could be entirely 
reduced to a "nexus of contracts"; limited liability proved an insurmountable barrier to the task, and some 
element of concession theory was necessary to entirely explain the defining features of the corporation.  
But while this allows one to reject the more extreme claims some "nexus of contracts" proponents have put 
forth, it does not mean that there is no merit whatsoever to this viewpoint. 
 Many of the issues discussed in the following chapters can, in part, be explained in terms of the 
tension between the view that a unanimous shareholder agreement is simply one more means of 
customizing a largely pre-determined entity in specific and perhaps superficial ways versus the view that 
the unanimous shareholder agreement allows (or should allow) shareholders to radically and fundamentally 
alter the corporation away from its default form. 
 One of the criteria for the formation of a unanimous shareholder agreement is that it restricts the 
directors.  If these instruments are conceived of as a specific statutory tool, this requirement needs no 
justification; they must restrict directors because that is their point.  It is, if anything, more curious that the 
documents can also include clauses which serve other purposes.  Conversely, proceeding from the premise 
that a corporation is at heart a voluntary arrangement amongst shareholders designed to further their 
interests, then the unanimous shareholder agreement could be a convenient tool to better achieve that, and 
there would be no reason to limit it to placing restrictions upon the directors, nor to require a term of that 
sort as a precondition for the document's statutory validity.  Even within the context of restricting directors, 
there are disagreement about what limitations are permissible; again, assumptions similar to those 
underlying the "nexus of contracts" theory would indicate that any restriction the shareholders can agree 
upon should be allowed, while perspectives more entrenched in the traditional corporate structure might 
seek to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable deviations from the board's default authority.  
These controversies are explored in Chapter Three. 
 The enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements, a topic covered in Chapter Four, is also 
informed by the debate as to whether the corporation is truly a "nexus of contracts", albeit in a more 
complex fashion.  One approach to enforcement holds that the instrument has truly reshaped the 
corporation, a position that a "nexus of contracts" understanding would also suggest, in order to remove 
some or all of the directors' powers.  The other three models are more compatible with an understanding of 
the corporation as a statutorily determined entity; either the agreement is one element to be considered 
                                                                                                                                                                             
by the legislation, adding that before the creation of the unanimous shareholder agreement, the separation 
of powers between shareholders and directors was an integral part of that fiction, but now the lawmakers 
have allowed investors greater freedom to modify the nature of that fiction themselves, almost to the point 
of treating it as an unincorporated partnership.  Martel thus sums up one of the paradoxes here: the 
unanimous shareholder agreement allows for greater freedom to alter the corporate structure, but only 
within the context of a legislative framework authorizing it and still subject to limits.  James Smith, La 
Partie 1A de la Loi sur Les Compagnies, Volume 3: Les commentaires (Montreal: Centre d'Edition 
Juridique, 1981), at p. 305 and fn 17 made a similar point. 
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when performing evaluations pursuant to standard corporate principles such as the directors' duties and the 
oppression remedy, or it exists outside the entity entirely as a contract.  But the connection between the 
"nexus of contracts" theory and the various enforcement models is not a strictly one-to-one association.  
Bearing in mind the discussion earlier that a "nexus of contracts" should still be subject to contract law, 
applying that same body of legal principles to enforcing a unanimous shareholder agreement implies 
similar assumptions.
229
  The other three methods of enforcement suggest instead that unanimous 
shareholder agreements- and, by extension, all matters of corporate governance- are not simply 
arrangements amongst private parties to be adjudicated according to contract law, but instead subject to 
principles that are uniquely those of corporate law. 
 Other issues raised by the "nexus of contracts" theory have significance to unanimous shareholder 
agreements as well.  The earlier discussion about who the parties are to the corporate "contract" is relevant 
in light of the criterion that a unanimous shareholder agreement must be acceded to by all of the 
shareholders.  This seemingly simple requirement is explored in Chapter Three, and the dilemmas over the 
definition of unanimity raised by unusual situations can be understood as manifestations of this same 
question. 
 Finally, the examination of directors' duties, in particular their duties of care and loyalty, in 
Chapter Five derives much from the debate as to whether protecting shareholders justifies or requires 
government interference in a "nexus of contracts". 
 Even if one rejects it as a fully workable model of the corporation, the "nexus of contracts" theory 
remains an intriguing viewpoint that contains some insights, and debates that have played out within its 
context have wider relevance.  As the following chapters examine the unsettled areas of law surrounding 
unanimous shareholder agreements, a recurrent theme is the conflict between the view of the corporation as 
a largely pre-determined, statutorily-defined entity and the view of it as a fundamentally malleable 
arrangement.
                                                          
229
 But the limits on the "nexus of contracts" theory suggest similar limits on unanimous shareholder 
agreements; the state is always a party to a unanimous shareholder agreement.  As a result, even if these 
documents are considered as contracts and subject to contract law for their enforcement, other policy goals 
than contractual freedom (and the prevention of externalities) should be considered in setting the possible 
scope allowed to unanimous shareholder agreements. 
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Chapter 3: Basic Criteria and Formation 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The obvious starting point for understanding unanimous shareholder agreements is determining 
what constitutes a valid one.
230
  In order to know what these agreements are and how they function, to 
comprehend them as a specific facet of the law, one must first distinguish what is a (valid) unanimous 
shareholder agreement from what is not.  And if the central dilemma the unanimous shareholder agreement 
introduces into Canadian corporate law is the potential conflict between a relatively static statutorily-
determined organization and an expanded contractual freedom to reorganize that structure, then the scope 
of permissible restructuring and the formalities required to accomplish it are key questions. 
 While the legislation addresses these points, there is sufficient ambiguity to allow for 
interpretation, particularly if judges are inclined towards either maintaining the standard corporate form or 
allowing for greater freedom to deviate from it.  It is difficult to say that the existing case law has "settled" 
the technical issues the statute does not explicitly cover, with the exception of certain specific ones 
addressed in the judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada in Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. v. R.
231
  Other 
than that obviously compelling authority, the decisions are too scattered to truly form a body of accepted 
rules.  Nonetheless, they constitute precedents, albeit perhaps weak ones, and more importantly, taken 
together they can give general insight into the levels of judicial understanding and acceptance of unanimous 
shareholder agreements.  This ultimately yields two general observations. 
 Instead of analyzing these agreements in isolation through the development and use of abstract 
principles, the courts may consider them in light of the entire fact situation, the behaviour of the parties, 
equitable concerns, et cetera.  This is obviously not unique to unanimous shareholder agreements, but there 
could be a vicious circle between the lack of well-developed and consistently applied legal doctrine 
surrounding the formation of these instruments and the tendency of courts to deal with them in this manner.  
While such contextual elements complicate attempts to derive general principles from the case law, unique 
                                                          
230
 An "invalid" unanimous shareholder agreement is legally not a unanimous shareholder agreement 
(although it may have some other legal effect, e.g. as a binding contract).  The phrase "valid unanimous 
shareholder agreement" is therefore technically redundant.  Such terminology is in common usage, 
however, including in reasons for judgment, and it is often the clearest way to discuss the difference 
between a purported unanimous shareholder agreement that meets the statutory criteria and one that does 
not. 
231
 Duha SCC, supra note 24. 
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equitable factors may also help explain away anomalous decisions. 
 A general result more specific to this topic is the overall judicial tendency, in situations where it is 
ambiguous whether the criteria for creation were met, toward resisting the existence of a contested 
agreement, with the result of instead maintaining the default corporate structure.  This is by no means 
universal, but many of the judgments where an agreement was found to exist in spite of reasons to think 
otherwise can be explained on the aforementioned equitable grounds.  Although the logic employed in 
these analyses may be compatible with a contractual understanding of the corporation- the unanimity 
requirement, in particular, derives more from that model than from the rest of corporate law- the effect is to 
prioritize the statutorily defined default power structure over shareholder attempts to rearrange it by 
agreement, the familiar over the novel.  If the unanimous shareholder agreement represents a push in 
Canadian law toward a more contractual understanding of the corporation, then the cases dealing with the 
requirements for one's formation suggest that the reception this is receiving in the courts is, at best, mixed.  
 
2. When Is It A Unanimous Shareholder Agreement? 
 
 The first question that must be answered when dealing with a unanimous shareholder agreement is 
whether it is, in fact, a unanimous shareholder agreement.  There is a difference between a unanimous 
shareholder agreement in the statutory sense and an agreement among all of the shareholders.
232
  The 
effects of this distinction include that only the former may limit the power of directors, is binding upon 
subsequent shareholders who were not party to it originally, affects de jure and not merely de facto 
corporate control,
233
 and is either equal to or superior to the articles in its authority over the corporation.
234
  
An agreement of all the shareholders which is not a unanimous shareholder agreement possesses none of 
those features. 
 How then are the two distinguished?  The unanimous shareholder agreement is a creation of 
statute, and it is in the relevant legislation that one may find the criteria for such instruments.  The C.B.C.A. 
provides a representative example:  
 
146. (1) An otherwise lawful written agreement among all the shareholders of a 
corporation, or among all the shareholders and one or more persons who are not 
                                                          
232
 There is obviously also a difference between a unanimous shareholder agreement and an 
agreement of only some of the shareholders, but this is less easily confused.  One might further differentiate 
a unanimous shareholder agreement from an agreement between some (or all) of the shareholders and the 
corporation. 
233
 Duha SCC, supra note 24. 
234
 Piikani Investment Corp. v. Piikani First Nation, 2008 ABQB 775, 2008 CarswellAlta 2070, 173 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 1087, [2009] A.W.L.D. 2490, [2009] A.W.L.D. 2491, [2009] A.W.L.D. 2492, [2009] 
A.W.L.D. 2493, [2009] A.W.L.D. 2494, [2009] A.W.L.D. 2520, [2008] A.J. No. 1470 (Alta. Q.B. Dec 17, 
2008) (hereinafter "Piikani"); see discussion later in this chapter. 
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shareholders, that restricts, in whole or in part, the powers of the directors to manage, or 
supervise the management of, the business and affairs of the corporation is valid. 
 
(2) If a person who is the beneficial owner of all the issued shares of a corporation makes 
a written declaration that restricts in whole or in part the powers of the directors to 
manage, or supervise the management of, the business and affairs of the corporation, the 
declaration is deemed to be a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 
 A certain awkwardness of drafting is visible here, as section 146(1) only classifies a type of 
agreement as valid without stating that it is also a "unanimous shareholder agreement", but this is clarified 
in section 2(1).
235
 
 In cases where more than one shareholder exists,
236
 the unanimous shareholder agreement appears 
to have four criteria under the C.B.C.A. 
1.  It is otherwise lawful. 
2.  It is written. 
3.  All the shareholders of a corporation are party to it. 
4. It restricts, in whole or in part, the powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the 
management of, the corporation. 
Unless one reads in additional criteria not present in the wording of the statute, any instrument that 
meets these criteria would be considered a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Conversely, any 
arrangement that does not meet these criteria is not a unanimous shareholder agreement.
237
 
Manitoba,
238
 New Brunwick,
239
 Ontario,
240
 Quebec,
241
 and Saskatchewan
242
 all have statutory 
requirements very similar to the C.B.C.A., although Ontario and Quebec do not include the "otherwise 
lawful" criterion, and Quebec allows for the agreement "to restrict the powers of the board of directors to 
manage, or supervise the management of, the business and affairs of the corporation, or to withdraw all 
                                                          
235
 Where the definition of a unanimous shareholder agreement is "'unanimous shareholder 
agreement' means an agreement described in subsection 146(1) or a declaration of a shareholder described 
in subsection 146(2)". 
236
 And the agreement was not created by an order of the Court.  C.B.C.A.s. 241(3)(c). 
237
 At least, not unless the Court uses its powers to make it one.  C.B.C.A. s. 241(3)(c). 
238
 M.C.A., s. 140(2). 
239
 N.B.B.C.A., s. 99(2).  N.B.B.C.A, s. 99(6), however, also deems close corporation by-law pursuant 
to s. 78 of the Companies Act, RSNB 1973, c C-13, to be unanimous shareholder agreements.  By-laws 
under that section must be unanimously confirmed by the shareholders, but they also must be passed by the 
directors, and they deal with restrictions upon share transfers rather than upon the powers of the directors 
(s. 78(1)). 
240
 O.B.C.A., s. 108(2). 
241
 Q.B.C.A., s. 213.  Although this wording is not explicit that the restrictions may be "in whole or in 
part", there is no reason to interpret the section otherwise, and the case law appears consistent with that 
view. 
242
 S.B.C.A., s. 140(2). 
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such powers from the board".
243
 
This model is not strictly followed by all provincial and territorial equivalents.  Alberta's version 
does not include the "otherwise lawful" criteria and, in place of the requirement that the agreement restrict 
the directors, allows as follows: 
 
146(1)  A unanimous shareholder agreement may provide for any or all of the following: 
(a) the regulation of the rights and liabilities of the shareholders, as shareholders, among 
themselves or between themselves and any other party to the agreement; 
(b) the regulation of the election of directors; 
(c) the management of the business and affairs of the corporation, including the 
restriction or abrogation, in whole or in part, of the powers of the directors; 
(d) any other matter that may be contained in a unanimous shareholder agreement 
pursuant to any other provision of this Act. 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador's,
244
 the Northwest Territories',
245
 Nunavut's,
246
 and the Yukon's
247
 
statutes contain the same selection (with some slight variations in the wording).
248
  While these 
jurisdictions' departure from the federal standard are occasionally specifically referred to below, in the 
following discussion, the C.B.C.A. criteria are assumed as the default definition of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement unless otherwise noted. 
The remainder of this chapter reviews each of the four C.B.C.A. requirements in turn, as well as 
the additional criterion of "intent" that some judgments have suggested.  A few cases have considered 
whether, quite apart from the specific statutory requirements of the unanimous shareholder agreement, an 
agreement actually existed between the parties at all;
249
 while arguably these go toward the "otherwise 
                                                          
243
 Q.B.C.A., s. 213. 
244
 N.L.C.A., s. 245(1). 
245
 N.T.B.C.A., s. 148(1). 
246
 N.B.C.A., s. 148(1). 
247
 Y.B.C.A., s. 148(1). 
248
 Four of these statutes also allow documents to opt out of statutory unanimous shareholder 
agreement status.  A.B.C.A. s. 146(9), N.L.C.A. s. 245(10), N.T.B.C.A. s. 148(9), and N.B.C.A. s. 148(9) all 
provide; "A unanimous shareholder agreement may exclude the application to the agreement of all but not 
part of this section."  (The Y.B.C.A. does not contain an equivalent, nor do the C.B.C.A., M.C.A., 
N.B.B.C.A., O.B.C.A., Q.B.C.A., or S.B.C.A.)  It is presumably not coincidental that these four are among 
those that expand the list of topics sufficient to meet the statutory criteria to include subjects that might also 
be dealt with through a regular contract (e.g. the rights and liabilities of shareholders as amongst 
themselves), and this subsection insures that that remains possible.  It is unclear, however, what the effect 
of excluding the application of the section would be for a document containing terms that could only be 
found in a unanimous shareholder agreement: restrictions upon the directors.  Either the exclusion or the 
restrictions (or the entire agreement) would have to be ineffective. 
249
 In Brewer v. Bishop, 2009 NBQB 330, 351 N.B.R. (2d) 202, 2009 CarswellNB 573, 904 A.P.R. 
202, 183 A.C.W.S. (3d) 529 (N.B. Q.B. Dec 14, 2009), an issue was raised (but not decided) regarding 
whether a unanimous shareholder agreement was binding because it had allegedly been rescinded by 
parties who had already signed it before the remaining shareholder did (pars. 11-15).  The issue of the 
validity of the agreement was specifically not decided because this was a motion hearing and the issue was 
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lawful" criterion, they do not raise issues particular to the unanimous shareholder agreement and are not 
considered in depth. 
 
3. "Otherwise Lawful" 
 
 Welling, in his textbook on corporate law, suggested that the "otherwise lawful" criterion is 
redundant, merely an example of legislative caution.
250
  The case law would largely seem to bear that view 
out.  Judges apply pre-existing legal principles to determine the validity of unanimous shareholder 
agreements without reference to this criterion, apparently considering their relevance and applicability self-
evident.  Attempting to justify those decisions as implicitly based upon the "otherwise lawful" requirement 
is a strained argument at best.  Nonetheless, on the strict wording of the statute, it may have been necessary. 
The provision specifically affirms the validity of agreements that meet its stated qualifications; to omit 
reference to wider principles might inadvertently lead to the result that any agreement, no matter how 
legally problematic it might otherwise have been, was deemed valid by the statute so long as it was 
unanimous, written, and restricted the directors.
251
 
 The "otherwise lawful" criterion has received almost no judicial attention, presumably because of 
this perceived redundancy, and yet it potentially has some significance to the question of whether 
unanimous shareholder agreements represent a displacement of corporate law principles by contract law.  
"Otherwise lawful" is not a term defined in the legislation, and without some point of reference, such a 
phrase must be either meaningless or tautological.  The most obvious framework to draw upon is that 
which governs most other agreements, that is to say contract law.  Concepts such as unconscionability, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
best left for trial (par. 19) and because the motion itself could be determined on the bases that it was an 
attempt to re-litigate a motion that had already been decided and that the agreement could have been raised 
during the earlier hearing (par. 26).  In Iampen v. Royal Bank, 79 A.R. 305, 1987 CarswellAlta 318, 66 
C.B.R. (N.S.) 47 (Alta. Master Jun 01, 1987), the plaintiff's failure to produce any copies of an alleged 
unanimous shareholder agreement led Master Funduk to make an adverse inference as to either the 
existence of the agreement or, if it did exist, its terms (pars. 56-57, 59-60).  In Sheer v. Lee, 263 A.R. 305, 
2000 CarswellAlta 248, [2000] A.J. No. 299 (Alta. Q.B. Mar 13, 2000), a preliminary agreement to later 
form a unanimous shareholder agreement was found to be insufficient to create one, and an arbitration 
clause in the preliminary agreement was not sufficiently broad to allow an arbitrator to create the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, only to determine if one's terms were in accordance with the 
preliminary agreement (pars. 36-43). 
250
 Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (Toronto: Butterworths, 
1984) (hereinafter "Welling 1st ed."), at p. 452.  
251
 Martel, supra note 11, p. 9-10, provided a similar explanation, but with the wider concern that this 
declared validity of unanimous shareholder agreements could otherwise circumvent not just contract law, 
but any legal restriction, e.g. by making an illegal dividend into a "valid" one.  McCarthy, supra note 8, p. 
468, similarly stated that the purpose of the "otherwise lawful" element was to indicate that the only legal 
rule that the provision waived was the normal inability of shareholders to restrict directors, but that other 
laws still applied, e.g. those governing restraint of trade. 
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misrepresentation, and legal capacity would therefore be relevant to determining whether a unanimous 
shareholder agreement is "otherwise lawful" and thus valid, and while those might not be particularly 
contentious, other aspects of contract law could be more controversial.
252
 
 An agreement is generally unenforceable if lacking in consideration; it is arguable that this could 
be applied to unanimous shareholder agreements.
253
  That would allow parties to take the position that none 
of the restrictions placed upon the directors were for their benefit (nor were any other terms) and thus they 
had received no consideration.  Given that the C.B.C.A. allows for power to be transferred to some (rather 
than all) shareholders,
254
 a use of this tool that presents obvious consideration problems,
255
 there is a 
question raised as to whether the formation of a unanimous shareholder agreement should be subject to all 
the principles of contract law.
256
  Even without all the standard requirements, these documents could still be 
                                                          
252
 These concepts listed are taken from the common law.  In Quebec, civil law would be relevant. 
253
 In Renfrew Insurance Ltd. v. Cortese, 2014 ABQB 157, 2014 CarswellAlta 450, 238 A.C.W.S. 
(3d) 953, [2014] A.W.L.D. 2229, [2014] A.W.L.D. 2289, [2014] A.W.L.D. 2290 (Alta. Q.B. Mar 17, 
2014), the defendants argued that there had been no consideration for a non-compete clause in a unanimous 
shareholder agreement; Hawco J. found that the consideration was that they had been allowed to become 
shareholders, but also noted that it was in each shareholder's interests that the others agreed to this term 
(par. 19).  The Court of Appeal, in Renfrew Insurance Ltd. v. Cortese, 2014 ABCA 203, 2014 CarswellAlta 
958, 241 A.C.W.S. (3d) 442, [2014] A.W.L.D. 2938, [2014] A.W.L.D. 2960, [2014] A.W.L.D. 2961 (Alta. 
C.A. Jun 18, 2014), briefly indicated agreement with this conclusion (par. 12). 
254
 C.B.C.A. s. 146(6).  See also Q.B.C.A. s. 214, 
255
 "Pre-made decisions", a type of restriction discussed in Chapter Five, might also raise problems of 
consideration, depending upon the facts. 
256
 Another such question arises if a unanimous shareholder agreement, as a contract, would be 
subject to the laws of a foreign jurisdiction.  Must the agreement be "otherwise lawful" according to that 
foreign jurisdiction's contract law?  Is the result different under the statutes that do not specify that a 
unanimous shareholder agreement must be "otherwise lawful"?  Even within Canada, the same problem 
might arise inter-provincially.  Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles, Third 
Edition (London, Ontario: Scribblers Publishing, 2006) (hereinafter "Welling 3rd ed."), at p. 468 argued 
that "a unanimous shareholder agreement may or may not be a contract", with the answer dependent upon 
conflict of laws rules and the contract law of the applicable jurisdiction, but with the document remaining 
effective as a unanimous shareholder agreement regardless; he did not address the relevant passage of Duha 
SCC, supra note 24. 
 
If the Supreme Court's comment that a unanimous shareholder agreement "must take the form of a written 
contract" is interpreted literally, then the result would be that the agreement would have to constitute a 
contract under the laws of whatever jurisdiction conflict of laws rules dictated.  However, Iacobucci J. 
contrasted "tak[ing] the form of a written contract" with the apparently more stringent standard of 
"accord[ing] with the other, general requirements for a lawful and valid contract", implying that the former 
did not necessarily include the latter.  If the key point the Supreme Court was making was not that the 
agreement must be a contract per se, but rather that it must take the form of one (without implying validity) 
and that it must also "accord with the other, general requirements for a lawful and valid contract", then it is 
possible that those could be the requirements for a contract in its jurisdiction of incorporation.  (Query, 
however, what that would mean for a corporation under the C.B.C.A.) 
 
That perhaps strained reading of Duha aside, the Supreme Court of Canada has indicated that a unanimous 
shareholder agreement must be a contract.  I have already suggested that that obiter remark might require 
  
 
 
54 
 
deemed to be valid contracts, if that result is considered desirable for other purposes, such as 
enforcement.
257
 
 Although contract law is generally a suitable component in the determination of whether a 
unanimous shareholder agreement has been created, it might not be appropriate in all circumstances.  The 
Supreme Court of Canada has stated that a unanimous shareholder agreement must be a lawful and valid 
contract (at least under some of the statutes), but the remark was obiter and the Court was not being asked 
to consider the more problematic implications of that position.  The law may therefore not be fully settled 
as to whether the formation of a unanimous shareholder agreement always has to satisfy all the 
requirements for the creation of a contract.
258
  Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that, at least in 
jurisdictions that include the "otherwise lawful" criterion, it must.  In Duha, Iacobucci J. wrote: 
 
[T]he USA is a corporate law hybrid, part contractual and part constitutional in nature.  
The contractual element is immediately apparent from a reading of s. 140(2): to be valid, 
a USA must be an "otherwise lawful written agreement among all the shareholders of a 
corporation, or among all the shareholders and a person who is not a shareholder".  It 
seems to me that this indicates not only that the USA must take the form of a written 
contract, but also that it must accord with the other, general requirements for a lawful and 
valid contract.
259
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
some qualification regarding the need for consideration under the common law.  Given that even the 
requirements of Canadian contract law may be inappropriate for unanimous shareholder agreements, there 
seems to be even less reason to subject the creation of a statutorily-authorized tool for governing a 
Canadian corporation to the contract law of a foreign country (or even of a province or territory other than 
the one where it was incorporated, if not under the C.B.C.A.).  Whatever policy goals prompted the 
inclusion of the "otherwise lawful" criterion (or can be assumed even in its absence) would presumably be 
met by applying the contract law principles of the home jurisdiction, with one possible exception.  If a 
unanimous shareholder agreement contains clauses that have purely contractual effect between the parties, 
and if those clauses were crucial to the bargain struck, then it would create injustice to declare the corporate 
constitutional terms alone valid.  In such circumstances, if the document fails to meet the requirements for a 
contract in the applicable jurisdiction, then it should also not be recognized as a valid unanimous 
shareholder agreement. 
257
 See Chapter Four for a discussion of the contractual approach to enforcing unanimous shareholder 
agreements. 
258
 One factor that might be relevant to such determinations is the presence of purely contractual 
terms (i.e. any terms that granted rights and imposed obligations as between the parties, outside the specific 
scope of the unanimous shareholder agreement as a statutorily-authorized corporate governance tool).  If a 
document can be a valid unanimous shareholder agreement while not being a valid contract, that would 
render any purely contractual terms unenforceable.  This is the reverse of a question discussed elsewhere in 
this dissertation: whether a document that fails to meet the criteria for a unanimous shareholder agreement 
can still be a valid contract.  The same principle should govern both scenarios.  If, on the facts, the 
"contractual" and "corporate constitutional" clauses are inextricable and formed a single bargain, then the 
document must be either both or neither.  If, again on the facts, the invalid terms can be severed, that 
should be done, regardless of which those are.  See note 323. 
259
  Duha, supra note 24, par 66.  I classify the last sentence of this as obiter because, while the 
necessary criteria for the formation of a unanimous shareholder agreement were central to the judgment, 
there was no issue regarding whether the document in question constituted a valid contract, only whether it 
was required to restrict the directors and/or whether it did so; see par. 74, which used the term "otherwise 
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 It is debatable whether it is the words "otherwise lawful" in that particular statutory definition that 
led the Supreme Court to the conclusion that a unanimous shareholder agreement needs to meet the "other, 
general requirements for a lawful and valid contract".  The connection may seem evident, but it is also 
plausible that the same position would have been taken even if the legislative language had not included 
that particular phrase. 
 As a general rule, judges use contract law principles to determine the existence of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, but this is not generally done with reference to the "otherwise lawful" criterion in 
the statute.  Issues such as fraud, lack of certainty, et cetera appear in judgments and are simply taken as 
self-evidently applicable; several examples appear in the following sections of this chapter, particularly 
where such principles are invoked in cases that also dealt with the unanimity requirement. 
 One case that did make explicit the connection between the "otherwise lawful" criterion and 
contract law is the trial decision of Sumner v. PCL Constructors Inc.
260
  Manderscheid J. noted that, unlike 
the C.B.C.A., the A.B.C.A. does not include an explicit requirement that a unanimous shareholder 
agreement be lawful, and the judge suggested that this implied a "broader meaning".
261
  The result, in his 
view, was that unanimous shareholder agreements under the Alberta act did not have to meet the general 
requirements of contract law, as they would under the federal one; for example, they could lack 
consideration.
262
 
 The Court of Appeal
263
 disagreed: 
 
The Alberta Business Corporations Act, under which this dispute is to be decided, defines 
a unanimous shareholders agreement as "a written agreement".  This minor difference 
does not mean that Albertan unanimous shareholders agreements are fundamentally any 
different from Manitoban unanimous shareholders agreements.  This minor difference in 
the wording cannot mean that in Alberta an "unlawful" unanimous shareholders 
agreement is possible.  The observations in Duha Printers that a unanimous shareholders 
                                                                                                                                                                             
lawful" to refer to the former criterion, regarding which there was "really no room for debate" (par. 74) that 
it had been satisfied.  It was therefore not necessary for the Supreme Court to determine in this case 
whether being a valid contract is a precondition for being a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
260
 Sumner v. PCL Constructors Inc., 2010 ABQB 536, [2011] 2 W.W.R. 313, 2010 CarswellAlta 
1637, 2010 C.L.L.C. 210-046, 87 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, 192 A.C.W.S. (3d) 159, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4659, [2010] 
A.W.L.D. 4660, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4661, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4662, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4724, [2010] A.W.L.D. 
4726, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4729, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4730, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4731, [2010] A.J. No. 948, 76 
B.L.R. (4th) 65, 32 Alta. L.R. (5th) 239 (Alta. Q.B. Aug 23, 2010) (hereinafter "Sumner QB 1"). 
261
 Ibid, par. 197. 
262
 Ibid, par. 197. 
263
 Sumner v. PCL Constructors Inc., 2011 ABCA 326, [2012] 1 W.W.R. 649, 515 A.R. 231, 2011 
CarswellAlta 1934, 532 W.A.C. 231, 95 C.C.E.L. (3d) 255, 210 A.C.W.S. (3d) 117, [2012] A.W.L.D. 194, 
[2012] A.W.L.D. 196, [2012] A.W.L.D. 197, [2012] A.W.L.D. 198, [2012] A.W.L.D. 238, [2012] 
A.W.L.D. 239, [2012] A.W.L.D. 240, [2012] A.W.L.D. 241, [2012] A.W.L.D. 242, 93 B.L.R. (4th) 138, 51 
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agreement is a form of contract apply in Alberta.
264
 
 
 While this disagreement did not affect the outcome of the case in any direct way, as there was no 
apparent issue with the document's "otherwise lawful" nature, it might be seen as tied to the overall 
philosophies of the two judgments; the trial judge viewed unanimous shareholder agreements as distinct 
instruments, subject to their own rules, while the Court of Appeal explicitly found that they were simply a 
specialized form of contract and should be enforced as such.
265
  If the Court of Appeal's decision is correct, 
then the words "otherwise lawful" in various statutory provisions on unanimous shareholder agreements are 
indeed redundant, insofar as the same criterion would be imputed into a statute that lacked it.  As noted 
earlier, this could be counter to legislative wording that literally affirms the validity of any agreement that 
meets the listed requirements. 
 Both sets of reasons for judgment in Sumner (and possibly the Supreme Court in Duha) took as a 
given that the "otherwise lawful" criterion refers to contract law.  An alternative possibility, however, is 
corporate law.  From that perspective, one might suggest that it is oppression, unfair prejudice, and unfairly 
disregarding interests that would render an agreement less than "otherwise lawful" and invalid.  These 
concepts, too, appear in reasons for judgment involving unanimous shareholder agreements, although again 
without reference to the "otherwise lawful" criterion; the oppression remedy trumps the unanimous 
shareholder agreement, so it is not necessary to invalidate the agreement when it can be overturned or 
modified instead.  If the "otherwise lawful" criterion refers to corporate law principles, not contract law, 
then possibilities such as unanimous shareholder agreements unsupported by consideration would not be 
problematic. 
 
4. "Written" 
 
 The requirement that a unanimous shareholder agreement be in writing appears to have sparked no 
debate.
266
  Presumably, whatever benefits oral agreements might offer are not considered sufficient to 
overcome the lack of evidentiary certainty they pose, nor is the written requirement considered unduly 
onerous. 
 From a theoretical perspective, the requirement that a unanimous shareholder agreement be in 
writing is in itself not particularly illuminating and it is difficult to draw any inferences.  Presumably the 
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justification for the requirement is to provide certainty as to the terms,
267
 although it apparently does not 
preclude the use of extrinsic evidence for interpretation purposes in the case of ambiguity
268
 and at least 
one case has come to the conclusion that an amendment to the agreement does not need to be in writing to 
be effective,
269
 although another has come to the opposite conclusion.
270
  This might indicate that, assuming 
sufficient evidence exists as to the terms of the agreement, the writing requirement could be treated more 
flexibly.  Despite this, the couple of reported cases in which the lack of a physical document was made an 
issue determined that a unanimous shareholder agreement in writing is necessary for shareholders to 
legitimately take power from the directors.
271
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
valid. 
267
 Smith, supra note 228, p. 307 provided the explanation that only a written document could satisfy 
the statutory provisions mandating that it be included in the company's records and available for all 
shareholders.  Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 216 stated that the agreement is a special mechanism that must be 
in writing for the same reasons as the statute is, although what those might be was not elaborated upon and 
it is debatable which (if any) justifications for written legislation apply to unanimous shareholder 
agreements.  Ratti, supra note 16, p. 114, stated that this requirement exists because these documents have 
the capacity to affect individuals who were not party to their formation (and that is tied to the requirement 
that they be kept in the company's records and made available to certain classes of people).  Alain 
Robitaille, "Les Conventions d'Actionnaires" (1982) 42 R. du B. 147, at p. 171, similarly identified the 
capacity of the agreement to affect directors and future shareholders as underlying the writing requirement. 
268
 In Ziegler Estate v. Green Acres (Pine Lake) Ltd., 2009 ABQB 464, 479 A.R. 396, 2009 
CarswellAlta 1349, 181 A.C.W.S. (3d) 273, [2009] A.W.L.D. 3632, [2009] A.W.L.D. 3633 (Alta. Q.B. 
Aug 04, 2009), ambiguity was found to exist such that an unsigned earlier draft was admissible as extrinsic 
evidence, with no reference being made to the statutory requirements of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement.  Rumbolt v. Labrador Timber Products Inc., 1999 CarswellNfld 303, 1 B.L.R. (3d) 232 (Nfld. 
T.D. Sep 07, 1999), also did not make specific reference to the statutory requirements, and while the 
document therein was found to be clear enough that extrinsic evidence was not necessary, the possibility 
was allowed in principle and considered in the alternative. 
269
 In Perricelli v. R., [2002] G.S.T.C. 71, 2002 CarswellNat 1346, 2002 CarswellNat 5126, 2002 
G.T.C. 244 (T.C.C. (G.P.) Jun 05, 2002) (hereinafter "Perricelli"), although the unanimous shareholder 
agreement was never amended in writing (par. 15), the appellant argued that it had been verbally amended 
(par. 21), and Miller T.C.J. accepted that the failure to alter the agreement to reflect changing 
circumstances was simply a "lack of attention to the legal paperwork" (par. 44).  The judge wrote that this 
was the result of small businessmen failing to pay attention to legalities and was not intended to be 
deceptive (par. 44), which was apparently sufficient basis for implicitly finding that the agreement had 
indeed been amended.  The relative ease with which it was accepted that the agreement had been verbally 
amended may be explained by the fact that it was not any party to the document who was attempting to 
enforce it as written, but rather the government, for the purpose of obtaining tax revenue, although the 
determination of whether the agreement had been legally amended should have been the same regardless of 
who subsequently argued otherwise.  The case is discussed further in Chapter Five. 
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 Simonelli v. Ayron Developments Inc.,
272
 however, suggests one possible way that principle can be 
adhered to in theory while possibly subverted in practice.  The three shareholders of a corporation entered 
into an oral agreement.
273
  Only one of them was a director,
274
 but one term of this agreement was that all 
three shareholders would make decisions jointly.
275
  After disagreements had arisen, the parties had entered 
into a consent order under which a variety of corporate decisions required all of their consent,
276
 and this 
decision concerned whether that order should be continued or varied.  As part of the analysis, Park J. 
considered whether the oral agreement was sufficient grounds for the earlier order, and determined that: 
 
38 The Plaintiffs' allegation is that Simonelli, Chaluk and Ona entered into an 
agreement to share information and jointly make decisions regarding Ayron.  These three 
individuals are not shareholders of Ayron.  They are shareholders in their own individual 
corporations, which are themselves shareholders of Ayron.  They are thus beneficial 
shareholders of Ayron.  There is no allegation or evidence that a written USA exists 
between Ayron's corporate or beneficial shareholders. 
 
39 Thus, the power and duty to make decisions, including decisions about the 
expenditure of Ayron's funds and the contracts that it will enter into, rests with and has 
always rested with its sole director, Ona.  If Simonelli or his nominee corporation, Elbow 
Lake, disagree with Ona's management of Ayron, absent any wrongful acts by the 
Defendants (discussed below), Simonelli's remedy is to remove Ona as a director, by 
ordinary resolution at a special shareholders meeting under s. 107(g) of the ABCA.
277
 
 
 Despite the conclusion that the agreement itself was ineffective, there was a finding that sufficient 
evidence existed upon which to make a claim for oppression.
278
  While based on a number of different 
allegations, one factor that the judge considered was the minority shareholder's reasonable expectations that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
606 (T.C.C. [Employment Ins.] Mar 23, 2012) that guaranteed that the employees' work would not be 
directed or controlled was found, on the basis that it was oral and not written, to be a term of their contract 
of employment rather than a unanimous shareholder agreement restricting the director, a distinction which 
had tax consequences (par. 17). 
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not that it was legally ineffective but rather only that "[t]he Plaintiffs in the case at bar allege that the 
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supra note 272, par. 150).  The agreement proved extraneous to the analysis, since the plaintiff's case 
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he would not be excluded from corporate decision-making.
279
  Although no direct mention was made of the 
oral agreement as a basis for reasonable expectations, it may have been an implicit factor.
280
  If it was, that 
would subvert the importance of having an actual valid unanimous shareholder agreement.  As discussed in 
the next chapter, one common means of enforcing these documents is through the oppression remedy, by 
providing legal protection to the "reasonable expectations" they created that their terms would be followed.  
If equivalent expectations can be created without a written unanimous shareholder agreement to ground 
them, then the legal significance of the instrument is diminished. 
 Conversely, the lack of a written unanimous shareholder agreement might protect shareholders 
who manage to exert control over directors (despite lacking the legal power to do so).  In United Canadian 
Malt Ltd. v. Outboard Marine Corp. of Canada Ltd.
281
 various defendants brought a motion to strike out 
the statement of claim as against them for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.
282
  One of these was the 
parent company of the corporation that was the main defendant.
283
  Nordheimer J. found that: 
 
19 In one respect, I agree with the submissions of the defendants.  In paragraph 6 of 
the proposed amended statement of claim, the plaintiff pleads and relies on section 146(5) 
of the Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, C-44.  It asserts that the 
American parent is the sole shareholder of the Canadian subsidiary and therefore is in the 
same position as if it were a director of the Canadian subsidiary.  However, that assertion 
fails on the clear wording of the section which only applies where there is a unanimous 
shareholder agreement which, according to the express wording of the section, must be a 
written unanimous shareholder agreement.  There is no allegation in the proposed 
amended statement of claim of such an agreement existing here.  The section cannot 
therefore have any application to the facts as pleaded in this case. 
 
 The allegations that the statement of claim did contain included that the parent company 
"effectively controlled" the subsidiary,
284
 which was found to be sufficient to ground a claim against the 
parent company directly.
285
  Unless there were unmentioned other shareholders in the subsidiary, it was 
apparently the requirement for a written directive from the parent that was the missing element in alleging a 
unanimous shareholder agreement (although it is difficult to believe that the parent could have exerted the 
control described without ever resorting to written instructions).  Ironically, this suggest that if shareholders 
are confident of their ability to control directors through means other than legally removing their powers, 
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they would be well served to make sure they do not do so in writing. 
 While the writing requirement may not have much theoretical depth, these couple of cases where it 
proved a decisive element do provide an introduction to the relationship between a unanimous shareholder 
agreement and the corporate power structure.  On the one hand, without such an instrument, recognized by 
the legislature, there can be no legally binding restriction of the directors' powers nor is there an automatic 
accompanying transfer of their responsibilities.  However, as these cases also both demonstrate, even in the 
absence of such an arrangement, shareholders might still have legally enforceable "reasonable 
expectations" and also they may be potentially liable for their de facto exertion of corporate control, even if 
de jure they do not have the directors' powers and responsibilities.  The unanimous shareholder agreement 
can allow for alterations of the legal power arrangement within a corporation, but it never exists in a 
vacuum. 
 
5. "All the Shareholders" 
5.(a) Justification for the Unanimity Requirement 
 
 The quintessential trait of the unanimous shareholder agreement is that all of the shareholders 
must be a party to it.
286
  Transferees are deemed parties.
287
  Though the justification for this might at first 
appear self-evident, the unanimity requirement is actually anomalous in the context of Canadian corporate 
law procedures; it is not required for amending the articles, electing directors who manage the corporation, 
or passing shareholders' resolutions.  The closest analogue is dissent rights, which also acknowledge that 
there are decisions for which the minority cannot be expected to simply abide by the will of the majority, 
but even there, the outcomes are not actually stopped.  The unanimity requirement that characterizes these 
agreements is therefore not self-evident at all; it stands in opposition to the general principle in corporate 
law that the majority (or special majority) rules. 
 The real explanation for the unanimity requirement appears to be that the unanimous shareholder 
agreement is not derived from the same principles that underlie most of Canadian corporate law, where a 
corporation is a creature of statute governed by pseudo-democratic "majority rules" principles.  It comes 
instead from a model where the company is an arrangement created out of the presumed consent of all the 
investors; such an arrangement can be amended only with the agreement of all the parties to it, here 
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assumed to be all of the shareholders (and only the shareholders, out of all the corporate stakeholders).  
While this approach may have been overtly modelled on partnerships originally,
288
 and the partnership 
analogy continues to be made,
289
 it is effectively identical to the shareholder-centric variant of the "nexus of 
contracts" theory of the corporation discussed in Chapter Two. 
 There are other possible interpretations that might explain the unanimity requirement even in the 
context of a statutory model that normally favours majority rule.  One possibility is that it is necessary to 
"protect" shareholders generally, or minority shareholders specifically, with their informed consent to the 
agreement presumed to be adequate protection of their interests.  It is debatable whether shareholders might 
need greater protection from the consequences of restricting directors' powers than from, for example, the 
consequences of those powers being exercised by individuals whose election they opposed.  Quack argued 
that since the views of the majority of shareholders are not synonymous with the best interests of the 
company, allowing the majority to overrule the directors (who must look to those best interests) would 
frustrate the benefit to minority shareholders of seeing that the best interests of the company prevail.
290
  
While this argument is susceptible to the criticism that the totality of the shareholders' interests are also not 
synonymous with the best interests of the company, he did not argue otherwise, saying instead only that 
minority shareholders cannot object to an agreement to which they have consented.
291
  Martel went further 
and asserted that one reason for this criterion is that when there is unanimous agreement amongst all the 
shareholders, the distinction between them and the company vanishes;
292
 as discussed in Chapter Five, this 
is not an accurate depiction of Canadian law at present.  Quack also assumed that unanimous shareholder 
agreements are only used in closely-held companies where minority shareholders are especially vulnerable 
due to a lack of market for their shares and their potential involvement as employees, both of which he 
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believed render oppression likely, but which a unanimity requirement can help forestall;
293
 why minority 
shareholders would be any more likely to be oppressed through an agreement than the actions of majority-
controlled directors was not elaborated upon.  Nor does the unanimity requirement necessarily prevent 
majority shareholders from abusing the minority.  In some circumstances, minority shareholders would 
have little bargaining power with regard to such agreements;
294
 normally the unanimity requirement is 
treated as a way to protect minorities by requiring their consent, but in fact such consent may be largely 
illusory.  Further, the belief that every action taken through the mechanisms provided by a unanimous 
shareholder agreement must be acceded to by all of the shareholders is erroneous; the agreements must be 
unanimous at the time they are formed, but they can contain provisions that later become contentious.  For 
example, shareholders might unanimously agree to transfer borrowing powers from the directors to 
themselves, to be exercised by majority vote; when it came time to exercise that authority, disagreements 
might arise. 
 The second potential justification for requiring unanimous consent is that these agreements impose 
duties and potential liabilities upon shareholders to the extent that they empower them.  As an argument 
that creating a unanimous shareholder agreement is distinct from other corporate decisions, this has more 
weight.  Public policy objectives require that shareholders bear the directors' duties if they have assumed 
their powers,
295
 and it is unfair to impose both the power and the responsibility upon shareholders who 
wanted neither.  That said, allowing for dissent rights- either with regard to the agreement as a whole or to 
the actions taken by empowered investors pursuant to it- would seem an adequate solution to this problem, 
making the unanimity requirement again anomalous. 
   A third potential reason for the unanimity requirement is that it provides a de facto general size 
limit for corporations to which a unanimous shareholder agreement can apply, making a specific numeric 
limit unnecessary,
296
 although this presupposes that such a limit is desirable.  Scavone took the position that 
"the diminished exit opportunities, high degree of personal involvement, and consensus-style decision-
making typical of close corporations argue in favour of a legislative regime that allows shareholders to 
strike their own bargains".
297
  He also believed that there was less of an "agency cost" problem in close 
corporations, and thus less need for regulation designed to solve that type of problem,
298
 and asserted that 
investors in close corporations, unlike public ones, were well-informed and capable of contracting to 
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protect their interests.
299
  This assumption that close corporations do not have passive investors (or, 
perhaps, that passive investors would not become party to a unanimous shareholder agreement), while 
perhaps often correct, would nonetheless seem open to exceptions.  Small business owners may seek equity 
funding from friends, family, acquaintances, and employees who are not involved in the management of the 
company and may not be sophisticated investors. 
 Another possible basis for the unanimity requirement is that shareholders have the right to have 
the company in which they have invested managed by dedicated directors and must consent to waive their 
rights; Turgeon dismissed this argument, but Martel found it compelling.
300
  Despite re-framing the matter 
in the language of "rights", this simply assumes the conclusion.  If the law provided for the non-unanimous 
restriction of directors, then shareholders would no longer have the "right" to corporations managed by 
them.  Even if one is not a legal positivist, it stretches credibility to suggest that the division of powers in 
the corporation between shareholders and directors constitutes an inherent right. 
 These possible explanations for the unanimity requirement thus all fail to demonstrate a 
compelling reason why the unanimous shareholder agreement should depart from the general corporate law 
principle of majority rule.  While none of them are without merit, their status as ex post justifications are 
clear.  The actual explanation is that the unanimous shareholder agreement has its origins in a conflicting 
conception of the corporation, one based upon a partnership/contractual model of voluntary 
arrangements.
301
  Bearing that in mind, it is worth seriously considering whether the unanimity requirement 
should be maintained. 
 There have already been outright suggestions that it be abolished.  Robitaille argued that, since the 
majority of the investors can collectively elect the directors who would run the corporation, it follows that 
the same majority should have the power to create a unanimous shareholder agreement (or rather, an 
instrument with the same effect).
302
  Turgeon drew a different analogy, claiming that the "fundamental 
changes" which shareholders can approve by supermajority are "plus fondamentaux souvent qu'un simple 
transfert technique de la capacite decisionelle".
303
  Presumably, this rests upon the premise that since the 
majority of shareholders can select who will be the decision-makers regardless, the use of this tool rather 
than elections to do so is relatively insignificant. 
 Turgeon's attack was more sustained.
304
  While he acknowledged that the criterion might have 
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some role in preventing the majority of shareholders from exploiting the others, he countered that it was 
overprotection that allowed the minority to act to the detriment of the majority.
305
  He further argued that a 
unanimity rule that only governed the formation of the agreement and not the exercise of the rights under it 
could not protect minority shareholders from exploitation.
306
  He did not, however, suggest that removing 
the criterion would somehow accomplish that, so one might rejoin that a highly imperfect protection (the 
requirement of initial consent to the document's terms) was still better than none at all.  Turgeon's 
recommendation was that instead of the unanimity requirement, a two-thirds majority be required for a 
similar effect,
307
 with minorities protected by their statutory dissent rights,
308
 although he limited his 
proposal to closely-held companies, since in his view it would break the (unlisted) mechanisms that protect 
investors in public ones.
309
  Although obviously a profound change from how the unanimous shareholder 
agreement has existed in Canada, Turgeon referred to some American jurisdictions that had regimes similar 
to his suggestion, arguing that it was not "l'heresie juridique".
310
 
 Other attacks upon the unanimity requirement in the literature have been indirect, taking the form 
not of openly querying its purpose but instead remaining implicit in two other lines of discussion.  Firstly, 
comparisons of the benefits of the unanimous shareholder agreement as a means of corporate control with 
the articles and by-laws sometimes seem to at least ignore, if not reject, any need for a unanimity 
requirement.  Sohmer pointed out that the unanimity requirement can be circumvented if the articles of 
incorporation are amended instead.
311
  (At the time, the articles could contain any provision which a 
unanimous shareholder agreement might, a feature of the 1975 Act
312
 that was later removed.)  Sohmer 
noted that this can be seen as a criticism, since the unanimity requirement was intended to protect minority 
shareholders.
313
  Despite this, he presented the possibility of using the articles as generally beneficial to 
shareholders, insofar as it would allow them to avoid liability unless characterized as de facto directors.
314
  
On the other hand, McCarthy was highly critical of the provision in C.B.C.A. '74-'75 allowing for the 
articles to contain any term found in a unanimous shareholder agreement, pointing out that if that was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
err on the side of caution (Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 255). 
305
 Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 255. 
306
 Ibid, p. 256.  He further stated that, once shareholders are empowered, some of them can even 
actively collude against others, given the difficulty of proving such side agreements. 
307
 Ibid, p. 256.  As a side point, he suggested that this would eliminate the need for a separate 
document at all; it could then be included within the articles (p. 257). 
308
 i.e. the right to withdraw if they dissent (Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 257). 
309
 Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 257.  He did not elaborate on how or why his earlier arguments would 
be inapplicable in that context. 
310
 Ibid, p. 256.  My translation: "judicial heresy". 
311
 David H. Sohmer, "Controlling the Power to Manage in Closely-Held Corporations Under the 
Canada Business Corporations Act" (1976) 22 McGill L. J. 673, at p. 677. 
312
 C.B.C.A. '74-'75, section 6(2). 
313
 Sohmer, supra note 311, p. 677.  He did not justify this assertion as to the intent or effect of the 
requirement. 
  
 
 
65 
 
permissible, it raised the question of why the unanimity criterion existed.
315
  He also queried whether in the 
absence of unanimity, the directors' duty to act in the interests of the corporation could be curtailed,
316
 
under the assumption that only when the shareholders acted unanimously did the distinction between their 
interests and those of the company vanish.
317
  McCarthy asserted that shareholders who used this method 
would still face liabilities as de facto directors, so that would not be an advantage to this technique;
318
 
circumventing the unanimity requirement would be the only reason to employ it.  Hay and Smith also 
considered whether the articles or by-laws might be used instead of a unanimous shareholder agreement, 
noting that some specific restrictions can be placed upon directors through those methods, although they 
pointed out that since only unanimous shareholder agreements are specifically allowed to restrict directors, 
use of other methods might be subject to common law limitations.
319
  They did not consider that using other 
methods to restrict directors would circumvent the unanimity requirement, focussing only on whether it 
was possible to avoid liability through this method, and concluded that it was not.
320
  Despite their differing 
conclusions, neither Sohmer nor Hay and Smith appear especially concerned with any perceived need for 
shareholder unanimity in altering the corporate power structure.  Comparing the unanimous shareholder 
agreement to the articles and by-laws highlights the degree to which the former's unanimity requirement is 
unusual and may be unnecessary. 
 This contrast is taken a step further when one compares unanimous shareholder agreements to 
themselves.  This is the second indirect form whereby the literature has examined the unanimity 
requirement: amendments.  While it is taken largely as a given that all the shareholders must agree to create 
these agreements, the law regarding their amendment is more complex.  Depending upon jurisdiction, non-
unanimous amendments may be explicitly permitted, explicitly forbidden, or unaddressed by the legislative 
language.
321
  This topic will be explored in a subsequent subsection. 
 The unanimity requirement is a part of the legislative definition of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, and so judges who enforce it are applying the relevant act.  While it is thus largely impossible 
for the judiciary to weigh in directly upon whether or not this criterion should even exist, the following 
subsections demonstrate that the degree of flexibility which the courts grant the requirement is not simply a 
matter of statutory interpretation.  It is an expression of the conflict between the corporation as a 
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statutorily-determined majority-led entity and the contractual model; in the former, a unanimity 
requirement is anomalous and possibly unnecessary, while in the latter, it is crucial. 
 
5.(b) Unanimity Requirement Cases 
 
 The cases involving the unanimity requirement do not question the basic existence of the criterion, 
but rather involve difficulties with its application.  It is perhaps surprising that something as seemingly 
straightforward as whether "all the shareholders" were party to an agreement can give rise to dispute.  In 
fact, such litigation has been rare, and it would be an overstatement to describe this element as a potential 
minefield.
322
  Nonetheless, problems have arisen in determining who exactly needs to be a party for an 
agreement to be effective.
323
  While largely a technical question, the resolution of such ambiguity has 
theoretical implications.  If the unanimity requirement represents a contractual model of the corporation, 
determining who must be a party to such agreements is, in essence, a reconsideration of who are the 
deemed parties to the "corporate contract" in the first place.  Further, how strictly the unanimity 
requirement is enforced reflects the degree to which the contractual model is replacing the looser majority-
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driven standards that are the default in corporate law. 
 Most of the cases where this criterion is an issue are ones where, for whatever reason, it is unclear 
whether or not it was met.  These include situations where not all the shareholders signed but related parties 
did (allegedly in their place), cases where it was unclear whether legal or beneficial shareholders or both 
needed to sign, cases where different shareholder classes complicated matters, and cases dealing with 
amending unanimous shareholder agreements.  Each of these is discussed in turn in the following 
subsections.  They present scenarios where judges have the opportunity to covertly reject the unanimity 
requirement if they so choose.  Yet, as explored below, the courts have largely declined to do so; at most, 
judges have sometimes allowed that, when they perceived that all the shareholders had been in agreement, 
technical compliance problems arising from the unanimity requirement did not necessarily invalidate the 
documents. 
Before turning to those grey areas, a case where the unanimity requirement was clearly not met 
deserves consideration.  In Couvre-Plancher Zénith Ltée v. Minister of National Revenue,
324
 an agreement 
was entered into by two shareholders of a corporation at a time when there was another shareholder, but 
that third investor's shares were subsequently redeemed.
325
  It was argued that this had the effect of 
transforming the agreement into a unanimous shareholder agreement, but Dussault J.T.C.C. rejected that 
reasoning.  In the judge's view, this development did not change the nature of the document or transform it 
into a unanimous shareholder agreement in the statutory sense; it remained a private agreement between the 
parties governing their relationship amongst themselves only.
326
  While reference was made to this being in 
accordance with what the document itself "suggest[ed]",
327
 the reasons for judgment were clear that a 
subsequent change in shareholdings cannot cure a failure to meet the unanimity requirement.
328
  If the point 
of the criterion is to protect all shareholders by ensuring that they have agreed to the document's terms, then 
this conclusion would be in error; all remaining shareholders being parties to the agreement should suffice, 
since there is no question they consented to it.  By treating the requirement as a hurdle that could not be 
overcome by removing non-consenting investors, this case suggests either some other explanation for it, 
albeit not one that is articulated clearly, or else merely elevates strict statutory compliance over any 
purposive reading of the provision. 
Martel, writing before this specific case and dealing with such a scenario as a hypothetical, had 
argued for the opposite conclusion.  In his view, a would-be unanimous shareholder agreement not yet 
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signed by all shareholders was ineffective until such time as it became unanimous, and it should make no 
difference whether that occurred through the consent of the other investors or their departure.
329
  Ratti also 
classified unanimity as a suspended condition which brought a document into effect when achieved, even if 
all shareholders did not initially sign,
330
 and Turgeon argued that a strict reading of the statute indicated that 
a unanimous shareholder agreement becomes effective whenever unanimity is achieved, even if not present 
from the start.
331
  The closest to a dissenting view came from Robitaille, who considered it an open 
question whether the departure of non-consenting shareholders leaves unanimity in their wake.
332
  The 
commentary is thus reasonably in accord, and in opposition to Couvre-Plancher, that unanimity may be 
achieved either by all shareholders consenting or by any hold-outs departing.  If Martel's assumption that 
this would give effect to the intentions of the only remaining investors is correct,
333
 however, nothing 
would stop them from creating a new unanimous shareholder agreement at that time.  This would eliminate 
the danger of the shareholders and directors unexpectedly finding themselves bound by a failed attempt to 
create a unanimous shareholder agreement, one long since abandoned. 
 
5.(b)(i) Related Parties Sign In Place of Shareholders 
 
 While it would seem self-evident that in cases where all the shareholders did not sign the 
document, there cannot be a  unanimous shareholder agreement, at least a few cases have considered 
whether it might be sufficient for related parties to sign in place of the shareholders (without an explicit 
agency relationship).  This issue does not, in and of itself, suggest particularly interesting things about the 
development of unanimous shareholder agreements; it does not seem an especially desirable revision of the 
tool's requirements, the case law is predictably minimal, and the results tend to confirm what one might 
expect, namely that the consent of all shareholders is normally necessary for the agreement's formation and 
related parties cannot be freely substituted in place of that.  What makes these cases nonetheless interesting 
is that they present one of the few plausible situations in which the unanimity requirement has clearly not 
been met where a judge might still find that a unanimous shareholder agreement had been formed.  They 
therefore present a means of examining how seriously judges take the requirement that all the shareholders 
must be parties to the agreement, or whether the courts are willing to be flexible and allow other factors to 
predominate. 
 Such an argument actually proved successful in Ming Minerals Inc. v. Blagdon.
334
  The plaintiff 
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corporation, Ming Minerals, had originally had only two shareholders, Blagdon and Dimmell.
335
  In search 
of financing, they entered into negotiation with another company, Financial, which ultimately resulted in a 
"Letter Agreement".
336
  It was signed by a representative of Financial and by Blagdon on behalf of Ming 
Minerals; Blagdon did not sign it in his personal capacity and Dimmell did not sign it at all.
337
  The "Letter 
Agreement" was not referred to on the share certificates nor was it registered as a unanimous shareholder 
agreement.
338
  Initially, the terms of the "Letter Agreement" were followed by both parties, which included 
Financial investing in Ming and the board of directors being expanded to five.
339
  Blagdon subsequently 
died, and was replaced by his daughter as both shareholder and director.
340
  Finally, a dispute arose as to the 
selection of a new fifth director, one of the issues covered by the "Letter Agreement".
341
 
It was in this context that Mercer J. analyzed whether the "Letter Agreement" was a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, with consideration both of its unanimity and whether it restricted the directors' 
powers.  It was obviously questionable at best whether "all the shareholders" had agreed.  Only one of the 
two shareholders had signed this document, and not even in his personal capacity. 
Dimmell, the shareholder who had not signed, provided evidence that during negotiations, both he 
and Blagdon had been "negotiating on behalf of themselves as shareholders of Minerals, as well as in their 
positions as the directors of Minerals".
342
  He further stated that, subsequently, both he and Blagdon had 
acted in a manner consistent with their rights and obligations in the agreement, as if it bound and applied to 
them.
343
  Mercer J.'s ultimate conclusion that Blagdon had signed the document as Dimmell's agent- or 
more specifically, that he had signed it as an agent of the company which was in turn Dimmell's (and his 
own) agent
344
- could therefore have reasonably been based upon a finding of fact that Dimmell had 
authorized an agency relationship, and validation of the agreement would have been unexceptional. 
But the conclusion was not made entirely on that basis.  It was also derived from the terms of the 
document itself, because "[t]he Letter Agreement specified obligations which were beyond the control of 
Minerals and which clearly required benefits and detriments flowing directly to and from Samuel Blagdon 
and Dimmell in their personal capacity".
345
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Mercer J. may well have been correct that these clauses demonstrated that this document was 
intended by all concerned to create rights and obligations for the two shareholders in their personal 
capacities.  From a legal perspective, though, it is not immediately obvious that they succeeded, at least 
prior to this judgment.  A contract may grant benefits to individuals who are not parties to it; those 
individuals do not thereby become parties and usually may not sue on their own behalf to receive those 
benefits.  As to the "obligations" of Blagdon and Dimmell, in the reproduced portions of the "Letter 
Agreement", these are explicitly described as obligations of Ming Minerals and not of the two men.
346
  
These obligations may not have been within the power of the corporation,
347
 and a "reasonable man" 
standard of contractual interpretation might have read these clauses to bind the shareholders if they were 
already parties to the contract.  Normally, however, the "reasonable man" standard would not be able to 
rope in additional parties just because they were needed to give effect to a contract's terms.  While the 
circumstances of the negotiations apparently helped lead to a conclusion of agency, it seems possible that 
the close relationship of the corporation and its two shareholders/directors helped, in essence causing the 
judge to lift the corporate veil;
348
 if the parties had been at arm's length and there was no other reason to 
suggest an agency relationship, such terms would presumably have been found to either be ineffective, 
"good faith" requirements, conditions precedent, warranties, et cetera.  Finally, the circularity of inferring 
additional parties from the phrase "all parties" is self-apparent. 
Nonetheless, Mercer J. concluded that: 
 
The negotiations leading to the Letter Agreement were carried out by Samuel Blagdon 
and Dimmell who were then the sole shareholders and directors of Minerals.  The 
conferring of benefits and obligations upon Samuel Blagdon and Dimmell were 
fundamental to the implementation of the Letter Agreement.  Accordingly I have 
concluded that Minerals, in executing the Letter Agreement acted not only on its own 
behalf but also as agent for Samuel Blagdon and Dimmell.  The Letter Agreement was 
therefore an agreement between all the existing shareholders of Minerals and its potential 
new majority shareholder, Financial.
349
 
 
 According to this judgment, a unanimous shareholder agreement need not be signed by all 
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shareholders, provided that it claims to confer benefits and obligations on all of them and that they were 
part of the negotiations leading up to it.  Particularly if this test can be applied to contracts entered with 
external parties, it makes the threshold for creating a unanimous shareholder agreement very low.
350
  This 
case might also demonstrate how that status can arise out of a contractual rather than a statutory analysis; 
starting from the premise that the document was a valid contract with a third party, the court found that its 
formation and contents gave rise to a conclusion that both shareholders were parties through an agent.  
Once they were found to be parties in that context, then it followed that the document was not just a 
contract with a third party but also a unanimous shareholder agreement.  In order for this to follow, the 
phrase "all the shareholders" in the statute could not have been understood as a more stringent test than 
standard contractual interpretation rules. 
The logic of this position was rejected in Sedona Networks Corp. v. R.
351
  An unsuccessful 
argument was made that a non-shareholder's consent to an agreement could substitute for a related 
shareholder; in that case the signatory was a subsidiary and the necessary shareholder was a parent 
company.  Archambault T.C.J. found that a management agreement that a corporation had entered into 
allowing a separate entity to exercise voting rights on shares the company owned was not a unanimous 
shareholder agreement vis-a-vis that corporation because its parent company (shareholder) was not a party 
to it,
352
 had not itself created any written declaration regarding the management of the subsidiary,
353
 and 
had not even "at the very least intervened in the management agreement and made its intention clear"
354
 
that it was restricting the power of the subsidiaries' directors.
355
 
On appeal,
356
 it was argued that the management agreement was meant to bind the parent company 
and that the subsidiary had therefore signed it in part as an agent of the parent.
357
  Various terms of the 
document were identified in support of this proposition, which contained obligations on the parent toward 
the management company with which its subsidiary was contracting, including the requirement that a 
senior executive of the parent serve as a point of contact, the transfer of assets owned by the parent, the 
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secondment of employees of the parent, and various other unspecified contractual obligations on the part of 
the parent.
358
  Based upon the type of logic employed in Ming, this would suggest that the document was 
intended to bind the parent as a party, and thus was a unanimous shareholder agreement.  However, Malone 
J.A. determined instead that "[i]n my view, the Judge was correct to find that BMO [the parent company] is 
not a party to the Management Agreement.  The items listed in paragraph 19 are simply provisions that 
enhanced Ventures' ability to perform its management function."
359
  Regardless of their purpose, these 
terms could only bind the parent company if it was a party to the agreement; the conclusion therefore only 
makes sense as a finding that these terms did not bind the parent, but merely represented options that the 
parent could take advantage of in order to enhance the benefit it was getting out of the management 
agreement.
360
 
Whether Ming or Sedona is correct has significant implications for commercial transactions.  
Sedona appears to have the more viable approach, firstly because it would significantly complicate business 
contracts if they could be deemed unanimous shareholder agreements even when the shareholders had not 
all signed them, and secondly because it is more consistent with the current definition of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  Alternatively, the law could evolve such that all business contracts became more 
binding upon corporations than has traditionally been the case, without the need for a strained finding of 
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shareholder unanimity. 
 A similar issue arose in Buttarazzi Estate v. Bertolo.
361
   Buttarazzi, Bertolo, and DiFlorio were the 
three shareholders of Con Steel until 1994, when DiFlorio transferred all of his shares to his wife; he 
remained an officer and a director of the corporation.
362
  In 1996, the three men, but not the wife, signed a 
"shareholders agreement".
363
  Following Buttarazi's subsequent death, his executors objected to various 
actions taken by the corporation and the other two men as oppressive.
364
  The respondents claimed that the 
"shareholders agreement" authorized their actions.
365
  The obvious flaw in that claim was that the 
"shareholders agreement" in question was not signed by all of the shareholders at the time.  Sachs J. held 
that it was not a unanimous shareholder agreement and therefore could not be binding under the 
circumstances. 
The respondents argued that the agreement was binding on two grounds.  First, that it did not 
matter whether the husband or the wife had signed it, as they were spouses and Buttarazzi (from whom the 
plaintiff's interests derived) had consented to the transfer.
366
  Sachs J. held that, since a husband and wife 
are not indivisible in the eyes of the law, but are separate individuals, the husband was not a shareholder 
and the wife was.
367
  The judge was obviously correct that the spouses were separate people and should not 
be equated, but given the facts and the relationship between the two, it would have been easy to uphold the 
agreement on the basis of agency or trust. 
The respondents also argued that Buttarazzi had signed the document, and therefore was bound by 
it even if not all other parties had signed it.
368
  Sachs J. rejected this approach as inapplicable to unanimous 
shareholder agreements, which by statute had to have the agreement of all shareholders;
369
 unlike the 
decision in Ming, she interpreted that requirement as superseding standard contract law.  She further 
distinguished the present case by noting that, unlike in the authority presented to her, the respondents had 
not taken steps to carry out their duties under the contract.
370
  On appeal to the Ontario Superior Court of 
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Justice,
371
 O'Driscoll J. upheld the judgment, confirming that the statute required that all shareholders sign 
a unanimous shareholder agreement.
372
 
This case confirmed the necessity of "all the shareholders" agreeing; there is no latitude to 
substitute a related party in place of the actual shareholder.  The husband was not the shareholder and the 
wife was.  Accordingly, her agreement and not his was necessary.  Significantly, the reasons for judgment 
did not contain any analysis as to whether the husband signed as agent for his wife or whether the wife held 
the shares in trust for her husband.  If the former were the case, then the unanimous shareholder agreement 
should have been valid.  If the latter, then an analysis similar to that in Piikani, discussed in a later 
subsection, would have been required to determine whether the agreement of the beneficial owner of shares 
suffices without the legal shareholders. 
The wording of the legislation clearly requires that all the shareholders sign a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  These three cases call into question whether that requirement should hold even in 
the face of other factors, including the consent of a related party to the contract (who can possibly be 
deemed to have been an agent).  It seems intuitively that it should; the eponymous quality of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement is difficult to disregard.  None of these three judgments actually rule unanimity 
unnecessary, although Ming amounts to a de facto waiver. 
While its fact pattern is unusual, Kary Investment Corp. v. Tremblay
373
 may also shed light on the 
substitution of related parties in satisfying the unanimity requirement, even though it dealt with a novation 
and not the initial formation of a unanimous shareholder agreement.
374
  The company at one point had two 
shareholders, who entered into a unanimous shareholder agreement.
375
  Five other people were 
subsequently invited to invest.  A document, referred to as a "waiver and novation agreement", was 
prepared to be signed by the two existing shareholders and the five potential ones, listing the latter all in 
their individual capacities.
376
  The last person to sign, however, did so on behalf of his private holding 
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there was no binding shareholders' agreement because one of the shareholders […] had failed to sign the 
agreement" is imprecise at best. 
373
 Kary Investment Corp. v. Tremblay, 2004 ABQB 413, 2004 CarswellAlta 1364, 50 B.L.R. (3d) 
116, [2005] A.W.L.D. 173 (Alta. Q.B. Jun 03, 2004) (hereinafter "Kary QB"). 
374
 Cases dealing with amendments to unanimous shareholder agreements and the specific issues they 
raise are largely dealt with in a later subsection, but given the facts of this case and that the analysis did not 
emphasize any distinction between this novation and the initial formation of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, it is appropriate to deal with it here. 
375
 Kary QB, supra note 373, par. 3. 
376
 The summary of the "waiver and novation agreement" in the judgment outlines its contents thus at 
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company.  Subsequently, both he and another of the five (who had signed in his personal capacity) 
subscribed for shares through their personal corporations.  Additionally, the spouse of one of the other 
signatories subscribed rather than the signatory himself.  The remaining two apparently subscribed 
themselves.  Finally, while the original two were still the only registered shareholders, but after five 
subscriptions had been received, one of the founders decided to exercise a put option.
377
  At issue was 
which parties were required to be notified of this put.  At the time, no shares had been issued or registered 
for the new investors.
378
  One of the points under consideration was whether the other individuals were 
shareholders and thus had rights under the put option; Nation J. found that they did, as a matter of 
interpreting the second agreement, provided that they had signed that agreement and, in the same capacity 
as they had signed, advanced funds and signed the subscription agreement.
379
  It was left undecided 
whether those who had signed in one capacity but not yet advanced funds in the same capacity were 
shareholders.
380
 
There is, obviously, no default requirement that anyone other than shareholders must agree to an 
amendment of a unanimous shareholder agreement.
381
  At the time it was signed, the five new investors 
were definitely not shareholders, merely potential future shareholders.  Since the agreement was signed by 
the only two individuals who actually were shareholders at the time, that would presumably suffice to 
amend the prior agreement, unless one proposes a doctrine that an amendment to a unanimous shareholder 
agreement that has been drafted to include parties other than all of the shareholders (as allowed by the 
C.B.C.A. and provincial and territorial acts) is not valid until all of the listed parties have executed it, 
including the non-shareholders.  This was apparently the position of the plaintiffs, who argued that the 
second agreement was invalid because it had been an offer made to one person (the final new shareholder 
in his personal capacity), who had refused it, and that signing in his corporate capacity was in essence a 
counter-offer that the others had not accepted.
382
 
Nation J. considered whether the substitution of one party for another was fatal to a contract and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Kary QB, supra note 373, par. 8: "[I]t references the USA; outlines the intention of parties for there to be 
new shareholders; waives rights that KIC and Tremblay would have under the USA in relation to the 
transaction; outlines that the new shareholders are required to acknowledge the existence of the USA; 
novates the new parties into the USA; and the new parties agree to be bound by it."  Nation J. concluded 
that this agreement would amend the unanimous shareholder agreement if it was valid (par. 8) and that it 
was through this second document that the five new shareholders would become parties to the agreement 
(par. 9). 
377
 Kary QB, supra note 373, par. 5. 
378
 Kary Investment Corp. v. Tremblay, 2005 ABCA 273, 371 A.R. 339, 2005 CarswellAlta 1145, 
354 W.A.C. 339, [2005] A.W.L.D. 3217, [2005] A.W.L.D. 3218, 55 Alta. L.R. (4th) 251, 8 B.L.R. (4th) 40 
(Alta. C.A. Aug 26, 2005) (hereinafter "Kary CA"), par. 4. 
379
 Kary QB, supra note 373, par. 28. 
380
 Ibid, par. 29. 
381
 A third party's consent to amendments could possibly be required by the unanimous shareholder 
agreement itself, but would not be presumed necessary by default. 
  
 
 
76 
 
found it to be a factual question, different in different situations.
383
  The original two shareholders gave 
evidence that they respectively did not care and did not consider whether the new shareholders were 
investing in a personal capacity or through a holding company.
384
  Nation J. determined that their concerns 
were that the new shareholders not overly dilute the interest of the originals, and that the manner in which 
they chose to invest was not a concern.
385
  Somewhat curiously, she added that no one except the investor 
in question and the solicitor even knew how he had signed and no subsequent inquiries were made;
386
 she 
apparently thought that this indicated that they were not concerned with the matter, rather than raising 
questions as to whether they might have been had they known.  The original unanimous shareholder 
agreement, incorporated by reference into the new one, contained a term that "excluded out of the strict 
requirements of USA, any transaction between a shareholder and a limited corporation controlled by the 
shareholder.  This indicates an acceptance that closely held corporations would not be strictly differentiated 
from those individuals who controlled them."
387
  Further, Nation J. found that as the involvement of the 
five new shareholders was as arm's length investors, unknown to each other, and not involved in the 
company's operations, it did not matter whether they participated in a corporate or individual capacity.
388
  
She suggested that it might have been different if they had "roles" in the company's operations.
389
  
Accordingly, she concluded that the agreement was validly executed by all parties.  The judgment therefore 
did not consider whether the agreement might still have successfully amended the unanimous shareholder 
agreement even absent every contemplated non-shareholder party, by virtue of the participation of all the 
then-shareholders. 
On appeal, Russell J.A., writing for the Court, agreed that since the unanimous shareholder 
agreement itself allowed for the substitution of corporations for individuals,
390
 it was up to the appellants to 
provide evidence that it was of importance at the time the document was signed whether the signatories 
were personal or corporate.
391
  In deciding which parties had become shareholders entitled to notice, 
Russell J.A. found that Nation J. had "implicitly considered each of them [the shareholders] had separately 
contracted under the WNA,"
392
 rather than that there had been one collective (and uncompleted) contract as 
                                                                                                                                                                             
382
 Kary QB, supra note 373, par. 10. 
383
 Ibid, pars. 14-16. 
384
 Ibid, par. 13. 
385
 Ibid, par. 13. 
386
 Ibid, par. 13. 
387
 Ibid, par. 18. 
388
 Ibid, par. 20. 
389
 Ibid, par. 19. 
390
 Kary CA, supra note 378, par. 30. 
391
 Ibid, par. 31.  Russell J.A. also confirmed Nation J.'s interpretation of the second agreement as 
requiring that notice be given at least to the three signatories who had subscribed in the same capacity as 
they had signed (par. 44). 
392
 Ibid, par. 34. 
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submitted by the appellants,
393
 and that this was a decision to be made on the facts, which had been done 
appropriately.
394
  This position- that whether a unanimous shareholder agreement is conceptually a single 
multilateral agreement or a group of bilateral ones is determined on a case-by-case basis- is problematic.  
The statutory purpose of restricting directors cannot be realized unless all the equity investors are parties, 
and in such circumstances, there seems little point in a conceptual division of it.  If not all the shareholders 
have given their consent, the directors cannot be restricted, and any other rights and responsibilities the 
document may grant as among the investors may not have been intended to be effective unless all of the 
shareholders were included.  Having such a document bind the individual parties in a staggered fashion if at 
all as they respectively sign creates the potential for great mischief and confusion with little apparent 
benefit. 
In a concurring judgment, Berger J.A. agreed that the importance of the exact identity of the 
signatories was a question of fact and that Nation J. had made a correct decision.
395
  This was accompanied 
by a wider point regarding unanimous shareholder agreements, with regard to the right to receive notice of 
the put: "[T]here is no requirement that a shareholder be a 'registered' shareholder in order to benefit from 
rights under a unanimous shareholders agreement."
396
  In  support of this, Berger J.A. cited the Supreme 
Court of Canada decision Gaby v. Federal Packaging & Partition Co.,
397
 which held that an individual who 
had purchased and paid for shares but not yet been registered as a shareholder should be considered one 
with regard to any matter of substantive rights.
398
  Arguably, this suggests they might need to be parties to 
any new agreement that arises while they wait to receive their shares.  This seems again to fall under the 
question of when "beneficial" shareholders must be parties to a unanimous shareholder agreement, 
discussed below. 
Kary, dealing as it does with amending a unanimous shareholder agreement through a contract 
with prospective shareholders, and with much of its discussion centred on interpreting that contract rather 
than general principles, is of limited application to the general question of who must be a party to a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.  That said, it does have some wider implications.  Similar to the other 
cases discussed in this section, the judgment raises the question of whether a related party to a shareholder 
can sign a unanimous shareholder agreement and thereby bind the shareholder to it.  Because of the unique 
situation, some of the substitutions actually caused the related party to become the shareholder instead, 
such that the statutory unanimity requirement would not have been an issue.  However, the case also raised 
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397
 Gaby v. Federal Packaging & Partition Co., [1966] S.C.R. 527, 57 D.L.R. (2d) 1, 1966 
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the question of whether someone who owns shares in one capacity but signs in another capacity
399
 could 
still help create a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Unfortunately, the uniqueness of the fact situation 
under review makes it difficult to draw any wider conclusions.  If the basis of the unanimity requirement is 
consent, then such a signature should be sufficient; regardless of the capacity in which he signed, the 
individual had consented.  If, on the other hand, the requirement rests in part upon the obligations and 
potential liabilities imposed upon shareholders,
400
 then a unanimous shareholder agreement could only be 
created if all parties signed (or are deemed to have signed) in the appropriate capacity as shareholders.  
That approach could be seen as an extension of the rule regarding transferees, who are deemed to be 
parties.  In effect, if the instrument is a valid unanimous shareholder agreement, then by definition all 
shareholders are bound by the agreement, regardless of who the signing parties were.
401
 
Whether related parties can sign in place of a shareholder is, from one perspective, a contractual 
question.  If the signatory had the authority to act as agent for the shareholder, then the contract was validly 
made with the principal, the investor.  If not, then the shareholder was not a party to the contract.  In the 
unusual circumstances of Kary, some of the unexpected signatories became both shareholders and 
principals to the contract themselves, but whether that was permissible was resolved through an analysis of 
what was acceptable to the other parties, a method also compatible with contract law. 
All of this presupposes that unanimity amongst the shareholders is required.  This is of course part 
of the statutory definition, so it is unsurprising that it is not casually waived by the courts.  The cases 
                                                          
399
 A situation that arose in Ming, supra note 334, although in that case the capacity in which it was 
signed was that of the very company that the agreement was meant to affect, which could not be a 
shareholder of itself. 
400
 Every unanimous shareholder agreement must impose an obligation upon shareholders by 
definition, since any restriction of directors imposes corresponding potential liability upon shareholders, 
however limited or unclear.  Certain possible power configurations make determining the corresponding 
shift of responsibility especially opaque, a topic discussed in Chapter Five. 
401
 Kary also suggested that, if a unanimous shareholder agreement is intended to be signed by non-
shareholder parties, their agreement might be necessary for the instrument to take effect, and it could be 
insufficient for the shareholders alone to sign it.  This is a departure from the normal rule, and it illustrates 
how the instrument is (or can be) at the same time both a corporate document and a contract amongst the 
parties.  It is for that reason that everyone who is expected to sign must actually do so, even non-
shareholders.  This follows not from the document's corporate nature nor the statute, but from the 
contractual element.  The expectation of some sort of consideration from these outside parties might be 
crucial to obtaining the participation of shareholders, whose own consent is implicitly dependent upon all 
expected parties being bound to the specified terms.  The case also held that while an individual party's 
rights under a unanimous shareholder agreement might be contingent upon performance of personal 
obligations, a total failure by anyone to perform does not necessarily invalidate the agreement as amongst 
the others.  Although this sensibly prevents any investor(s) from invalidating a unanimous shareholder 
agreement and disturbing the rights of others through a refusal to honour their own obligations, Russell 
J.A.'s view that this unanimous shareholder agreement consisted of multiple bilateral contracts is 
problematic, for reasons discussed regarding White v. True North Springs Ltd., 205 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181, 
2001 CarswellNfld 257, 615 A.P.R. 181, [2001] N.J. No. 266 (Nfld. T.D. Sep 28, 2001) (hereinafter "White 
SC (TD) 1") in a subsequent subsection. 
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discussed in this subsection, however, can also be understood, not as analyses of whether all the 
shareholders had become parties to the agreement, but as challenges to the actual need for strict compliance 
with the unanimity requirement. 
Read that way, the result in Ming can be seen as a rejection of the criterion, but it is notable that 
even in that case, the non-signing shareholder had by his subsequent acts acknowledged the contract and 
the finding was one of agreement via agency.  Similarly, in Kary, most of the substitutions occurred in such 
a manner that the person who became a shareholder was also a signatory, with the sole exception being an 
individual who signed in his personal capacity yet the ultimate shareholder was his holding corporation; it 
may have been reasonable to infer that there was no issue of the latter not consenting.  At most, one can 
perhaps find a judicial willingness to sometimes look past technical compliance so long as all of the 
shareholders have consented to the agreement; arguably, that speaks more to the "in writing" requirement 
than unanimity.  The couple of other examples discussed reinforce that where the shareholders themselves 
are not explicitly parties to the agreement, their lack of direct participation can be fatal, even if terms of the 
document refer to them or they were merely "passive" investors and all the "active" ones had consented. 
The substitution of related parties is not, in and of itself, a desirable reworking of the legal 
criterion.  There is no overwhelming benefit and several possible drawbacks to generally allowing for one 
of these agreements to be formed if "all the shareholders (or some related party)" sign the document; to the 
extent that such an arrangement may be necessary or desirable, agency law principles already in effect 
would enable it where appropriate.  But these cases allow us to see what happens in a situation where the 
statutory unanimity requirement has clearly not been met, yet where the judge has a remotely plausible 
excuse to pretend that it has.  While it is foolish to draw strong conclusions from such limited data, it seems 
that the unanimity requirement still holds significant force in such circumstances, and that what flexibility 
exists applies only to deficits in technical signing-on-the-dotted-line compliance; all the shareholders must 
have agreed, at least in spirit. 
 
5.(b)(ii) Beneficial Shareholders 
 
In the preceding subsection, cases were analyzed where it was obvious that certain shareholders 
who would normally be expected to be parties to a unanimous shareholder agreement had not signed.  The 
matter is sometimes more complicated.  Among other ambiguities, the federal legislation did not clarify 
whether legal shareholders, beneficial shareholders, or both need to sign a unanimous shareholder 
agreement if there are multiple shareholders.
402
  Oddly, however, the C.B.C.A. makes it clear that an 
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 A variant of this question, discussed by Smith, supra note 228, p. 306, is who must sign if shares 
have been sold to a non-shareholder, but the new owner has not yet been registered with the company and 
the old one continued to be.  He concluded that all registered shareholders must be parties. 
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individual who is the "the beneficial owner of all the issued shares"
403
 can make a written declaration of the 
same effect as a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
The "nexus of contracts" model of the corporation can be helpful in resolving this debate.  
Determining whether the legal or beneficial shareholders need to sign a unanimous shareholder agreement 
can be conceived of as asking which of the two was the actual party to the corporate "contract" in the first 
place.  That suggests that the analysis must be fact-based, and that neither "legal owner" nor "beneficial" is 
always the correct answer. 
This potential difficulty has not received much academic attention, although Hay and Smith did 
identify the issue and suggested that it would be prudent to have both legal and beneficial shareholders 
sign, to avoid any uncertainty.
404
  It has, however, been the source of litigation.
405
 
In Piikani Investment Corp. v. Piikani First Nation,
406
 the Piikani First Nation received funds from 
Canada and Alberta subject to a Trust Agreement.
407
  The Nation and CIBC Trust Corporation signed this 
document.
408
  The Piikani Investment Company was subsequently incorporated pursuant to that Trust 
Agreement.
409
  As set out in the document, shares of the company were held by a shareholder-trustee, with 
the beneficiary being the Piikani First Nation.
410
 
McIntyre J. considered whether the Trust Agreement should be viewed as a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, and found that it was a lawful written document and that it restricted the directors' 
powers.
411
  As to whether the agreement was one among all of the shareholders, the judge described this as 
a "difficult" question,
412
 but since the shareholder-trustee was holding all of the shares for the Piikani First 
Nation, the latter was the beneficial owner,
 
and under the C.B.C.A. was entitled to unilaterally make a 
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 C.B.C.A. s. 146(2). 
404
 Hay and Smith, supra note 319, p. 445.  They also recommend that a variety of non-shareholders 
sign, including spouses of investors and principals of shareholder corporations, simply to avoid potential 
issues (pp. 445-446).  They further advised that the corporation itself sign, which they considered a 
prerequisite to imposing obligations upon it (p. 446); they apparently did not accept that a restriction on the 
directors who control the corporation to be a de facto restriction on it, or at least not an effective one. 
405
 In addition to the cases discussed in the main text of this subsection, in Corp. immobilière 
Gleneagles de Montréal inc. c. Compagnie Montréal Trust, 1996 CarswellQue 1747 (C.S. Que. Feb 01, 
1996) (hereinafter "Corp. immobilière"), all of a corporation's shares were pledged as security for a loan 
(par. 5).  After the debtor defaulted, the creditor took steps including creating a unanimous shareholder 
agreement (par.1).  The debtor argued that it did not have the right to do so because it had not taken the 
proper legal steps to realize upon the security and was not a shareholder (par. 7).  The creditor would have 
been able to exercise voting rights in such circumstances (pars. 8-12), and thus Lévesque J.C.S. upheld its 
ability to create a unanimous shareholder agreement as well (par. 13). 
406
 Piikani, supra note 234. 
407
 Ibid, par. 3. 
408
 Ibid, par. 4.  Presumably some representative of the Piikani First Nation did the actual physical 
signing, but the judgment simply refers to the Nation having done so. 
409
 Ibid, par. 8. 
410
 Ibid, par. 10. 
411
 Ibid, par. 24.  Discussion of the restrictions on directors is in the next section of this chapter. 
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unanimous shareholder agreement.
413
  The respondents argued that under section 146(1) of the Act, it was 
ambiguous whether the shareholders who needed to sign were the registered or beneficial owners, and if the 
latter, then the Trust Agreement did not meet the test, the registered shareholder-trustee not having 
signed.
414
  No explanation was given as to why section 146(2) was not considered instead, as it would seem 
to have been on point, unless it was because this was not a unilateral declaration by the sole shareholder, as 
contemplated by section 146(2), but instead a contract with a third party.  Regardless, McIntyre J. accepted 
that the Nation was the beneficial owner, ownership flowing through the shareholder-trustee, and the 
Nation was therefore entitled under s. 146 (no subsection specified) to enter into a unanimous shareholder 
agreement with a third party.
415
  Notwithstanding his conclusion that it met all the statutory tests and 
qualified as a unanimous shareholder agreement, McIntyre J. preferred to analyze it using different 
language, for reasons relating to the "intent" criterion, discussed in a subsequent section.
416
 
 Given the statutory allowance for sole beneficial owners to make unilateral declarations that have 
the status of unanimous shareholder agreements, this judgment appears sensible.  If the presence of an 
additional party negated that ability, the result would be that the sole beneficial owner would have to sign 
two agreements, one with another party (presumably for some contractual benefit) and the other without (to 
achieve unanimous shareholder agreement status).  That system might make sense if there were an "intent" 
requirement for unanimous shareholder agreements, but otherwise seems to be nothing but busywork.  
Worse, it allows canny sole beneficial owners to create documents that appear to be unanimous shareholder 
agreements while ensuring that they are not simply by adding other parties (including the corporation itself, 
whose participation would ironically create the illusion of greater certainty), while ignorant ones will be 
surprised by the same results. 
 What is unfortunate is that McIntyre J. did not specify under what heading of section 146 he found 
this agreement valid.  If it was under subsection (2), the analysis in the preceding paragraph applies; a sole 
beneficial owner entitled to create a unanimous shareholder agreement by unilateral declaration is also able 
to have some other party sign that declaration without thereby preventing it from meeting the definition of a 
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 Ibid, par. 25. 
413
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414
 Ibid, par. 25. 
415
 Ibid, par. 26. 
416
 Ibid, par. 27.  A separate case dealing with the same document, Nation v. Piikani Energy Corp., 
2010 ABQB 352, 2010 CarswellAlta 1057, 196 A.C.W.S. (3d) 89, [2010] A.W.L.D. 4235, [2010] 
A.W.L.D. 4236, 73 B.L.R. (4th) 87 (Alta. Q.B. May 20, 2010), added to this that while it was a unanimous 
shareholder agreement with respect to Piikani Investment Company, it was not a unanimous shareholder 
agreement with respect to a wholly owned subsidiary, and therefore terms guaranteeing the former's 
independence from the Council did not apply to the latter (pars. 51-53, 61).  The document did not place 
any restrictions on how companies in which the Piikani Investment Company invested were to be run (par. 
52), and although that was not identified as the reason it was not a unanimous shareholder agreement with 
regard to the subsidiary, it would have sufficed.  No factor is clearly identified as being the basis of the 
determination, leaving its logic ambiguous, albeit quite easily supportable. 
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unanimous shareholder agreement created under that subsection.  However, since McIntyre J.'s analysis 
touched upon whether subsection (1) referred to registered or beneficial owners, it is possible that that was 
the question he was purporting to settle.  If that is the case, then in a company with multiple shareholders, 
where some shares are held in trust, it is at least permissible for the beneficial owners to sign the agreement 
rather than the corresponding legal ones.  Whether it is actually mandatory to involve the beneficial owners 
is equally unclear. 
 This approach is consistent with subsection (2), at least.  If the beneficial owner of all of a 
company's shares is able to implement their will through a unanimous shareholder agreement without the 
participation of the registered shareholder, then it seems reasonable that a beneficial owner of some shares 
be allowed to work together with any other shareholders to do the same.  One is, however, left wondering 
why the unanimous shareholder agreement should be an exception to the rules normally governing trust 
law.
417
 
 Indeed, there are cases where the registered shareholder but not the beneficial shareholder was a 
signatory to the unanimous shareholder agreement, and the validity of these agreements was not questioned 
on that basis.
418
  This is of course in line with the standard trust law approach.  The result is possibly that 
both beneficial and legal owners could create separate unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 Which of the two subsections applies, and what the significance of that distinction might be, was 
considered more directly in Colborne Capital Corp. v. 542775 Alberta Ltd.,
419
 albeit in the context of the 
Alberta Act.  Virtue J. came to unusual conclusions about the unanimity requirement.  In order to fully 
understand them, it is first necessary to review the facts in some detail.  A corporation, referred to as 
"Group" in the judgment, owned all the shares of a subsidiary, referred to as "Petro".
420
  Thomas Pointer 
was an office and director of Petro
421
 who was instrumental in a reorganization of the corporate hierarchy 
that saw a new numbered company, "542", interposed between Group and Petro.
422
  Group owned 100% of 
the shares of 542.
423
  The shares that Group owned in Petro were transferred to 542; the trial judgment 
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 It is not the only section in the C.B.C.A. to grant rights to beneficial owners.  But the policy 
reasons for this specific provision's inclusion of them are unclear. 
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 For example, Vaszi v. Ontario (Ministry of Labour), 2000 CarswellOnt 1748, [2000] O.E.S.A.D. 
No. 88 (Ont. E.S.B. (Adjud.) Mar 27, 2000) (hereinafter "Vaszi") stated explicitly that the legal owner of 
shares held in trust was a signatory but not the beneficial owner (par. 5). 
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 Colborne Capital Corp. v. 542775 Alberta Ltd., [1995] 7 W.W.R. 671, 171 A.R. 241, 30 Alta. 
L.R. (3d) 127, 22 B.L.R. (2d) 226, 1995 CarswellAlta 194, [1995] A.W.L.D. 691 (Alta. Q.B. May 31, 
1995) (hereinafter "Colborne QB"). 
420
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 Aside from a brief period immediately after its formation where Pointer and another individual 
owned 10% of the shares, which were quickly transferred to Group (Colborne QB, supra note 419, par. 
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repeatedly said that 542 was to "hold Group's shares".
424
  The intention of Group was that the board of 
directors of 542 would mirror that of Petro, but Pointer set it up so that he was the sole director and 
president.
425
  Two other companies subsequently became interested in acquiring the shares of Petro.  Group 
favoured one, Stampeder, and ultimately closed a deal with it.
426
  Pointer nonetheless took several steps to 
favour the other interested company, Colborne, including entering into a secret unanimous shareholder 
agreement.
427
  This agreement was executed by Pointer in his capacity as the sole director of 542, which 
was in turn the sole shareholder of Petro.  Its terms included that Colborne's consent was necessary for 
Petro to consider any proposal (including the sale to Stampeder), that Colborne have the right to be 
represented on the board of Petro, and that the document was to remain secret.
428
 
Virtue J. considered, among other issues, whether this unanimous shareholder agreement met the 
statutory definition.
429
  The relevant provision was s. 1(z) of the A.B.C.A.: 
 
(z) "unanimous shareholder agreement" means 
(i) a written agreement to which all the shareholders of a corporation are or are deemed to 
be parties, whether or not any other person is also a party, or 
(ii) a written declaration by a person who is the beneficial owner of all the issued shares 
of a corporation,  
that provides for any of the matters enumerated in section 140(1).
430
 
 
Much of his analysis depended upon the view that Group was the true shareholder of Petro.  This 
was expressed most directly when, in first describing the alleged unanimous shareholder agreement, Virtue 
J. said, "The document is replete with conditions which purport to affect 'the shareholders of Petro' which, 
of course, was Group, the sole shareholder of 542."
431
  This understanding, that Group was the sole 
shareholder of Petro, was repeated several times.
432
  While portions of the judgment suggest that Group was 
somehow the shareholder of Petro outright, ultimately Virtue J.'s position was explained as being that while 
542 was the legal owner, Group was the beneficial owner:
433
 "The shares of Petro were registered in the 
name of 542, and were beneficially owned by Group."
434
  On this basis, he wrote: 
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I am of the view that subs. (ii), not subs. (i), was intended to control the situation where 
there is one beneficial owner of all the issued capital.  I am led to this opinion by the use 
of the plural terms: "shareholders", "are", and "parties", which is inappropriate language 
if the subsection was intended to apply to a single shareholder.
435
 
 
If it is on this distinction that this part of Virtue J.'s judgment rests, then the implications are as 
follows.  If a corporation has only one legal and one (separate) beneficial owner of the shares, then it is 
only the latter who can make declarations that are unanimous shareholder agreements.  However, since this 
point apparently turns upon which subsection applies, then if subsection (i) were operative by virtue of 
there being more than one beneficial owner, it would be the legal owners of the shares who would have the 
power to sign a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Two anomalies immediately arise.  If a corporation has 
only one registered owner but multiple beneficial ones,
436
 the logic of Virtue J. suggests that neither section 
could apply.  Conversely, if a corporation has two (or more) registered shareholders but only one beneficial 
owner of the shares,
437
 then both sections would apply simultaneously, a result he apparently sought to 
avoid. 
While Virtue J.'s conclusion may be a valid literal reading of the statute, it raises questions about 
the purpose of this division.  Section 1(z)(ii) (and its equivalents, including C.B.C.A., section 146(2)) was 
presumably enacted to allow sole shareholders to make declarations equivalent to unanimous shareholder 
agreements, in order to allow them access to the same tool they would be able to use if there were more 
than one shareholder.  The alternative would be to either deny them this tool or force them to work around 
the limitation, e.g. by transferring some shares to trustees just to make agreements with them.  But what is 
the significance of allowing beneficial owners to make declarations with the force of unanimous 
shareholder agreements, and why only if they are the sole shareholders?  It seems pointless to allow a sole 
beneficial owner to make a declaration but prevent two beneficial co-owners from working together to do 
so.  Conversely, reversing that situation for legal owners (who are not also beneficial owners) is just as 
inexplicable. 
The utility of this tool for businesses could be impaired by this principle.  In some multi-level 
corporate hierarchies, a corporation might be meant to be controlled by its immediate shareholder, not the 
company at the top of the structure.
438
  Virtue J.'s approach would deny them the ability to create such 
arrangements. 
Assuming that 542 would normally have had the power to enter into a unanimous shareholder 
agreement with respect to Petro does not necessarily contradict Virtue J.'s conclusion that this was not a 
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valid declaration.  The judge also found that Pointer did not legitimately occupy the position of sole 
director of 542, since its sole shareholder, Group, had ordered that its board mirror that of Petro.
439
  If he 
was not truly the sole director, he could not unilaterally cause 542 to enter into a unanimous shareholder 
agreement. 
Further, Virtue J.'s general portrayal of Pointer and his actions was, to say the least, unflattering.  
For example, he wrote, "[T]he 542 [unanimous shareholder] agreement is unenforceable because, at best, it 
represents a sham transaction by which Grenon and Pointer sought to fraudulently impose legal obligations 
on 542 and Petro[….]"440  The A.B.C.A., unlike the C.B.C.A., does not make reference to unanimous 
shareholder agreements being required to be "otherwise lawful", and in any event, even the C.B.C.A. does 
not include that element in its definition when there is a sole (beneficial) shareholder.  If one accepts 
Welling's view that this part of the statutory definition is redundant and would be assumed as a requirement 
regardless,
441
 then this unanimous shareholder agreement is void not because the wrong people were parties 
to it, but because it was "a sham transaction" for "fraudulent" purposes. 
That was essentially the approach taken by the Alberta Court of Appeal, when the case came 
before them.
442
  The appellants argued that Virtue J.'s finding that the unanimous shareholder agreement 
was invalid was in error because 542 was "the legal and beneficial owner of Petroleum".
443
  The Court of 
Appeal did not directly address the trial judge's views on the corporate arrangement.  They found that, 
under the circumstances, the corporate veil should be disregarded if necessary
444
 and that, even if they were 
to accept the appellants' arguments that the three companies should be viewed separately, liability would 
still attach to Pointer for breaching duties he owed to Petro and/or Group, regardless of any separate 
identity of 542.
445
  Unfortunately for those interested in the technical interpretive issues of unanimous 
shareholder agreements, the Court of Appeal had only this to say on the agreement's invalidity: 
 
190 We are satisfied that the trial judge did not err in his conclusion that the conduct 
of Pointer, Grenon and Colborne was dishonest and deceitful.  He was correct in 
dismissing the claims brought by GE against Petroleum, 542, Group, Stampeder and 
Ricinus.  The documents on which those claims rested were correctly found to be the 
product of fraudulent conduct and therefore, void. 
 
191 In the circumstances, it is not necessary to consider whether the trial judge was 
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correct in alternative interpretations leading to invalidation of any of the documents 
produced by Grenon and Pointer. 
 
 It therefore remains unclear whether the Court of Appeal would have endorsed Virtue J.'s 
interpretation of the distinction between the applicability of the two subsections.
446
 
 The current legislative provision is open to criticism for being at best needlessly ambiguous and at 
worst contradictory.  That critique does not end the matter, as it leaves open the question of how to resolve 
this quandary.  The best solution would be to distinguish situations where shares are held by an 
"intermediary" as that term is defined in the C.B.C.A.
447
 from other trust situations.  The Act already 
recognizes that such an "intermediary" cannot exercise all the rights of a shareholder, and that in particular, 
the voting rights remain with the beneficial owner and cannot be exercised by the intermediary except with 
the beneficial owner's consent.
448
  I suggest that becoming a party to a unanimous shareholder agreement 
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should be treated similarly to voting rights in such circumstances; the beneficial owner's agreement would 
be necessary, either directly or through explicit instructions to the intermediary.  This would be true 
whether there was one or multiple shareholders. 
 Conversely, where the legal shareholder is not the beneficial one but is also not a mere 
"intermediary" holding shares on another's behalf, then the legal shareholder should be the one whose 
consent to the agreement is required, again regardless of the number of shareholders.  This would allow for 
classic trustees to manage the trust property and also enable trust funds to become parties to unanimous 
shareholder agreements.
449
 
 Although the concept of an "intermediary" is already found in the statute, this suggestion also has 
much in common with a contractual understanding of the corporation, albeit one that must take a nuanced 
approach to determining whom the relevant contracting parties are.  Where an "intermediary" is the legal 
shareholder, that person has much in common with an agent, who purchases, sells, and exercises rights on 
behalf of a principal; in contract law, it would be that principal, and not the agent, who was considered the 
party to the contract.  Conversely, a true trustee actually would be a party to the corporate contract, much as 
any true trustee who purchases, sells, or otherwise deals with trust property is the contracting party, not the 
trust beneficiary. 
 
5.(b)(iii) Share Classes 
 
While there is some genuine ambiguity as to whether the relevant shareholders are the legal or 
beneficial ones or both, there is little that the owners of all shares, regardless of "share class", must consent 
to a unanimous shareholder agreement for it to take effect.
450
  An agreement amongst all the voting 
shareholders was found in Simon v. Ramsay
451
 not to constitute a unanimous shareholder agreement 
because it did not include the holder of non-voting shares,
452
 and therefore it could not restrict the 
directors.
453
  The justification for this determination was limited to a brief excerpt from an academic text
454
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that simply asserted that owners of non-voting shares must also be parties to the agreement.
455
 
 Another case to deal with the implications of multiple share classes was White v. True North 
Springs Ltd.,
456
 which raised the issue of whether separate agreements signed by each class of shareholders 
could collectively be considered a unanimous shareholder agreement assuming sufficient overlap in their 
terms.  Such a situation is not necessarily limited to corporations with multiple share classes- multiple 
agreements could exist among the same share class, as in Ekamant Canada Inc. c. R.
457
- but that seems one 
of the likelier places for it to arise, particularly since it is an obvious way to grant slightly different rights to 
the different classes, as here.  A careful analysis of the case demonstrates, however, that this consolidation 
of separate documents only works if one focuses strictly on the statutorily-required unique function of the 
agreements, their restrictions upon directors, and becomes highly problematic if one takes into account 
their contractual aspects. 
 In White, the corporation in question had two classes of shares, Class A and Class B.  Two 
documents, both purporting to be unanimous shareholder agreements, were signed, one by all of the Class 
A shareholders and the other by the then sole Class B shareholder, Kevin Bussey.
458
  Bussey was not one of 
the Class A shareholders who signed the Class A agreement.
459
  The purpose of the two share classes was a 
desire for the Class B shareholders to control the board of directors; they were entitled to elect three of the 
five, with the balance elected by Class A.  It was intended that the founders would hold all of the Class B 
shares.
460
  For tax reasons, the two founders entered into a complicated transaction which, inter alia, 
granted the son of the other founder, French, the ability to acquire half the Class B shares held by 
Bussey.
461
  The two founding shareholders subsequently had a falling out, and White, one of the Class A 
shareholders, purchased French's right to acquire half the Class B shares.
462
  The remaining founding 
shareholder, Bussey, took the position that the two unanimous shareholder agreements were invalid.
463
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Specifically, he and his supporters argued that the creation of share classes through the agreements and the 
granting of specific board representation rights were ineffective.
464
  They sought to reorganize the 
corporation to have only one class of shares. 
The basis of the allegation of invalidity was that there was not one unanimous shareholder 
agreement, but two, one for each class, neither of which had been signed by all the shareholders of the 
corporation.
465
  The opposing parties argued that the agreements differed in only a few substantial respects: 
each class received pre-emptive purchase rights only for shares of its own class, a different specific number 
of directors was promised to each class, the Class B pre-emptive purchase rights applied only if a 
shareholder was selling all of his shares, and Class B shareholders had "tag-along" rights on another 
shareholder's sale of Class B shares to a third party.
466
  Apart from these differences, the documents were 
"essentially identical".
467
 
Hall J. considered the statutory requirements for a unanimous shareholder agreement under the 
Newfoundland Corporations Act, and found that: 
 
[T]he principal concern of the section deals with a unanimous shareholders' agreement 
restricting in whole or in part the powers of the directors to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation.  The section provides that if an agreement amongst all of the 
shareholders is otherwise lawful and in writing, it can restrict the powers of the directors 
to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.
468
 
 
Hall J. listed the various ways that these two agreements (assuming they were valid) limited the 
powers of directors.
469
  This provided the basis for his conclusion: 
 
Assuming for the moment that these agreements are otherwise lawful written agreements, 
where there are two separate agreements and the Class A shareholders have not formally 
ratified the Class B unanimous shareholders' agreement and the Class B shareholders 
have not formally ratified the Class A shareholders' agreement, can these two agreements 
together constitute a unanimous shareholders' agreement under s. 245 of the 
Corporations Act?  I am satisfied that they can.  While it obviously would have been 
prudent to have had only one purported unanimous shareholders' agreement, it cannot be 
argued that the intent of these agreements was not to restrict the powers of directors in an 
uniform manner.  The two agreements purport to do that uniformly.  There are no 
differences in the manner in which each agreement purports to restrict the powers of 
directors. I am therefore satisfied that, if these agreements were otherwise lawful, they 
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can, read together, constitute a unanimous shareholders' agreement.
470
 
 
 He proceeded to note that he had the statutory power to amalgamate the two agreements into one 
unanimous shareholder agreement, but did not actually do so.
471
  He undoubtedly had the power to 
accomplish that,
472
 and given the facts before him, it might have been a perfectly appropriate move.  What 
is less certain is the correctness of his decision that there existed a valid unanimous shareholder agreement 
without him ordering the creation of an amalgamated document.  Also, while he referred in the above-
quoted paragraph to the two classes not having "ratified" each other's documents, he had earlier noted that 
it was unclear whether the Class A shareholder had even seen the Class B agreement originally, which casts 
some additional doubt on the validity of the arrangement.
473
 
 A variety of other decisions were connected with this litigation, finally including a second 
judgment of the Court of Appeal that addressed the question of the two unanimous shareholder 
agreements.
474
  Rowe J.A. noted in this regard only that he found "no merit in the submissions of the 
Appellants".
475
  Despite this, he actually dismissed whatever objections were raised to the joining of the 
two unanimous shareholder agreements on "a different, albeit related, basis",
476
 namely that the appellants 
had consented to the share transfer through which White obtained his Class B shares and could not now 
object to it on the basis that some of the documents that led to it might have been invalid.
477
 
 According to the Supreme Court of Canada in Duha, even sections of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement that do not restrict directors are part of the agreement, so long as some restriction is present 
somewhere in it.
478
  Setting aside the merits of this approach, it presents a significant problem for Hall J.'s 
analysis, which was written post-Duha.  Hall J.'s logic appears to be that the point of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement is for all the shareholders to unanimously agree upon a restriction of the directors' 
powers, and that between the two documents before him, they had done so.  He therefore found a 
unanimous shareholder agreement was in place.  However, he also implicitly imported into it the terms that 
differed between the two documents, most notably the number of directors that each class could appoint.  
These were terms that did not have explicit unanimous support of the shareholders,
479
 but were apparently 
granted status as if they did. 
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 Even if one accepts that, for example, the share transfer restrictions of each class are of concern 
only to owners of that class, it is obvious that the number of directors each class can elect concerns every 
other class and only has meaning in the context of what all the others have.  Class A shareholders were 
allowed to elect two directors; whether Class B was allowed to elect one, two, or (as was the case) three 
directors completely changes the meaning of what Class A received, from a superior position to equality to 
inferiority.
480
 
 On this basis, then, Hall J.'s decision appears incorrect.  Hypothetically, would it have been a 
problem if only the other differences were present?  It is possible that members of a class of shareholders 
have an interest in matters that do not directly affect their own rights.  Knowing that the Class B 
shareholders were receiving a "tag along" provision when other Class B shareholders sold their shares, for 
example, they might have insisted that the Class A shareholders receive one as well for sales of their own 
class.  Indeed, one of the issues put before the court was whether the Class A shareholders should have had 
a pre-emptive right to purchase Class B shares (a right that the Class B shareholders had in their own 
agreement).  Hall J. found that they did not have such a right, could not have been granted it by Bussey 
without French's permission, and that in any event, they had consented to the transfer of shares to White.
481
  
Any speculation about what difference it might have made had the Class A shareholders been aware at the 
time the documents were signed of the rights Class B shareholders had in their agreement obviously cannot 
be definitively addressed. 
 There is also the question of amending the documents.  Neither agreement contained any provision 
preventing its members from amending it without obtaining the consent of the other class of 
shareholders.
482
  If one class had amended its own agreement, would such amendments have been valid?
483
 
 The decision in White appears to ultimately rest upon the idea that the unanimity requirement was 
designed to protect the shareholders by ensuring that they had consented to the specified restructuring of 
corporate power, and that this criterion had been met in this case.  That having been satisfied, the judge 
declined to void the agreement(s) for their possible technical non-compliance with the wording of the Act.   
In this regard, the case appears to have taken the opposite approach to Couvre-Plancher.
484
  The underlying 
assumption here was that the unanimous shareholder agreement fulfilled a narrow niche within the larger 
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legal structure, that of restricting directors, and that the criterion of unanimity was therefore only necessary 
for that purpose.  Had the documents instead been conceived of as a renegotiation of the corporate 
arrangement, it would have been more important to ensure that the shareholders of every class were in 
accord on all matters.  While the purposive approach in White is understandable and may have been fact-
specific, if taken to its logical conclusion and applied generally, it would open the door to the 
aforementioned host of problems. 
 
5.(c) Amendments 
 
 Amendments to unanimous shareholder agreements do not necessarily have to follow the 
unanimity rule that governs their formation.  In some provinces and all territories, there is a statutory 
unanimity requirement for amendment.
485
  In Ontario, non-unanimous amendment is permitted by the 
legislation.
486
  In still other jurisdictions, including the C.B.C.A. itself, the situation is uncertain.
487
  The 
tension here is clearly between an assumptions derived from contract law, in which all parties to the 
"corporate contract" must consent to any changes, and a corporate law model, where majority (or super-
majority) rule is normally sufficient to govern the company. 
 The Alberta Report recommended that, despite the fact that a partnership agreement could provide 
for lesser thresholds for amendment, once the shareholders had invoked "the principle of unanimity in 
relation to the ground rules under which they operate",
488
 they should be bound to that principle for all 
subsequent changes.
489
  It was successful in persuading that jurisdiction to require unanimity for 
amendments. 
 The Industry Canada Discussion Paper noted that allowing non-unanimous amendments arguably 
contradicted the (unstated) "philosophy"
490
 of unanimous shareholder agreements, but it did not elaborate 
on what actual issues this abandonment of the "philosophy" might raise, and instead noted that requiring 
unanimity for amendments could lead to inflexibility and require the oppression remedy to amend or 
terminate agreements that were being abused.
491
  Dennis, responding to a working draft of the Industry 
Canada Discussion Paper, elaborated upon these arguments, stating that requiring unanimity for 
amendments is a means of protecting minority shareholders and their ability to participate in determining 
the decision-making structure of the corporation, although with the possible danger that this might be 
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abused by a minority who found themselves benefiting to an oppressive or unfair degree from an agreement 
that they refused to allow to be amended.
492
  Dennis apparently found the benefit more convincing than the 
drawback, as he included a unanimity requirement for amendment among his own recommendations for 
reform.
493
 
 The Ontario Act is the one that most clearly departs from a unanimity standard for amendment, as 
it allows a unanimous shareholder agreement to provide for non-unanimous amendment procedures.  As 
Disney has noted, this could theoretically lead to extreme situations such as a single shareholder being able 
to unilaterally alter the agreement,
494
 and although he hypothesized that it would be rare for shareholders to 
agree to an amendment procedure that could exclude them, the Ontario approach is subject to criticism for 
"permit[ing] a 'tyranny of the majority' far more all-encompassing than would be permitted by the general 
scheme of the statute"
495
 which otherwise places limits on majority rule such as the directors' duties.
496
 
 Under some other statutes, such as the C.B.C.A., the situation is simply uncertain, with the 
legislation itself being silent on the issue of amendment procedure.  Disney asserted that while contract law 
generally requires unanimous amendment of a multi-party contract, there was no principle in law 
preventing a contract from providing otherwise;
497
 this view might be in error, since a contract as described 
could raise certainty of consideration problems that would affect its validity.
498
  Regardless, Disney 
balanced his understanding of contract law against the nature of the unanimous shareholder agreement, and 
noted that since the statute made unanimity a fundamental criterion of such documents, it could be seen as 
implicit that amendments would also need to be unanimous,
499
 or it could become "in substance, an 
agreement that purported to bind all the shareholders but to which they had not all agreed".
500
  Ewasiuk also 
warned that in many jurisdictions it was uncertain at best whether a term allowing for non-unanimous 
agreement would be valid, but since his concern was that as the number of shareholders increased, the 
ability to amend a unanimous shareholder agreement decreased, he suggested instead that this obstacle 
could be circumvented by having each shareholder appoint the same person (possibly the corporate 
president or the company itself) as their attorney for the purpose of consenting to amendments, conditional 
upon the amendments receiving some specified level of majority approval.
501
  While this suggestion is 
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ingenious, it completely ignores the problems of allowing majority approval of amendments, treating a 
unanimity requirement as an annoyance rather than a legitimate means of protecting all shareholder 
interests (or some other purpose).  Martel too found the situation ambiguous, depending upon whether the 
amendment of unanimous shareholder agreements was governed by contract law
502
 or whether these 
agreements were considered a unique exception that required unanimity to exist and therefore unanimity to 
amend, as doing so was equivalent to bringing a new agreement into effect;
503
 he preferred the latter 
interpretation, in order to protect minority interests.
504
  Although Ratti accepted Martel's argument that non-
unanimous amendment was not legally permitted, he suggested that it would nonetheless be beneficial to 
have the agreement specify as much, in order to discourage (illegitimate) attempts to non-unanimously 
amend it and further protect minority shareholders.
505
 
 The confusing state of the law in this area can be illustrated by the contrast between Consumer 
Impact Marketing Ltd. v. Shafie
506
 and Palumbo v. Research Capital Corp.
507
  In Consumer Impact, the 
defendant, a former employee and shareholder, argued that the non-compete clause in his employment 
agreement superseded the broader one in the unanimous shareholder agreement he had earlier signed.
508
  
Grace J. rejected this, saying, "The employment agreement was not intended to displace a multi-party 
agreement which dealt with wide ranging rights and obligations of the signatories in their capacity as 
shareholders, directors and officers of CIM."
509
 
 Similarly, in a motion in Palumbo, the plaintiff argued that his employment agreement, which 
contained a term that with regard to the employment relationship it took precedence over the unanimous 
shareholder agreement to which he was also a party, meant that he was not required to provide a release in 
the form required by the unanimous shareholder agreement in order to receive full compensation upon 
termination.
510
  The issue was referred to trial;
511
 neither the trial
512
 nor the appeal
513
 judgment mention this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
at p. 17.  (Discussion of unanimous shareholder agreements at pp. 11-18.) 
502
 Specifically, given his focus upon Quebec, the civil law governing contracts. 
503
 Martel, supra note 11, pp. 35-36. 
504
 Ibid, p. 36.  He still held the same position in Martel and Martel, supra note 16, p. 374. 
505
 Ratti, supra note 16, pp. 128-129. 
506
 Consumer Impact Marketing Ltd. v. Shafie, 2010 ONSC 3257, 2010 CarswellOnt 3819, 189 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 215, 71 B.L.R. (4th) 43 (Ont. S.C.J. Jun 07, 2010)  (hereinafter "Consumer Impact"). 
507
 Palumbo v. Research Capital Corp., 50 C.C.E.L. (2d) 101, 2000 CarswellOnt 1238 (Ont. S.C.J. 
Apr 12, 2000) (hereinafter "Palumbo Sup Ct J motion"). 
508
 Consumer Impact, supra note 506, par. 12. 
509
 Ibid, par. 13.   In addition to this broadly applicable determination, the specific facts supported the 
conclusion.  The release the defendant had retained with regard to the employment agreement's non-
compete clause had specifically excluded obligations under the unanimous shareholder agreement, a term 
that would have been rendered meaningless under the defendant's interpretation (par. 14). 
510
 Palumbo Sup Ct J motion, supra note 507, pars. 6-7. 
511
 Ibid, par. 10. 
512
 Palumbo v. Research Capital Corp., 2002 CarswellOnt 4041, 2003 C.L.L.C. 210-023, [2002] O.J. 
No. 4475 (Ont. S.C.J. Nov 25, 2002) (hereinafter "Palumbo Sup Ct J trial").  Unlike Palumbo Sup Ct J 
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conflict between the agreements, and both applied the unanimous shareholder agreement.
514
  In deciding 
the motion, Chapnik J. did not find anything amiss in the contention that a provision in an employment 
agreement granting it precedence over a unanimous shareholder agreement might be valid; while the terms 
in question did not relate to restricting the power of directors, and thus were more closely aligned with the 
"contractual" and not "corporate constitutional" aspect of these documents, the objection raised in 
Consumer Impact that a unanimous shareholder agreement is a multi-party one and thus not subject to 
renegotiation by two of the parties might still have merit on contract law grounds alone.  Further, if one 
accepts the implication of Duha that the entirety of a unanimous shareholder agreement is part of the 
corporate constitution, not just the restrictions upon directors, then the idea that parts of it could be 
amended by the most directly affected parties without the consent of the others is yet more dubious.  That 
said, while it might not be possible for a subset of the parties to amend the agreement, they could still 
potentially have the ability to grant releases regarding their personal claims against each other. 
 In some cases, however, amendment of a unanimous shareholder agreement clearly requires 
unanimity, if for no other reason than that the document in question specifies as much.  While a technical 
distinction must still be maintained between contractually-required and statutorily-mandated unanimity, 
and some caution might be warranted with regard to the cross-applicability of precedents, one can 
nonetheless use these amendment cases to learn still more about how the courts view a unanimity 
requirement and what is required to satisfy it. 
 This is demonstrated by Power v. Vitrak Systems Inc.,
515
 which illustrates that even shareholders 
with trivial holdings must be parties to an amendment if unanimity is required, and thus by extension that 
they must be parties to the original formation of the agreement.
516
  In addition to this confirmation that a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
motion, supra note 507, and Palumbo v. Research Capital Corp., 72 O.R. (3d) 241, 190 O.A.C. 83, 2004 
CarswellOnt 3572, 2005 C.L.L.C. 210-003, 35 C.C.E.L. (3d) 1, [2004] O.J. No. 3633 (Ont. C.A. Sep 07, 
2004) (hereinafter "Palumbo CA"), both of which specifically identified the document as a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, Palumbo Sup Ct J trial refers to it only as a "Shareholders Agreement". 
513
 Palumbo CA, supra note 512. 
514
 Palumbo Sup Ct J trial, supra note 512, pars. 94-98 and Palumbo CA, supra note 512, pars. 44-49. 
515
 Power v. Vitrak Systems Inc., 258 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 38, 2006 CarswellPEI 29, 779 A.P.R. 38, 2006 
PESCTD 33, 150 A.C.W.S. (3d) 363, [2006] P.E.I.J. No. 36, 21 B.L.R. (4th) 103 (P.E.I. T.D. Jul 05, 2006) 
(hereinafter "Power"). 
516
 The company involved, Vitrak, had had a unanimous shareholder agreement among its original 
five investors; it was validly amended once, when an additional six people invested (Power, supra note 
515, par. 3).  At that point, one of the original shareholders held 62.80% of the shares, the other four 
original shareholders each held either 7.25% or 9.66%, and the six shareholders who were newly investing 
each held less than 1% of the shares (par. 55).  The agreement itself provided that it could only be amended 
unanimously by the shareholders (par. 52).  Among its provisions were restrictions on share transfers 
without the authorization of other shareholders and a right of first refusal (par. 52).  Subsequently, a 
management consultant the company hired convinced the controlling shareholders to amend the agreement, 
for what ultimately turned out to be his own self-interested purposes.  The consultant implemented what 
Campbell J. described as "a clear strategy and a well crafted plan to dilute Power's [the original controlling 
shareholder] shareholdings and influence within the company and acquire control for himself" (par. 23).  In 
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literal unanimity requirement includes all shareholders, and not even an overwhelming majority suffices, 
the case is notable for the fact that the plaintiff, the then-majority shareholder, was one of the shareholders 
who actually did vote to pass the alleged amendments,
517
 even though he subsequently questioned their 
validity.
518
  Notwithstanding his participation in the very meeting in question, his right to assert it as a 
nullity apparently remained.  Campbell J. ruled, "Neither the passage of time nor the continued improper or 
illegal acts of Lauer and/or others have the effect of quashing the rights of the shareholders to direct and 
manage the corporation as they set out in the USA, or, unless altered by the USA, as is set out in the Act or 
the by-laws of the corporation."
519
  A lack of unanimity invalidated that which required unanimity, 
regardless of whether the one relying upon that lack was a participant.  If this could be extended to a party 
to an alleged unanimous shareholder agreement challenging the very formation and validity of the 
document on the basis that it was not unanimous, it would again suggest that the purpose of the requirement 
extends beyond protecting the rights of shareholders who did not participate. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
addition to the lawsuit under discussion here, he was eventually tried for criminal fraud for his actions and 
acquitted on appeal (see R. v. Lauer, 2009 CarswellPEI 72, [2009] P.E.I.J. No. 61 (P.E.I. T.D. Aug 06, 
2009) (hereinafter "Lauer SC (TD)"), reversed by R. v. Lauer, 2011 PECA 5, 306 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 289, 269 
C.C.C. (3d) 127, 2011 CarswellPEI 9, 951 A.P.R. 289, [2011] P.E.I.J. No. 9 (P.E.I. C.A. Mar 09, 2011) 
(hereinafter "Lauer CA")).  First, there was a purported transfer of nearly half of the majority shareholder's 
interest to a new party.  This was accompanied by a purported amendment to the unanimous shareholder 
agreement, signed by at most the original five shareholders and not the six newer ones, to authorize this 
transfer (Power, supra note 515, par. 57).  (The document presented in court only bore the signatures of 
three or four of the original shareholders, but there was oral evidence that the fifth had signed as well.  The 
exact number was a moot point, since it was agreed that the additional six shareholders had not signed it.)  
Campbell J. simply found that "[w]ithout the 'unanimous written agreement' (Article 9.15) of the 
shareholders, no amendment is valid" (par. 57).  The provisions governing share transfers were thus in 
effect, and as the six additional investors had not given consent nor declined their right of first refusal, the 
transfer itself was invalid under the unanimous shareholder agreement (par. 57). This reconfirms that the 
agreement of shareholders who collectively possess the vast majority of shares and who are all of the 
"active" investors is still insufficient to meet the definition of the word "unanimous".  Although in this case, 
there was a clause confirming the requirement for amendment, the principle likely applies with at least as 
much force to the statutory criterion for creating one initially.  Of course, this ruling was unknown at the 
time of the purported amendment, and the parties proceeded as if the transfer was legitimate.  
Subsequently, there was an even more radical attempt to rework the unanimous shareholder agreement.  
Although Campbell J. noted that "[n]o other agreements amending the USA were executed" (par. 58), the 
events which followed amounted to a de facto attempt, albeit a completely inadequate one.  At a 
shareholders' meeting, various resolutions were passed to alter or terminate elements of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement (par. 61).  Only four of the five original shareholders were notified of the meeting 
(and the notice was found to be inadequate (par. 65)); two attended, as did the "shareholder" under the 
transfer that was ultimately negated.  At least one of the original shareholders and all six of the additional 
ones did not get notice (par. 62).  Campbell J. found that the shareholders' meeting as a whole was a nullity, 
for failing to give proper notice to all shareholders (par. 66).  He noted in passing that one of the purposes 
of the meeting was to amend the unanimous shareholder agreement, which would require consent of all the 
shareholders (par. 66), but he did not specifically belabour the point that, no unanimity having been 
achieved, the agreement could not have been altered even if the meeting had otherwise been properly held. 
517
 Power, supra note 515, par. 61. 
518
 Ibid, par. 40. 
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 On the other hand, Marque d'Or Inc. c. Clayman
520
 took a looser approach to the amendment of 
unanimous shareholder agreements, albeit regarding non-compete clauses rather than terms restricting the 
directors.  Despite objections that one of the shareholders had not consented to de facto amendments and 
that therefore they were ineffective under both the terms of that document itself and C.B.C.A. s. 140(2) 
(which was apparently assumed to require unanimity for amendment),
521
 Gonthier J.C.S. concluded (for 
frankly dubious reasons
522
) that the shareholder had actually consented, and it was only an error on the part 
of the lawyers that had resulted in him not being a party to that particular document.
523
  It might therefore 
be appropriate to take this judgment as having waived the writing requirement in the context of 
amendments, rather than the need for unanimity. 
 The question also extends to whether non-shareholders who were parties must participate in the 
amendment, as the following two cases demonstrate.  In Gillespie v. Overs,
524
 one shareholder 
unsuccessfully attempted to have the other sign a by-law which purported to alter arrangements specified in 
the pre-existing unanimous shareholder agreement.
525
  Sutherland J. considered whether such a by-law 
might have constituted an amendment to the unanimous shareholder agreement if signed by all 
shareholders,
526
 and the judge concluded that it would not have because the corporation itself had been a 
party to the original agreement and the corporation would not be a party to its own by-laws.
527
  While 
                                                                                                                                                                             
519
 Ibid, par. 69. 
520
 Marque d'Or Inc. c. Clayman, [1988] R.J.Q. 706, 1988 CarswellQue 779, 21 C.P.R. (3d) 490 
(C.S. Que. 1988) (hereinafter "Marque d'Or").  (The same judgment, with slightly different paragraph 
numbering, also appears at Marque d'or inc. c. Clayman, 1988 CarswellQue 898, J.E. 88-291, EYB 1988-
77910 (C.S. Que. Jan 14, 1988).)  A company based in Montreal had four investors (par. 4) who created a 
unanimous shareholder agreement with a non-compete clause covering Quebec (pars. 6-7).  One of the 
shareholders (the defendant) left the company (par. 5) and along with two of the remaining ones formed 
another business to do the same work in Toronto (par. 6).  This new company also had an agreement among 
its own shareholders with a non-compete clause covering Ontario, as well as a shotgun clause (par. 7).  
These three individuals then entered yet another agreement stating that if the shotgun clause was used 
within two years, all non-compete clauses were inapplicable (par. 7).  This subsequently occurred, and the 
defendant was bought out (par. 8).  At issue was whether he was still bound by the first corporation's non-
compete clause covering Quebec. 
521
 Marque d'Or, supra note 520, par. 15. 
522
 The judge based this on the fact that the fourth shareholder had clearly accepted the departure of 
the other from the first corporation (Marque d'Or, supra note 520, par. 16).  The logic connecting this to 
consent to amendment of the non-compete clause is tenuous at best, and becomes even more so when one 
considers that the contracts involved in the sale of his shares in that initial company also contained 
restrictive covenants covering Quebec (par. 12). 
523
 Marque d'Or, supra note 520, par. 16. 
524
 Gillespie v. Overs, 1987 CarswellOnt 3404, 5 A.C.W.S. (3d) 430, [1987] C.L.D. 1217, [1987] O.J. 
No. 747 (Ont. H.C. Aug 14, 1987) (hereinafter "Gillespie"). 
525
 Ibid, par. 71. 
526
 See also the discussion of Investissements Amiouny Inc. c. Placements A.A.A.H. Inc., 14 B.L.R. 
(2d) 161, 1993 CarswellQue 28, J.E. 93-1841, EYB 1993-84140 (C.S. Que. Nov 03, 1993) (hereinafter 
"Investissements") later this chapter. 
527
 Gillespie, supra note 524, par. 71. 
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obiter,
528
 this indicates that if non-shareholders are parties to a unanimous shareholder agreement, they 
must also be parties to an amendment.  This makes sense from a contractual perspective, although not 
necessarily from one which views the unanimous shareholder agreement as nothing more than a statutory 
authorization for the shareholders to unanimously restrict the powers of the directors. 
 A loosely similar issue arose in Papillon & Fils (J.C.) Ltée c. Gagnon.
529
  The defendant had 
purchased (from existing shareholders) shares in the company that was the principal shareholder and 
managing company for the one where he worked,
530
 and he had confirmed that he was bound by the pre-
existing unanimous shareholder agreement.
531
  It contained a non-compete clause.
532
  The defendant 
eventually sold his shares to four of the five other shareholders.
533
  The sale contract contained a term 
revoking all prior contracts among the parties, specifically including the unanimous shareholder 
agreement.
534
  The company then had a shareholder meeting where the sale was accepted and the 
revocation clause was repeated in writing, this time adding the final shareholder.
535
  All shareholders 
signed.
536
 
 The original unanimous shareholder agreement had included both the managing company and the 
operating company as intervenors, for the purpose of enforcing their rights under it
537
 and the non-compete 
clause specifically referred to them.
538
  Therefore, they argued, those companies could still have the benefit 
of the non-compete clause, never having waived it.
539
  Allard J. found that the parent company had waived 
the clause by virtue of the decisions made unanimously by its shareholders at the aforementioned meeting, 
where all of the original shareholders who had signed the agreement (plus one new one) had signed the 
revocation.
540
  The judge said that, in reading the document as a whole, it was clear that the intervenors had 
left it to the shareholders to modify the agreement.
541
  The document stated that it would be terminated in 
                                                          
528
 And possibly based on the terms of the document; the judge alluded to "a written agreement such 
as by the terms of the Agreement, is required if the Agreement is to be amended" (Gillespie, supra note 
524, par. 71). 
529
 Papillon & Fils (J.C.) ltee c. Gagnon, 1989 CarswellQue 1669, J.E. 90-604, EYB 1989-79513 
(C.S. Que. Nov 09, 1989) (hereinafter "Papillon"). 
530
 Ibid, pars. 28-29. 
531
 Ibid, par. 30.  The document was a unanimous shareholder agreement and purported to restrict the 
directors (par. 31). 
532
 Ibid, par. 32. 
533
 Ibid, par. 40. 
534
 Ibid, par. 41. 
535
 Ibid, par. 43. 
536
 Ibid, par. 44. 
537
 Ibid, par. 45. 
538
 Ibid, par. 46. 
539
 Ibid, par. 47. 
540
 Ibid, par. 48. 
541
 Ibid, par. 50. 
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its entirety by the dissolution or bankruptcy of the company or the will of all the shareholders;
542
 the text 
thus specifically allowed for the agreement to be terminated at the sole discretion of the shareholders, 
without the intervenors.
543
  Allard J. noted further that the agreement stated that it could be modified by the 
written consent of the "parties". 
544
  With regard to that, the judge said, this being a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, it was understood that the term "parties" referred to the shareholders and not the companies that 
had been added as intervenors.
545
  Additionally, it was found to be relevant that, at the time the original 
agreement had been signed, the two companies had not intervened to create a right to enforce the non-
compete clause against the defendant.
546
  (He had not then been a shareholder.)  The non-compete clause 
had therefore been terminated.
547
  Unfortunately, the reasons for judgment contain some ambiguity as to 
whether it rests upon an interpretation of this document's terms, a general legal principle that the 
intervenors' consent was not required to amend a unanimous shareholder agreement, a determination that 
the intervenors actually had consented by proxy, or some combination of the above.  While such a 
distinction was unimportant in this case, given that all of these factors were apparently present, in others it 
might be more relevant. 
 Some distinction exists between the unanimity requirement for the formation of unanimous 
shareholder agreements and its sometimes role in their amendment, but the latter situation can nonetheless 
shed light on the former.  Specific interpretation of exactly how the criterion functions can likely be carried 
over, but more importantly, amendments provide a situation where the basic existence of the requirement 
can be questioned.  To ask whether it should be possible to non-unanimously alter the control structure of a 
corporation by amending a unanimous shareholder agreement is, at heart, to ask why unanimity should ever 
be required to do so.
548
 
 If one views the corporation as a "contract" which all shareholders (and only shareholders) are 
parties to, then amending it requires the consent of all parties.  Indeed, from this perspective, there would 
be no difference between creating and amending a unanimous shareholder agreement; both would 
                                                          
542
 Ibid, par. 51. 
543
 Ibid, par. 53. 
544
 Ibid, par. 54. 
545
 Ibid, par. 55. 
546
 Ibid, par. 49. 
547
 Ibid, par. 56. 
548
 In addition to provisions relating to control of the corporation, unanimous shareholder agreements 
can also contain clauses that govern other rights and obligations.  Adding, subtracting, or altering such 
terms is outside the scope of corporate law principles and should obviously require unanimity, or at the 
very least the consent of all affected parties.  See, for example, Château St-François inc. c. 9087-5550 
Québec inc., 2003 CarswellQue 1609, REJB 2003-44646, J.E. 2003-1639 (C.S. Que. June 12, 2003), where 
it was found that three quarters of the investors could not amend a unanimous shareholder agreement 
(generally described in the judgment as just a shareholder agreement, but referred to as a unanimous 
shareholder agreement at par. 42 in an extract reproduced from the pleadings) to add a non-compete clause 
and impose it upon the dissenting shareholders. 
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constitute revisions to the previously existing voluntary arrangement between the parties.  That such a 
distinction is even conceivable represents a rejection of a strictly contractual understanding of the 
corporation.  Conversely, accepting the tenets of that position requires that the unanimity requirement apply 
with equal force to amendments, unless the parties themselves have waived it (as they can in Ontario). 
 But if the corporation is instead viewed as a creation of statute, governed by rules designed to 
balance the interests of the shareholders (and perhaps even other parties) in a fair yet practical manner, in 
accordance with the will of the majority as tempered by legal protections for the minority, then non-
unanimous amendment could be permissible... but so might the non-unanimous creation of an instrument to 
restrict directors' powers.
549
 
 
5.(d) Summation 
 
 The very name of the unanimous shareholder agreement makes clear one of its fundamental 
criteria: all of the shareholders must be parties to it.  This seemingly simple requirement hides a number of 
technical complications that the legislation fails to clearly address, some of which have been the subject of 
litigation.  Lurking behind these practical problems, however, is the more fundamental question of why the 
unanimity requirement exists and what purpose it actually serves. 
 The position that the corporation can be represented as an extremely complex voluntary 
arrangement of individuals, a "nexus of contracts", would require the consent of all affected parties to any 
alteration of that structure; their consent is crucial to the hypothesis and cannot be imposed.  The 
unanimous shareholder agreement clearly has commonalities with a version of this model, one that focuses 
upon the agreement of the equity investors as the sole relevant parties (to at least the governance aspects of 
the notional corporate contract).  The unanimity requirement is, in such a framework, essential. 
 Yet the unanimity requirement is also problematic, because corporate law does not, as a rule, 
require it.  The default power structure is controlled by representatives elected by majorities who in turn 
govern via majority rather than unanimity, subject to certain safeguards and duties; where shareholder 
direct participation is allowed or required by statute, it is again generally through majority or supermajority 
rule.  The corporate framework set out in the legislation therefore stands in contrast to the "nexus of 
contracts" model, although can be rationalized with it by positing that there has been unanimous consent to 
this power arrangement. 
 Because the necessity for unanimity was included in the legislation with regard to this particular 
tool, the unanimous shareholder agreement's status as an incursion of "nexus of contracts" assumptions into 
the existing statutory model is on the one hand central; its basic criteria suggest a corporation that is a 
                                                          
549
 This would obviously require amending the current wording of the statute(s), but such a change 
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contract amongst all the shareholders and requires all of their consent.  But on the other hand, this also 
serves to subsequently disguise any conflict between the two models; enforcement of the unanimity rule 
becomes both adherence to the statute and in line with "nexus of contracts" axioms.  Cases where the 
unanimity rule is simply not met do not garner much analysis; the situation is such that there would be no 
easy basis for judicial disagreement.  The exception is circumstances where the unanimity rule is somehow 
rendered ambiguous: the substitution of related parties, legal versus beneficial shareholders, share classes 
with separate agreements, and amendments.  These cases create an arena in which to ask the question of 
whose consent to a unanimous shareholder agreement is really required. 
 While the data remains limited, it is possible to cautiously draw the conclusion that even when 
judges have this sort of "cover" for waiving the unanimity requirement, they generally have no great 
appetite for doing so.  That said, the (perceived) "spirit" of unanimity may sometimes overcome technical 
compliance issues, as White, Kary, Piikani, and Ming suggest.  Where there is no clear indication of 
unanimity amongst the shareholders, however, there can be no unanimous shareholder agreement.  It is 
seemingly inseparably bound to its eponymous criterion and to a conception of corporate power arising 
from the joint consent of all the shareholders. 
 
6.   "Restricts the Powers of the Directors" 
6.(a) Scope of the Criterion 
 
 A unanimous shareholder agreement's ability to restrict the power of a corporation's directors
550
 is 
its unique feature.  It is also, in the C.B.C.A. and some of the provinces,
551
 the final criterion that the statute 
                                                                                                                                                                             
would have theoretical justification. 
550
 Roger D. Wilson, in "Voting Agreements and Unanimous Shareholder Agreements" in 
Shareholders and Shareholders Agreements: Edited Lectures from the Programme  (Toronto: Department 
of Continuing Education, The Law Society of Upper Canada, 1976)  61, at p. 67 queried whether one could 
restrict the liabilities of one director, since the statute refers to "directors".  His answer was that the court 
would not allow unanimous shareholder agreements to be used to avoid justice, which sidesteps the 
interpretative question raised.  Wilson appears to have been contemplating whether a unanimous 
shareholder agreement could restrict (and thus relieve) only one individual from amongst a larger group of 
directors.  The legislation refers to "the power of the directors", and the definitive article (the directors) 
indicates a reference to the entire board collectively, so restricting the power of specific directors does not 
appear to have been contemplated or authorized.  The power of the board collectively might nonetheless be 
restricted in a manner that altered the relative power of individual members, e.g. by requiring the assent of 
a director representing the minority shareholder before the board could perform certain acts.  In the other 
situation where the pluralization of "directors" in the statute might be in issue, a corporation with only a 
single director, a unanimous shareholder agreement should still be effective; that lone individual wields 
"the power of the directors" until and unless restricted. 
551
 See discussion earlier in this chapter. 
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sets out for a document to qualify as a unanimous shareholder agreement.
552
  Only a unanimous shareholder 
agreement may restrict the power of the directors, but if the agreement doesn't contain such a restriction, it 
is merely a contract amongst all the shareholders.
553
  While the most obvious limitation on a non-
unanimous shareholder agreement- that it cannot limit the directors- tautologically does not apply, there are 
other implications; it does not bind transferees, it is not a "constitutional" document with regard to 
determining de jure control, et cetera. 
 There has been debate in the literature, discussed further in Chapter Five, about whether the word 
"restricts" in the legislation refers only to a negative restriction, or if it can also include pre-made decisions 
and transfers of power.
554
  The case law, with a few isolated exceptions,
555
 seems to find all of them 
acceptable.  What constitutes a "restriction" is not only the measure of what a unanimous shareholder 
agreement can accomplish,
556
  but also what terms meet the requirement of a (valid) limitation upon the 
                                                          
552
 Although Duha SCC, supra note 24, settled the necessity of a restriction, the opposite judicial 
view had found expression in the caselaw (e.g. Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. v. R., [1996] 3 F.C. 78, 27 
B.L.R. (2d) 89, [1996] 3 C.T.C. 19, 198 N.R. 359, 1996 CarswellNat 1458, 1996 CarswellNat 2573, 96 
D.T.C. 6323, [1996] F.C.J. No. 738 (Fed. C.A. May 30, 1996) (hereinafter "Duha FCA"); Investissements, 
supra note 526).  Martel, supra note 11, did not include it in his list of the three criteria of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement (p. 8), but he qualified that by noting that not all (written, lawful) agreements 
amongst all the shareholders are unanimous shareholder agreements.  For example, a buy-sell agreement 
would not be.  He wrote that the legislature meant an agreement that restricted the directors, and he went so 
far as to suggest that a better name for the tool would have reflected that purpose (p. 10).  Such a name 
change would be necessary if the criteria for an instrument restricting the directors' powers were ever 
reduced from unanimity to majority (p. 11).  In that regard, he was misinterpreted in Investissements, as 
discussed below.  Daniel LaFortune, "La Convention D'Actionnaire" (2002) 36 R.J.T. n.s. 197, at pp. 212-
213 also found it "l'oin d'etre evident" (my translation: "far from evident") that the provincial legislature 
had wanted restrictions upon the directors to be a requirement for the creation of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement. 
553
 Unlike a failure to meet the unanimity requirement, a lack of restriction upon the directors seems 
unlikely to invalidate whatever terms the document does include, assuming they were otherwise valid.  It 
would simply be a contract amongst the investors, unless for some reason it failed to achieve even that legal 
status.  Parties who had mistakenly believed that they were entering a unanimous shareholder agreement 
with all the attendant implications (e.g. that it would be binding upon transferees) might, once corrected, 
seek to have it nullified, but generally speaking, being wrong about the exact legal implications of a 
contract is not grounds to void it.  The general rule that a would-be unanimous shareholder agreement that 
does not restrict directors is still an enforceable contract finds expression in Landreville c. Chouinard, 
[2000] J.Q. no 2411 (C.S. Que. Apr 17, 2000).  A motion was brought to annul the acts of individuals who 
had recently been elected directors (par. 38) in violation of the quorum requirements in a unanimous 
shareholder agreement (pars. 7, 33).  Although Dalphond J. specifically found that the document met all the 
criteria (including restricting the directors) and therefore was a unanimous shareholder agreement (pars. 7, 
48), the judge said that even were that not the case, it would still constitute a binding pooling agreement, 
and it had still been violated (pars. 49-50). 
554
 Chapter Five also provides some recommendations for dealing with the various power 
configurations. 
555
 See the discussions of 9109-0068 Québec inc. c. Lambert, 2008 CarswellQue 12469, J.E. 2009-44, 
EYB 2008-150855 (C.S. Que. Nov 10, 2008) (hereinafter "9109 CS"); 9109 CA, supra note 450; and 
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directors necessary to satisfy the statutory definition.  It would create an absurdity if the exact same usage 
of the word "restricts" had a different meaning depending upon whether the issue was the ability to restrict 
or the requirement to restrict.  From a prescriptive standpoint, rewording the statute to create such a 
separation between abilities and requirements
557
 has no apparent benefit. 
 The question of exactly what types of restrictions do meet that definition has received some 
attention in the case law, discussed below, although those judgments have not emphasized a contrast 
between negative restrictions and pre-made decisions, nor between restrictions and transfers.  Generally 
speaking, all of these appear to be permissible, subject to some complications discussed in the next section. 
 The other issue upon which commentary has largely focussed is the existence of the criterion, or 
rather its exclusivity in some statutes, rather than precisely what types of restrictions are acceptable.
558
  The 
Alberta Report rejected the need to limit unanimous shareholder agreements to focussing upon restrictions 
on the directors, on the ground that shareholders might want to entrench other changes to the corporate 
structure, and that unanimous agreements amongst them might be the most appropriate means of doing so 
in some situations.
559
  It recommended a number of other possible topics that might be acceptable in place 
of, rather than in addition to, restrictions upon the directors: the regulation of shareholder rights among 
themselves, providing for the management of the corporation including restricting the powers of the 
directors, and any other provision contemplated in the Act.
560
  The explanation provided takes as a given 
that the corporate structure should be malleable and shareholders should be able to alter it: "Such an 
expansion would, we think, give the shareholders the maximum power to regulate their own affairs in 
accordance with the needs of the particular corporation, and by reason of other provisions of the Act, we do 
not think that the expansion would adversely affect third parties."
561
  As discussed above, the legislation in 
Alberta and subsequently several additional jurisdictions followed this advice, although the C.B.C.A. and 
other provinces did not; notably, while the list of acceptable topics is broader than that in the C.B.C.A., it is 
still not unlimited. 
 The Industry Canada Discussion Paper concluded, with minimal discussion, that "[f]rom a policy 
perspective, there do not appear to be strong reasons to prohibit shareholders from entrenching in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement 'any provision which they want to make about the internal affairs and 
organization of the corporation'".
562
  Three articles by Dennis, Disney, and Scavone
563
 took strong 
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prescriptive stances for similarly widening the scope of unanimous shareholder agreements in the 
C.B.C.A.
564
  While the primary position being advocated was increased possible uses of the tool, including 
uses that may be currently impermissible, they as a corollary suggested that the agreements would no 
longer need to contain a restriction upon directors at all. 
 All three justified their position in part upon a perceived need to recognize and legitimize 
allegedly common existing practices in close corporations, which may operate in a manner that is informal 
(less charitably: illegal) and in contravention of various statutory requirements.
565
  I would suggest that the 
failure of companies to adhere to a given provision is not necessarily indicative that it serves no purpose.  
While the law must sometimes change in response to reality, non-compliance may indicate a problem with 
the non-compliers rather than with the law. 
 It is also telling that the unanimous shareholder agreement is advanced as the means whereby 
these anomalous business practices might be legitimized.  There are doubtless provisions of the Act which 
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563
 Scavone had earlier co-authored another brief article recommending that the unanimous 
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are unnecessary
566
 but it is not clear why any reform should be limited to close corporations
567
 or achieved 
through the expansion of unanimous shareholder agreements.  If the legislation does contain a plethora of 
provisions that neither serve public policy nor protect third parties, then surely the redundant sections are 
best eliminated, rather than rendered subject to override by a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Or, if the 
sections are not of such utility as to be mandatory but remain useful default arrangements, why reserve the 
power to override them to a unanimous shareholder agreement and not the articles, the by-laws, or even 
decisions of the board of directors?  If the missing factor justifying these alleged vast swathes of semi-
useless provisions (in the absence of a unanimous shareholder agreement) is minority protection, then is the 
unanimous enactment of an agreement sufficient to displace the policy goal of minority protection, 
including the protection of subsequent transferees? 
 The reason that these analysts have settled upon the unanimous shareholder agreement as the tool 
for their desired reforms is their belief that it is fundamentally associated with a contractual understanding 
of the corporation.  Disney openly stated that the unanimous shareholder agreement has introduced "a 
shareholder-chosen contractual model of corporate governance formerly absent from Canadian law",
568
 and 
Scavone asserted that these documents are not merely a tool whereby shareholders might exert somewhat 
greater powers, but rather a radical shift in Canadian corporate law from a paradigm of statutory division of 
powers to contractual corporations.
569
 
 Accordingly, they suggested that a wider list of topics than just restricting directors should be 
present in the criteria for unanimous shareholder agreements, and that any provision in the corporate law 
statutes which does not affect third parties or public policy should be subject to variation through that same 
method.
570
  This would, of course, be a substantial shift in the law toward a contractual corporation, 
although the recognition of some legitimate concerns beyond the shareholders' self-interest prevents it from 
being a total embrace of the corporation as merely a complex private "contract" among the investors. 
 There are compelling arguments to be made that a restriction upon the powers of the directors is 
not the only possible arrangement amongst shareholders that would benefit from some degree of special 
statutory status that excluded it from the normal rules of contract law.  For example, a right of first refusal 
on the sale of shares might be more useful if it automatically bound subsequent transferees who were not 
parties to the initial contract.  But even if that is so, it does not follow that the unanimous shareholder 
agreement (as it currently exists) is the best or even an appropriate method to achieve such ends. 
 Dennis, Disney, and Scavone all endorsed a wide-ranging contractual model of the corporation, 
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albeit one constrained by some legal safeguards.  Despite its limited scope in the current legislation, each of 
them saw the unanimous shareholder agreement as a reflection of that approach, even as they advocated 
that it must be extensively overhauled in order to truly accomplish the goals they believed it should.  There 
is a contradiction there.  While the unanimous shareholder agreement allows for some alteration of 
corporate power, in its current form, that alteration occurs within limits.  Even Alberta,
571
 which presents 
additional options, is still only offering a tool to accomplish a few specified customizations of the 
corporation within a wider, largely set framework. 
 Strictly speaking, it would be possible to accomplish the aforementioned goals by altering the 
permissible scope of unanimous shareholder agreements, but leaving the necessary requirement unchanged.  
It is a mistake to conflate what unanimous shareholder agreements can accomplish with the criteria they 
must meet.  All three authors not only wished to expand the permissible scope of the documents, but also to 
revise the criteria such that a contract amongst all the shareholders does not need to restrict the directors in 
order to qualify as a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Assuming for the sake of argument that the more 
malleable corporation they envision is desirable and moreover that a unanimous shareholder agreement is 
the appropriate vehicle by which to accomplish that, it is not actually necessary to remove the criterion that 
the directors must be restricted. While such a term might be irrelevant in a contract primarily designed to 
achieve other ends, perhaps satisfied by a pro forma restriction unlikely to ever matter (e.g. "the directors 
may not authorize the borrowing of more than ten trillion dollars in debt financing"),
572
 it could serve a 
useful function by signifying that the parties were deliberately choosing to enter into a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, not a mere agreement amongst all the shareholders.
573
 
 Dennis did not make such a distinction; he viewed the C.B.C.A. requirement that directors be 
restricted as "problematical, since it defines very narrowly the purpose and scope of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  Shareholders may wish to vary other C.B.C.A. rules relating to internal governance 
in addition to or without altering the powers of the directors."
574
  This confuses "purpose and scope" with 
necessary criteria; while under the circumstances, some correlation may be inferred from what terms these 
agreements must include and their purpose, this utter conflation of the criteria with the purpose is not 
necessarily any more accurate than the assertion that the "purpose" of these documents is that they be in 
writing.  Scavone was more cognizant of this potential difference between the criteria for these agreements 
and their purpose, although he suggested this may be a drafting error.
575
  Notwithstanding that, he accepted 
that at present the legislation has made restricting the directors into an actual requirement of a unanimous 
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shareholder agreement, and he was critical of a pair of judgments that suggested otherwise.
576
  Disney 
argued that that it was fruitless to allow the legal status of an agreement to be determined by whether it 
contained such a restriction
577
 and added the specific criticism that what constituted a restriction was 
debatable and could lead to uncertainty regarding whether a document constituted a unanimous shareholder 
agreement.
578
 
 It is therefore unsurprising that each of them offered a prescriptive suggestion for reform that 
dispensed with the requirement that a unanimous shareholder agreement restrict the directors.
579
  Dennis 
and Scavone suggested that a list be added to the legislation of permissible-and-sufficient topics for 
unanimous shareholder agreements, modelled respectively on the American close corporation statutes and 
the Alberta act,
580
 while Disney suggested instead a negative list of what topics cannot be changed,
581
 
although the view that it is easier to list those that do serve a purpose and cannot be contracted out of than 
those that do not is questionable. 
 Despite these general urgings toward a more expansive definition, Dennis explicitly rejected the 
idea that every agreement amongst all the shareholders, no matter the contents, be given the status of 
unanimous shareholder agreements, on the grounds that the uses for which they are "really intended"
582
 
were limited to "affect[ing] the internal governance of a close corporation in one or more ways and opt[ing] 
out of the procedural requirements of the Act".
583
  It is unclear how such a conclusion can be drawn from 
the existing legislation; it appears to be a prescriptive argument, based on his own view of the corporation 
and this tool's potential role in it. 
 Many of these suggested uses for the unanimous shareholder agreement are already possible.  
Even the Alberta variation with its four alternatives, which these authors endorse as superior to the federal 
requirement that the directors be restricted, arguably is more an expansion of the requirements for 
qualifying than of what the instrument itself can accomplish.
584
  Why then do they equate their desired role 
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for the unanimous shareholder agreements with an alteration to the criteria for one's formation? 
 The reason that they argued for the removal of the requirement may be the confusion that has 
existed as to whether only terms that restricted directors were granted statutory status, with the other terms 
not subject to the special rules governing unanimous shareholder agreements.  This question has received 
substantial attention in the literature, without consensus.  Scavone considered the matter uncertain, but he 
noted that there are provisions in the C.B.C.A. that list other matters which may be dealt with in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement (and which do not themselves restrict the powers of directors), which in 
turn suggested to him that such agreements would be considered as a whole once they met the initial 
condition.
585
  Disney argued that any other clauses of such documents, including for example buy-sell 
agreements, would constitute part of the unanimous shareholder agreement but not bind transferees, which 
he describes as the "only sensible result"
586
 while noting that the C.B.C.A. is not explicit on this point.  Ratti 
asserted the same conclusion.
587
  Martel took the position that under the Q.C.A. (as it then was) terms in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement unrelated to restricting directors would not bind transferees, although he 
considered the wording of the C.B.C.A. '74-'75 more expansive in that regard.
588
  Smith raised the concern 
that if a unanimous shareholder agreement contained terms that did not restrict the directors, not only 
would those items not bind transferees, but those terms or even the entire agreement might become 
ineffective with respect to all parties (even original signatories) in order to avoid that result.
589
  Ewasiuk 
discussed some of the problems that might arise if unanimous shareholder agreements are considered 
indivisible documents such that even the terms which do not restrict directors bind transferees (a result he 
did not necessarily find inevitable, merely possible
590
): some clauses may be of application to all 
shareholders and others to particular shareholders; some may relate to restrictions on directors' powers and 
others to shareholder issues unrelated to the directors; some may be of clear relevance to the shareholders 
qua shareholders and others may relate to them in some other capacity such as employees or lenders (or 
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even, though Ewasiuk does not go so far, capacities completely unrelated to the corporation).
591
  In each 
case, the question arises as to whether a transferee is bound, be it to a clause that was specific to the 
shareholder-transferor and not to the shareholders generally, a clause that related to a matter other than the 
restriction of directors' powers, or a clause that applied to the original participants in a capacity other than 
shareholders.
592
  And, in a parallel question, does a transferor escape those sorts of obligations?
593
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Duha, discussed in the next section, makes it clear that 
a unanimous shareholder agreement is a single unified whole, including terms that do not restrict directors.  
Aside from the technical complications Ewasiuk identified, this raises a more basic issue: why is it possible 
to grant the special status of a unanimous shareholder agreement to arbitrary contractual terms?  Normally, 
it would not be possible to do so, and their inclusion in a document that also happens to include restrictions 
upon directors seems a poor reason to give special status to largely unrelated clauses.  One justification 
might be that the other items could be the consideration for the restrictions, and to treat them differently 
might lead to unjust results, but it remains anomalous that terms which would normally be merely 
contractual are granted the special status that accompanies inclusion in a unanimous shareholder 
agreement.  A more theoretically rigorous approach might have been to identify what specific terms both 
satisfy the criteria to qualify as unanimous shareholder agreements (or some similar status) and also to 
receive it, with all other terms being excluded.
594
  This would also avoid the technical complications that 
accompany the current state of the law, but it would require amendments to the legislation to remove 
references to unanimous shareholder agreements in sections covering unrelated aspects of corporate 
organization. 
 
6.(b) Restriction Requirement Cases  
6.(b)(i) Duha Printers 
 
 The last statutory requirement for a unanimous shareholder agreement to be valid under the 
C.B.C.A. is that it restricts in whole or in part the powers of directors.  This necessity has been the subject 
of consideration by the Supreme Court of Canada, in their only major examination of the unanimous 
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shareholder agreement, Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. v. R.
595
  They confirmed that it is a required element 
in order for a unanimous shareholder agreement to have statutory status, and they considered what might 
constitute such a restriction, as well as indirectly confirming that once that criterion had been met, the 
document as a whole was a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 Before examining that decision, it is useful to review the lower level judgments that preceded it, 
first in the Tax Court of Canada,
596
 then at the Federal Court of Appeal.
597
  Duha concerned the question of 
who controlled, for tax purposes, a Manitoba Act company referred to as "Duha #2".  If Marr's Leisure 
Holdings Inc. controlled it, then the tax losses of a different company which Marr's controlled could be 
applied to Duha #2 as a related company.  If Marr's did not control Duha #2, then the losses could not be so 
transferred.
598
  Marr's owned the majority of the voting shares of Duha #2, but had entered into a 
unanimous shareholder agreement
599
 whereby the three directors of the corporation had to be selected from 
a list of four individuals: Emeric V. Duha and his wife Gwendolyn, William A. Marr (the majority 
shareholder of Marr's) and Paul S. Quinton, a friend of both Duha and Marr.
600
 
 At the trial level, Rip J.T.C.C. asserted that the agreement was not, in fact, a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  While he found that it was a valid legal contract amongst the shareholders,
 601
 it 
failed the statutory definition, since it did not restrict the powers of the directors.
602
  In his view: 
 
The agreement between the shareholders of Duha #2 and Duha #2 is not the unanimous 
shareholder agreement contemplated by the Corporations Act since it does not restrict 
one or more powers of the directors of Duha #2 in the management of its business and 
affairs. There are no provisions, for example, as there are in the agreement between the 
shareholders in Alteco, infra, in which the shareholders agreed to cause the corporation to 
do certain things that normally are within the powers of the directors to decide.
603
   
 
 The constating documents of the company, which in the judge's view excluded the agreement
604
 
and consisted only of the articles and by-laws, did not limit the ability of the majority shareholder to control 
the election of the board of directors.  Rip J.T.C.C. noted that even if he consulted the agreement, since 
Marr's could vote in both Marr himself and Quinton, who was viewed as a neutral party, Marr's could 
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control the board, or at least ensure that Duha did not.
605
  Accordingly, he ruled that Marr's was in control 
of Duha #2. 
 In Alteco, which will be discussed in greater detail below, the unanimous shareholder agreement 
mandated that the company would do various things, including obtaining specified financing, making 
certain banking arrangements, and entering a number of agreements.  It also placed restrictions on new 
share issuances.  The agreement was held to impose restrictions upon directors, but without any specific 
clauses providing the basis for this conclusion.
606
  Apparently, Rip J.T.C.C., in using the case as precedent, 
had inferred that the former elements were the basis of the decision. 
 As the Supreme Court of Canada would emphasize, the unanimous shareholder agreement in 
Duha also contained restrictions on share issuances.
607
  Rip J.T.C.C. either did not notice these restrictions 
or did not consider them to be restrictions upon the directors.  While the point is not explicit, there is an 
implication that Rip J.T.C.C. considered the clearest evidence of restricting directors' powers to be a 
corresponding empowerment of shareholders.  In Duha such empowerment, as located by the Supreme 
Court, was minimal; the written consent of shareholders was necessary for the directors to issue shares, 
allowing them a veto power.
608
  The shareholders did not take on any of the general powers of the directors 
nor did the agreement itself mandate that any actions be taken by the board.  Looking to the empowerment 
of shareholders as evidence of a restriction on directors can be useful, but it should not replace looking for 
the restrictions themselves.  Except insofar as the restriction is itself an example of shareholder decision-
making, a unanimous shareholder agreement need neither make any specific decisions regarding the 
corporation's actions nor allocate to the shareholders such power in the future. 
 The Federal Court of Appeal overturned the trial decision.  Linden J.T.C.C. delivered what was 
apparently the majority judgment; Isaac C.J. gave a brief concurring judgment endorsing Linden J.T.C.C.'s 
reasons, while Stone J.A. concurred for different reasons.  According to the analysis of Linden J.T.C.C., 
Paul Quinton was a nominee of the Duha family, and therefore any combination of three directors elected 
from the possible four would leave the Duhas in control.
609
  Linden J.T.C.C. believed that, in coming to this 
conclusion, it made little difference whether the agreement was a unanimous shareholder agreement or not, 
as even without statutory status, an agreement amongst shareholders could determine control.
610
  He 
nonetheless decided that it was, in fact, a unanimous shareholder agreement for two reasons: 
 
I am, first, not convinced that that Act requires that a shareholders agreement restrict the 
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powers of directors in order to be a "unanimous shareholders agreement."  No binding 
case law was put to me on this issue, and I do not read the subsection 140(2) as 
unambiguously requiring this.
611
 
 
 In the event that he was wrong, he added, with unfortunate vagueness: 
 
I am not convinced that the agreement failed to restrict the powers of the directors.  
Certain of its provisions bound the directors directly, and others bound them indirectly by 
binding the company.  This is, in my view, a sufficient restriction to meet the wording of 
subsection 140(2) of the Corporations Act.
612
 
 
 With regard to his first point, the Manitoba Corporations Act section in question read: 
 
140(2) An otherwise lawful written agreement among all the shareholders of a 
corporation, or among all the shareholders and a person who is not a shareholder, that 
restricts, in whole or in part, the powers of the directors to manage the business and 
affairs of the corporation is valid.
613
 
 
 Technically, Linden J.T.C.C. is right that this section on its own does not create any requirements 
whatsoever for a unanimous shareholder agreement, merely declaring a certain type of agreement amongst 
all the shareholders to be valid.  But the definition of "unanimous shareholder agreement" in section 1(1) 
explains it as an agreement of the type described in section 140(2).
614
  Since the only type of agreement 
described in section 140(2) is one that restricts directors, it is difficult to see how such an element could be 
only "ambiguously" required, unless Linden J.T.C.C. considered the first and second halves of the sentence 
to be somehow separable. 
 Stone J.A., in his concurring judgment, went into a more lengthy analysis as to whether or not the 
agreement in question restricted the power of the directors.
615
  The basis of his decision was that the 
agreement explicitly put the "affairs" of the corporation under the control of the directors; by omission, it 
removed the "business" of the corporation from their control.
616
  Since directors normally have a statutory 
power over both the business and affairs of a corporation, that constituted a restriction.
617
  This conclusion 
was bolstered in his view by the wording of the arbitration clause, which suggested that the shareholders 
(not directors) would resort to arbitration to settle differences regarding the business of the corporation.
618
  
The separate meaning of the "affairs" of the corporation, as opposed to its business, was in Stone J.A.'s 
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view clear from the M.C.A., where it was defined separately.
619
  Based upon this reasoning, Stone J.A. 
found that Marr's did not control the corporation, because it had the power only to elect directors who 
would manage the affairs but not the business of it, which was not sufficient for control; the business of the 
company was to be controlled by the shareholders, and Stone J.A. found it implicit in the agreement that 
they were to do so by unanimous agreement and not by voting their shares, hence the need for an 
arbitration clause.
620
 
 Two objections might be made to Stone J.A.'s approach.  The first is whether this division between 
"business" and "affairs" is plausible, notwithstanding the definitions in the statute.  The second is whether 
shareholders, by specifically empowering directors in one area, are implicitly removing powers in others.  
It is not a standard assumption that the existence of a unanimous shareholder agreement removes all powers 
from the directors unless they are explicitly re-granted by the document.  Generally, since the instrument 
specifies ways in which the corporation will deviate from default rules, it must explicitly remove powers 
the directors would otherwise have.
621
  Only in a few situations would the granting of a certain power be 
implicitly a limitation on related ones.  For example, a provision that "the directors may authorize the 
corporation to take out loans of one million dollars or less" might reasonably be read as eliminating the 
power to borrow greater amounts.
622
  Whether a specific reference to "affairs" without "business" falls into 
this category is debatable; Stone J.A. concluded that it did, but the Supreme Court of Canada disagreed. 
Iacobucci J. delivered the unanimous judgment of the Supreme Court.  He stressed that in order to 
transfer the losses, the control of Duha #2 needed to be de jure and not de facto.
623
  He determined that a 
unanimous shareholder agreement was a constitutional document of the corporation and thus determined de 
jure control.
624
  Having so concluded, Iacobucci J. considered whether this particular unanimous 
shareholder agreement met the statutory requirements.  He rejected Stone J.A.'s separation of the "business" 
and "affairs" as "difficult to accept"
625
 and ruled that clearer language would be needed for such an unusual 
result.
626
  He found that the reference to "business" in the arbitration clause referred only to that normally 
carried out by shareholders, not directors.
627
 
 He went on to write: 
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Generally speaking, USAs exist to deal with major issues facing a corporation: corporate 
structure, issuance of shares, declaration of dividends, election of directors, appointment 
of officers, and the like.  General business decisions are not ordinarily touched by such 
arrangements, and with good reason: it would not be efficient, for business purposes, to 
remit every decision, however minor, to a shareholder vote, let alone to require 
unanimous agreement among the shareholders on such decisions.  Fundamental 
disagreements among shareholders are ordinarily dealt with by different means, such as, 
for example, buy-sell arrangements or other methods of dispute resolution.  In 
exceptional cases, a USA may provide that an aggrieved shareholder may apply to the 
court for dissolution of the corporation and the return of his or her share capital.  But 
these are long-term solutions which are agreed upon with a view to facilitating the 
ongoing operation of the business, undisturbed by the day-to-day wrangling and 
disagreements that often characterize the relationships among shareholders in closely-
held companies, while permitting insurmountable disputes to be resolved by special 
measures.  This is vastly different from requiring unanimous consent to every action 
taken in furtherance of the business of a corporation.  Such an extraordinary corporate 
policy would require specific expression in the constating documents.  In my view, the 
provisions cited by the Minister do not qualify as such.
628
 
 
 However, since the unanimous shareholder agreement required that written consent of all the 
shareholders was necessary before the directors could issue new shares, and since normally the directors 
would be free to do so at their discretion, he found that their powers had been restricted.
629
 
 Despite this document being a valid unanimous shareholder agreement, and despite his conclusion 
that it therefore determined de jure control, Iacobucci J. ruled that the actual terms of the agreement did not 
remove Marr's control, as it had the power to elect the board of directors and that board retained virtually 
its full powers.
630
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada thus established four important rules regarding the requirement that 
directors' powers be restricted. First, such a restriction is necessary under the Manitoba Act, and 
presumably under all similarly worded statutes. Second, so long as there is a restriction anywhere in the 
document, the whole thing has status as a statutory unanimous shareholder agreement, even provisions that 
have nothing to do with restricting directors' powers.
631
  Third, a restriction on the issuance of new shares, 
and even more specifically a restriction only barring issues without written consent of the shareholders, is 
sufficient to qualify under that Act.  Finally, a unanimous shareholder agreement that establishes a need for 
unanimous shareholder consent for every corporate decision (or a similar level of shareholder power) must 
do so explicitly; the courts should be hesitant to find provisions of that sort. 
 The first and second of these conclusions raise fundamental questions about what the unanimous 
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shareholder agreement is and how it functions.  Why should an agreement amongst all the shareholders 
whose sole provision was, for example, restricting the possible directors to a set list (as in Duha) fail to 
achieve statutory recognition, simply because it failed to include a completely unrelated provision requiring 
approval of share issuances?  Conversely, why should the latter clause somehow elevate the former?  While 
the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was consistent with the statute, and allowed shareholders the 
maximum possible freedom in the circumstances as to what terms can fall under the ambit of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, it might have been more logically consistent to hold that only terms which 
restricted directors would have the statutory status.
632
  That, however, would have rendered nonsensical 
other sections of the Act that contemplate clauses in unanimous shareholder agreements for other 
purposes.
633
  This paradox is one of several that plague this tool.  The possibility that a restriction upon 
directors serves a signalling function has some substance, but there are simpler means of accomplishing 
that goal. 
 Taken together, these two principles also present a contradictory picture as to whether the 
development of the unanimous shareholder agreement embodies a shift toward a contractual view of the 
corporation.  On the one hand, by holding a restriction upon the directors as essential to the formation of 
this instrument (in some jurisdictions), the Supreme Court determined that there were statutory 
requirements that needed to be satisfied and that the written consent of all equity investors alone was not 
necessarily sufficient to alter the corporate structure.  On the other, in ruling that all terms of the agreement 
were of equal status once that criterion was met, Iacobucci J. found that the ability of shareholders to 
collectively reconfigure aspects of the default corporation by agreement was not narrowly limited to 
restricting directors' power, but could extend beyond that.  The former conclusion, however, could be 
viewed as simply an interpretation of relatively clear statutory language (although alternative readings of 
that section have been made); the latter, by contrast, being less clearly derived from the wording of the Act, 
might be more revealing as to whether the Supreme Court found it acceptable for the unanimous 
shareholder agreement to move Canadian corporations toward a contractual model. 
 Their third conclusion, in addition to providing an example of what might constitute a restriction 
on directors, has two general implications.  First, the Court accepted that such a highly specific item, 
affecting only a single type of decision, was enough to qualify as a restriction.  Second, this restriction was 
not in the form of an outright transfer of decision-making power to shareholders, even over this one area.  
The primary decision to issue shares still had to be made by the directors.  It was the restriction, not the 
corresponding empowerment of shareholders, that was crucial.  Treating the requirement in this manner 
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simultaneously weakens any barrier it may pose to the formation of a unanimous shareholder agreement 
and grants investors greater freedom to customize the corporate power structure to their exact liking.  While 
allowing for restrictions that only slightly curtail directors' powers means that the resultant corporations 
will stick closely to the statutorily-defined norm, it nonetheless suggests a comfort with the idea that 
shareholders have the ability to alter the board's authority as much or as little as they choose, that it is their 
right (not the statute's) to agree upon exactly what powers directors have. 
  The final point, that courts should be cautions in finding unanimous shareholder agreements have 
transferred power over routine decisions to shareholders, was one that has unfortunately been 
misinterpreted at times, as discussed below in the subsection on "invalid restrictions".  While a careful 
reading of the judgment indicates that Iacobucci J. was again actually empowering shareholders to create 
unusual and precisely tailored reconfigurations of power within the corporation, provided they did so in a 
sufficiently clear manner that they overcame the presumption that this sort of arrangement was unlikely, 
subsequent decisions have misread the passage in order to disallow such deviations from the default 
structure. 
 The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Duha is therefore consistent, in many ways, with the 
view that the unanimous shareholder agreement has moved Canadian corporate law a step closer to a 
contractual approach.  It did not, however, abandon the statutory model.  The judgment was clear that 
something more than just a contract amongst all the investors was needed; a unanimous shareholder 
agreement must meet requirements in the relevant legislation to be effective.  And even though the 
judgment allowed all the document's terms to qualify for this enhanced status, it remains true that- although 
this was not directly addressed in the judgment- many aspects of corporate law are currently beyond the 
scope of these instruments to change.  Nonetheless, within those parameters, the Supreme Court of Canada 
demonstrated comfort with the idea that an agreement amongst the shareholders has the ability to alter the 
corporation to better suit their desires. 
 
6.(b)(ii) Alternatives to Duha 
 
 The conclusions, both explicit and implicit, reached by the Supreme Court of Canada in Duha are, 
aside from the statutory provisions themselves, the highest available authority on the nature of unanimous 
shareholder agreements.  While they may be challenged on prescriptive grounds, those principles are, 
unless their merits are specifically being discussed, taken as a given throughout the rest of this dissertation.  
The subsections following this one, for example, takes it as axiomatic that a restriction is a required 
element.
634
  Given the isolated and contradictory nature of cases involving unanimous shareholder 
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agreements (and, frankly, elements in their analysis that often invite question), one should be sceptical of 
the notion that any judgment has "settled" anything about them even in a purely doctrinal sense, let alone 
from the perspective of any other legal philosophy.  That said, to ignore a Supreme Court of Canada 
precedent would render any further analysis at best overly abstract and at worst a form of "alternate 
history" of limited use to those interested in actual Canadian law. 
 There is nonetheless a utility to briefly examining alternative approaches; if sufficiently 
compelling, they may provide justification for reform, and if not, they will at least illuminate the current 
law through a contrast with the road not taken.  Two cases in particular, one from before Duha and one 
from after, performed analyses of unanimous shareholder agreements that arrived at very different 
conclusions from the Supreme Court's.  The first assumed a wider freedom on the part of shareholders to 
create contracts that had the status of unanimous shareholder agreements, without the need to include any 
particular type of term.  The second, conversely, argued in favour of awarding that status only to those very 
terms.  These two judgments thus present contrasts with Duha from either side, one granting even more 
freedom to investors to fundamentally affect corporations through contracts, the other preferring to limit 
contractual alterations to the corporation. 
 The one that came before Duha is Investissements Amiouny Inc. c. Placements A.A.A.H. Inc.,
635
 
which determined that restrictions upon the directors were not an essential criterion of unanimous 
shareholder agreements.  The issue was relevant because the company had passed a by-law requiring a 70% 
shareholder majority for the election of directors, 
636
 but under the statute,
637
 this requirement could be 
included in a unanimous shareholder agreement, but not a by-law.
638
 
 The position that restrictions upon directors were necessary for a document to constitute a 
unanimous shareholder agreement was specifically considered- one of the parties pled it
639
-  but Forget 
J.C.S. rejected it.  Citing Martel,
640
 the judge held that the purposes of a unanimous shareholder agreement 
could include restrictions upon share transfers,
641
 voting requirements,
642
 and "fiduciary control",
643
 and 
that "[r]ien ne permet de croire qu'une convention unanime d'actionnaires doit en même temps restreindre 
les pouvoirs des directeurs pour être valide".
644
  The judge noted that the legislation specifically 
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contemplated the use of unanimous shareholder agreements to change voting requirements.
645
  Forget 
J.C.S. held that, in the absence of clear legislative wording to the contrary- which was apparently found not 
to exist here- a unanimous shareholder agreement could set shareholder voting requirements without also 
restraining directors' powers.
646
 
 
71 Il est sans doute possible de soutenir que les conventions d'actionnaires visent 
souvent à restreindre les pouvoirs des administrateurs, mais parfois elles poursuivent un 
but tout à fait différent, telles les restrictions sur le transfert des actions. 
 
 Citing again Martel,
647
 the judge determined that the only three requirements for a unanimous 
shareholder agreement were that it be written, lawful, and unanimous.
648
  (This was, in fact, a misreading of 
Martel's position in that article; although he only listed those three criteria at one point,
649
 he subsequently 
added that only agreements that met those criteria and restricted the directors were meant by the legislation 
to be considered unanimous shareholder agreements,
650
 describing such restrictions as their "but"
651
 (goal).)  
Because the "by-law" in question met those criteria,
652
 Forget J.C.S. found that it was a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.
653
 
 This decision has been the subject of a surprising amount of attention from commentators, all of it 
critical.  Martel himself responded to it, at one point having mistakenly interpreted its finding to be that the 
"by-law" in question restricted the directors, such that he argued that that position was incorrect on the 
grounds that it could be revoked by the board, that by-laws generally do not restrict directors, and that the 
contents of this particular one specifically did not do so, with the result that it did not appear in any way to 
be a unanimous shareholder agreement.
654
  Later, Martel correctly stated that the case had simply rejected 
the restriction criterion, and thus was in conflict with Duha.
655
  Beauregard and Auger made his earlier 
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mistake, also interpreting the result as a finding that the "by-law" met the restriction requirement, and 
similarly criticized it because the directors can overturn by-laws and thus are never truly bound by them.
656
  
To play devil's advocate, however, if this actually was a unanimous shareholder agreement, arguably it is 
the rules for amending those agreements that would apply, not the ones that normally govern by-laws.  
Scavone described the judgment as a "startling conclusion",
657
 blaming the decision on the judicial 
determination that the agreement was "valid", and arguing, "Of course, this misses the point, namely, that 
valid or not as a contract, an agreement that does not restrict the powers of the directors is not a unanimous 
shareholder agreement."
658
  That criticism presumably was invoking the statutory definition that 
specifically grants validity to agreements that restrict the directors (if they meet the criteria). 
 Is there, however, justification for the approach taken in Investissements, notwithstanding that the 
law subsequently followed a different path?  There are sections in the legislation that contemplate 
unanimous shareholder agreements in contexts other than the restriction of directors, but simply because 
expanded uses of the agreements are being referred to does not necessarily mean that restrictions cannot be 
a necessary element, anymore than it means that being in writing or being unanimous are no longer 
required just because they are not repeated explicitly each time mention is made of this tool.  It does, 
however, raise questions as to what the purpose is of having an arbitrary requirement to include an 
irrelevant term, not just as a prerequisite to allowing parties to apply these instruments for purposes which 
they themselves might invent, but which are specifically contemplated by the statutes.
659
  On the other 
hand, there would also be difficulties if any contract signed by all of the shareholders was treated as a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, binding subsequent transferees and possibly opening up corporate law 
remedies for enforcement. 
 This enigma also drove the decision in PriceWaterhouseCoopers Inc. c. R.
660
 which endorsed the 
opposite extreme, also in contrast to Duha, although the judge ultimately backed down and followed the 
Supreme Court's precedent.  As in Investissements, Bedard J. in PriceWaterhouse stated in passing that 
while a unanimous shareholder agreement would normally need to restrict directors, it would also be valid 
if it did not do so but instead raised shareholder voting requirements as contemplated by the statute.
661
  The 
bulk of the decision, though, concerned whether terms that did not individually meet any statutory criteria 
had the status of a unanimous shareholder agreement, or whether only the specific terms that met those 
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requirements did.  Ultimately, the judge determined that a close reading of Duha indicated that they did
662
 
and with clear reluctance noted that he had "no choice but to follow the doctrine of the SCC, even though it 
may seem illogical".
663
 
 Before abruptly reaching that point, however, the consideration of the issue was lengthy.   Bedard 
J. was critical of the idea that the same provision would have a different effect if it appeared in a unanimous 
shareholder agreement
664
 and a different agreement
665
 and endorsed a criticism of Duha put forth by Robert 
Couzin
666
 that he quoted, in which it was queried why a restriction upon the powers of directors elevates 
unrelated provisions, even when that restriction might make those other provisions less relevant.
667
  The 
judge described this objection as in line with fundamental principles of corporate law
668
 and also in 
accordance with the writings of Martel.
669
  The expanded criteria of the Alberta statute were also raised, 
and it was queried why that province would have found such a list necessary if an agreement entered into 
under the wording of the C.B.C.A. could have contained those clauses.
670
  (The answer that it would remove 
the necessity of also having a restriction was not considered.)  It was similarly questioned why the federal 
legislators did not make it explicit that an agreement could contain other types of clauses, if that was their 
intention.
671
  The logical inconsistencies and interpretive issues which the judge listed dovetail with his 
understanding of the tool as existing
672
 for a single, narrow purpose, which he set out in no uncertain terms: 
"It also seems to me to be essential to conclude this overview of unanimous shareholders' agreements by 
stressing that the very nature of unanimous shareholders' agreements is to restrict the directors' power and 
expand the power of shareholders in the management of the corporation."
673
 
 Despite all that, and despite citing the precedent of Leblanc c. Fertek inc.
674
 to the effect that 
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unanimous shareholder agreements can be divided into terms that have the status of unanimous shareholder 
agreements and terms that do not, the judge ultimately accepted that the Supreme Court of Canada had 
determined otherwise.  On appeal,
675
 the analysis centred around whether Duha had been correctly 
interpreted and applied,
676
 and after noting that in that precedent the relevant clause had not itself been one 
that restricted directors,
677
 the Court of Appeal found that Duha meant that once the conditions for a 
unanimous shareholder agreement were met (including some restriction upon directors), the document as a 
whole qualified.
678
 
 The Court of Appeal noted the trial judge's reservations about the principle from Duha, but 
Gauthier J.A. explicitly rejected them: 
 
58 With respect, I do not share this opinion.  In my view, the SCC adopted a 
pragmatic, flexible approach that seems as valid today as it was in 1998.  Clearly, clauses 
regarding the election of the board of directors can have a crucial impact on a majority 
shareholder's ability to effectively control a corporation.  In order to avoid creating 
uncertainty for taxpayers, the SCC concluded that such clauses should not be taken into 
consideration when simply included in private agreements between shareholders.  In 
seeking to strike a fair balance between these two concerns, it is logical that the special 
nature of USAs, which are constating documents, and the fact that USAs are easily 
accessible (for example, under subsections 20(1) and 21(2) of the CBCA, USAs are 
entered in the records of a corporation and kept at the corporation's registered office, and 
may be consulted by any representative of the corporation's shareholders or creditors) 
make a difference.  It is not unusual in tax law to obtain a different result by using one 
form rather than another. 
  
 The Court of Appeal also rejected the idea that subsequent amendments to the C.B.C.A. had 
rendered Duha outdated, since the ones proposed as relevant literally amounted only to a renumbering,
679
 
and further found that the inclusion of alternative criteria in the Alberta statute was simply that.
680
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
properly enforced only through contract law (pars. 54-57).  As discussed in Chapter Four, this 
understanding is not exceptional, and does not indicate that those clauses are not part of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement for many purposes, only that the enforcement mechanism is slightly different 
depending upon circumstances.  Secondly, although the specific agreement in Leblanc required unanimity 
for all amendments (par. 60), the case implied that by default, while the statute required unanimity for the 
amendment of unanimous shareholder agreements, that only extended to terms that restricted directors (par. 
59).  This would represent a genuine divisibility of the agreement, and to the extent that it does, it is 
contrary to Duha.  Perhaps more importantly, the potential for documents to be amendable in part by only 
some of their signatories creates obvious potential for confusion (since presumably these amendments 
would have no effect vis-a-vis the remaining parties), although the same effect could be achieved through 
the use of side agreements respecting rights and obligations as between specific parties.  For a related issue, 
see the discussion of White in this chapter. 
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 The contradiction at the heart of both these cases illustrates that the current wording of the 
legislation and the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Duha lack analytic purity.  In splitting the 
difference between having the unanimous shareholder agreement be a statutory tool limited to a single 
defined purpose and allowing any contract amongst all the investors to be a unanimous shareholder 
agreement regardless of what terms it does or does not include, the law is now in a situation that, while 
largely workable in practice, lacks commitment to either theory of the corporation and can lead to absurd 
results. 
 
6.(b)(iii) Invalid Restrictions 
 
 Of the cases that have dealt with the requirement that a unanimous shareholder agreement restrict 
the directors, a number of them have found that the terms in the agreement that might appear to constitute 
such limitations were inadequate.  In coming to this conclusion, judges appear to have applied 
preconceived notions of what sorts of restrictions were valid, rather than whether the terms in question 
would restrict directors if enforced.  This would suggest greater comfort with a standardized role for 
directors than with granting investors the ability to alter it. 
 O'Brien v. O'Brien Estate
681
 provides an excellent example.  A father and son were the only 
shareholders of a charter airline company.
682
  The father sold his shares of the company to the son, but 
before he did so, the two of them signed an agreement.
683
  The son subsequently transferred half the shares 
to his wife, and upon his death, she inherited his remaining shares as well and thus became the sole 
shareholder.
684
  At issue was whether the agreement between the father and son was enforceable; the wife 
repudiated it.
685
  Up until the son died, the company had honoured its terms.
686
 
One of the grounds that the father advanced was that the document he had signed with his son was 
a unanimous shareholder agreement.  It was in writing, was between the only two shareholders at the time, 
and restricted the directors insofar as it imposed obligations upon the corporation which the directors would 
need to ensure it met.
687
  The agreement was not registered,
688
 but the father argued that the purpose of 
registration was to give notice, and his daughter-in-law had had actual notice, so it should be effective as 
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against her.
689
  Smith J. noted that the argument that this was a unanimous shareholder agreement had not 
been properly pled and was contrary to some of the father's other positions,
690
 but nonetheless considered 
its merits.  In addition to the parties' intent, discussed later in this chapter, she determined whether the 
agreement restricted the directors.  In order to understand Smith J.'s ruling and the subsequent Court of 
Appeal decision, one must first look at the contents of the agreement, or at least at her summary of them: 
 
Clause 2 has a number of lettered subclauses.  Subclauses B, C, D and E state that Jack 
O'Brien shall continue to receive a number of benefits from the company that he had 
enjoyed prior to the sale.  These include: (Subclause B) the right to "Any flying done by" 
B.N.A. Ltd. on his behalf at cost price; (Subclause C) the use of B.N.A. Ltd.'s facilities 
for the maintenance of his own aircraft; the right to purchase airplane parts; and 
(Subclause D) fuel from B.N.A. Ltd. at cost; and (Subclause E) the right to operate his 
aircraft under the B.N.A. Ltd. charter and licence at no charge.  Subclause F states that 
these benefits shall also be granted to Barry O'Brien, Jack O'Brien's other son who is also 
a pilot.  Subclause A states that Jack O'Brien "shall have the unrestricted first right of 
refusal on all or any part of Buffalo Narrows Airways Ltd. if it is put up for sale" and 
Subclause G states:  Unless otherwise agreed by Jack O'Brien at the time of sale, if 
Buffalo Narrows Airways Ltd. is sold, items C, D and E shall become part of the sale 
agreement and the new owners shall be compelled to honour this for a period of time 
agreeable to Jack O'Brien.
691
 
 
 In Smith J.'s view, none of this constituted a restriction on the powers of the directors within the 
meaning of the statute.  She stated that any argument to that effect must fail because it "can only succeed by 
assuming what it sets out to prove: that the legal effect of the agreement is to 'restrict, in whole or in part, 
the powers of the directors to manage the business and affairs of the corporation'".
692
  This objection could, 
of course, be raised about any unanimous shareholder agreement's attempts to restrict the powers of the 
directors.  If those restrictions are initially assumed to be ineffective, then the document is not a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, and therefore the restrictions are unenforceable.  The reasoning is circular.  Aside 
from this self-fulfilling assumption, the clauses of the agreement would seem prima facie to be restrictions 
on the company and therefore on the directors. 
 The root of Smith J.'s odd skepticism concerning these provisions is earlier in the reasons for 
judgment, in the analysis of the document's effects as a personal contract.  Assuming that it was a personal 
contract between the father and son, it could not bind the company's actions, and therefore some other 
interpretation of what was being promised was necessary.  Smith J. found it unreasonable to conclude that 
the son had been supplying a guarantee for the actions of a third party which he might not, in future, be in a 
position to control.
693
  She concluded that the agreement was only that the son would attempt, in good faith, 
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to use his influence over the company to cause it to follow the terms.
694
  In considering the effect of the 
clause purporting to bind subsequent owners, which contradicted her analysis that this was a personal 
contract between father and son for good faith efforts only, Smith J. declared that it 
 
simply represents one of the unworkable provisions that Jack O'Brien inserted into the 
agreement, without any advice or much consideration about how the agreement might 
actually work, either practically or legally.  In fact, it is impossible to see how any new 
owner not personally connected to Jack and Barry O'Brien in the same way that Dennis 
was could or would even consider accepting the burdens of these provisions.
695
 
 
 Having found it more plausible to view the contract's enforceability as against the son to be merely 
for "good faith efforts", Smith J. unfortunately did not consider anew the document's ability to actually 
effect what it purported to when she considered it as a unanimous shareholder agreement.  There is again a 
circularity in this logic.  As a personal contract, it cannot control the company's actions.  Therefore it is not 
intended to do so.  Therefore it is not a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Therefore it is a personal 
contract.  
 The appeal was unfortunately similar.
696
  Lane J.A., writing for the Saskatchewan Court of 
Appeal, upheld the decision that this was not a unanimous shareholder agreement.  After summarizing and 
agreeing with the trial judge's view that the document was prepared in a manner that suggested the intent 
was that it be a personal agreement and not a corporate document,
697
 Lane J.A. added an additional wrinkle: 
"It is clear a unanimous shareholders' agreement is an agreement concerning the governance of a 
corporation and the agreement between Jack and Dennis was not intended to dictate fundamental aspects of 
corporate governance."
698
 
 In support of this alleged principle, Lane J.A. cited the Supreme Court decision in Duha, 
specifically paragraph 78, with the following line being given emphasis: 
 
Generally speaking, USAs exist to deal with major issues facing a corporation: corporate 
structure, issuance of shares, declaration of dividends, election of directors, appointment 
of officers, and the like.  General business decisions are not ordinarily touched by such 
arrangements, and with good reason: it would not be efficient, for business purposes, to 
remit every decision, however minor, to a shareholder vote, let alone to require 
unanimous agreement among the shareholders on such decisions.
699
 
 
Lane J.A. interpreted this comment, which was originally a descriptive remark that explicitly 
                                                          
694
 Ibid, par. 73. 
695
 Ibid, par. 87. 
696
 O'Brien v. O'Brien Estate, 27 E.T.R. (2d) 117, 180 Sask. R. 33, 1999 CarswellSask 358, 205 
W.A.C. 33 (Sask. C.A. Jun 03, 1999) (hereinafter "O'Brien CA"). 
697
 Ibid, pars. 44-45. 
698
 Ibid, par. 46. 
  
 
 
125 
 
applied only "generally" and "ordinarily", i.e. not universally, that unanimous shareholder agreements only 
deal with major matters and not with minor ones for efficiency reasons, as creating a new legal principle 
that such a focus is a necessary feature of a unanimous shareholder agreement.  This interpretation, quite 
simply, is not supported by the plain meaning of the words.  It also ignores the explicit statement elsewhere 
in the Supreme Court's decision that a specific expression in the unanimous shareholder agreement could 
grant the shareholders power even over routine business decisions.
700
 
 A similar view appeared in General Electric Capital Canada Inc. v. R.
701
  Hogan J. considered the 
powers that shareholders may have over a corporation's business, including but not limited to using a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.
702
  He stated that while that tool means shareholders "can appropriate 
the powers of the board of directors",
703
 that the ability is narrow because: 
 
As for the day-to-day operations of a business, the Canada Business Corporations Act 
(the "CBCA") does not specifically allow for shareholders to appropriate powers of 
officers.  According to Bruce Welling, this reality is "formalistically consistent with the 
traditional corporate law notion that officers are limited functionaries appointed by the 
board of directors".
704
 
 
 As part of this analysis, he cited
705
 another extract from Duha: 
 
Directors generally owe a duty not to the shareholders but to the corporation, and 
shareholders could not, therefore, control the day-to-day business decisions made by the 
directors and their appointed officers.  In other words, although the shareholders could 
elect the individuals who would make up the board, the board members, once elected, 
wielded virtually all the decision-making power, subject to the ability of the shareholders 
to remove or fail to re-elect unsatisfactory directors.  [emphasis in General Electric]
706
 
 
This passage was in the original judgment explicitly describing the corporate set-up absent a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.
707
  Nonetheless, Hogan J. concluded that "the fundamental distinction 
remains that shareholders can appropriate the powers to appoint the officers, but not the powers of the 
officers to in fact manage the business. This is the result of a close reading of subsection 146(1) of the 
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CBCA."
708
  This result is only logical if one finds a statutory limitation on the power of directors to manage 
the business that forces them to appoint officers to do so, rather than such delegation being merely the most 
practical and common arrangement.  In the absence of such a statutorily mandated distinction, directors 
could choose to make ordinary business decisions and therefore so can shareholders under a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  Conversely, if such clauses were invalid, then any agreement amongst all the 
shareholders which only contains restrictions of that sort is not a unanimous shareholder agreement, the 
conclusion reached in O'Brien.  General Electric was not directly concerned with whether such a clause in 
a unanimous shareholder agreement would be valid, although apparently in Hogan J.'s view it would not.
709
 
A different basis for rejecting restrictions as not the sort allegedly envisioned in the statute 
appeared in 9109-0068 Québec inc. c. Lambert.
710
 A unanimous shareholder agreement provided that, 
while meeting liquidity requirements, all extra net profits had to be distributed as dividends.
711
  The 
minority shareholder sued to enforce this term.  The defendant argued that the decision to declare dividends 
was within the directors' discretion.
712
  Matteau J.C.S. analyzed the unanimous shareholder agreement to 
see whether it was effective.  Citing Martel,
713
 the judge found that a unanimous shareholder agreement had 
to restrict the directors,
714
 and moreover that under the then-current Quebec legislation, such a restriction 
had to take the form of a transfer of power to the shareholders;
715
 powers could not be simultaneously 
within the realms of the shareholders and directors.
716
  The judge found that clear and precise language was 
needed to accomplish this transfer,
717
 but the clause in question "ne rencontre pas les exigences requises 
pour soustraire au pouvoir des administrateurs leur discrétion à cet égard".
718
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Two other clauses affirming the binding nature of the agreement upon the shareholders' 
representatives and upon the company itself were further held to not transfer any of the directors' powers 
and to not create rights not found elsewhere in the agreement.
719
  The Court of Appeal stated their support 
(without additional analysis) for Matteau J.C.S's reasoning
720
 and added that the unanimity requirement had 
also not been met.
721
 
Similarly, in Couvre-Plancher Zénith Ltée v. Minister of National Revenue,
722
 the document was 
also found not to be a unanimous shareholder agreement because, among other reasons,
723
 Dussault 
J.T.C.C. determined that it did not restrict the directors.  The basis for this was that "no clause of the 
agreement restricts the directors' powers over matters under their authority so that they can be exercised by 
the shareholders.  The clause of the agreement referred to in clause 3(e)(iii) of the Agreement on Facts 
requires only the unanimity of the directors where there are only two directors."
724
  This appears to be a 
finding that a lack of transfer of powers to the shareholders means that there is no restriction on directors in 
the sense required, even though the agreement did contain reference to at least two restrictions upon them, 
as noted: that the number of directors be two and that their decisions must be unanimous.
725
   This is an 
illustration of how the concept of transfer of power can eclipse that of restriction per se.  Dussault J.T.C.C. 
also appeared to ignore, when considering whether the directors' powers were restricted, that the agreement 
vested power over day-to-day operations in one of the parties,
726
 removing either the directors' authority to 
exercise such control or else to determine who has it.  It is difficult to see how this would be anything other 
than a fundamental restriction of the board's normal powers. 
The outright rejection in 9109-0068 and Couvre-Plancher of restrictions upon the directors not 
framed as transfers of power to the shareholders is anomalous; examples of such terms being enforced are 
found throughout this chapter and the next.  The implications, both positive and negative, of restrictions 
that take the form of "pre-made decisions" in unanimous shareholder agreements are discussed in Chapter 
Five.  Even if all restrictions upon directors are treated as transfers of power, there is no justification for 
simply ignoring them if not worded as such in the document. 
While the preceding cases dealt explicitly with why some limitations might not form valid bases 
for unanimous shareholder agreements, others were less clear.  Instead of providing a justification, they 
simply asserted that no restriction existed, even if terms were mentioned that could reasonably have 
qualified. 
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The defendants in Nicholson c. Gmiterek
727
 argued that a document was not a unanimous 
shareholder agreement (in the statutory sense) because it did not restrict the directors in any way.
728
  They 
therefore argued that the court's power under the oppression remedy to amend a unanimous shareholder 
agreement did not apply.
729
  Ryan J.C.S. rejected this argument, but on the basis that the powers of the 
court under the oppression remedy were not limited to those listed, and could include the amendment of a 
shareholder agreement that was not a unanimous shareholder agreement.
730
  The judge therefore implicitly 
accepted that this particular document had failed to meet the criterion.  Curiously, the claim for oppression 
included that the plaintiffs had been fired from posts as officers that were guaranteed to them in the 
agreement and that the defendant director had caused the company to repay a loan to his family without the 
plaintiff's consent, which was also said to be in violation of the agreement.
731
  Arguably, these both 
represented restrictions upon the directors; the possibility was not addressed. 
The management contract in Sedona Networks Corp. v. R.
732
 was found not to be a unanimous 
shareholder agreement in part because the shareholder was not actually a party to it, as discussed earlier, 
but also because its contents were found not to restrict the directors.  The corporation ("BMCC") owned 
shares, and it had granted the voting rights of those shares to another company, which the appellant argued 
was the removal of those voting rights from the directors.
733
  Archambault T.C.J. rejected this position, 
writing, "It does not affect the corporate constitution of BMCC.  For instance, it is not a constating 
document limiting the powers of the BMCC's board of directors to manage its affairs."
734
  Unless this 
represents a determination that exercising the voting rights of shares that a corporation owns is not part of 
managing the affairs of said corporation, it is simply an incorrect interpretation of the facts.  On appeal,
735
 
the issue was similarly dealt with, Malone J.A. saying only, "[T]here is no basis for concluding that the 
Management Agreement restricted the powers of BMCC's board of directors to manage its business and 
affairs.  Without this restriction, the statutory requirements for a unanimous shareholder agreement are not 
met."
736
  Again, this makes sense only if one assumes that exercising voting rights of shares owned by a 
company is not part of managing that company's business and affairs.
737
 
                                                          
727
 Nicholson c. Gmiterek [1989] J.Q. no 2546 (C.S. Que. Apr 21, 1989) (hereinafter Nicholson). 
728
 Ibid, par. 18: "qui ne restreint en aucune façon les pouvoirs des administrateurs". 
729
 Ibid, par. 18. 
730
 Ibid, pars. 19-20. 
731
 Ibid, par. 10. 
732
 Sedona TCC, supra note 351. 
733
 Ibid, par. 20. 
734
 Ibid, par. 19. 
735
 Sedona FCA, supra note 356. 
736
 Ibid, par. 20. 
737
 If a distinction is maintained between a company's business and affairs, then this would generally 
fall under the latter. 
  
 
 
129 
 
Finally, Higgins v. Wilson
738
 may represent another example of this type, although it is more 
ambiguous.
739
 
The common element in these decisions is that the documents in question did contain terms that 
would have, if enforced, restricted directors.  But the judges either failed to recognize that or else 
determined that the restrictions were not a type these documents were intended to contain.  This necessarily 
means that, in their view, the statutorily-defined powers of the board sometimes supersede the terms of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement that purportedly alter them, a rejection of "nexus of contracts" based 
assumptions that investors should have the right to freely determine the corporate arrangement.  Ironically, 
in so doing, they departed from the definition of the unanimous shareholder agreement found in the 
legislation, substituting their own visions of the appropriate forms of shareholder intervention in corporate 
management for what the statute itself set out.
740
 
 
6.(b)(iv) Valid Restrictions 
 
There have, of course, also been cases where the restrictions in the unanimous shareholder 
agreement were found to be sufficient to meet the statutory requirements.  As the examples in the previous 
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section illustrated, there is some dispute about what sorts of limitations are valid, and so it is worth 
exploring exactly what terms have been upheld as sufficient. 
In Ming Minerals Inc. v. Blagdon, discussed in a previous section, Mercer J. noted that there was 
authority that a unanimous shareholder agreement need not restrict directors' powers, but that was based 
upon the then-current Court of Appeal judgment in Duha, before the Supreme Court re-established its 
necessity.
741
  Regardless, Mercer J. found that clauses in the Letter Agreement restricted the directors' 
powers.  Specifically, they 
 
obliged the issuance of shares in specified circumstances, stipulated that the directors of 
Minerals were to reserve additional shares for issuance in specified circumstances and 
further prevented, in certain circumstances, the directors from diluting the Blagdon and 
Dimmell shareholdings to less than fifteen percent.  The Letter Agreement further 
obligated the directors to execute employment contracts with Samuel Blagdon and 
Dimmell in the capacities of Mine Manager and Chief Geologist, presumably key 
positions for the future operations of Minerals.  These were restrictions on the powers of 
the directors[….]742 
 
White v. True North Springs, also discussed above, included the following examples of restricting 
directors' powers, which were explicitly referred to as being only some of the restrictions present: a quorum 
for directors' meetings; a requirement that the board meet at the call of the chair or at the last three 
directors' request; a stipulation that decisions of the board would be by majority, thus preventing them from 
establishing a super-majority requirement; time limits and notice requirements for meetings; requiring the 
unanimous consent of shareholders for the issuance of additional shares, articles of amendment, changes in 
the number of directors, and "many other"
743
 decisions not repeated in the judgment; and "providing that 
shareholders cannot sell, transfer, sign or otherwise dispose of their shares or mortgage, pledge, 
hypothecate, charge, or otherwise encumber them without the prior consent of the Board of Directors 
except as specifically provided in the various preemption clauses of each agreement".
744
  While the 
abundance of other restrictions makes it a moot point, the final item on that list is more properly viewed as 
a restriction on shareholders and not directors, and it should not have been included.  Otherwise, the most 
interesting observation about this list is the presence of minor procedural requirements for directors to 
follow, rather than substantive restrictions.  Establishing a quorum for directors' meetings or preventing 
them from setting super-majority requirements for themselves apparently qualifies as restricting the power 
of the directors, even if the board collectively retains its normal power to control the corporation.
745
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In Piikani Investment Corp. v. Piikani First Nation, discussed in a previous section, the directors 
were bound by the Trust Agreement to follow any instructions from the Piikani First Nation Council with 
respect to a list of issues, and the power of directors to fill vacancies was curtailed.
746
  The specific issues 
on which the Council could give directions
747
 were that it could direct the Piikani Investment Corp. to hold 
shares in and appoint directors of Piikani Business Entities,
748
 to monitor the management and operations of 
such entities, to provide managerial and other services to them, to report to Council on the operation, 
management, and financial status of such entities, to provide a written report on those topics, and to 
undertake related tasks.
 749
  The point of interest here is that these restrictions, with the exception of filling 
vacancies, all arise only at the subsequent direction of the Council.  Absent such direction, the board's 
powers would be as normal.  So granting a group or individual the discretionary power to override the 
directors counts as a restriction upon them, even if they continue to be, by default, the decision-makers. 
In Alteco Inc. v. R.,
750
 discussed briefly above, Bell T.C.C.J. found that a failure to file a 
unanimous shareholder agreement did not invalidate it.
751
  He also confirmed that the document in question 
restricted the powers of the directors,
752
 although without being clear as to which clauses were 
restrictions.
753
  The instrument mandated that the company would obtain certain financing, limited the 
corporation's ability to issue shares, set the number of directors, listed various agreements the corporation 
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would enter into, and outlined banking arrangements for the corporation.
754
  While the Respondents 
apparently contested that it qualified as a unanimous shareholder agreement even aside from its being 
unfiled, presumably on the basis that it did not restrict the directors, they did not elaborate on that point.
755
  
It is therefore unsurprising that Bell T.C.J.J. found as he did, but he at least set his mind to the question. 
In Fulmer v. Peter D. Fulmer Holdings Inc.,
756
 McDermid J. noted that the document in question 
met the criteria to be recognized as a unanimous shareholder agreement because it restricted the 
directors,
757
 and while no example was provided immediately in the context of that determination, 
subsequently a term was specifically referred to as one that "restricts the powers of the directors in relation 
to the appointment of a president"
758
 and the judgment generally concerned the effects of that particular 
limitation. 
A slightly different version of this same general question arose in National Bank of Canada v. 
Bronfman
759
; the status of the unanimous shareholder agreement as a whole was not the subject of 
contention, but rather whether a term in it that the directors could only pass certain resolutions if they had 
obtained shareholder approval fell within the ambit of the statutory provision, and specifically whether 
liability had therefore been transferred.
760
  Spence J. found that "[t]his provision 'restricts the powers of the 
director' as contemplated by s. 146(5) of the CBCA and gives to the shareholders the veto provided in s. 
3.03(2)".
761
 
Finally, in Sportscope Television Network Ltd. v. Shaw Communications Inc.
762
 Blair J. considered 
whether a unanimous shareholder agreement met the statutory test, although it does not appear to have been 
a contested issue.
763
  Clauses presented in support of this included the recitals that it concerned the business 
and affairs of the corporation, requirements that certain resolutions, by-laws, and agreements be approved, 
a right of one shareholder to bring a non-voting participant to directors' meetings, restrictions on share 
transfers, a requirement that if a shareholder sold its shares then its representative director must resign, and 
a clause requiring that so long as the shareholders or their nominees were directors, officers, and/or 
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shareholders, they would act and vote to give effect to the terms of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement.
764
  This last provision was described by Blair J. as "a more or less blanket fettering of the 
discretion of the directors",
765
 but upon closer analysis, it is evident that it was almost completely 
redundant; the directors would already be bound to give effect to the agreement, so this was at most a 
clarification that, e.g., they were still required to hold votes on these issues even if their votes were pre-
determined.  By definition, it did not expand or create any restrictions not found elsewhere in the 
agreement.  The clause on share transfers also should not have been listed as affecting the directors' powers, 
nor did the recitals themselves, but since restrictions did exist, those would not have affected the outcome.  
Regardless of the correctness of the conclusion, the dubious items on this list invite us to consider how 
broadly the judge was interpreting, arguably misinterpreting, what could meet the criterion.
766
 
Sportscope was the subject of a case comment, wherein Gray took just that position.  He argued 
that this judgment is illustrative of a judicial tendency to find this requirement "easily satisfied".
767
  He 
stated that: 
 
It is difficult to see how any of the foregoing provisions shift what would otherwise be 
board powers to the shareholders.  Recitals do not even have binding legal effect.  If the 
articles give the board of directors discretion to approve share transfers, it may be that the 
USA fetters the directors' discretion in that regard.  However, Blair J. does not say 
whether, absent the USA, the directors would have the exclusive power to approve share 
transfers.  Although Blair J. recognizes the shift of board powers to shareholders is a 
necessary qualifying condition in meeting the definition of a USA, his reasons also 
illustrate how lightly the courts will apply the requirement to the facts before them so as 
not to defeat the intensions of the parties on a technicality.
768
 
 
 The final generalization is inaccurate; as the cases discussed in the preceding subsection illustrate, 
courts have not always been reluctant to dismiss a unanimous shareholder agreement for failing to restrict 
the directors in a manner they considered sufficient. 
 Gray's analysis of Sportscope was unfortunately incomplete, marked by a failure to separately 
consider all of the elements Blair J. had put forth, and thus missed the obvious restriction on the board's 
power contained in the second listed element.  If the unanimous shareholder agreement, directly or 
indirectly, made the decisions of the board subject to approval or veto by representatives of the two 
shareholding corporations, their power was restricted.  Possibly, Gray had adopted the view that a 
"restriction" on directors power is synonymous with a transfer of those powers directly to the shareholders.  
Allowing the board to make decisions but having those decisions be subject to outside approval is a 
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restriction, and Blair J.'s finding that the document was a valid unanimous shareholder agreement is 
justifiable on that basis.  An argument could also be made that the requirement that directors resign under 
certain conditions is a restriction on their powers.  The judgment thus need not be taken to have treated the 
"restriction" requirement as irrelevant or a formality, even if it did define it too broadly. 
 Collectively, these examples of restrictions upon directors which have received judicial approval 
indicate that at least sometimes, highly specific restrictions in a unanimous shareholder agreement are both 
valid and sufficient limitations to meet the statutory criterion.  They also suggest that the requirement 
encompasses clauses framed in both positive and negative terms, not just negative restrictions.  This 
versatility is in many ways in accord with the contractual view of the corporation; if the corporate structure 
represents only the agreement of the shareholders, then there would be no reason they could not alter it 
however subtly or specifically they wished.
769
 
 On the other hand, it is less clear from this particular sample set whether it is ever permissible to 
make a specific business decision in a unanimous shareholder agreement.  All of the restrictions alluded to 
in the cases in this section at least arguably concern governance rather than operational matters.  In concert 
with the cases in the previous subsection, this might suggest that, when a court is specifically reviewing the 
restrictions to determine if they meet the statutory requirements, that type of limitation would not be 
sufficient (and possibly not be valid as well).
770
  The view that governance choices are permissible within a 
unanimous shareholder agreement but operational ones are not would be more consistent with the 
traditional corporate structure that limits shareholders' direct powers while making directors the ultimate 
decision-makers for most purposes.  This narrow view of the uses to which the tool might be put is 
difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile with the shareholders' ability to simply assume all of the directors' 
powers via a unanimous shareholder agreement, since that would allow them to make those sorts of 
decisions.  It is thus difficult to justify this position on principle, save perhaps on the basis that the transfer 
of powers is less problematic than their division.
771
 
 
7. Intent 
 
 There is no statutory requirement of "intent" in the creation of unanimous shareholder 
agreements.
772
  However, several judgments raise the question of whether intent is, or should be, necessary 
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to transform an agreement amongst all the shareholders into a unanimous shareholder agreement, with all 
that that status conveys.
773
  An intent requirement may have merit in avoiding unwanted outcomes, but if 
one is included in the definition, it must be accepted that this means that many documents would be 
rendered either partially or wholly inoperative, not merely downgraded in status to "contract".  Only an 
agreement that restricts the directors qualifies as a unanimous shareholder agreement,
774
 but an agreement 
                                                                                                                                                                             
statements that a unanimous shareholder agreement was intended would obviously suffice to meet such a 
standard.  No statute requires either an explicit or implicit intent to create a unanimous shareholder 
agreement. 
 
However, Alberta, Newfoundland and Labrador, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut allow for a 
document that would otherwise be considered a unanimous shareholder agreement to "exclude the 
application to the agreement of all but not part" of the statutory section setting them out (A.B.C.A. s. 146(9), 
N.L.C.A. s. 245(10), N.T.B.C.A. s. 148(9), N.B.C.A. s. 148(9)).  This is distinct from adding intent to the 
requirements for creating a unanimous shareholder agreement; unless the exclusion is invoked, it would 
appear to still be possible to form one accidentally by meeting all the criteria.  This provision does, 
however, allow parties who do not intend to create a unanimous shareholder agreement to specifically 
prevent that from occurring while still meeting all the criteria, and so to that limited extent, it does add an 
"intent" element (as found in the document's terms, not inferred) to the question of whether a unanimous 
shareholder agreement has been created in those two provinces and two territories. 
 
These four jurisdictions all also have the expanded criterion allowing for unanimous shareholder 
agreements that do not restrict the directors, and thus whose contents could be dealt with through a contract 
instead (albeit without the advantages the statutory tool confers, e.g. binding transferees).  For example, 
they include unanimous shareholder agreements concerning "the regulation of the rights and liabilities of 
the shareholders, as shareholders, among themselves or between themselves and any other party to the 
agreement".  It therefore makes sense to allow parties the option of choosing whether such an arrangements 
has the status of a unanimous shareholder agreement or just a contract.  If, however, the document included 
restrictions upon the directors, it is unclear what effect invoking the exclusion provision would have.  
Giving effect to such an exclusion would necessitate invalidating any terms that could only be effective as 
part of a unanimous shareholder agreement.  The difficulties presented by an "intent" requirement, as 
discussed herein, would apply. 
773
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the original reasons for judgment.) 
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that does not qualify as a unanimous shareholder agreement cannot restrict the directors.  While the parties 
to a lawful written agreement amongst all the shareholders that restricts the directors might not fully 
understand or appreciate the consequences of that fact, they surely intend that the terms of their agreement 
be effective.  If there was a requirement added that the parties specifically intended for their contract to 
assume the status of a unanimous shareholder agreement, it might hinder more than help them. 
 That the benefits and drawbacks of the unanimous shareholder agreement are interrelated is a truth 
not always acknowledged.  Disney noted that since, under the statute, there is no requirement of an intent to 
form a unanimous shareholder agreement, "many shareholder agreements that do not explicitly operate as 
unanimous shareholder agreements and may not have been consciously intended to take advantage of the 
statutory provisions may nonetheless, to some extent, constitute 'unanimous shareholder agreements' within 
the meaning of the CBCA".
775
  He warned that this could have "significant consequences"
776
 even aside 
from the transfer of liability
777
 and the binding of transferees with regard to the restrictions upon 
directors.
778
  While unclear, it appears that the "significant consequences" to which he alluded are that other 
terms in the agreement might also bind transferees.
779
  Scavone similarly noted that a shareholder 
agreement with a wide range of terms that "only incidentally restricts the powers of the directors 
automatically becomes a unanimous shareholder agreement even though the parties may not want to give 
the agreement that enhanced status".
780
 
 While such cautions are warranted, they do not address the fundamental problem with denying 
these documents the status of unanimous shareholder agreement: they would then fail to give effect to their 
terms.  Scavone refers to "incidentally" restricting directors, but an incidental restriction was nonetheless 
intended.  The choice then becomes either placing an enhanced status upon the agreement that the parties 
may not have known about or wanted, or nullifying terms (or entire agreements) that the parties definitely 
did want. 
 Given the normal presumption that the law governs parties even if they were unaware of it, the 
resolution to this dilemma seems clear.  There does not appear to be much debate, for example, as to 
whether an individual who is elected director of a corporation must specifically be aware of and consent to 
all the legal responsibilities that that office entails in order for them to apply.  One possible explanation for 
the increased concern over such an outcome in the context of unanimous shareholder agreements is the 
frequent equation of the tool with a contractual model of the corporation; this sort of unintended 
consequences would be antithetical to an approach based entirely around the alleged mutual consent of the 
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parties to the arrangement.  And yet, as noted in Chapter Two, there is nothing unusual about contracts 
being subject to the law, including aspects of it that the parties may not have anticipated.  The onus is on 
them to be aware of the legal implications of their agreements. 
 This emphasis on intent may also derive from the opposite perspective, the preference for 
corporate structures to remain in the default form and scepticism of the notion that shareholders could alter 
them by agreement.  Adherents of that position might require additional proof that such an outcome was 
intended before allowing it to occur.  Conversely, openness to such alterations would lead to minimizing or 
rejecting any additional criteria such as "intent". 
 An intent requirement was both manufactured and awkwardly circumvented in Piikani Investment 
Corp. v. Piikani First Nation, the facts of which were discussed earlier, where after establishing that the 
Trust Agreement was both a document to which the correct shareholders were a party and that it restricted 
the power of the directors, McIntyre J. concluded, "For the reasons given above, I find the Trust Agreement 
fulfils the technical requirements of a USA according to s. 146 of the CBCA.  However, it is not an easy fit 
and may be better described as a foundational document."
781
  This reluctance to find the document a 
unanimous shareholder agreement resulted from the interpretation that "it is difficult to ascertain from the 
construction of the documents that the Nation intended to create a USA".
782
  It was therefore preferable, in 
the judge's view, to treat it not as a unanimous shareholder agreement, but as a "foundational document".
783
  
The significance of this new invented terminology was not well explored.  He seemed willing to explicitly 
equate the legal status of this "foundational document" with what a unanimous shareholder agreement 
would possess, and rejected the idea that it was a "super USA" entitled to even greater power than a normal 
one.
784
  Indeed, in order to proceed with the analysis, he needed to work in terms of the pseudo-
hypothetical condition "if the Trust Agreement is best described as a USA"
785
 to find that it should be read 
as having equal status to the articles and superior status to the by-laws.
786
 
 This distinction-without-a-difference intent requirement seems pointless.  If it is necessary that the 
parties are aware of the unanimous shareholder agreement as a specific legal tool and intend to create one 
before that is the effect, then the logical corollary is that a failure to meet that requirement results in 
something that does not have the same status. 
 This was the conclusion reached in O'Brien v. O'Brien Estate,
787
 also discussed earlier. At the trial 
level, Smith J. noted that neither party appeared aware at the time the document was signed of the concept 
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of a unanimous shareholder agreement.
788
  She found various aspects of its creation, including the lack of 
professional consultation on its drafting and the father's deliberate choice to deal only with his son despite 
knowing that his daughter-in-law would likely soon become a shareholder, were evidence of it being a 
personal contract only.
789
  She was therefore apparently reading a requirement of "intent" into the statute.  
While she acknowledged that the document imposed obligations upon the company and not the son, that 
simply led her to classify those as referring to good faith efforts only.  Curiously, she further found that the 
section of the agreement dealing with its effect upon subsequent transferees was evidence against the 
document being a unanimous shareholder agreement, because it was limited to only some provisions, 
allowed one and only one party to exercise discretion in holding transferees to the terms of the agreement, 
and would have been redundant if the agreement was a statutory unanimous shareholder agreement.
790
  On 
appeal, Lane J.A. summarized and agreed with the trial judge's view that the document was prepared in a 
manner that suggested the intent was that it be a personal agreement and not a corporate document.
791
 
 Like Piikani, O'Brien seems to import an "intent" requirement into the unanimous shareholder 
agreement.  But unlike in Piikani, the conclusion was that if something is not intended to be a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, it cannot have similar effect.  Moreover, while the finding of fact was that neither 
party was at the time aware of the legal tool available to them, the agreement was meant to govern 
corporate actions, restrict director decision-making, and bind subsequent transferees.  It was clearly 
intended that the contract have characteristics very much like a unanimous shareholder agreement.  To rule 
that its very similarities meant it was not intended as one seems almost perverse.  The clause dealing with 
the obligations of subsequent owners should, at most, have constituted a partial waiver of rights one party 
would have had by default through a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
Whether the parties intended a document to constitute a unanimous shareholder agreement was 
also put at issue in 2082825 Ontario Inc. v. Platinum Wood Finishing Inc.
792
  The shareholders had entered 
into a "letter agreement" whose recitals included that "while it was not likely practical to have a complete 
shareholder agreement in place by closing, the shareholders would enter into a shareholder agreement".
793
  
This letter agreement also included various provisions that the parties agreed would be incorporated into 
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the subsequent unanimous shareholder agreement, including a unanimity requirement for certain specified 
decisions, the positions of the shareholders within the company including the salary of the President, and 
the composition of the board of directors.
794
  No such agreement was subsequently signed.
795
  Ultimately, 
the majority shareholders/directors
796
 sought to terminate the employment of the President, contrary to the 
terms of the letter agreement specifying his office.
797
 
Newbould J. found that: 
 
In my view, the letter agreement and the acknowledgment of October 7, 2005 constituted 
a unanimous shareholder agreement.  The terms were in writing in the letter agreement, 
and it is common ground that the terms were all agreed to.  The acknowledgment of 
October 7, 2005 was in writing and signed on behalf of the two numbered companies as 
shareholders of the company to be acquired.  The agreed terms restricted the powers of 
the directors to manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the 
corporation.  The fact that a full blown shareholder agreement was not later signed does 
not mean that there was no unanimous shareholder agreement.  The acknowledgment 
stated that upon execution of the anticipated shareholder agreement, it would supersede 
the letter agreement, which was an acknowledgment that the letter agreement was a 
binding document.
798
 
 
There was no requirement that the parties intended the "letter agreement" itself to be a unanimous 
shareholder agreement per se, and some evidence that they did not at the time consider it one, but since it 
met the statutory requirements and the judge found that it was intended to be binding, it was so classified. 
Though the question of intent was not raised there, a similar issue might have been present in 
Ming Minerals, discussed above.  In that case, one of the shareholders on behalf of the company and the 
representative of what was then an arm's length party signed a contract.  Setting aside the problem of the 
other shareholder not signing, the question remains as to whether it was intended to be a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  A contract the company enters with a third party presumably usually mandates it 
will take certain steps, meaning that if for some reason all the shareholders happen to sign a corporate 
contract, it might become a unanimous shareholder agreement despite that not being intended or desired.
799
  
It is arguably beyond the power of the directors or officers of a corporation to violate a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.
800
  If one subscribes to the view that companies should be allowed to break 
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contracts when it is "economically efficient", then this scenario presents difficulties.  Considering the 
contract a unanimous shareholder agreement might also shift liability arising from those acts from the 
directors to the shareholders, including transferees.
801
 
 While the concern in the literature that the accidental creation of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement might be detrimental to the investors may have been based in the belief that these instruments 
should only reflect the voluntary intent of the parties, the case law reveals that the true effect of an intent 
requirement would not necessarily benefit shareholders.  These judgments demonstrate both the drawbacks 
and possible benefits of an "intent" requirement, and suggest that this might be best solved by applying the 
"restriction" criterion in a more nuanced manner.  If the parties intend to create a binding document that 
restricts directors, then it should be recognized as effective if it meets the statutory requirements.  Looking 
for a specific desire to create a unanimous shareholder agreement leads only to the contradictions and 
circular logic found in O'Brien, not to mention increases legal uncertainty and penalizes parties who 
entered into what they thought would be a binding arrangement.  It is true that there may be consequences 
of such a determination that the shareholders did not foresee or wish, but these dangers are easy to overstate 
and responsibility for avoiding them should rest upon the parties.  If, on the other hand, a contract between 
the corporation and a third party is intended to impose contractual obligations upon the corporation vis-a-
vis the third party, then, absent specific counter-indications, these should not be interpreted as restrictions 
upon the directors simply because all the shareholders happen to have signed the document for some 
reason.  Although this might not fully avoid the problem of documents being classified as unanimous 
shareholder agreements (or not) contrary to the parties' intent, it will best give effect to their bargains and 
minimize unforeseen complications. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
The four criteria of a unanimous shareholder agreement in the C.B.C.A.- that it be written, lawful, 
unanimous, and restrict the directors- appear straightforward.  Mostly, they are.  There are, however, a 
number of potential ambiguities within them, particularly the latter two, which can lead to practical 
difficulties.  Moreover, while these requirements are now well-established, their theoretical bases are 
neither self-evident nor value-neutral, but are reflective of contestable and not necessarily consistent 
conceptions of both this tool and the corporation itself.  Understanding the criteria necessary for the 
formation of a unanimous shareholder agreement is therefore necessary not only to clarify technical issues 
in order to maximize the tool's utility and resolve disputes, but also to help us comprehend these 
agreements' very nature, and perhaps therefore the nature of the corporations they can affect. 
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Arguments that the unanimous shareholder agreement's scope should be expanded and that 
correspondingly one should no longer need to restrict directors in order to be valid derive from the view 
that these documents are not simply a tool to achieve limited goals within a statutory framework, but rather 
that they embody a contractual corporation that may be altered by its alleged parties, the shareholders, 
within only the broadest of limits required by third party protection and social policy.
802
  And yet, in fact, 
that is clearly not what the unanimous shareholder agreement currently is, at least not in the C.B.C.A. and 
the jurisdictions that follow similar models  The case law on forming unanimous shareholder agreements 
suggests that the opposite position still holds significant sway with the judiciary, who not only enforce the 
statutory requirements (as they must) but may take a view of it narrower than the wording of the legislation 
indicates, let alone necessitates, in order to more closely align these companies with the standard corporate 
arrangement.  On this front, the case law does not support the position that the unanimous shareholder 
agreement has transformed Canadian corporations into contractual arrangements; it has simply provided a 
tool through which statutorily defined organizations can be manipulated to a limited extent. 
The unanimity requirement itself, from which the tool derives its name, is also significant for this 
debate.  It is an anomaly in corporate law, where majorities typically rule (subject only to general principles 
designed to safeguard minorities from exploitation).  In that framework, the purpose of the requirement 
would presumably be the protection of minority interests, although it is unclear why unanimous consent is 
necessary here when it is not to, for example, elect the directors who normally control the corporation.  
Conversely, if the corporation is viewed as a contract, the unanimity criterion is an expression of the wider 
principle that all parties must consent to an amendment varying an agreement amongst them.  The 
relatively small volume of reported case law makes it more difficult to draw conclusions here.  Protecting 
the interests of shareholders who did not consent to the agreement (or an amendment to it) is sometimes the 
implicit or explicit reason for a judgment, but at other times this factor is clearly irrelevant or ignored.  
Reported cases lean toward strictly enforcing the unanimity requirement even when given potential "cover" 
for waiving it, but there are exceptions such as Ming or White.  So, although the case law is not fully 
consistent with regard to the unanimity requirement, it appears that the judiciary is mostly supportive of it.  
Given that enforcing it creates a higher threshold for the creation of these instruments, adherence to a strict 
unanimity requirement does not necessarily represent sympathy for a contractual model; it may actually 
imply the opposite. 
 It is possible to find in the foregoing cases a number of specific rules.  From the Supreme Court 
decision in Duha, we know that requiring shareholder consent for new share issues is a sufficient restriction 
upon directors' powers, that a restriction upon directors is necessary for a unanimous shareholder 
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agreement, and that once such a term is present the entire document has that status.
803
  The other decisions 
discussed come from lesser authorities, but results such as separate but very similar documents for each 
class being read together as one agreement or the need to have the actual shareholders and not their spouses 
sign might prove persuasive in some subsequent decision.  However, by considering multiple decisions 
together, one can tentatively identify some larger principles at work, even while it becomes clear that other 
dilemmas remain unresolved. 
 Two of the more technically questionable decisions regarding the statutory requirements for 
unanimous shareholder agreements, Colborne and White, involved parties whose behaviour was generally 
found to be less than admirable.  While the judges in both cases did provide statutory analyses to support 
their decisions, it is at least possible that they were affected by consideration of what would lead to an 
equitable outcome.  Generally speaking, courts have not made decisions in this area that place a technical 
interpretation of the law over some more general conception of "justice".  Even O'Brien, another of the 
more analytically dubious decisions, may represent an example of this principle; the plaintiff's attempt to 
hold family members to a strict standard of contractual obligation might have rendered him unsympathetic, 
as might the alleged contradictions in his position and the lateness of the additional argument that the 
contract was a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Unfortunately, these judgments all presented their 
conclusions as if they were consistent with the general legal principles governing unanimous shareholder 
agreements, rather than as on-the-facts exceptions.  This has both contributed to and been allowed by the 
vagueness of the statutes and the uncertainty in this area of the law. 
 Similarly, in Ming, White, and Buttarazzi, the subsequent behaviour of the parties was used as 
evidence as to whether or not a unanimous shareholder agreement existed, in the first two cases positively 
and in the other negatively.  A variation appeared in Plomberie J.C. Langlois Inc. c. R,
804
 where the parties' 
utter failure to follow the terms of their agreement meant that the judges at both the trial and appeal level 
disregarded it, although they did not find that no unanimous shareholder agreement existed.  Counter-
examples would include Power and O'Brien, where the parties subsequently behaved for at least a period of 
time as if a valid agreement had been made or amended.  In both cases, however, it seems likely that it was 
not just the strict statutory requirements, but other fact-specific elements as well, which proved more 
persuasive than the parties having initially followed the agreements. 
 Even the use of an "intent" criterion may fall into this general category, another example of 
eschewing a narrow, objective, and technical analysis of the statutory criteria in favour of a broad, 
                                                          
803
   Under the M.C.A., at least. 
804
   Plomberie J.C. Langlois Inc. c. R., 2004 TCC 734, 2004 CCI 734, 2004 CarswellNat 3844, 2004 
CarswellNat 7322, 2004 D.T.C. 3595 (Eng.), 2006 D.T.C. 2997 (Eng.) (T.C.C. (G.P.) Nov 02, 2004);  
Plomberie J.C. Langlois Inc. c. R., 2006 CAF 113, 2006 FCA 113, [2007] 3 C.T.C. 148, 357 N.R. 339, 
2006 CarswellNat 675, 2006 CarswellNat 3752, 2006 D.T.C. 6508 (Fr.), 2007 D.T.C. 5662 (Eng.) (F.C.A. 
Mar 16, 2006).  Only the latter referred to the document as a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
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subjective, and equitable analysis of the entire situation. 
 All of the foregoing suggests that determining whether or not a document is a unanimous 
shareholder agreement will not be done solely on the basis of a simple, technical test for the required 
statutory elements.  Judges might look to surrounding factors, including the overall behaviour of the 
parties, whether everyone participated in the process, whether the parties subsequently treated the 
agreement as binding, and what their intent was in entering it.  They may also compare the agreements to 
their own preconceptions and prejudices as to how a corporation should be run. 
 Although very narrow restrictions of corporate governance matters have been found sufficient to 
meet the statutory requirements, and thus the agreements can be used for some minute adjustments to the 
corporate power structure rather than its complete overhaul, terms that attempt to control the operational 
decisions of the company may be met with more resistance.  When this occurs, it suggests a judicial pre-
conception of the role of this tool that is largely in keeping with the traditional statutory division between 
shareholders and directors, rather than a full embrace of the more contractual perspective that investors 
may, through a unanimous shareholder agreement, assert whatever control over the corporation they wish. 
 The requirements for the formation of a unanimous shareholder agreement remain rife with grey 
areas.  Despite their apparent simplicity, they contain any number of potential ambiguities which have to 
date been the subject of little or no reported judicial attention, making the state of the law uncertain.  One 
of the few general principles that has emerged is that the court is likely to favour a contextual, equitable 
analysis over a technical one.  Another is that a certain amount of judicial scepticism or even resistance 
may exist toward attempts to alter the corporate structure away from the traditional arrangement- to replace 
the default statutory model of directors' authority with one determined by a contract amongst the 
shareholders- and that this is made manifest in how the criteria are interpreted and applied.
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Chapter 4: Enforcement 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Perhaps the question that throws into sharpest relief the unusual nature of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement is the multiplicity of approaches that Canadian courts have used to enforce them.  A 
lack of consistent terminology or (frequently) analytic purity has often obscured the very existence of this 
divergence, let alone its primary factions, but a careful review of the case law reveals four significant 
frameworks that have been employed by the judiciary: the corporate constitutional approach, contract law, 
the directors' duties, and the oppression remedy.
805
  This chapter will examine those cases
806
 in depth, 
firstly to establish the existence and continued currency of these competing approaches, secondly to 
determine some of their implications in a practical context, and thirdly as a basis for arriving at normative 
conclusions as to how the conflicts in this area might best be resolved.  The ultimate recommendation is 
that the corporate constitutional method is generally superior to the alternatives. 
 The corporate constitutional approach, briefly stated, is one where the unanimous shareholder 
agreement is taken to have fundamentally altered the powers of the directors, making any action that is 
contrary to the agreement ultra vires them.
807
  This approach is the only one that treats the terms of 
                                                          
805
  This list is not exhaustive of all possible theoretical approaches, but is functionally exhaustive of 
all the ones that appear in reported Canadian cases, with a couple of minor exceptions.  A fifth approach, 
based around judicial discretion, is discussed at note 895.  Specific fact situations have given rise to cases 
where violations of a unanimous shareholder agreement were considered in the context of alleged criminal 
frauds, such as Lauer SC (TD), supra note 516, and Lauer CA, supra note 516, but it would be difficult 
(and contrary to the Lauer CA, pars. 112-114) to extrapolate a doctrine that breaching these agreements is 
inherently an act of fraud, rather than an incidental element in some frauds.  This list also excludes 
situations where a party's wilful failure to observe the document's terms constitutes bad faith, a lack of 
"clean hands", or similar concepts, but the specific nature of the legal dispute is difficult to characterize as 
even an indirect attempt to rectify those deficiencies themselves. 
806
 Judgments dealing with enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements strictly in the context 
of rights existing as between shareholders, e.g. shotgun clauses, or rights the company has against 
shareholders outside the control context, e.g. non-compete clauses, will be excluded from the analysis 
unless they involve corporate governance issues or corporate law principles.  While these cases do illustrate 
the other half of the agreements' hybrid nature, as discussed in Duha SCC, supra note 24, they generally 
proceed along strict contract law lines, although occasionally the oppression remedy is invoked. 
807
 But the resulting action is not ultra vires the corporation itself.  In corporate law, the phrase "ultra 
vires doctrine" typically refers to the principle that certain acts are outside the legal capacity of a given 
corporation to perform, usually due to limitations in its authorizing statute or its articles of incorporation, 
and thus its attempts to perform them will be void. As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in 
Communities Economic Development Fund v. Canadian Pickles Corp., [1991] 3 S.C.R. 388, 1991 
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unanimous shareholder agreements as literally placing restrictions upon directors.  It therefore appears the 
most consistent with the legislative wording and also with the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in 
Duha.  Even putting that authority aside, from a purely theoretical prescriptive standpoint, the corporate 
constitutional approach allows for greater certainty than any of the others, as well as allowing for more 
creative use of the unanimous shareholder agreement as a means of departing from traditional corporate 
structures. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
CarswellMan 25, 1991 CarswellMan 402, [1991] S.C.J. No. 89, [1992] 1 W.W.R. 193, 10 W.A.C. 1, 131 
N.R. 81, 29 A.C.W.S. (3d) 980, 76 Man. R. (2d) 1, 85 D.L.R. (4th) 88, 8 C.B.R. (3d) 121, J.E. 91-1789, 
EYB 1991-67199 (S.C.C. Nov 14, 1991) (hereinafter "Communities"), Canadian law has largely moved 
away from this ultra vires doctrine.  Most of the statutes that authorize the creation of unanimous 
shareholder agreements explicitly provide that a corporation has all the capacity of a natural person.   (See 
C.B.C.A. s.15(1), A.B.C.A. s. 16(1), M.C.A. s. 15(1), N.B.B.C.A. s. 13(1), N.L.C.A. s. 27(1), N.T.B.C.A. s. 
15(1), N.B.C.A. s. 15(1), O.B.C.A. s. 15, S.B.C.A. s. 15(1), and Y.B.C.A. s. 18(1).)  Thus, any act that a 
human being has the legal capacity to do cannot be ultra vires the corporation. 
 
That does not mean, however, that it cannot be outside the powers of the directors to cause the corporation 
to perform such an act.  This is simply the same principle by which, in the absence of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, the shareholders lack the power to cause the corporation to act, or for that matter by 
which outside parties lack that power, without that being in any way relevant to the corporation possessing 
the capacity of a natural person.  Making a decision ultra vires the directors is distinct from making the 
corresponding act ultra vires the corporation.  A unanimous shareholder agreement that restricts the 
directors does not affect the corporation's legal capacity. 
 
This remains the case even if, as discussed in Chapter Five, the effect of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement is to restrict the powers of the board without correspondingly granting powers to shareholders 
(or another party).  Although the result may be that neither group (and thus no one) has the authority to 
cause the company to perform certain acts, the corporation itself nonetheless retains the legal capacity to 
perform those acts. 
 
The corporate constitutional model of enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements therefore does not 
represent a revival of the "ultra vires doctrine".  Actions nullified under this approach are not void because 
they were beyond the corporation's legal capacity, but rather because they were not authorized by the 
proper decision-maker(s) within the corporate structure. 
 
With one exception, the sections of the various statutes that specifically provide that a corporate act is not 
invalid simply by reason that it failed to follow the relevant Act or its articles of incorporation do not 
mention unanimous shareholder agreements.  (See C.B.C.A. s. 16(3), A.B.C.A. s. 17(3), M.C.A. s. 16(3), 
N.B.B.C.A. s. 14(3), N.L.C.A. s. 29, N.T.B.C.A. s. 16(4), N.B.C.A. s. 16(4), S.B.C.A. s. 16(3), and Y.B.C.A. s. 
19(3).  O.B.C.A. s. 17(3) provides that "no act of a corporation including a transfer of property to or by the 
corporation is invalid by reason only that the act is contrary to its articles, by-laws, a unanimous 
shareholder agreement or this Act".  The Supreme Court in Communities determined that such sections 
must be understood as "part of a legislative scheme to abolish the doctrine of ultra vires" (par 48), which as 
was just explained is a development inapplicable to the restrictions in a unanimous shareholder agreement; 
the issue is not whether acts of the corporation were contrary to the agreement per se, but rather whether 
those who purported to cause those acts had the authority to do so.  Nonetheless, s. 17(3) may represent a 
barrier to applying the corporate constitutional approach to unanimous shareholder agreements under the 
Ontario Act; see note 892. 
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 The contractual approach to enforcement
808
 treats the agreement as a contract, subject to the 
normal rights and remedies of contract law.  Directors retain the authority to breach these contracts, 
although they could potentially be held liable for any resulting damages, so there remains an incentive not 
to do so.  Ultimately, in the event that the prohibited acts do occur, this model reduces the agreements to a 
form of insurance for shareholders, subject to the necessity of proving the quantum of harm.  This would 
severely limit their flexibility and utility. 
 The directors' duties approach incorporates adherence to the unanimous shareholder agreement 
into the directors' duties to the corporation.  The legislation states that directors must comply with 
unanimous shareholder agreements, but regardless of whether that is the basis of the claim, elements of this 
model may influence the analysis.  In particular, this framework draws upon principles developed to govern 
the general statutory or common law duty of care and possibly to a lesser extent the duty of loyalty.
809
  This 
would allow directors to use their discretion as to whether following "restrictions" placed upon them was in 
the best interests of the company.  The problems of enforcing the duty of care are well-known, and while 
that may be a necessary evil when it comes to reviewing most business decisions, it seems inappropriate for 
enforcing the set terms of an agreement. 
 The oppression approach uses the various aspects of the statutory oppression remedy to rectify any 
harm caused by violations of the agreement, if such remedy is warranted under the standards of that 
doctrine.  Some cases suggest that the oppression remedy is not actually enforcing the specific terms of the 
agreement, but rather doing what it always does, namely controlling abuse of power in the corporate 
context by protecting reasonable expectations.  To the extent that this is meaningfully distinct from 
enforcement of the agreement per se, the oppression remedy might retain a role in this area.  But the 
considerations that it takes into account introduce unacceptable levels of uncertainty when the issue at hand 
is the enforcement of the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 There are real and substantial differences between these approaches, both at a theoretical level and 
a practical one. 
 In addition to various procedural differences between them,
810
 these frameworks may result in 
                                                          
808
 The "contractual approach" (or "contractual model", et cetera) to enforcing unanimous 
shareholder agreements is different from the "contractual approach" (et cetera)  to the corporation itself.  
Throughout this chapter, the phrase should be understood as referring to the contractual approach/model of 
enforcing these agreements. 
809
 Recent developments in the law, particularly the Supreme Court of Canada decision in People's 
Department Stores Ltd.(1992) Inc., Re, 2004 SCC 68, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461, 244 D.L.R. (4th) 564, 326 N.R. 
267 (Fr.), 326 N.R. 267 (Eng.), 2004 CarswellQue 2862, 2004 CarswellQue 2863, 49 B.L.R. (3d) 165, J.E. 
2004-2016, [2004] S.C.J. No. 64, REJB 2004-72160, 4 C.B.R. (5th) 215 (S.C.C. Oct 29, 2004) (hereinafter 
"Peoples"), indicate that the duty of care would be the more appropriate one to cover any general obligation 
to follow the agreement regardless of whether self-interest is at stake, but the two duties are not always 
clearly delineated in the caselaw. 
810
 e.g. limitation periods. 
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very different answers to the three most basic questions that arise regarding the enforcement of unanimous 
shareholder agreements: who can have them enforced, is enforcement necessary in a given case, and what 
form should enforcement take?  The approach taken also provides insight into the very nature of unanimous 
shareholder agreements as a facet of corporate law.  The question of how they should be enforced is 
entangled with the question of what they are.  This in turn leads to the question of what a corporation is.
811
  
The corporate constitutional approach is the most closely aligned with the "nexus of contracts" corporation, 
whose fundamental terms can be subject to renegotiation; the other three, conversely, largely maintain the 
default power arrangement found in the statutes, even as they incorporate these instruments into it through 
its existing mechanisms. 
 The recent Alberta case of Sumner v. PCL Constructors Inc. provides, at both the trial
812
 and 
appeal
813
 level, the only extensive analysis in the reported case law to specifically contrast the corporate 
constitutional and contractual approach to the enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements; the 
differing conclusions reached at the two levels serve to illustrate how the choice of theoretical framework 
can have practical consequences.  Because of the scant judicial attention to this specific issue, the Court of 
Appeal decision is also de facto the leading authority on this topic.  It is therefore useful to examine this 
case closely before proceeding to consider the various approaches separately, both as an introduction to 
some of those frameworks and as an illustration that the contrast between them is not merely "a distinction 
without a difference".  The next section of this chapter will therefore review both levels of judgment in 
Sumner.  The four following sections will then discuss the bases of the four approaches in turn, with an 
accompanying examination of cases embodying each. 
 
2. Sumner v. PCL Constructors Inc.: The Choice of Approach Matters 
2.(a) The Trial Judgment 
 
 Nearly all reported cases involving the enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements do not 
spend substantial analysis determining which of the four approaches to the topic is appropriate.  In that 
regard, the recent case of Sumner v. PCL Constructors Inc.
814
 is exceptional, as detailed consideration is 
                                                          
811
 Conversely, from a prescriptive perspective, a position regarding what a unanimous shareholder 
agreement is can lead to a position on how it should be enforced. 
812
 Sumner QB 1, supra note 260, and additional findings in Sumner v. PCL Constructors Inc., 2011 
ABQB 20, [2011] 7 W.W.R. 184, 2011 CarswellAlta 20, 197 A.C.W.S. (3d) 101, [2011] A.W.L.D. 1767, 
[2011] A.W.L.D. 1768, [2011] A.W.L.D. 1769, [2011] A.J. No. 23, 79 B.L.R. (4th) 300, 39 Alta. L.R. (5th) 
249 (Alta. Q.B. Jan 12, 2011) (hereinafter "Sumner QB 2"). 
813
 Sumner CA, supra note 263. 
814
 Sumner also contained a second issue, pay owing for wrongful dismissal, which is dealt with 
separately in the judgments and irrelevant to the current summary. 
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given to which of three possible enforcement methods should be used, and in particular whether the 
document should be treated as a part of the "corporate constitution" or merely a contract.  Furthermore, the 
case offers contrasting views on that question at the trial and appeal level, which led directly to differing 
results. 
 In Sumner, the plaintiff was a former employee of one of the corporate defendants and a former 
shareholder of the other, its corporate parent.
815
  Upon his termination, the latter corporation redeemed his 
shares, allegedly in accordance with the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement.
816
  Unfortunately, 
the redemption violated the agreement in at least one and possibly two ways.  It was conceded by the 
defendants that, to follow the document's terms, there should have been a directors' resolution before the 
redemption rather than after it, as had in fact occurred.
817
  More contentiously, there was disagreement as to 
whether the proper steps had been taken to have the plaintiff found disabled and unable to continue his 
employment, a precondition in the unanimous shareholder agreement to the redemption of his shares 
through the particular method used.
818
  Manderscheid J., in the initial trial judgment, found that both these 
sections of the agreement had been violated.
819
  The Court of Appeal subsequently disagreed, and found 
that only the former had been.
820
 
 Having found two violations of the unanimous shareholder agreement, Manderscheid J. proceeded 
to consider what consequences flowed from that determination.  He noted that the parties had, in their 
arguments, both treated the unanimous shareholder agreement as a contract.
821
  He held that this was wrong 
in law.
822
  He pointed out several features that distinguished unanimous shareholder agreements from most 
contracts; "In that sense a USA is something other than a contract - it affects the authority of parties (the 
corporation and its directors) who are not even parties to the agreement."
823
 
 Drawing upon the precedent of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Duha,
824
 Manderscheid 
J. explained that unanimous shareholder agreements are constitutional documents for corporations.
825
  He 
rejected the argument that Duha's precedent regarding their constitutional nature was limited to the realm of 
                                                          
815
 Sumner QB 1, supra note 260, pars. 2 sub 1, 2 sub 19. 
816
 Ibid, par. 2 sub 20. 
817
 Ibid, par. 167. 
818
 Ibid, pars. 168-176. 
819
 Ibid, pars. 177-182. 
820
 See discussion below. 
821
 Sumner QB 1, supra note 260, par. 153. 
822
 Ibid, par. 153. 
823
 Ibid, par. 190.  Of course, the corporation and/or its directors may be parties to the contract, but 
they do not have to be.  Note the interesting and perhaps debatable claim that the authority of the 
corporation is automatically affected by the unanimous shareholder agreement, in addition to the board. 
824
 Ibid, pars. 191-193 cited Duha SCC, supra note 24, pars. 61 and 63-68; Sumner QB 1 also more 
briefly referenced Piikani, supra note 234, at pars. 194 and 200, and O'Brien CA, supra note 696, at par. 
195, as further authority that a unanimous shareholder agreement is a constitutional document of the 
corporation.  Both cases are discussed elsewhere in this chapter and in Chapter Three. 
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tax law.
826
  Further, because Manderscheid J. found that corporate constitutions were not contracts in 
Alberta and most other Canadian jurisdictions unless so deemed by statute, then if unanimous shareholder 
agreements were considered corporate constitutional documents, they must necessarily not be contracts.
827
  
Making perhaps too much of Iacobucci J.'s reference in Duha to the C.B.C.A. requirement that a unanimous 
shareholder agreement be "lawful", a term not found in the A.B.C.A. definition, Manderscheid J. further 
found that under the Alberta Act, the normal requirements of contract law might be relaxed for a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, further distinguishing the two.
828
  In addition to generally rejecting the approach of 
the trial judge, the Court of Appeal specifically disagreed with this point, finding that there was no 
significance to the omission of the adjective "lawful" in the Alberta legislation.
829
 
 Despite this lengthy analysis concluding that a unanimous shareholder agreement was not a 
contract, Manderscheid J. proceeded to find that, in cases where a corporation was a party to the unanimous 
shareholder agreement, the corporation would be bound to the contract and contract law remedies might be 
available.
830
  This appears to contradict the earlier assertion that a corporate constitutional document is by 
definition not a contract, although the hybrid analysis is more in line with Duha and, as discussed below, 
solves problems that would otherwise arise.  In this case, however, Manderscheid J. found that the 
corporation was not a party,
831
  so for reasons of fact if not law, contract law could be of no help to the 
plaintiff. 
 This then left two possible avenues for enforcing the unanimous shareholder agreement: either the 
oppression remedy or "a court compliance or restraining order requiring adherence to the corporate 
constitution, including a valid unanimous shareholder agreement"
832
 under s. 248 of the A.B.C.A..
833
  After 
briefly setting out the "well developed" principles of the oppression remedy,
834
 Manderscheid J. provided a 
more in-depth review of the s. 248 (and equivalent provisions) jurisprudence, outside the area of unanimous 
shareholder agreements, to determine applicable principles, summarized thus: 
 
208 The breach of corporate constitutional rules is a precondition for an application 
to the court to direct compliance or restraint, and order other appropriate relief.  Where 
that breach is disputed then presumably a court would first engage in a preliminary 
inquiry as to whether unauthorized action or inaction had occurred.  Then, with that step 
completed, a "complainant or creditor" may then apply to the court for its remedy.  The 
procedure for this latter application is open-ended[....] 
                                                                                                                                                                             
825
 Sumner QB 1, supra note 260, pars. 184-200. 
826
 Ibid, par. 200. 
827
 Ibid, par. 196. 
828
 Ibid, par. 197.  See Chapter Three for a further discussion of this point. 
829
 This question is discussed further below. 
830
 Sumner QB 1, supra note 260, par. 203. 
831
 Ibid, par. 203.  As discussed below, the Court of Appeal disagreed with this finding. 
832
 Ibid, par. 204. 
833
 Ibid, par. 204. 
834
 Ibid, par. 205. 
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224 In summary, the reported case-law provides some guidance on how a court 
should apply BCA, s. 248.  That said, the remedies for a breach of corporate constitution 
seem to be contextual, and are intended to address any injury suffered by an applicant or 
other affected party that result from the breach.  In general, academic and judicial 
commentary has interpreted this kind of provision as providing a very broad authority to 
the court to craft an appropriate remedy to address injury, in addition to directing lawful 
corporate conduct. 
 
 As argued below, the logical application of the corporate constitutional approach would normally 
be a judicial finding that any acts the directors purported to perform outside their restricted powers would 
be nullities.  Manderscheid J.'s conclusion, by contrast, while perhaps correct as a matter of statutory 
interpretation, grants an almost equitable flavour to the issue.
835
  Nonetheless, he concluded that s. 248 was 
not an equitable remedy, but on the contrary was designed to enforce strict compliance with legal rights, 
and therefore "need not strictly parallel the principles applied when ordering a remedy for oppressive 
conduct".
836
 
 In Manderscheid J.'s view, the plaintiff had framed his s. 248 argument essentially as an 
oppression claim.
837
  The defendants objected because oppression had not been pled,
838
 which the trial 
judge accepted.
839
  The defendants also objected that the unanimous shareholder agreement had specifically 
excluded the oppression remedy,
840
 although Manderscheid J. expressed doubt that it was possible to 
contract out of that remedy
841
 and found that, regardless, the agreement specifically allowed claims of 
oppression in cases where it had itself been violated.
842
  The trial judge found that his conclusions regarding 
s. 248 made it unnecessary to decide whether oppression had occurred.
843
 
 Finally, having dismissed both the contract and oppression approaches and having outlined some 
of the principles of s. 248, Manderscheid J. determined that it was possible to use that section to rectify 
prior breaches and not simply restrain future ones: 
 
246 Bluntly, the Defendants' suggested s. 248 interpretation results in the very 
problematic result that a corporation or its directors could exceed their authority, and fait 
accompli, deny any remedy to affected parties.  That cannot be correct. 
                                                          
835
 The term "equitable" here does not refer to equity investments, but rather to the legal tradition 
originally associated with the historical Chancery Courts, which departed from the formalistic and rules-
driven common law of the period in an effort to do justice between the parties, and continuing today in the 
form of equitable principles. 
836
 Sumner QB 1, supra note 260, par. 227. 
837
 Ibid, par. 231. 
838
 Ibid, par. 234. 
839
 Ibid, par. 241. 
840
 Ibid, par. 234. 
841
 Ibid, par. 238. 
842
 Ibid, par. 238. 
843
 Ibid, par. 236. 
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 Manderscheid J. also rejected the plaintiff's position that the oppression remedy should serve as a 
guide for a s. 248 award,
844
 and illustrated how analyses under the two sections differed: 
 
249 The facts of the present matter can be adapted to illustrate the difference 
between the oppression and s. 248 remedies.  I have concluded that the notice to purchase 
the Plaintiff's PCLEH shares and the Director's declaration that the Plaintiff was disabled 
were premature, that PCLEH had no right at that time to require the Plaintiff sell his 
PCLEH.  That is unfair, the Plaintiff was deprived of something to which he had a legal 
right. 
 
250 In contrast, if the Plaintiff was properly notified of being categorized as 
disabled, a six month period elapsed without challenge, and then PCLEH issued a notice 
to purchase shares without the Plaintiff being designated by the Directors as a 
withdrawing shareholder, then the defect in PCLEH's conduct is procedural, rather than 
substantive.  Put another way, in the hypothetical scenario the Plaintiff had not been 
deprived of any right.  PCLEH had authority to require repurchase of the Plaintiff's shares 
- it just conducted that repurchase in a procedurally incorrect manner.  Now there is no 
unfairness, and so oppression would not be available.  However, I conclude s. 248 would 
still be available in this hypothetical case, as the Plaintiff has a right to have a court order 
to fix the consequence of procedural error.  Similar to Davidson v. FinancialCAD Corp., 
that right may not mean unwinding a series of corporate actions, but must have the result 
that the parties affected by non-compliance with the corporation's rules are not negatively 
affected.  In that sense, s. 248 has a broader potential application than the oppression 
remedy; a complainant need not demonstrate "unfairness", rather simply that an 
unauthorized action occurred, and the complainant was affected. 
 
 This then led to a second decision, in which Manderscheid J. denied the plaintiff's application to 
amend the Statement of Claim to include a claim for oppression,
845
 allowed the plaintiff' to amend the 
pleadings to include a s. 248 claim that the judge had essentially already found in favour of before it had 
been added,
846
 and considered what remedy to award for the s. 248 claim.  This included a reiteration that 
the remedy could rectify prior wrongs
847
 and a finding that, on the wording of the Alberta act
848
 it was 
possible to award damages under s. 248 to plaintiffs who had suffered financial harm as a result of the non-
compliance.
849
 
 Manderscheid J. considered how to rectify the violation of the unanimous shareholder agreement.  
Two options were presented: either the plaintiff could be treated as having redeemed his shares upon the 
end of his notice of termination period or upon his 64th birthday, as specified in a different redemption 
                                                          
844
 Ibid, pars. 247-248. 
845
 Sumner QB 2, supra note 812, par. 15. 
846
 Ibid, par. 9. 
847
 Ibid, pars. 24-26. 
848
 Specifically, the words "any other order", discussed at Sumner QB 2, supra note 812, pars. 41-44. 
849
 Sumner QB 2, supra note 812, par. 50. 
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provision of the agreement.
850
  While noting that the amount would be the same in either event,
851
 
Manderscheid J. decided in favour of the latter date, both because it was earlier in time and because it was 
explicitly in accordance with the unanimous shareholder agreement.
852
 
 The argument that any award to the plaintiff would unfairly harm the other shareholders was also 
considered: 
 
77 As for the argument that only innocents will be harmed, those innocents 
nevertheless are in possession of property that belongs to someone else.  Any award I 
might make to Sumner will most likely mean the PCLEH owners receive a smaller 
dividend or bonus at some future date.  In effect that balances out their 'windfall' from 
Sumner's unlawful PCLEH share repurchase. 
 
 As the Court of Appeal noted, the statement that the funds "belonged to someone else" depends 
upon the preceding corporate constitutional analysis, under which the redemption of the plaintiff's shares 
was a nullity.  
 On a technical level, it might have been preferable if the award had not been damages, but instead 
had been a declaration that the share purchase was invalid, which would have given the plaintiff the ability 
to separately pursue claims for the rights to which that would give rise if the corporation refused to pay the 
funds that would then be owing.  Perhaps Manderscheid J.'s decision to award damages can be explained as 
an attempt to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings, but it lacks theoretical elegance. 
 The analysis in the second trial judgment contains one further curiosity, which unfortunately 
obfuscates the distinctive quality of a corporate constitutional approach as opposed to an oppression one.   
The defendants argued that, while they had not followed the unanimous shareholder agreement precisely, 
their intention to redeem the shares was clear and, had they pursued that intention properly as was available 
to them to do, the same outcome would have been reached; therefore, the plaintiff had not been harmed by 
the failure to follow the unanimous shareholder agreement.
853
  In responding to this argument, 
Manderscheid J. considered it crucial that it was not merely a failure to follow procedure that had occurred, 
but also a failure to notify the plaintiff of this.
854
  Despite having previously determined that s. 248 was not 
an equitable remedy, but that equity was in some unspecified way still "relevant", Manderscheid J. held that 
equity was determinative on this point.
855
  In knowingly concealing their breach, the defendants did not 
have "clean hands".
856
  Further, in misleading a minority shareholder, Manderscheid J. found that the 
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directors had breached a fiduciary duty to the shareholder.
857
  For these reasons, he declined to give effect 
to the defendants' intention (i.e. to redeem the shares in accordance with the unanimous shareholder 
agreement) rather than their actions.
858
  The judge explicitly stated that, had the corporation informed the 
plaintiffs that the original redemption notice had been premature, he would have given effect to their 
intentions and not found them in violation of the agreement.
859
  While the statement that equity is 
"relevant" to a corporate constitutional approach is unfortunately confusing, the most consistent 
interpretation of this section of the reasons for judgment would be that s. 248 is not in any way an equitable 
relief itself, but that Manderscheid J. considered and declined to give the defendants general equitable relief 
from s. 248. 
 The trial decision in Sumner thus explicitly demonstrates the corporate constitutional approach as 
contrasted with both the contractual and the oppression responses to the same set of facts.  The Court of 
Appeal decision that followed would cast further light upon that contrast by first revisiting the question of 
which understanding of enforcement should predominate and then demonstrating the consequences of 
choosing differently. 
 
2.(b) The Court of Appeal Judgment 
 
 The Court of Appeal disagreed with the lower court judge's conclusion that a unanimous 
shareholder agreement was not a contract.
860
  They found that the emphasis on the word "lawful" was 
misplaced and could not mean that an "unlawful" unanimous shareholder agreement would be valid.
861
  
They also relied upon Duha, but to the effect that a unanimous shareholder agreement was a form of 
contract: "The observations in Duha Printers that a unanimous shareholders agreement is a form of 
contract apply in Alberta."
862
  The Court of Appeal did not discuss the findings in Duha that a unanimous 
shareholder agreement was also a constitutional document or what that might entail; it was simply treated 
as a contract, albeit one with unusual features.  Regarding those other elements that distinguish unanimous 
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shareholder agreements from standard contracts, the Court of Appeal found: 
 
41        A unanimous shareholders agreement may well be described as a specialized form 
of contract because of its unusual ability to bind non-parties, and to override the 
constating documents of the corporation.  It is, however, at its core, a contract.  There are 
other specialized types of contracts that have features unique to them.  For example, 
collective agreements are negotiated between unions and employers, yet they can have a 
significant effect on the rights of employees.  There are also special dispute resolution 
procedures and remedies available under collective agreements that are not available 
under other contracts.  Collective agreements are, nevertheless, contracts at their core: 
Labour Relations Code, RSA 2000, c. L-1, s. 1(f); Part 2, Div. 21; St. Anne-Nackawic 
Pulp & Paper Co. v. C.P.U., Local 219, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 704 (S.C.C.), at pp. 717-8.  
Similar comments can be made about other specialized types of contracts: insurance 
policies, surety agreements, guarantees, etc. 
 
 The Court of Appeal also found that, contrary to the lower court ruling, the corporation had been a 
party to the agreement, as it was one of the listed parties.
863
  (It is unclear, based upon the rest of the Court 
of Appeal's analysis, what remedy, if any, would have been available had this not been the case.)  The 
Court of Appeal found, "The unanimous shareholders agreement in issue in this case is a contract, and the 
primary source of remedies for its breach is the law of contract."
864
 
 The Court of Appeal considered it "questionable" whether s. 248 could be used to award damages, 
but found that even if it could, an award of over a million dollars was "disproportionate", "excessive", and a 
"windfall"
865
 as a remedy for the directors having performed certain acts in the wrong order.
866
  Moreover, 
the Court of Appeal noted that the corporation was actually obliged by the unanimous shareholder 
agreement to repurchase the shares in question, albeit under a slightly different procedure, a factor that they 
also considered in favour of the corporation.
867
  It is also relevant to this finding that the Court of Appeal 
considered there to have been no real issue with regard to whether the plaintiff was truly disabled, leaving 
the only violation of the agreement that the resolution was done too late.
868
 
 Nonetheless, having identified a breach, the Court of Appeal said: 
 
48        As previously found, a unanimous shareholders agreement is a contract, albeit one 
with some particular characteristics.  The remedies for breach are primarily contractual.  
The trial judge made certain findings (see supra, para. 15) which, if he had realized he 
was dealing with a contract, he might have found were breaches of that contract.  On a 
proper interpretation of the unanimous shareholders agreement they are not, however, 
breaches that now entitle the respondent to any remedy. 
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 The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge, in considering a remedy, had been incorrect in 
taking it as less than a given that, had the procedural defects been made apparent, the corporation would 
simply have corrected them and proceeded to the same end, an inference that the Court of Appeal found 
"overwhelming".
869
   
 The Court of Appeal further found that the doctrine of "clean hands"- which the trial judge had 
invoked in declining to treat the corporation as having done what it should have and easily could have- did 
not apply, because it could only disentitle a party to relief, and could not create a right.
870
  As discussed, 
while the trial judgment was less than clear on this point, the most logically consistent interpretation is that 
this is exactly how the doctrine was so applied therein.  They further appeared to deny that the corporation 
had unclean hands, while acknowledging that things had been done in the wrong order.
871
  With regard to 
any alleged concealment of procedural defects from the plaintiff, the Court of Appeal found, "Generally 
speaking, a contracting party that is exercising rights or options under a contract, or that is calling for 
performance of a contract, is not under any obligation to advise the other contracting party of its rights 
under the agreement."
872
  They found that the Notice To Sell which the corporation had sent could not be 
construed as a representation that all necessary preconditions under the unanimous shareholder agreement 
had been met,
873
 and that there was no fiduciary relationship, because the relationship was contractual.
874
   
 The Court of Appeal also denied that the "indoor management rule" could be relied upon by the 
plaintiff, pointing out that it was designed to prevent the corporation and its participants from invoking 
procedural flaws, not to allow third parties to take advantage of such flaws.
875
  While it is true that the 
"indoor management rule" itself is a shield, the Court of Appeal gave no consideration to whether it might 
be appropriate for a parallel doctrine to emerge as a sword. 
 Having determined that it was impossible
876
for a third party to have a corporate act that violated a 
unanimous shareholder agreement nullified on a corporate constitutional basis, the Court of Appeal 
considered whether in this case the plaintiff could achieve such a nullification on contractual grounds.  
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They found that "a contracting party has a limited ability to challenge a contract based on the nonexistence 
of a condition precedent (not amounting to a continuing covenant in the agreement) once the contract has 
been fully executed".
877
  Because the contract for sale of the shares had been fully completed, any condition 
precedent mandated by the unanimous shareholder agreement had ceased to apply.
878
  Further: 
 
60        In any event, even if there were breaches in the procedural provisions of the 
unanimous shareholders agreement, that does not automatically undermine the validity of 
any actions taken.  The trial judge found that PCL Employees Holdings was "in 
possession of property that belongs to someone else [the respondent]", which essentially 
assumes that the share transfer never actually happened, or was legally ineffectual (see 
2011 ABQB 20 (Alta. Q.B.), at paras. 70, 77, 82).  Breaches of procedural provisions in 
private contracts do not render subsequent actions "null and void": New Brunswick 
(Board of Management) v. Dunsmuir, 2008 SCC 9, at paras. 81-2, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 
(S.C.C.); H.S.A.A. v. Alberta Health Services, 2011 ABCA 306 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 22.  
The directors of PCL Employees Holdings should have passed the "withdrawing 
shareholder" resolution first, but their failure to do so does not mean that the subsequent 
purported (and successful) exercise of the option to purchase the shares was a nullity.  
The most the respondent was potentially entitled to was any damages he could prove 
from a breach of this provision, and on this record those damages would appear to be 
nominal.  It was clear that the respondent had in fact been unable to work for six 
continuous months, and the directors were entitled to declare him a withdrawing 
shareholder.  The fact that the declaration was made in the wrong order did not cause any 
damage to the respondent. 
 
 There could be no clearer demonstration of the difference between a corporate constitutional 
approach and a contractual one than this passage.  While the trial judge did not actually nullify the share 
purchase, the damage award served as a de facto cash substitute for the consequences of such a 
nullification, simply because that award flowed from the assumption that the directors could not do that 
which they had purported to do.  The Court of Appeal, by contrast, took a contractual approach, found that 
no such nullification was appropriate, and instead looked to provable damages.  As a result, the Court of 
Appeal found that the trial judge had been wrong on the quantum of his award, since a correct 
determination of the period over which damage occurred should have assumed that the corporation would 
have immediately rectified any procedural errors.
879
 
 The Court of Appeal concluded that: 
 
76 In conclusion, with respect to the share sale the respondent at best had 
contractual rights under the unanimous shareholders agreement.  As such, he was only 
entitled to be put in the same position he would have been in if the contract had been 
performed.  On this record it is clear that the respondent was disabled at all times.  The 
fact that the directors' resolution came after the Notice to Sell did not have any 
substantive effect on the price the respondent received for his shares, or his other 
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entitlements.  In any event, whatever remedies he might have been entitled to from a 
failure to follow the procedure set out in the unanimous shareholders agreement were 
overtaken by his acquiescence in PCL Employees Holdings' demand that he sell his 
shares, and the subsequent closing of the transaction. 
 
 The Court of Appeal here confused the two contracts.  The contract of sale was completed, but 
that leaves open the possibility of damages under the unanimous shareholder agreement, even viewed as a 
contract.  Granted, the finding was that the damages would be nil.
880
 
 The Alberta Court of Appeal's decision in Sumner is currently the most prominent Canadian case 
on the question of whether unanimous shareholder agreements should be enforced as "corporate 
constitutions" or contracts.  Their answer was unequivocally the latter.  As elaborated upon in the following 
section, however, the decision of the Court of Appeal in Sumner was, unfortunately, quite wrong in its 
interpretation of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Duha. 
 Regardless of the specific merits of the conclusions reached in either judgment in Sumner, the case 
contributes two valuable developments to the law regarding unanimous shareholder agreements.  First, at 
both levels, different approaches to their enforcement were specifically identified by the judges and a 
conscious decision between them was made.  This is, as the rest of this chapter illustrates, an all too rare 
occurrence.  Secondly, it illustrates that the choice between these approaches is not a purely abstract matter; 
it can lead to different outcomes.  Having established this as a basis, the remainder of this chapter will deal 
with the four approaches to the enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements in turn: corporate 
constitutional, contractual, directors' duties, and oppression.  Sumner juxtaposed three of these, but taking 
them one at a time and examining the cases that applied them sheds greater light on each of their distinct 
characteristics. 
 
3. The Corporate Constitutional Approach 
 
 In a traditional corporation, the directors are empowered to manage or supervise the management 
of the business and affairs of the company.
881
  That is their function in the corporate structure.  While they 
are subject to duties in their exercise of this authority, which may give rise to liability if not met, there are 
very few limitations on their collective ability to make choices regarding the corporation, the principal one 
being the necessity of shareholder agreement for certain major decisions.
882
 
 The corporate constitutional approach to unanimous shareholder agreements is the view that such 
documents fundamentally alter the nature of the corporation and the directors' powers.  With a unanimous 
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shareholder agreement in place, some or all of the board's normal powers cease to exist (or are transferred 
to the shareholders).  At that point, the restricted areas would be ultra vires the directors.
883
 
 The Alberta Report put forth as one of the primary reasons for the tool that, absent its statutory 
recognition, specific performance would be generally unavailable to enforce shareholder agreements
884
 and 
"[a]n act of the company which contravenes the [non-unanimous shareholder] agreement is valid".
885
  It 
suggested that the unanimous shareholder agreement, as then set forth in the C.B.C.A. and as it was 
recommending be implemented in Alberta, solved this problem within the scope of its effectiveness.
886
 
 The position that directors' powers can be literally removed by a unanimous shareholder 
agreement does not require acceptance of the idea that a corporation is just a "nexus of contracts".  The 
ability to limit directors' powers by agreement is, after all, currently one of a number of specifically defined 
rights granted to the shareholders in a statutory framework; it is not a total abandonment of that framework.  
But this tool is obviously at the very least consistent with that theory.  Proceeding from the opposite 
direction analytically reveals an even closer connection; if a corporation is just a complex set of contracts, 
renegotiating the contracts must change the corporation at a fundamental level.  If the powers of the 
directors were always a notional "term" of that deal, then amending the arrangement actually would alter 
those powers.  A distinction should still be maintained between the corporate constitutional approach to 
enforcement and a strong form of the  "nexus of contracts" model of the corporation that entirely reduces 
the organization to a web of voluntary agreements- and specifically, the eventual endorsement in this 
chapter of the former does not extend to the latter- but it is appropriate to consider the discussions and 
analysis surrounding the choice of enforcement models in light of the recurring question of whether the 
unanimous shareholder agreement represents a shift toward a "nexus of contracts" corporation and, if so, to 
what degree.  
 If one takes the corporate constitutional notion seriously, then two important consequences follow 
from it regarding enforcement.  Firstly, the required judicial analysis is vastly simplified, with the outcome 
determined solely by whether the restrictions in the agreement had been violated.
887
  No other 
considerations need to be taken into account; it is neither necessary for the complainant to provide 
additional evidence or argument as to why the agreement should have been followed, nor would the 
directors (or corporation) be able to put forward a defence on the basis that the violation was the correct 
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course of action in the circumstances. 
 This simplicity arises from the approach's fundamental axiom that the directors simply did not 
have the power to do what they purported to do.  The desirability of their chosen action is beside the point.  
One possible analogy is that of a dissenting director who disagrees with the decision of the majority; the 
dissenter could not simply declare that their view would nonetheless carry the day on the basis that that 
would be the best course of action in the circumstances.  Another comparison might be to a shareholder 
unhappy with the decisions of the directors, in a situation where no unanimous shareholder agreement 
applied; again, the shareholder would have no ability to override the directors.
888
 
 The second implication of the corporate constitutional approach is that the appropriate remedy is 
always nullification, unless third party
889
 interests are involved.
890
  Since the directors did not have the 
authority to do that which they purported to, the action is by definition of no force and effect.
891
  Only 
where nullification is impossible, either for practical reasons or because third party interests would be 
affected, might damages be appropriate.
892
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indicated in Communities, supra note 807, par. 48, that such sections were "part of a legislative scheme to 
abolish the doctrine of ultra vires".  As discussed at note 807, the abolition of the ultra vires doctrine is not 
an obstacle to the corporate constitutional approach, because the issue is not the corporation's legal capacity 
but rather who in the corporate structure (if anyone) has the power to cause the corporation to exercise that 
capacity.  For example, if a unanimous shareholder agreement transferred all the board's authority to the 
shareholders, but the directors nonetheless purported to cause the company to act (and, for whatever reason, 
it did so), the problem would not be the act itself, but rather the lack of proper authorization for it.  I would 
suggest that s. 17(3) should not apply in such circumstances.  Third party interests are already separately 
protected.  The general arguments in this chapter in support of the corporate constitutional approach apply, 
including the implications of other aspects of the O.B.C.A. (e.g. if the duties and liabilities of the board 
have been transferred to the shareholders, what are the consequences if the directors can still cause the 
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 At a technical level, there appear to be two possible avenues through which a corporate 
constitutional claim for enforcement of a unanimous shareholder agreement can be put before the courts.  
First, the complaining party could rely upon the statutory definition of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement as validly restricting directors' powers;
893
 enforcement would flow from the court's inherent 
power to declare acts for which the alleged actor had absolutely no legal authority to be of no force and 
effect.  Second, the parties could rely upon the sections of the statute allowing them to ask the courts to 
enforce unanimous shareholder agreements.
894
  (This opens the door to a corporate constitutional analysis, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
corporation to act?). 
 
That said, there are two counter-arguments supporting the position that O.B.C.A. s. 17(3) applies to protect 
acts from being found invalid solely on the basis that, under a unanimous shareholder agreement, the 
directors lacked authority to decide upon them.  First, although the terms of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement under the O.B.C.A. should properly be understood as restrictions upon the directors, they are 
often phrased as restrictions upon the corporation itself, making it appear prima facie that the issue raised is 
the corporation acting contrary to them.  Second, if the conclusion outlined above is correct, then the 
inclusion of "unanimous shareholder agreement" in that section of the Ontario Act would be meaningless.  
The alternative reading limits one of the primary implications of the corporate constitutional approach, that 
restrictions upon the directors genuinely remove their authority and therefore any attempts by them to 
ignore those limitations have no effect (unless third party interests are involved).  The subsection does not 
entirely negate this principle, since it refers specifically to acts of the corporation not being invalid only for 
that reason.  That leaves it open for acts to be invalid partly (but not only) because they violate a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, for unperformed decisions of the board and purported corporate obligations to be 
void for only that reason, and for a court to order compliance on an ongoing basis with the restrictions set 
out in the document.  It also remains possible for damages to be assessed in accordance with corporate 
constitutional reasoning, which might differ from calculations under other methods.  (See the discussion of 
Sumner earlier in this chapter.)  Nonetheless, to the extent that this section of the O.B.C.A applies to 
decisions of the directors that ignore the restrictions upon them, it works against both the underlying logic 
and primary practical benefit of the corporate constitutional approach.  Courts dealing with Ontario 
corporations do sometimes apply corporate constitutional principles when enforcing unanimous 
shareholder agreements, as several of the cases discussed in this section demonstrate; such decisions may 
be reconcilable with this reading of s. 17(3) on the basis that they fall into one of the categories listed above 
that circumvent the exact statutory language (e.g. other factors were involved so the acts were not invalid 
only for violating a unanimous shareholder agreement, it is an unperformed obligation rather than an act 
being voided, et cetera), but the reasons for judgment tend to simply ignore that section when indicating 
that directors do not have the power to ignore a unanimous shareholder agreement's restrictions upon them 
and their attempts to do so are invalid. 
893
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but does not render it inevitable, since the court is given a choice of what remedy, if any, is appropriate.
895
) 
 A handful of cases, discussed in the following subsection, use the explicit terminology that 
unanimous shareholder agreements are part of the "corporate constitution" and thus capable of 
fundamentally altering directors' authority; these include the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Duha, 
a significant endorsement.  More common are cases that do not include the "corporate constitutional" 
terminology, but that accept the premise that the directors' powers have been genuinely restructured; some 
                                                                                                                                                                             
O.B.C.A. s. 253(1), Q.B.C.A. s. 460, S.B.C.A. s. 240, and Y.B.C.A. s. 249.  Another section upon which a 
claim might be brought is C.B.C.A. s. 122(2) and its equivalents (see note 1142), under which directors 
have a duty to comply with the Act, the regulations, articles, by-laws and any unanimous shareholder 
agreement.  As discussed later in this chapter, the nature of this section may suggest the directors' duties 
approach to enforcement, but once the claim is before the courts, the principles applied could be drawn 
from the corporate constitutional framework instead. 
895
 See C.B.C.A. s. 247 reproduced at note 894.  The legislative wording grants a discretion to either 
decline to enforce the agreement or to choose some alternative remedy.  Therefore, while this section (and 
its equivalents) provide a potential method for bringing a claim on the grounds that the directors are acting 
in violation of a central document of the corporation (as opposed to bringing a claim in contract, et cetera), 
the resultant analysis is not necessarily going to follow corporate constitutional principles.  It may invoke 
the other approaches discussed in this chapter.  And, given the discretion granted by the wording of this 
section, there is a further possibility, as illustrated by Rogers v. Rogers, 2011 NBQB 36, 368 N.B.R. (2d) 
178, 2010 CarswellNB 645, 949 A.P.R. 178 (N.B. Q.B. Dec 23, 2010). 
 
In Rogers, on an application under the similarly-worded N.B.B.C.A. s. 172 to enforce terms of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement naming the applicant as a director and president (pars. 7-8), McLellan J. expressed 
"two concerns bother[ing him]" (par. 8) about the latter request, those being the potential for 
"misunderstandings" if the applicant were returned to the position while litigation was ongoing (par. 8) and 
an inappropriate decision the applicant had previously made while president (par. 9).  On the basis of these 
concerns, the judge was "not persuaded that [he] should exercise [his] equitable jurisdiction" (par. 10).  The 
Court of Appeal, in Rogers v. Rogers, 2011 NBCA 78, 374 N.B.R. (2d) 397, 2011 CarswellNB 491, 965 
A.P.R. 397, 207 A.C.W.S. (3d) 256 (N.B. C.A. Sep 15, 2011), summarized this by saying, "The application 
judge determined he had a residual discretion to grant or deny the relief sought under s. 172, despite the 
clear language of the unanimous shareholders' agreement" (par. 3).  While the existence of such discretion 
was not contested, only the use of it (par. 3), the Court of Appeal noted that McLellan J. had made no errors 
in law or the application of principles (par. 5).  Rogers is unusual in the degree to which it foregrounds the 
judicial discretion allowed for by this legislative wording as the primary basis for a decision.  (But it is not 
quite unique; 829194 Ontario Inc. v. Garibotti, 2013 ONSC 5857, 2013 CarswellOnt 13503, 234 A.C.W.S. 
(3d) 732, 19 B.L.R. (5th) 118 (Ont. S.C.J. Sep 18, 2013) (hereinafter "829194"), discussed later in this 
chapter, used the permissive wording of this section of the statute as one (probably unnecessary) reason for 
determining the court had discretion under the oppression remedy to decline to strictly enforce the terms of 
a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Conversely, in Sumner QB 1, it was concluded that the Alberta 
version of this section was not equitable but rather designed to enforce legal rights; see the discussion 
earlier in this chapter.)  It is inevitable that the court must retain some latitude even in a corporate 
constitutional framework, in order to handle situations where a strict application of corporate constitutional 
principles is impossible, would harm third parties, or would be blatantly inequitable; the contractual, 
directors' duties, and oppression remedy methods each also contain various degrees of built-in flexibility.  
The wordings of C.B.C.A. s. 247 and its equivalents go beyond that.  As Rogers illustrates, they potentially 
create yet another approach to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements: judicial discretion.  The 
objections raised later in this chapter to the unnecessary uncertainty that is created by using oppression 
remedy principles as the primary method of enforcing a document's terms apply with even greater force to 
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of these are discussed in the next subsection thereafter.  Following that, some of the less obvious 
implications of this particular approach will be reviewed through discussions of cases that employed the 
corporate constitutional approach as a legal "shield" and ones that involved the interaction between this 
framework and the "indoor management rule".  Collectively, these cases embody the corporate 
constitutional model, first of the four ways of enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 
3.(a) Explicitly Corporate Constitutional Cases 
 
 The corporate constitutional approach to enforcement arguably has support in the Supreme Court 
of Canada's only extensive consideration of the unanimous shareholder agreement, Duha Printers 
(Western) Ltd. v. R.
896
  The Court clearly stated that these agreements have a special statutory status with 
regard to the corporation, and are not merely agreements that exist alongside it.  They are, instead, "part of 
the corporate constitution, along with and equivalent to the articles of incorporation and the by-laws".
897
  
Unfortunately for any simple understanding of these agreements, the Supreme Court's analysis did not stop 
there; it concluded that the agreements are "a corporate law hybrid, part contractual and part constitutional 
in nature",
898
 although the constitutional aspect was said to be more "potent" than the contractual
899
 and 
formed the basis of the Supreme Court's conclusion that a unanimous shareholder agreement could affect 
de jure and not just de facto control.
900
 
 While Duha did not concern enforcement of a unanimous shareholder agreement, but rather one's 
tax implications,
901
 Iacobucci J.'s analysis touched upon the nature of the restrictions that they placed upon 
directors, noting that "through a unanimous agreement, [shareholders] could strip the directors of some or 
all of their managerial powers as desired by the shareholders.  Rather than removing the directors from 
their positions, a USA simply relieves them of their powers, rights, duties, and associated 
responsibilities."
902
  He elaborated: 
                                                                                                                                                                             
such a regime. 
896
 Duha SCC, supra note 24.  As discussed in Chapter Three, Duha concerned whether provisions in 
a unanimous shareholder agreement regarding who could serve as director affected de jure control for tax 
purposes.  While enforcement was therefore not at issue, the Supreme Court's general examination of the 
nature of unanimous shareholder agreements, defining them as "constitutional" documents of the 
corporation capable of affecting de jure control, included remarks significant to the current topic, as 
referred to herein. 
897
 Ibid, par. 61. 
898
 Ibid, par. 66. 
899
 Ibid, par. 67. 
900
 Ibid, par. 69. 
901
 If a unanimous shareholder agreement affected de jure control, two companies would be "related", 
which meant that tax losses could be transferred between them.  See the discussion in Chapter Three for 
more details. 
902
 Duha SCC, supra note 24, par. 64. 
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69 Thus, a USA can play a vital role in the de jure control analysis.  If the 
Buckerfield's test were to be followed slavishly and the inquiry limited only to the share 
register of the corporation, or even extended to the articles of incorporation and by-laws 
but not to USAs, then a company could circumvent the test or obfuscate the picture of 
corporate control simply by confining to a USA provisions that substantially alter the 
way in which corporate decisions are made.  If, by a USA, the board of directors is 
deprived of the power to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, this is more 
than simply an issue of de facto control.  It would defy logic to treat de jure control as 
remaining unaltered by an agreement which, by the very statute which governs the 
incorporation of the company and the governance thereof by its articles and by-laws, is 
given the same power as the articles to supersede the statutory provisions for corporate 
control.  Not only is this a distinction without a difference, but it is also one without any 
principled foundation. 
 
70 As I have said, the essential purpose of the Buckerfield's test is to determine the 
locus of effective control of the corporation.  To my mind, it is impossible to say that a 
shareholder can be seen as enjoying such control simply by virtue of his or her ability to 
elect a majority of a board of directors, when that board may not even have the actual 
authority to make a single material decision on behalf of the corporation.  The de jure 
control of a corporation by a shareholder is dependent in a very real way on the control 
enjoyed by the majority of directors, whose election lies within the control of that 
shareholder.  When a constating document such as a USA provides that the legal 
authority to manage the corporation lies other than with the board, the reality of de jure 
control is necessarily altered and the court must acknowledge that alteration. 
  
 In stating that the unanimous shareholder agreement alters de jure control of the corporation and 
otherwise referring to a board of directors as "deprived" of its normal powers and lacking "actual 
authority", the Supreme Court of Canada endorsed the position that the restrictions placed upon boards of 
directors by these documents are real and insurmountable alterations to their normal powers, and not 
merely agreements as to how those powers may be used.  Given that Iacobucci J. also affirmed that such 
restrictions were required to create a unanimous shareholder agreement, as discussed in Chapter Three, this 
forceful view of those limitations' effect is unsurprising; the Supreme Court of Canada understood 
restricting directors' authority as the quintessential role of this legal tool. 
 Nonetheless, as discussed throughout this chapter, the Supreme Court's decision in Duha has not 
in fact settled this matter, and other approaches to unanimous shareholder agreements continue to find 
expression in the case law.
903
  The remainder of this section, however, will consider cases consistent with 
the corporate constitutional approach, as briefly and perhaps indirectly endorsed in Duha, in order to 
consider its relative merits. 
 Other than Duha and Sumner, the reported case that delves most explicitly into the nature of 
unanimous shareholder agreements as constitutional documents is Piikani Investment Corp. v. Piikani First 
                                                          
903
 Parties' decisions regarding how to plead their case can shape this even more than judicial analytic 
inclinations, as the difference between Sumner QB 1and Sumner CA illustrated. 
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Nation.
904
  A First Nation was granted settlement funds by Canada and the province of Alberta, which were 
made subject to a trust agreement.
905
  A corporation was formed under the terms of the trust agreement
906
 to 
provide advice to the First Nation's Council about investing the funds and to help certain of the First 
Nation's businesses prepare business plans and financial arrangements.
907
  As discussed in Chapter Three, 
McIntyre J. held that the Trust Agreement met the requirements of a unanimous shareholder agreement, but 
preferred to refer to it as a "foundational document", a term apparently of the judge's own invention and 
uncertain legal implications.
908
  McIntyre J. specifically denied that it was a "super USA", but maintained 
that as a "foundational document" it had a "unique status".
909
  Presumably, this means unique even as 
compared to other unanimous shareholder agreements, though again, this was not entirely clear. 
 Despite extensively discussing the agreement's status as a constitutional document, McIntyre J. 
found the court's authority to enforce it was not automatic, but flowed in that case from a term of the 
agreement that expressly provided that the court could provide advice and direction concerning it.
910
 
 At issue was whether certain amendments to the articles and by-laws of the corporation were in 
violation of the agreement.  Citing Duha,
911
 McIntyre J. stated, "I have no difficulty in finding that a USA 
has equivalent status to the articles of a corporation.  It forms part of the constitution of the corporation to 
which it relates."
912
  Therefore, because the articles supersede the by-laws, a unanimous shareholder 
agreement would supersede the by-laws.
913
  On the other hand, McIntyre J. held that, if the Trust 
Agreement were "best described as" a unanimous shareholder agreement, it would not supersede the 
articles.
914
  Because of the allegedly unique history of the parties, however, McIntyre J. held that the Trust 
Agreement as a "foundational document" superseded the articles in this case.
915
 
 Despite the decision to treat the agreement in question as both a unanimous shareholder agreement 
                                                          
904
 Piikani, supra note 234. 
905
 Ibid, pars. 2-4. 
906
 Ibid, par. 8. 
907
 Ibid, par. 9. 
908
 Ibid, par. 27. 
909
 Ibid, par. 41. 
910
 Ibid, par. 80.  As a result, the judge found it unnecessary to invoke the oppression remedy (par. 
80).  It is unclear whether the oppression remedy would have been used had the court not been explicitly 
given the power to intervene, nor whether an oppression analysis might have differed in any way from the 
one presented. 
911
 At Piikani, supra note 234, par. 22. 
912
 Piikani, supra note 234, par. 33. 
913
 Ibid, pars. 37, 91. 
914
 Ibid, par. 38. 
915
 Discussion at Piikani, supra note 234, pars. 42-55, conclusion at par. 55.  The actual 
determinations of which articles and by-laws were in compliance with the Trust Agreement, were not in 
compliance, or needed minor amendments to be in compliance, were done on the basis of the exact 
wordings of all the documents.  McIntyre J. also held a shareholder's resolution for payment to the 
shareholder for unspecified "indispensable services" was void for being too broad and opposed to "the spirit 
and intent of the Trust Agreement" (par. 168). 
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and a sui generis "foundational document", Piikani provides a useful examination of how the unanimous 
shareholder agreement might relate to other constitutional documents of the corporation.  Unfortunately, it 
technically leaves open the question as to how a conflict between the articles of a corporation and a 
unanimous shareholder agreement would normally be resolved. 
 Another case strongly influenced by the corporate constitutional approach of Duha is Power v. 
Vitrak Systems Inc.
916
  The corporation at its centre had contracted with a company that supplied 
managerial services and obtained an individual as its manager.
917
  Over time, that manager, who initially 
owned no shares of the corporation, became its majority shareholder (prior to determinations in this 
case).
918
  He did so through a series of steps that Campbell J. characterized as "a clear strategy and a well 
crafted plan to dilute [the plaintiff]'s shareholdings and influence within the company and acquire control 
for himself".
919
  This included misrepresentations to the shareholders,
920
 acquiring shares at 1/10th the rate 
the company had hitherto used,
921
 and transferring corporate assets to another company he controlled.
922
  
Campbell J. ultimately concluded that this conduct was "unfair, prejudicial and oppressive"
923
 but that this 
"may not strictly be essential to the foundation of the decision [...] except in the alternative.  It is, however, 
relevant to explain and support some aspects of the remedies I grant."
924
  The language is that of the 
oppression remedy: unfair, prejudicial, and oppressive.  But Campbell J. also explicitly did not base the 
actual decision on that aspect.  Instead, the analysis proceeded according to the corporate constitutional 
approach, first by noting that, per Duha, a unanimous shareholder agreement is a constitutional document: 
 
51        It was confirmed in Duha Printers (Western) Ltd. v. R., [1998] 1 S.C.R. 795 
(S.C.C.), that the USA has a unique legal status given its statutory origins and 
recognition.  Generally, shareholders agreements addressing issues such as voting rights 
and other arrangements give rise to contractual obligations, but they are not considered 
legal or constitutional in nature.  However, the legislative intervention in the Canada 
Business Corporations Act materially altered that situation.  A USA is to be read along 
side the corporation's constating documents and is to be considered in pari materia with 
the company's articles of incorporation and its by-laws. This conclusion is further 
supported by the fact that the very statute that governs the incorporation of the company 
creates the USA and gives it the same power as the articles to supercede the statutory 
provisions for corporate control. 
 
 On the basis of this constitutional importance of the unanimous shareholder agreement, Campbell 
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 Power, supra note 515. 
917
 Ibid, par. 5. 
918
 Ibid, par. 9. 
919
 Ibid, par. 23. 
920
 Ibid, par. 45. 
921
 Ibid, par. 37. 
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 Ibid, par. 48. 
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 Ibid, par. 49. 
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 These acts also gave rise to criminal fraud proceedings; see Lauer SC (TD), supra note 516, and 
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J. found a number of actions in contravention of it to be nullities.  First, the agreement had allegedly been 
amended, but this was held to be of no effect, because its own terms required unanimity for amendment, 
and only a majority had been involved in the attempt to do so.
925
  Second, a share transfer that had occurred 
without regard to the required consent or the right of first refusal specified in it was simply declared "a 
nullity".
926
  A purported "shareholders meeting" that did not satisfy either the notice requirements of the Act 
and the by-laws or the quorum requirements of the unanimous shareholder agreement was also a "a nullity 
and the business purportedly conducted is of no force or effect".
927
  Another meeting that also failed to 
meet these requirements was the one at which the individual defendant was made a director as well as 
manager, and therefore he never properly held that post.
928
  Other share transfers that contravened the 
unanimous shareholder agreement were also declared "invalid" simply for doing so.
929
  As a result, the 
shareholdings were returned to what they had been before these events began.
930
 
 While it would be difficult not to suspect that the judgment was based on the conduct of the 
individual defendant as much as any technicalities of corporate law, the analysis of the judge, the explicit 
description of the unanimous shareholder agreement's status in light of Duha, and the immediate 
invalidation of any acts that contravened its terms make Power one of the clearest examples of the 
corporate constitutional approach in action. 
 The Supreme Court of Canada decision in Duha set out a corporate constitutional approach 
whereby unanimous shareholder agreements altered the very nature of the corporation.  Cases such as 
Piikani and Power, both of which explicitly followed from Duha, illustrate how when such an approach is 
explicitly applied, the results are clear and certain; anything that contravenes the unanimous shareholder 
agreement is a nullity.  But while these cases represent the most obvious examples of a corporate 
constitutional approach, they are by no means the only ones, as the following subsection illustrates.  
 
3.(b) Implicitly Corporate Constitutional Cases 
 
 Because the terminology in this area is as yet unstandardized, the corporate constitutional 
approach is not always easily identified by explicit reference to the concept of a corporate "constitution", 
and sometimes it must be identified in action though its fundamental characteristics.  As noted above, these 
are (a) that any action by directors in contravention of the agreement is outside their powers and therefore a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lauer CA, supra note 516, the latter of which resulted in acquittal. 
925
 Power, supra note 515, par. 57. 
926
 Ibid, par. 57. 
927
 Ibid, par. 66. 
928
 Ibid, par. 67. 
929
 Ibid, pars. 73, 74. 
930
 Ibid, par. 79. 
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nullity,
931
 and (b) no further justification is required and no other considerations as between the parties may 
weigh against it, although the "indoor management rule"
932
 still applies. 
 Based on these criteria, a few cases have appeared to follow a corporate constitutional model 
without so naming it, demonstrating that some judges are willing to take the restrictions upon directors as a 
real and absolute restructuring of power within the corporation.  In addition, as discussed later in this 
chapter, a number of cases nominally under the oppression remedy have more in common with the 
corporate constitutional approach. 
 The summary of the effects of a unanimous shareholder agreement in Leclerc c. Savard
933
 
demonstrates clearly how, even if they use some other terminology or none at all, judges may exhibit a 
corporate constitutional understanding of this tool, as that term is herein defined.  Young J. stated: 
 
La présente convention constitue une "convention unanime" au sens de la Loi sur les 
corporations commerciales (Voir l'article 30 de la C.U.A.).  Le but d'une telle convention 
unanime des actionnaires est de restreindre en tout, ou en partie, les pouvoirs des 
administrateurs dans la gérance et dans les affaires internes de la compagnie.  Le pouvoir 
de prendre des décisions est alors transféré des administrateurs aux actionnaires.  
Toutefois, lorsqu'accordés, les pouvoirs exercés ne peuvent s'étendre au delà des limites 
des restrictions précisées dans la C.U.A.  Cette façon de faire permet plus de souplesse 
dans l'organisation corporative afin qu'elle puisse mieux représenter la négociation entre 
actionnaires.
934
 
 
 While Leclerc did not contain any specific label for it, the judge nonetheless did explicitly set out 
the principle being followed: unanimous shareholder agreements remove powers from directors, who 
thereafter cannot exceed those restrictions.  It was therefore unsurprising that it was found that the director 
and company did not have the authority to transfer shares in contravention of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement and that the transfer was null and without effect ab initio.
935
 
 Other judgments have not been so explicit in setting out the general principles at work, but 
corporate constitutional-style premises can be found underlying determinations that directors cannot 
                                                          
931
 In certain circumstances, such as arose in Sumner, it may no longer be possible to actually reverse 
the offending acts, and therefore another order may be made of necessity, but theoretically nullification is 
the correct response under this approach. 
932
 See note 999 for a discussion of the term "indoor management rule". 
933
 Leclerc c. Savard, 2011 NBBR 124, 382 N.B.R. (2d) 1, 2011 CarswellNB 752, 988 A.P.R. 1, 213 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 92 (N.B. Q.B. May 05, 2011) (hereinafter "Leclerc"). 
934
 Ibid, par. 89.  My translation: "This agreement is a 'unanimous shareholder agreement' in the sense 
of the Act governing business corporations.  (See s. 30 of the unanimous shareholder agreement.)  The goal 
of such a unanimous shareholder agreement is to restrict, in whole or in part, the powers of the directors in 
the management and internal affairs of the company.  The power to make decisions is therefore transferred 
from the directors to the shareholders.  However, once agreed, the powers cannot extend beyond the limits 
of the restrictions set out in the unanimous shareholder agreement.  This approach allows more flexibility in 
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935
 Ibid, par. 113. 
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disregard a unanimous shareholder agreement and the restrictions it places upon them.  This form of 
implicit corporate constitutional analysis is succinctly demonstrated in Ming Minerals Inc. v. Blagdon
936
 
(the facts of which were discussed at greater length in Chapter Three) where, after having determined that a 
document was a unanimous shareholder agreement, Mercer J. said simply, "As the Letter Agreement is a 
unanimous shareholder agreement as contemplated by Section 245(1) the directors of Minerals must 
comply with it.  See Section 203(2) and Section 167."
937
 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement in Skrien v. Waterloo Junction Rail Tours Ltd.
938
 required 
two thirds shareholder approval for the creation of any mortgage, charge, or encumbrance.
939
  The 
agreement also specified the terms of loans to three of the shareholders.
940
  The promissory notes issued 
contained additional terms regarding the payment of interest not found in the unanimous shareholder 
agreement.
941
  Sills J. held that, by virtue of having been in the unanimous shareholder agreement, these 
loans (and generally speaking the notes which had been signed by the sole director, subject to the 
modification noted) were authorized by two thirds of the shareholders, but that "[t]he clause in the notes 
requiring monthly payments of interest is invalid as being contrary to s. 3.07(5) of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement but the notes and the security created by the general security agreement are 
otherwise valid and enforceable against the assets of the corporation".
942
 
 The Plaintiff in Riverstar Inc. v. Hookenson
943
 asked, inter alia, for an order that the various 
defendants be restrained from interfering in the Bailiff Consolidated Civil Enforcement Incorporated with 
respect to the distress for rent owing by one of the defendants to a corporation whose shares the plaintiff 
and the defendant owned.
944
  Watson J. declined to grant that relief because the unanimous shareholder 
agreement contained a unanimous resolution requirement that had not been met
945
 and therefore "it is not 
possible for that company on the direction of any single member or even members of the company or any 
shareholders or individual directors to instruct seizure of any kind as against any tenant in that particular 
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 Ming, supra note 334. 
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 Ibid, par. 28. 
938
 Skrien v. Waterloo Junction Rail Tours Ltd., 32 O.R. (3d) 777, 1997 CarswellOnt 5635 (Ont. Gen. 
Div. Jan 27, 1997) (hereinafter "Skrien Ct J (Gen Div)").  The decision was appealed and upheld in a brief 
judgment, which included the Court of Appeal specifically agreeing that the general security agreement 
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 Skrien Ct J (Gen Div), supra note 938, par. 14. 
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 Ibid, par. 17. 
942
 Ibid, par. 17.  This was upheld on appeal; see note 938. 
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 Riverstar Inc. v. Hookenson, 2004 ABQB 916, 2004 CarswellAlta 1744, [2005] A.W.L.D. 711 
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premises".
946
 
 In Klein v. Viscount Mobile Homes Ltd.,
947
 the unanimous shareholder agreement provided that 
share transfers could only occur with the consent of all shareholders.
948
  Upon the death of one shareholder, 
two of the remaining investors negotiated with his estate to acquire his shares, without notifying or 
receiving consent from the other shareholder.
949
  The purchasers' conduct with regard to the estate was 
found to be in violation of fiduciary duties arising out of the relationship.
950
  While that was the primary 
basis for this portion of the judgment, Brockenshire J. also noted that "[f]rom the point of view of the 
corporation, the very basic requirement of consent by the shareholders and directors was not only never 
obtained, it was never sought.  Without it there could be no transfer of the shares."
951
  This immediate 
nullification of acts contrary to the unanimous shareholder agreement is consistent with the corporate 
constitutional approach.  There was a further issue with regard to share transfers from the same two 
shareholders to numbered companies and their families, again without the knowledge or consent of the last 
shareholder in violation of the agreement;
952
 these were also declared void,
953
 again in accordance with the 
corporate constitutional model. 
 The agreement in Simon v. Ramsay
954
 was not a unanimous shareholder agreement,
955
 but the 
judge noted that if it had been, then "[i]t appears from the terms of clause 2.2 of the shareholders' 
agreement that Salmon and Ramsay [the directors] could not act to remove Simon from his position as 
officer of Continental without his participation in the vote".
956
  The language suggests a genuine inability to 
violate the agreement, a situation that was only circumvented due to defects in its formation.
957
 
 In Gluckstein v. Checkmate Capital Partners Inc.,
958
 after Newbould J. determined that the 
selection of corporate counsel had occurred without unanimous consent of the directors as was required by 
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 Ibid, par. 61. 
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a unanimous shareholder agreement,
959
 without further explanation it was found that the resolution 
authorizing the retainer was therefore invalid.
960
 
 While the enforcement of the unanimous shareholder agreement was not a litigated issue in 
Robinson v. Willis,
961
 it was mentioned in passing as part of the fact summary, and Mitchell J. endorsed the 
corporate constitutional understanding that, given that its terms required any change in management to 
receive support of 75% of shareholders,
962
 the holder of 27.7% of the shares enjoyed an "effective veto"
963
 
and "was right"
964
 that he could not be fired (without his consent). 
 The plaintiff in Lavergne c. Bouchard
965
 was removed from her positions as one of the directors 
and Vice-President of the company.  The unanimous shareholder agreement provided that she could only 
be removed from her position as Vice-President if she ceased to be a shareholder or for cause,
966
 and the 
company had relied upon the former.
967
  Bishop J.C.S. determined that she was still a shareholder,
968
 and 
thus, without additional analysis or explanation, found that her removal from that position was prima facie 
illegal and a nullity.
969
  In a pure corporate constitutional analysis, this would have ended the issue, but as 
this was a request for an injunction and not a final determination of the matter, the reasons continued to the 
other stages of the test; not only had her prima facie case been established, but there was sufficient urgency 
and potential harm and the balance of convenience favoured her.
970
  With regard to the position of director, 
the unanimous shareholder agreement did not specifically provide that she would hold the office, but 
instead stated that each of the three shareholders could select one of the three directors and the others 
agreed to elect those choices.
971
  The judge therefore found that removing her from her position had prima 
facie been accomplished according to the law and the company's articles.
972
  It was left as a question for 
trial whether the same shareholder would thus have the right to select a replacement director whom the 
others would have to support under the terms of the agreement.
973
  This judicial reliance upon the literal 
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wording of the document rather than what one might view as its "spirit" stands in contrast to how the 
situation might be handled under the oppression approach. 
 A unanimous shareholder agreement in 3103-0604 Québec inc. c. Éditions Gatineau ltée
974
 
provided that contracts between the company and a shareholder or related party had to be approved by 60% 
of the shareholders.
975
  Setting out the general effects of a unanimous shareholder agreement, Plouffe J.C.S. 
said: 
 
Ses actionnaires peuvent, si tous y consentent et font une convention écrite à cet effet, 
restreindre le pouvoir des administrateurs.  L'effet d'une convention restreignant le 
pouvoir des administrateurs est de substituer les actionnaires aux administrateurs dans les 
droits et pouvoirs et aussi dans les devoirs et responsabilités des administrateurs, dans la 
mesures de la restriction.  Ce qui précède a trait à la convention unanime des 
actionnaires.  En l'espèce, tous les actionnaires de la société-intimée se sont prévalus de 
cette prérogative.
976
 
 
 Therefore, a contract of employment purportedly entered into with a party related to a shareholder 
that had not received 60% shareholder approval was found, without further explanation, to have no legal 
effect.
977
 
 These cases, as well as the ones listed in the preceding subsection and a few others,
978
 demonstrate 
                                                          
974
 3103-0604 Quebec inc. c. Editions Gatineau ltee, 2006 QCCS 1930, 2006 CarswellQue 3374, J.E. 
2006-999 (C.S. Que. Apr 10, 2006) (hereinafter "3103"). 
975
 Ibid, par. 23. 
976
 Ibid, par. 52.  My translation: "Its shareholders can, if they all agree and make a written contract 
for this purpose, restrict the powers of the directors.  The effect of an agreement restricting the power of the 
directors is to substitute the shareholders for the directors with regard to their rights and powers and also 
duties and responsibilities, to the extent of the restriction.  The preceding has the features of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  In this case, all the shareholders of the company took advantage of this 
prerogative." 
977
 Ibid, par. 61. 
978
 See the discussion later in this chapter concerning oppression cases that employed corporate 
constitutional assumptions.  The following additional examples may also represent this model, given that 
the choice of remedy was to enforce the agreement by reversing/nullifying acts taken contrary to it. 
 
A unanimous shareholder agreement in Leblanc, supra note 674, required that both shareholders agree on 
major decisions, which included the firing and replacement of the company's CEO, called in the judgment 
the "directeur generale" (pars. 72-75).  One of the investors had done this alone, claiming authority under 
the term of the agreement allowing for either shareholder to make routine business decisions (par. 69).  The 
judge ordered the old CEO reinstated (par. 84). 
 
Although the analysis was minimal, the judge in Boudreau c. Després, 2012 QCCS 4027, 2012 
CarswellQue 8539, EYB 2012-210459 (C.S. Que. Jun 15, 2012) ordered on an interim motion that the 
plaintiff be restored to his position in the company (par. 16), in part because of the terms of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement (par. 8). 
 
In Arboriculture 3-R inc. c. Dontigny, 2011 QCCQ 16051 (C.Q. Dec 21, 2011), a company sued its own 
director for, inter alia, transferring a car owned by the company to his wife in satisfaction of a debt the 
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that while the language of "corporate constitutional" unanimous shareholder agreements may not be 
commonly employed by judges, the underlying principles do have some wider currency, one whose sway 
on the judiciary's collective mind is at least competitive with the contractual approach.  These cases 
demonstrate the analytic simplicity, even brevity, to which the corporate constitutional approach lends 
itself, and the absolutism in which it results.  Outside the context of tax law, this is the most significant 
feature of the corporate constitutional view of unanimous shareholder agreements: in this model, the 
restrictions placed cannot be circumvented or ignored.  Any attempt to do so is forbidden and void.  This is 
what makes the corporate constitutional approach not just the simplest, but also the most radical approach 
to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 While the treatment of restrictions as a genuine removal of (some of) the directors' powers, rather 
than a means of controlling how those powers are exercised, is the most crucial difference between the 
corporate constitutional approach- whether explicit or implicit- and the other three means of enforcing 
unanimous shareholder agreements, this model does have a couple of other distinct implications, as 
explored in the following two subsections. 
 
3.(c) Shield 
 
 Because it renders purported corporate acts null and void, the corporate constitutional approach 
could also be used as a "shield" and not a "sword".
979
  A few cases provide examples of how this might 
occur, even if they do not demonstrate successful attempts.  In Jeffrey Pinder & Associates Inc. v. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
company owed her; it sued the wife as well (pars. 2, 13).  A unanimous shareholder agreement shifted from 
the directors to the shareholders the power to sell all or substantially all of the corporation's assets (par. 17).  
The transfer of an automobile valued at $3000 to satisfy an existing debt was found not substantial enough 
to run afoul of that restriction (pars. 19-22).  It therefore remained within the director's power to sell or 
transfer it (par. 20).  The judgment's wording, however, implied the board's authority in the specified areas 
was genuinely removed and only outside those restrictions did they retain their powers (see pars. 17, 20). 
 
The plaintiff in Autotte c. Innovations Voltflex inc., 2008 QCCS 3505, 2008 CarswellQue 7283, EYB 2008-
142782 (C.S. Que. Jul 15, 2008) was removed from his position as director by the majority investor despite 
a unanimous shareholder agreement (par. 3).  During an interim motion hearing for the production of 
documents (and the referral of a related claim to arbitration), Richard J.C.S. commented in passing that it 
would be up to the trial judge to determine whether to annul the shareholder's firing of him (pars. 21, 35).  
The impugned step was taken qua shareholder, which raises questions about whether the agreement would 
be enforced as a unanimous shareholder agreement or a pooling agreement.  The unanimous shareholder 
agreement, as a specific statutory tool, is designed to restrict the powers of the directors, not the 
shareholders, and thus the corporate constitutional approach to enforcing them is not appropriate against the 
latter group.  The same agreements can, however, impose obligations upon shareholders as well, and these 
are enforceable through other means, which may in some circumstances yield similar results. 
979
 A "shield" is a metaphorical term for a defence against a claim, in contrast with a "sword" which is 
a term for the legal basis for a claim. 
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Stephenson Fuels Ltd.,
980
 the applicant attempted to enforce a security agreement under which it had been 
appointed receiver.
981
  The respondent argued that the security agreement contravened a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, to which the applicant was a party, and that therefore the security agreement was 
unenforceable.
982
  Klebuc J. determined that the issues involved required a full trial to sort out conflicting 
evidence,
983
 so did not consider the issues raised at length, but did say this: 
 
2    [4] If the unanimous shareholder's agreement was executed before the general 
security agreement, or the parties had agreed that the terms thereof would govern their 
relationship pending the execution thereof, the general security agreement may be 
unenforceable.  In turn, the appointment of the applicant as receiver would be invalid. 
 
 In C.S.A.E. Inc. v. Air Service S.A.,
984
 the respondent brought a motion to dismiss the suit because, 
inter alia, it was not brought with the authority of the applicant.
985
  The primary basis for this claim was 
that the lawsuit had been initiated by the corporate president without either a directors' or shareholders' 
resolution.
986
  While most of the decision dealt with the situation as a general matter of corporate law, there 
was a unanimous shareholder agreement involved.  It stated that shareholder approval was necessary for, in 
the words of Pepall J., "the making of any decisions or taking of any action with respect to the operation of 
the applicant".
987
  However, the judge concluded that "the institution of the lawsuit was not in the nature of 
an operational decision or action as described in the shareholders' agreement".
988
  While the precedent set is 
arguably a narrow one,
989
 a more interesting and potentially widely applicable aspect of the case is the 
implication regarding standing.  The respondent was not a signatory to the unanimous shareholder 
agreement, but its motion (or at least the judicial consideration of that motion) was based in part on whether 
the agreement outright restricted corporate activities.  This would suggest a corporate constitutional 
understanding.  No other model would allow for third party "enforcement" of a unanimous shareholder 
                                                          
980
 Jeffrey Pinder & Associates Inc. v. Stephenson Fuels Ltd., 2002 SKQB 398, 2002 CarswellSask 
664 (Sask. Q.B. Nov 27, 2002) (hereinafter "Jeffrey Pinder"); Jeffrey Pinder & Associates Inc. v. 
Trollhaugen Management Inc., 2002 SKQB 484 , 2002 CarswellSask 734 (Sask. Q.B. Nov 28, 2002) is a 
functionally identical decision arising out of the same facts, but with even less judicial discussion. 
981
 Jeffrey Pinder, supra note 980, par. 1. 
982
 Ibid, par. 1. 
983
 Ibid, par. 3. 
984
 C.S.A.E. Inc. v. Air Service S.A., 2006 CarswellOnt 9896 (Ont. S.C.J. Sep 11, 2006) (hereinafter 
"C.S.A.E.").  The document in question was generally identified in the judgment simply as a "shareholders' 
agreement", but Pepall J. did make refence to the statutory tool by stating that "[t]he by-laws of the 
applicant provide that the directors shall manage or supervise the management of the business and  affairs 
of the applicant unless otherwise specifically provided in any unanimous shareholder agreement" (par. 5). 
985
 Ibid, par. 1. 
986
 Ibid, par. 7. 
987
 Ibid, par. 6. 
988
 Ibid, par. 12. 
989
 In short, that a unanimous shareholder agreement referring to "operational decisions" would not 
include the bringing of lawsuits to collect on accounts owing. 
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agreement.
990
  Another detail of potential significance is that the target of the motion was specifically not 
the directors, who were explicitly not allowed to vote on the action, but the president (admittedly, also a 
director
991
).  While the president was a party to the agreement, and therefore might be bound by it qua 
signatory in addition to being restricted qua director, this returns us to the question of whether it was being 
enforced as a contract (impossible due to privity) or as a corporate document. 
 The "shield" argument was also raised in Daigle c. 9004-3654 Québec inc.,
992
 but there it did not 
succeed.  The directors had declared that a bonus was payable to one of the officers.
993
  Under the terms of 
a unanimous shareholder agreement, that power had been removed from them and transferred to the 
shareholders.
994
  The corporation subsequently took the position that the bonus was invalid because it had 
not been declared via a shareholders' resolution as set out in the agreement,
995
 prompting him to sue to 
receive it.  The officer in question had signed the document and knew its terms.
996
  Because the company 
had historically not followed the requirements of the unanimous shareholder agreement in this regard,
997
 
the judge found that it could not invoke that clause now to deny the bonus.
998
  A strict corporate 
constitutional approach would not have yielded this conclusion, but the specific logic employed did leave 
some room for the possibility that, had the company normally followed the agreement, the restrictions 
therein could have been used as a "shield" against the officer's claim. 
 While it is possible that a unanimous shareholder agreement might be used as a "shield" in an 
analysis performed under either the contractual or oppression models, depending upon the facts, the 
corporate constitutional approach allows for this much more easily, since its central implication is that 
                                                          
990
 Except the oppression approach to a limited extent, but C.S.A.E. was not an oppression claim.  
C.B.C.A. s. 247, A.B.C.A. s. 248, M.C.A. s. 240, N.B.B.C.A. s. 172, N.L.C.A. s. 378, N.T.B.C.A. s. 249, 
N.B.C.A. s. 249, O.B.C.A. s. 253(1), Q.B.C.A. s. 460, S.B.C.A. s. 240, and Y.B.C.A. s. 249 permit a variety 
of groups (typically creditors, security holders, directors, the Director appointed by the Minister, and any 
person the Court in its discretion allows, with the Quebec version including "any interested person") to 
apply for, inter alia, an order that the corporation or the directors comply with or restrain from breaching a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, although the Court has discretion in dealing with such applications.  
The very existence of this provision suggests that the legislature envisioned a corporate constitutional 
approach to enforcement.  If some other theory is adopted, however, the scope of these provisions as they 
apply to unanimous shareholder agreements may be read narrowly, with third parties either being denied 
permission to bring an application (if required) or else denied the relief sought. 
991
 C.S.A.E., supra note 984, fn 1. 
992
 Daigle c. 9004-3654 Quebec inc., 2002 CarswellQue 1431, J.E. 2002-1331, REJB 2002-32875 
(C.S. Que. Jun 19, 2002) (hereinafter Daigle).  The judgment was upheld by the Court of Appeal, with very 
brief reasons that did not address this point specifically, in Daigle c. 9004-3654 Quebec inc., 2003 
CarswellQue 2927, REJB 2003-51133 (C.A. Que. Nov 24, 2003). 
993
 Daigle, supra note 992, pars. 5-7.  Some of the shareholders subsequently signed one of the 
directors' resolution as well. 
994
 Ibid, par. 8. 
995
 Ibid, par. 18. 
996
 Ibid, par. 20. 
997
 Ibid, pars. 21-27. 
998
 Ibid, par. 27. 
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directors simply have no authority to override the restrictions placed upon them and any purported attempt 
to do so is a nullity.  C.S.A.E. also brings up another aspect of the corporate constitutional model, in the 
suggestion that third parties might be able to enforce unanimous shareholder agreements, because under 
this approach, enforcement is not a matter of rights, but a finding of fact, that the directors' alleged actions 
were beyond their power.  This, again, makes it unique among the four approaches to enforcement, and 
demonstrates how the competing means through which unanimous shareholder agreements are enforced are 
also conflicting views of what they actually are. 
 
3.(d) The "Indoor Management Rule" 
 
 Even under the corporate constitutional approach to the enforcement of unanimous shareholder 
agreements, the "indoor management rule" would protect third parties.
999
  Such a situation arose in Royal 
                                                          
999
 The "indoor management rule" protects third parties who deal with a corporation in the belief that 
its internal decision-making processes are being followed.  It prevents any failure on the part of the 
corporation and/or its participants to adhere to those processes from later being used by them as a basis on 
which to disregard their dealings with outsiders. 
 
In the jurisdictions where the unanimous shareholder agreement exists, each of the statutes specifically 
identifies lack of compliance with one as among the procedural defects that may not be asserted against a 
third party unless they knew or ought to have known of that failure.   The C.B.C.A. provides: 
 
18. (1) No corporation and no guarantor of an obligation of a corporation may assert 
against a person dealing with the corporation or against a person who acquired rights 
from the corporation that 
(a) the articles, by-laws and any unanimous shareholder agreement have not been 
complied with; 
[…] 
(2) Subsection (1) does not apply in respect of a person who has, or ought to have, 
knowledge of a situation described in that subsection by virtue of their relationship to the 
corporation. 
 
See also A.B.C.A. s. 19(a), M.C.A. s. 18(a), N.B.B.C.A. s. 16(a), N.L.C.A. s. 31(a), N.T.B.C.A. s. 18(a), 
N.B.C.A. s. 18(a), O.B.C.A. s. 19(a), Q.B.C.A. s. 13(1), S.B.C.A. s. 18(a), and Y.B.C.A. s. 21(a). 
 
Although it may be terminologically inexact to refer to these sections as the "indoor management rule" (a 
term originally describing a common law rule), that phrase is commonly associated with this principle.  It 
appears as a heading for the section in the Ontario statute (but not the others), and it is employed by several 
of the cases discussed in this subsection.  References in this dissertation to the "indoor management rule" 
should be taken to refer to the statutory provisions where applicable. 
 
See also the discussion in Chapter Five or whether third parties unaware of the existence or terms of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement can rely upon the presumption that directors retain their normal 
liabilities, which falls outside the "indoor management rule". 
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Bank v. Ag-Com Trading Inc.,
1000
 where for separate aspects of the claim, the outside party both was and 
was not protected by the "indoor management rule".
1001
  The corporation was subject to a "joint venture 
agreement" between the two corporations which owned it.  Under the terms of this agreement, the majority 
shareholder would appoint three of the corporate directors and the minority shareholder would appoint two, 
but a two-thirds majority of the directors would be necessary for certain acts, effectively giving the 
minority shareholder a veto.
1002
  The corporation's bank, which was the plaintiff in the suit, was given a 
copy of the agreement, although its representative claimed not to have read it carefully.
1003
  Subsequent to 
this, the corporation both guaranteed bank loans to its majority parent (funds which were in turn used to 
finance the corporation) and eventually took out a loan itself, all without obtaining the two-thirds director 
approval required under the agreement.
1004
 
 Cameron J. considered the issue in the context of the statutory codification of the "indoor 
management rule" in the Ontario Business Corporations Act, which specifically includes unanimous 
shareholder agreements.
1005
  The judge found that, generally, the bank's deemed knowledge of the contents 
of the agreement which it had been given, along with its actual knowledge of the general situation of the 
parties, combined to put it on notice as required by the "indoor management rule":
1006
 "In these 
circumstances the Bank must bear the consequences of failing to examine the JVA for the terms that would 
impact on its relationship with Huron and failing to address that impact in future dealings with Huron."
1007
 
 When obtaining one of the guarantees in question, the bank had received a signed form from a 
corporate officer
1008
 which stated that the attached resolution of the corporation's directors satisfied any 
unanimous shareholder agreements and that there were no unanimous shareholder agreements which 
restricted the ability of the corporation or its directors from borrowing money.
1009
  These assurances were 
false.  However, Cameron J. determined that, in obtaining them, the bank had satisfied its duty to inquire 
with regard to that transaction, and therefore the "indoor management rule" protected it from the need for 
further investigation.  It was entitled to take a corporate officer at his word that the unanimous shareholder 
                                                          
1000
 Royal Bank v. Ag-Com Trading Inc., 2001 CarswellOnt 428, 2 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, [2001] O.J. No. 
474 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Feb 12, 2001) (hereinafter "Royal Bank"). 
1001
 Another issue in the case was that the J.V.A. included an obligation on the majority shareholder to 
transfer equipment to the corporation.  That property was subject to a security interest.  The bank argued 
that the interest survived the transfer, which the judge agreed with, despite finding that the corporation 
would have expected to receive the equipment free of encumbrances. 
1002
 Royal Bank, supra note 1000, par. 8. At par. 68, Cameron J. noted that the agreement did not 
specifically list guarantees, but that the ones in question were liabilities over $50 000, which were covered. 
1003
 Ibid, par. 13. 
1004
 Ibid, pars. 20-51. 
1005
 Ibid, par. 64. 
1006
 Ibid, pars. 67, 70. 
1007
 Ibid, par. 67. 
1008
 Actually the treasurer, but signing as secretary, a position he did not in fact hold; Cameron J. 
found this to be immaterial (Royal Bank, supra note 1000, par. 71). 
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agreements had been satisfied.
1010
 
 With regard to the loan made directly to the corporation, Cameron J. found that despite the fact 
that it had been made without proper authorization, because the benefit had been received by the 
corporation, the money advanced was repayable but unsecured.
1011
  It is unclear on precisely what grounds 
this was done; Cameron J. noted at the conclusion of the judgment that the issue of unjust enrichment had 
not been considered, but that "equitable issues" had.
1012
  By contrast, the judge declined to hold the 
corporation liable for the guarantees under the same general equitable principles, even though the funds had 
been used to finance it, on the grounds that the beneficiary of those loans was still the shareholder, who had 
used the funds as an investment in the corporation "by equity or by loan".
1013
  Therefore, the benefit of the 
loans had been received by the majority shareholder, not the corporation. 
 Both the voided guarantees and the unsecured loan represented nullifications of unauthorized 
corporate acts.  Under a contractual approach, the directors might have been held liable by the shareholders, 
but corporate contracts with third parties would not be invalidated.  So this appears to have been an 
example of the corporate constitutional approach, yet subject to the "indoor management rule". 
 Finally, in 609940 Ontario Inc. (Five Star Auto), Re.,
1014
 the two 50% shareholders of the 
corporation
1015
 agreed that there was to be no "casting vote" and all decisions required both their 
consent.
1016
  One shareholder eventually decided to withdraw from the company and resigned his position 
as director; the other shareholder, then the sole director, subsequently had the company make an 
assignment in bankruptcy.
1017
  The first shareholder took the position that, his consent having been required 
by the unanimous shareholder agreement and not having been obtained, the assignment was void.
1018
  The 
judge framed the issue (as argued by the shareholder) in clearly corporate constitutional terms: 
 
The grounds stated are simple: that by reason of the unanimous shareholder agreement 
the director was not authorized to adopt the enabling resolution without the consent of 
Mr. Cicco; the Business Corporations Act requires directors to comply with the 
shareholder agreement and to manage the affairs of the corporation subject to its 
provisions; therefore the assignment is void.
1019
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1009
 Royal Bank, supra note 1000, par. 30. 
1010
 Ibid, par. 72. 
1011
 Ibid, par. 84. 
1012
 Ibid, pars. 107-108. 
1013
 Ibid, par. 80. 
1014
 609940 Ontario Inc. (Five Star Auto), Re, 1985 CarswellOnt 202, 57 C.B.R. (N.S.) 137, [1985] 
O.J. No. 1753 (Ont. S.C. Dec 19, 1985) (hereinafter "609940"). 
1015
 Ibid, par. 2. 
1016
 Ibid, par. 3. 
1017
 Ibid, par. 5. 
1018
 Ibid, par. 7. 
1019
 Ibid, par. 7. 
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 Under the terms of the Bankruptcy Act,
1020
 the assignment could be annulled if it "ought not to 
have been made".
1021
  Henry J. stated that there was no precedent exactly on point,
1022
 although 
interestingly considering the subsequent analysis, noted also that one possible ground for annulling an 
assignment was lack of adequate notice of the directors' meeting at which it occurred.
1023
  The judge 
concluded: 
 
12 The shareholder agreement of 4th January 1985 is in my opinion a unanimous 
shareholder agreement as defined by the Act.  It binds the directors but does it bind a third 
party dealing with the company who has no notice of the restrictive authority of its 
directors?  In the case at least of the trustee in bankruptcy the answer is "no".  The 
assignment is for the benefit of the creditors and the function of the trustee is to protect 
their interest.  It is the policy of the Act that assets of an insolvent company are to be 
distributed to the creditors according to the scheme of priorities there described; a debtor 
or a creditor may set the machinery in motion. 
 
13 Here the sole director has done so.  The trustee, who has started his 
administration, in his affidavit deposes that at the date of the assignment the company 
was insolvent.  There is a deficiency of assets; it is expected that some preferred creditors 
will be paid but that there will be nothing for the unsecured creditors.  In these 
circumstances, the director made the decision to invoke the Act, justifiably so in my 
opinion.  There is no question that the resolution and assignment are regular on their face; 
the director was duly appointed and qualified to act.  The effect of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement is to limit his authority but in my opinion that is an entirely 
internal matter between the director and the shareholders.  He may be accountable to 
them for failure to comply with the agreement and the statute but that does not render the 
assignment void or disentitle the trustee to rely on the assignment and supporting 
resolution.  To hold otherwise would have the result that no trustee could safely act under 
a corporate assignment in bankruptcy without enquiring into the internal (and 
unpublished) fetters on the authority of the duly appointed directors convened in a regular 
meeting.  In my opinion that cannot have been the intention of the legislature. 
 
 There are obvious reasons why third parties without notice should not find their dealings with a 
corporation nullified due to the operations of a unanimous shareholder agreement; it would create an 
unacceptable level of uncertainty in commercial transactions and lead to the potential abuse of innocent 
outsiders who transacted with the company in good faith.  However, despite Henry J.'s conclusions, it is not 
immediately clear that these reasons extend to the trustee in bankruptcy.  Likewise, the interests of the 
creditors are not necessarily relevant; if they had wished for this bankruptcy, as Henry J. appeared to 
assume it was in their interest, they could have begun the process.  In short, if the assignment were to have 
been annulled, no one was detrimentally deceived by the unusual corporate structure.
1024
  Further, as noted 
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 Bankruptcy Act, RSC 1970, c. B-3, s. 151(1). 
1021
 609940, supra note 1014, par. 10. 
1022
 Ibid, par. 10. 
1023
 Ibid, par. 10. 
1024
 I assume here no facts not referred to that might establish actual loss or reliance. 
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above, lack of proper attention to corporate formalities (such as notice of meetings) is an acceptable reason 
to annul an assignment into bankruptcy.  This is inconsistent with the judge's logic. 
 Despite conceding that unanimous shareholder agreements bind directors, Henry J. did not fully 
accept the implications of the corporate constitutional model.  In the paragraph quoted above, it was stated, 
"There is no question that the resolution and assignment are regular on their face; the director was duly 
appointed and qualified to act."
1025
 (emphasis mine)  Under a corporate constitutional model, the director 
would not have been qualified to act.  But Henry J. defaulted to a more typical corporate arrangement in 
conceiving of directorial powers, stating that any restrictions upon them were a purely internal matter, 
leading only to potential liability to the shareholders. 
 This leads to two questions.  Was Henry J.'s conclusion a rejection of the corporate constitutional 
approach in favour of a contractual one or was it a recognition that third party rights can only be protected 
through an "indoor management rule" that allows them to assume that directors have their normal 
powers?
1026
  And is there a difference between the two?  It was argued in the preceding subsections that the 
quintessential feature of the corporate constitutional approach is that directors simply do not have the 
power to take steps in contravention of unanimous shareholder agreements, and any of their decisions or 
actions that purport to do so are nullities.  As these cases demonstrate, third party interests may require 
giving effect to these acts nonetheless, to protect outsiders from having to know the intricacies of a 
company's inner workings.
1027
  At best, this could be viewed as a necessary compromise of theoretical 
purity in the face of practical considerations.  At worst, this could suggest that another approach, such as 
the contractual view discussed in the next section of this chapter, might be a better way both of enforcing 
unanimous shareholder agreements and of conceiving of their fundamental nature. 
 
                                                          
1025
 609940, supra note 1014, par. 13. 
1026
 This case can be contrasted with 9226-5909 Québec inc. c. 9126-9456 Québec inc. (Pourvoirie 
Monet), 2012 QCCS 1928, 2012 CarswellQue 4441, 222 A.C.W.S. (3d) 591, EYB 2012-206182 (C.S. Que. 
Apr 26, 2012) which explicitly considered it (par. 35) and declined to follow it because, in Quebec, the law 
required disclosure of a unanimous shareholder agreement in the application for bankruptcy (par. 36).  
Therefore, the corporation actually had disclosed it to the registrar (par. 37).  As such, the agreement 
applied, and the director did not have the power to make a proposition under bankruptcy law; that was a 
decision out of the ordinary course of business and, under the document's terms, required shareholder 
approval (pars. 33-34).  In other words, without a concern for harming third parties who had no notice, the 
situation defaulted to one where corporate constitutional principles applied, and the director could not 
overcome the restriction upon his power. 
1027
 In another case dealing with the "indoor management rule", Brosseau-Nestor c. Raymark Xpert 
Business Systems Inc., 2009 QCCS 940, 2009 CarswellQue 1920, EYB 2009-155716, D.T.E. 2009T-247, 
J.E. 2009-652 (C.S. Que. Mar 9, 2009), a corporate officer was found to be entitled to rely upon the 
apparent authority of her superior, the company's President and CEO, to renegotiate her employment 
contract (par. 59).  She was not aware of the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement that placed limits 
upon the superior's ability to do so unilaterally (par. 62).  The "indoor management rule" was specifically 
invoked by the judge (par. 53). 
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3.(e) Summation 
 
 The first of four methods of enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements, the corporate 
constitutional approach, is intertwined with the idea that this tool genuinely restructures the corporation.  
This was the model adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada in Duha, who held that these documents 
become part of the "corporate constitution" and therefore place actual restrictions upon the authority of 
directors.  Once one is in place, any attempts to ignore those limitations are nullities; directors who have 
had their powers removed could no more validly exert them than could, for example, a director who had 
been voted out. 
 Whether or not explicitly labelled as "corporate constitutional", cases that take literally the idea 
that directors lack the power to overcome the restrictions placed upon them demonstrate that this approach 
yields relative simplicity and certainty.  With the significant exception of situations involving the "indoor 
management rule", directors' actions in violation of the agreements are nullities.  This principle extends so 
far as to allow for the possibility of that nullification as a legal "shield".  Even more than its consistency 
with apparent legislative intent and the Supreme Court of Canada's endorsement of it in Duha, it is that 
simplicity and certainty which are the chief practical virtues of the corporate constitutional approach as a 
means of enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 On a theoretical level, the appeal or lack thereof of this method of enforcement is inherently tied to 
whether or not unanimous shareholder agreements truly alter the corporation at a fundamental level.  To 
accept that the corporate structure and the authority of the directors have been reshaped by the unanimous 
will of the shareholders is to endorse the nullification of actions taken in contravention of that restructuring, 
and vice versa.  This is consistent with (and would be required by) a "nexus of contracts" understanding of 
the corporation, but it is also compatible with a statutory framework, with the result that the unanimous 
shareholder agreement is a legislatively-authorized tool, powerful but ultimately specialized, for removing 
powers from the directors.  Yet as the other three approaches covered in this chapter demonstrate, there are 
alternative ways to conceive of both the enforcement of these documents and the nature of the agreements 
themselves. 
 
4. The Contractual Approach 
 
 The restrictions that unanimous shareholder agreements place upon the directors do not have to be 
viewed as an alteration of their fundamental powers to control the corporation.  An alternative conception 
of them is as the terms of a contract with the directors regarding how those powers are to be used. 
 Under the common law, directors were not permitted to enter into contracts detailing how they 
would exercise their powers, as that was seen to "fetter their discretion" and interfere with their ability to 
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make each decision as it arose in the best interests of the company, as their duty requires.  One possible 
interpretation of the provisions in the various acts creating unanimous shareholder agreements is that they 
are a statutory override of this prohibition, under the specific circumstances that all shareholders agree.  In 
other words, in the phrase "[a]n otherwise lawful written agreement among all the shareholders of a 
corporation [...] that restricts, in whole or in part, the powers of the directors to manage, or supervise the 
management of, the business and affairs of the corporation is valid"
1028
 it is the agreement and not the 
restrictions whose validity is being declared; this would replace the previous rule that a contract with the 
directors that restricted their discretion was not legally valid. 
 One immediate implication is the technical difficulties that could arise if the directors were not 
parties to the document.  While they might typically also be shareholders, all of whom by definition must 
be parties or are deemed parties, there are any number of possible circumstances where non-shareholders 
might be elected as directors.  Since contracts cannot typically be enforced against non-parties, it is 
possible that this would mean that the unanimous shareholder agreement could not be enforced against 
them.  A similar question arose at the trial level in Sumner, with regard to whether the corporation itself 
was bound by the agreement.
1029
  This problem might be circumvented by deeming directors and/or the 
                                                          
1028
 C.B.C.A. s. 146(1). 
1029
 Commentators had previously weighed in regarding whether or not a corporation is a deemed 
party to a unanimous shareholder agreement, if it is not an explicit one.  They concluded that the company 
is bound, but using two separate approaches, which arguably have different theoretical implications.  One 
of these is corporate constitutional in nature (and also follows the "nexus of contracts" model).  Ratti, supra 
note 16, p. 121, and Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 235, both argued that the corporation is itself bound by a 
unanimous shareholder agreement because it cannot ignore changes to the very documents that set out its 
parameters.  I agree that the corporate constitutional approach to enforcement necessarily means that the 
company is bound by unanimous shareholder agreements (except where third party rights are involved), 
since any actions taken by directors in contravention of them are nullities.  If these documents are enforced 
contractually against the directors, however, it is less clear what the situation might be regarding the 
company itself.  This brings us to the second explanation.  Robitaille, supra note 267, pp. 172-173, pointed 
out that since the corporation is legally a separate person from its shareholders, it is not automatically 
bound by a contract they sign, even a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Despite that, he considered this 
distinction largely academic if the investors had assumed full power over it, and since he also believed that 
the statute at least implicitly required that directors be bound to follow a unanimous shareholder agreement, 
he concluded that it would be difficult to claim that the company was not.  Martel, supra note 11, p. 31, 
argued that despite it not being explicit in the statute that the corporation was bound by the agreement 
whether or not a party to it, this was the only logical conclusion.  Martel and Martel, supra note 16, p. 373, 
also argued that since both shareholders and directors were bound, so must the company be, because the 
unanimous shareholder agreement dissolved the distinction between them.  If one adopts a contractual and 
not corporate constitutional approach to enforcement, it is not clear that legally binding the decision-makers 
is the same as binding the company.  (This also assumes that the directors themselves are bound.)  The 
distinction is not merely technical.  Presumably, acts of the company that were prohibited would usually be 
imputed to the directors whether or not specifically authorized by them, but it is possible that this might not 
always occur.  Further, although an order of specific performance against the board would de facto affect 
the company they control, if damages were awarded, resort would be limited to the directors' personal 
assets and exclude corporate ones.  The ability of a unanimous shareholder agreement to bind the company 
is thus another potential difference between the corporate constitutional and contractual approaches.  For 
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corporation
1030
 to be bound by unanimous shareholder agreements as if they were parties.
1031
  On the other 
hand, one might take the position that this result is a feature, not a bug, and that directors should not be 
bound by restrictions to which they did not agree, even if the shareholders unanimously wish to impose 
them, essentially adding an additional requirement to those present in the statutes. 
 Conversely, privity bars non-parties from suing to enforce a contract.  While, as discussed above, 
it is at least debatable whether it is open to a third party under a corporate constitutional approach to argue 
that an alleged corporate act was a nullity because it was not properly authorized, under traditional contract 
law there would be no such opportunity.
1032
  It might also complicate attempts by shareholders to enforce 
the agreement when their own personal rights are not obviously at stake.
1033
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
completeness, the final two models would address this dilemma as follows.  If breach of an agreement is a 
violation of the directors' duties, then the corporation is necessarily the claimant (if often by proxy) rather 
than a defendant.  The oppression remedy easily includes the company itself among potential defendants. 
1030
 According to the legislation, a unanimous shareholder agreement restricts directors, not the 
corporation directly, although if it is enforceable against the former, this will generally not make a 
significant difference. 
1031
 If they were literally deemed parties, this would also have implications for the directors' and/or the 
corporation's ability to enforce the document against the shareholders.  While not precisely on point, see H 
& R Electric Ltd. v. Chieftain Industrial Contractors & Consultants Ltd., 91 Sask. R. 20, 1990 
CarswellSask 480 (Sask. Q.B. Dec 18, 1990), where a corporation that was a party to its own unanimous 
shareholder agreement (par. 5) but not the accompanying covenants contemplated in it (par. 15) therefore 
could not enforce non-compete clauses in the latter documents against its investors (par. 21).  Whether a 
corporation (or directors) not party to the unanimous shareholder agreement itself could enforce the terms 
therein as against a shareholder is not precisely the same situation, but bears consideration.  Privity, if it is 
applicable, would bar such a claim; that could be reversed if they were legally deemed parties for the 
purpose of allowing enforcement as against them. 
1032
 While the present discussion has focussed on unanimous shareholder agreements as instruments 
that restrict directors and largely ignored cases dealing with intra-shareholder rights placed in the same 
document, e.g. shotgun clauses, it is perhaps notable that in a suit brought over a right of first refusal for 
share sales, Groupe Bocenor inc. c. Lamiver inc., 2006 CarswellQue 4907, J.E. 2006-1481, EYB 2006-
105490 (C.S. Que. May 12, 2006), Jacques J.C.S. held that in addition to the "indoor management rule" 
applying (the phrase was not used, but the principle was set out and the federal and Quebec statutes were 
cited (par. 178 and fn 58)), because on the facts the purchaser had no knowledge of the agreement (par. 
183), so did the wider Civil Code of Québec, LRQ, c C-1991, c. 64 (hereinafter "C.C.Q."), article 1440 also 
apply: "A contract has effect only between the contracting parties; it does not affect third persons, except 
where provided by law" (par. 179).  The judgment did not specify if it applied generally to any term in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement or only to intra-shareholder rights.  The court also commented that the 
remedy for a shareholder for a breach was therefore a suit for damages (par. 181), although again it was 
unclear if that was limited to intra-shareholder disputes or included restrictions upon directors. 
1033
 In Vaillancourt c. Lambert, ès qualités "Liquidateur succession Laurent Perreault", 1998 
CarswellQue 2525 (C.S. Que. Apr 27, 1998), a unanimous shareholder agreement provided that the 
company was to repurchase the shares of a deceased investor (par. 9).  Other shareholders sued to enforce 
this sale (par. 6).  The remaining shareholders and the company brought a motion to dismiss (par. 1).  The 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked sufficient interest in the matter to bring a claim, as they would 
not be parties to the share purchase (pars. 15-16).  Rochon J. found that they had sufficient interest to defeat 
the motion to dismiss, both since it related to a unanimous shareholder agreement to which they were 
parties and because any share repurchase by the company affected the rights they had through their own 
holdings (par. 21). 
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 Undoubtedly the most significant implication of a contractual approach to unanimous shareholder 
agreements, however, is that contracts can be broken.  There are penalties for doing so, to be sure, but 
generally these take the form of damages, financial compensation to the aggrieved party rather than forced 
compliance with the terms of the agreement.  It is possible for a judge to order specific performance, but 
that is a discretionary remedy, and it is granted more rarely than damages.
1034
  The amount of money 
awarded is generally calculated on the basis of the quantum of provable harm caused by the breach.  
Furthermore, completed actions that contravene contracts are not legal nullities.
1035
   
 With regard to unanimous shareholder agreements, the contractual approach therefore suggests 
that directors would still retain their full power, and any contraventions of the agreement would be within 
their ability.  They might incur liability, but they could do it.  They would not, as in the corporate 
constitutional approach, be rendered powerless in the designated areas.  The contractual approach is thus 
much less radical in its implications for the corporation.  Rather than a customizable corporate form in 
which power could be restricted and reapportioned, one would find a traditional corporate structure in 
which directors could make contracts as to how they would vote, only to break them again if they were 
willing to pay the price. 
 The next subsection examines the contention, put forth by the Court of Appeal in Sumner, that the 
Supreme Court of Canada endorsed a contractual approach to unanimous shareholder agreements in Duha, 
a claim that I ultimately reject.  The subsequent subsection examines how contract law principles are 
nonetheless often invoked in interpreting and applying these agreements.  This is followed by consideration 
of one of the central implications of favouring the contractual approach over a corporate constitutional one: 
directors' actions taken in contravention of the agreements are not nullities.  Finally, cases allowing for 
injunctions enforcing negative covenants are examined to demonstrate how they- and, by extension, any 
enforcement of contractual rights through injunction or specific performance rather than damages- blur the 
line between the two approaches. 
 
4.(a) Duha Revisited 
 
 While the Supreme Court of Canada in Duha
1036
 found that unanimous shareholder agreements 
were constitutional documents, they also recognized that the agreements had a contractual aspect: 
 
66 In other words, the USA is a corporate law hybrid, part contractual and part 
constitutional in nature.  The contractual element is immediately apparent from a reading 
of s. 140(2): to be valid, a USA must be an "otherwise lawful written agreement among 
                                                          
1034
 See e.g. Sumner CA. 
1035
 See e.g. Sumner CA. 
1036
 Duha, supra note 24. 
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all the shareholders of a corporation, or among all the shareholders and a person who is 
not a shareholder".  It seems to me that this indicates not only that the USA must take the 
form of a written contract, but also that it must accord with the other, general 
requirements for a lawful and valid contract.  More generally, the USA is by its nature 
able to govern both the procedure for running the corporation and the personal or 
individual rights of the shareholders: see Iacobucci, supra. 
 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement is thus, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
contractual in two senses.  The first is both clear and largely trivial; the formation of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement necessitates that the general requirements for a lawful and valid contract be met.
1037
  
A unanimous shareholder agreement could therefore be challenged on the grounds of non est factum, 
unconscionability, lack of legal capacity, et cetera.
1038
 
 The second contractual aspect, the "general" one alluded to in the last sentence, is unfortunately 
ambiguous when taken on its own or only within the context of the immediately preceding sentence, as it 
could be read to mean that the contractual nature of the unanimous shareholder agreement underlies both its 
ability to govern the procedures of the corporation and the personal and individual rights of other parties to 
the agreement.  However, read in the context of the paragraph as a whole and the reasons for judgment as a 
whole, it seems more plausible to construe the last sentence as meaning that it is the hybrid nature of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement that allows it to both govern the procedure for running the corporation 
(thought its constitutional aspects) and the personal rights of shareholders (through its contractual aspects). 
 Despite this, courts have sometimes interpreted the enforcement of unanimous shareholder 
agreements with regard to corporate governance as being itself contractual.  The Court of Appeal in Sumner 
did so, allegedly relying upon the precedent of Duha as represented in the very paragraph reproduced 
above.  This ignored the larger context and other passages of the reasons for judgment.  As described in the 
next subsections, other decisions have independently come to the conclusion that unanimous shareholder 
agreements should be enforced as contracts. 
 
4.(b) Contract Law Principles 
 
 The clearest indicator that a contractual approach to the unanimous shareholder agreement is being 
used is, of course, an analysis that explicitly proceeds on the basis that these instruments are just contracts, 
as the Court of Appeal in Sumner did.
1039
  Absent that, the use of contract law principles to interpret the 
                                                          
1037
 Although the Supreme Court was unambiguous on this point, the comment was obiter, and 
Iacobucci J. did not specifically address scenarios that might call this principle into doubt.  See the 
discussion of the "lawful" criterion in Chapter Three. 
1038
 See Chapter Three. 
1039
 In Sumner CA, supra note 263, the Court of Appeal did not simply categorize the case as a breach 
of contract, but applied contract law principles as well.  It is possible for the former to occur without the 
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document or contract law remedies can serve as implicit indicators that the court approached the unanimous 
shareholder agreement as a contract.  Over the centuries, a rich body of law has developed governing issues 
of contractual breach; if unanimous shareholder agreements are enforced simply as contracts, all of that law 
would be applicable to them.
1040
 
 The contractual approach is obviously not the only one that rests upon interpreting the words of 
the document.  The corporate constitutional method similarly requires that the words' meaning be applied 
by the courts, as ultimately do all the others, and similar principles may be followed to do so.  On the other 
hand, the strict reading of the unanimous shareholder agreement in the first case discussed in this 
subsection was a choice based upon its classification as a "commercial contract"; alternatives include a 
more purposive approach to interpretation, one that would allow for extrinsic evidence normally barred by 
the rules of contract law, a bias in favour of the default corporate form requiring unusually clear language 
for any displacement of it, or a contra preferendum style presumption that favoured an expansive reading 
of shareholders' rights to the extent reasonably consistent with the agreement.  As discussed later in this 
chapter, an oppression remedy approach to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements can lean in this 
last direction, though it is questionable whether there is a benefit to a system that allows for unanimous 
shareholder agreements to be the basis of both a narrow contractual right and a broad oppression claim.  All 
of the cases which follow demonstrate how utilizing contract law to interpret and enforce unanimous 
shareholder agreements can lead to outcomes that might not have been reached under a corporate 
constitutional, directors' duties, or enforcement model. 
 The aforementioned strict reading of a "commercial contract" is found in BMO Capital Corp. v. 
Clear Picture Corp.
1041
  Two corporations, BMO Capital Corporation (the plaintiff) and ACF Equity 
                                                                                                                                                                             
latter.  For example, in Pollock v. Sasltech Inspection Ltd., 2013 SKQB 409, 432 Sask. R. 227, 2013 
CarswellSask 882, 236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 342 (Sask. Q.B. Nov 19, 2013), Kovach J. allowed an amendment to 
the claim to add "breach of contract" regarding the company's alleged violations of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement (in terminating him without cause and redeeming his shares), stating simply that this 
constituted a prima facie meritorious case requiring trial (pars. 51-52).  Although substantive analysis was 
thus deferred, the judge accepted that it was legally correct to categorize a corporation's violation of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement as a breach of contract.  This classification is only meaningful, however, 
if the accompanying principles of this approach are ultimately applied. 
1040
 While much of the following discussion alludes to common law contract principles, LaFortune, 
supra note 552, pp. 222-233 contained a discussion of how civil law contract principles would apply to 
shareholder agreements in Quebec; unanimous shareholder agreements were specified only where they 
differed from other shareholder agreements, e.g. the requirements for formation (p. 222).  For an example 
of a case applying civil law contract interpretation to a unanimous shareholder agreement, see Dupuis c. 
Disques Atlantis inc., 2013 QCCS 408, 2013 CarswellQue 804, EYB 2013-217709 (C.S. Que, Jan 29, 
2013), pars. 46-75, or (in the context of an oppression claim) the discussion of Matic c. Trottier, 2014 
QCCS 3376, 2014 CarswellQue 7200, EYB 2014-239877 (C.S. Que. Jul 14, 2014) (hereinafter "Matic") 
later in this chapter. 
1041
 BMO Capital Corp. v. Clear Picture Corp., 2008 NSSC 230, 266 N.S.R. (2d) 378, 2008 
CarswellNS 382, 851 A.P.R. 378, 168 A.C.W.S. (3d) 976, 47 B.L.R. (4th) 301 (N.S. S.C. Jul 18, 2008) 
(hereinafter "BMO"). 
  
 
 
186 
 
Atlantic Inc. (granted intervenor status), were among the shareholders of the defendant corporation Clear 
Picture Corp.
1042
  Under the terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement, approval of both those two 
shareholders was required for the defendant corporation to issue securities or to issue or repay loans.
1043
  
The company subsequently borrowed from its shareholder ACF under terms that included a defined 
maturity date for the loan,
1044
 with BMO approval,
1045
 but then repeatedly agreed to extend the term of the 
loan without obtaining BMO approval.
1046
  BMO objected to further extensions, arguing that its approval 
was required under the unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 The analysis began by setting out the contractual paradigm being used: "It is generally accepted 
that commercial contracts are to be interpreted in accordance with sound commercial principles to the 
extent the wording used permits such an interpretation."
1047
  On that basis, Scaravelli J. cited authorities 
indicating that the proper approach to interpreting commercial contracts is to begin by determining whether 
there is more than one meaning possible.
1048
  The judge concluded that there was not; the wording referred 
only to the issuance of new loans, not the extension of maturity dates.
1049
  The fact that BMO was a 
"sophisticated commercial entity"
1050
 and could have contracted in advance to include extensions in the 
clause, was also a factor.
1051
  In the alternative, Scaravelli J. noted that the terms of the debenture, to which 
BMO had originally consented, set the maturity date as either the one specified "'or such later date as is 
agreed in writing by the Debenture holder'"
1052
 and thus ruled that BMO had agreed to the possibility of 
extensions.  This alternative analysis appears flawed, since the wording of the debenture refers to the holder 
agreeing to extend the date, not being granted a unilateral right to do so, and therefore the corresponding 
agreement of Clear Picture Corp. might still be conditional upon its pre-existing obligations such as the 
unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 Another case that applied contract law principles to determine that a party could not enforce a 
unanimous shareholder agreement was Albert Estate v. Gionet.
1053
  McIntyre J. definitively placed the 
claim in the realm of contract law, ruling that "[t]he companies' obligation to the estate [of a deceased 
                                                          
1042
 Ibid, par. 3.  No directors were named as parties. 
1043
 Ibid, par. 3. 
1044
 Ibid, par. 4. 
1045
 Ibid, par. 11. 
1046
 Ibid, pars. 5-7. 
1047
 Ibid, par. 9. 
1048
 Ibid, par. 9. 
1049
 Ibid, par. 12. 
1050
 Ibid, par. 12. 
1051
 Ibid, par. 12. 
1052
 Ibid, par. 13. 
1053
 Albert Estate v. Gionet, 133 N.B.R. (2d) 408, 1993 CarswellNB 77, 341 A.P.R. 408 (N.B. Q.B. 
May 07, 1993) (hereinafter "Albert Estate").  It was upheld on the appeal, Albert Estate v. Gionet, 160 
N.B.R. (2d) 70, 1995 CarswellNB 382, 412 A.P.R. 70 (N.B. C.A. Mar 08, 1995).  The Court of Appeal 
ruled that the trial judgment rested ultimately upon a finding of credibility, and declined to overturn the 
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shareholder] under the terms of the [unanimous shareholder] agreement was purely contractual".
1054
  In 
context, this was a rejection of a claim that the companies' obligations under the agreement took the form of 
a trust, and not a rejection of a corporate constitutional analysis, but nonetheless, it makes clear the 
approach that the judge took, and the effects of this (as opposed to what the corporate constitutional model 
might have dictated) can be seen in the balance of the judgment. 
 In Albert Estate, the unanimous shareholder agreement for two related corporations contained 
provisions requiring the company to take out life insurance on its two shareholders
1055
 and upon either of 
their deaths, to buy their shares from their estates at a specified price.
1056
  After one of the two died, his 
widow initially declined to accept this buy-out.
1057
  She became a director of the companies.
1058
  Soon after, 
she unsuccessfully attempted to negotiate the sale of her shares
1059
 to the other shareholder, outside the 
price framework in the agreement.
1060
  Finally, several months after initially declining to sell, and after the 
company's fortunes had fallen further, the widow remitted the shares in both companies and demanded 
payment in compliance with the unanimous shareholder agreement.
1061
 
  McIntyre J. determined that the widow had acted in a manner "totally inconsistent with the terms 
of the shareholders' agreement"
1062
 and that, while the other shareholder and the corporation had been 
willing to fulfill their obligations under it,
1063
 the widow's "refusal to perform [at the appropriate time] 
entitles [the other shareholder] and the companies to a discharge of their obligation".
1064
  Because the 
approach to the unanimous shareholder agreement was conceived of as contractual, the corporation (and the 
directors') obligations under it could be discharged by the widow's refusal to perform at the appropriate 
time.  Under a corporate constitutional approach, the directors (and company) would have been legally 
powerless to not perform (although in the circumstances of this case, some sort of equitable defence might 
have been justifiable). 
 In Clarfield v. Manley,
1065
 there was a term in the unanimous shareholder agreement that stated 
                                                                                                                                                                             
decision (pars. 8, 10). 
1054
 Albert Estate, supra note 1053, par. 58. 
1055
 Technically, one of the shareholders owned some of his shares through a holding company, rather 
than personally (Albert Estate, supra note 1053, par. 6). 
1056
 Albert Estate, supra note 1053, par. 19. 
1057
 Ibid, pars. 22, 30. The two parties gave differing accounts as to exactly why this refusal occurred, 
with the widow claiming that she was told she also had to sell her shares in two other companies not 
covered by the agreement and the other shareholder saying she voluntarily decided to remain with the 
company. 
1058
 Ibid, par. 31. 
1059
 In these two companies and two other related companies. 
1060
 Albert Estate, supra note 1053, pars. 38-39. 
1061
 Ibid, par. 40. 
1062
 Ibid, par. 62. 
1063
 Ibid, par. 63. 
1064
 Ibid, par. 63. 
1065
 Clarfield, supra note 289. 
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that the management contract the corporation had entered into with a company controlled
1066
 by one of its 
shareholders
1067
 could only be terminated with the unanimous consent of all its shareholders.
1068
  He argued 
that this arrangement granted him a lifetime contract which should be taken into account in a winding up 
order.
1069
  While there was no issue of this clause being violated by one of the parties, and thus it did not 
give rise to enforcement issues in the strict sense, Blair J.'s treatment of this contention is interesting in the 
context of the divide between the corporate constitutional and contractual approaches.  The judge rejected 
the argument: 
 
63. [...]  As between Mr. Manley - or more technically, Altrim Lumber - and Clear 
Customs itself, the employment contract is terminable on 30 days' notice.  It is only Mr. 
Manley's position as a shareholder and a party to the agreement that protects him against 
termination because unanimity is required.  In my view, this provision of the agreement 
could not have been intended by the parties to apply to a situation where the business is 
being wound up as between them and will no longer be carried on.  It was meant to 
protect one of them from being frozen or squeezed out by the others while the business 
continued to be carried on, and is buttressed by the requirement that if one of the 
shareholders sells his shares to a third party, the purchaser of those shares must assume 
the obligations under the agreement. 
 
[...] 
 
65. Mr. Manley's argument, it seems to me, is founded upon an unsustainable 
premise.  It confuses a contractual claim as an employee, protected by a contractual right 
as a shareholder, with a claim as a shareholder to additional equity in the company.  The 
latter does not follow from the former. 
 
 While the court would have the power to override or disregard a unanimous shareholder 
agreement regardless of whether it was following a corporate constitutional or contractual approach, the 
judge here, in deciding not to take into account the value (both economic and otherwise) of rights under a 
unanimous shareholder agreement because they were merely contractual and not part of the shareholder's 
equity in the company, was adopting an explicitly contractual approach to it.  This does not account for the 
possibility that the agreement had fundamentally changed the nature of the corporate structure and thus the 
shareholders' interests in it. 
 Similarly, in Houle, Re,
1070
 provisions in a unanimous shareholder agreement naming an 
individual to positions as director and officer of the company were treated as contractual, no different from 
                                                          
1066
 It was not explicit in the reasons for judgment whether he owned all the shares, but it was referred 
to as "his company" (Clarfield, supra note 289, par 3) and generally treated as synonymous with him (see 
e.g. par. 63). 
1067
 The one responsible for the oppression discussed below. 
1068
 Clarfield, supra note 289, par. 12. 
1069
 Ibid, par. 61. 
1070
 Houle, Re, 2004 CarswellQue 9344, EYB 2004-60483 (Que. Bktcy. Apr 08, 2004) (hereinafter 
"Houle"). 
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an employment contract.  The person in question was fired after various improper behaviours diverting 
corporate assets to himself were discovered.
1071
  A unanimous shareholder agreement bound the 
shareholders to elect him as one of the two directors and included terms the effect of which was that 
removing him from his position as officer required unanimity among the board.
1072
  The other director 
unsurprisingly had acted alone in firing him.
1073
  In addition to the unanimous shareholder agreement, the 
company's articles stated that directors could only be removed by a shareholder's resolution, which had also 
not occurred; Chaput J.C.S. appeared to consider that this procedure trumped the provision of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement that bound them to elect him.
1074
  The individual brought a motion to be 
restored to his position pending trial.
1075
 
 Chaput J.C.S. stated that the ex-officer had been an employee with a contract of indeterminate 
length, and thus could be fired by the company;
1076
 whether the dismissal was wrongful or with cause, the 
corporation had put an end to his employment.
1077
  The judge further determined that it was not in the 
company's best interests for him to be reinstated, but that pending trial he was entitled to his salary and 
access to corporate records.
1078
  While the allegations of inappropriate behaviour doubtless played a role in 
the outcome, the classification of this situation as merely an employment contract of indeterminate length 
is, as in Clarfield, a rejection of the possibility that a unanimous shareholder agreement can entrench 
individuals in given positions effectively permanently, their assigned role a fundamental part of the 
corporation's structure.  As always, interpreting arrangements codified in a unanimous shareholder 
agreement through the lens of contract law- here, specifically the principles which govern contracts of 
employment- represents a choice, and one which starkly contrasts with the other models. 
 Because all attempts to enforce a unanimous shareholder agreement, regardless of the approach 
used, ultimately amount to giving effect to the terms of an agreement, the influence of contract law can 
unsurprisingly be seen even when a strictly contractual analysis is not being followed.  But when such an 
approach is predominant, it brings with it a host of specific rules, and however natural the rules of contract 
law may grow to seem to those steeped in them, they still represent choices, and it is possible to envision 
competing principles.  Each of the cases in this subsection might have come out differently had the 
restrictions in the agreements been taken as literal and absolute rather than subject to contract law 
principles, or perhaps had an oppression remedy analysis been performed.  But if unanimous shareholder 
agreements are treated as contracts, then aside from the areas where these agreements are unusual by 
                                                          
1071
 Ibid, pars. 16-19. 
1072
 Ibid, par. 20. 
1073
 Ibid, par. 23. 
1074
 Ibid, pars. 21-25. 
1075
 Ibid, par. 4. 
1076
 Ibid, par. 27. 
1077
 Ibid, par. 31. 
1078
 Ibid, pars. 32-33. 
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definition (deemed parties, for example), the natural presumption would be that the law of contracts would 
and should apply.  If they are not simply a form of contract, the extent to which contract law applies 
becomes more debatable, and other outcomes become possible. 
 
4.(c) Remedies for Contractual Breach 
 
 The use of a contractual approach to analyzing unanimous shareholder agreements can affect 
whether enforcement occurs, as the previous subsection demonstrated, but even if that is the conclusion, 
this method leads to a very different sort of remedy from the corporate constitutional one.  Unlike that 
model, it does not automatically nullify the actions of directors who violate the unanimous shareholder 
agreement.  It has this in common with the directors' duties and oppression remedy theories of enforcement, 
discussed later in this chapter, so it is not always clear which of the three a case is following when it 
suggests without elaborating that actions taken in contravention of a unanimous shareholder agreement 
might be problematic, but are not ineffective.
1079
 
 The typical remedy for contractual breach is damages.  As the Court of Appeal decision in Sumner 
demonstrated, the principles used in calculating damages can result in quite miniscule awards, and rely 
                                                          
1079
 For example, while not explicitly framed as a contractual case, the approach taken in Bekkering v. 
Lakeside Feeders Ltd., 1992 CarswellAlta 754, [1992] A.W.L.D. 608 (Alta. Q.B. Jun 26, 1992) also 
appears most consistent with the view that a unanimous shareholder agreement imposes contractual 
obligations upon the directors, rather than restricting their powers outright, despite concluding that those 
terms constituted a barrier to the validity of certain acts.  The plaintiffs had entered into negotiation with 
the defendant regarding the sale of shares of a subsidiary of the former to the latter (par. 12).  (Technically, 
it was a subsidiary of the corporate plaintiff only.  The other plaintiffs were in turn the shareholders of the 
parent company (par. 6).)  The position of the plaintiffs was that an agreement had been reached, which 
was denied (pars. 2-3).  Principally on grounds having to do with terms not having been settled, Waite J. 
found for the defendants (pars. 17, 21).  However, the judge also examined an alternative ground.  The 
defendant corporation had a unanimous shareholder agreement which required the consent of a certain 
shareholder for any purchases of this scope, consent which had not been granted (par. 23).  Despite 
disagreement on this point, the defendants' evidence was accepted that they had notified the plaintiffs 
during the negotiations that this approval would be required for the sale to proceed (par. 24).  The judge's 
conclusion was framed as follows: "However, even if the course of dealings between the parties had been 
such as to sustain the inference that terms had been agreed upon and a contract made, those terms and that 
contract would be unenforceable because of a condition precedent established at the meeting of July 19th" 
(par. 23).  The invalidity of the sale contract (assuming no other problems) was rested on an unfulfilled 
condition precedent, not the lack of authority of the directors to breach a unanimous shareholder agreement.  
While in this case, the result was the same, the distinction is important.  The agreement itself did not bind 
the directors or the company, but rather their own choice to invoke it as a condition precedent.  Anything 
might be made a condition precedent; this would mean that a unanimous shareholder agreement has no 
special ability to restrict the board. (In fact, the decision does not necessarily grant this instrument even the 
force of a contract, as regards the shareholders' ability to enforce it.)  This could mean that a unanimous 
shareholder agreement would not affect such external negotiations even if the third party had notice, if the 
directors had told the third party that they were choosing not to follow it, or if the third party had somehow 
learned of it through other channels. 
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upon proof of quantifiable harm caused by the breach.
1080
  This stands in contrast not only to the potential 
value of having the restricted act "undone" through the corporate constitutional approach, but also the other 
two models as well.  As elaborated upon later in this chapter, the legislation allows for a wide array of 
remedies for oppression including financial compensation for the unmet "reasonable expectations" that are 
oppressed or unfairly disregarded, rather than loss in the contract law sense per se, and the directors' duties 
approach potentially (if problematically) includes the duty of loyalty, which can require the disgorgement 
of profits even if the beneficiary suffered no corresponding loss. 
 Bergeron c. Paré
1081
 demonstrates the connection between conceiving of enforcement in 
contractual terms and providing contractual remedies.  A motion was brought pending arbitration 
requesting that the petitioners be restored to their former positions in the company.
1082
  The directors' 
meeting at which they had been fired was alleged to have been invalid under the terms of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.
1083
  Allard J.C.S. held that the balance of convenience did not favour restoring them 
to their positions pending arbitration.
1084
  Notably, the judge found that this was unlikely to prejudice them, 
because even if they were successful at arbitration, the standard award for contractual breach was damages, 
not specific performance.
1085
  The connection between approach, remedy, and even outcome is clearly 
illustrated; had the unanimous shareholder agreement been viewed not as a contract but instead in corporate 
constitutional terms, the outcome might have been different. 
 It is also important to remember that the parties themselves can shape the analysis through the 
relief they request.  In Lemire c. Nault,
1086
 the plaintiff argued that his firing from his employment with the 
company was contrary to a unanimous shareholder agreement that required the consent of all shareholders 
and resort to arbitration.
1087
  Arguing that this firing did not follow the agreement and was therefore illegal, 
                                                          
1080
 There may also be an issue regarding whether an investor attempting to enforce terms in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement primarily for the benefit of the company has a sufficient interest therein 
under Code of Civil Procedure, CQLR c C-25, s. 55.  Such an argument was discussed regarding a 
shareholder agreement in Banque Nationale du Canada c. Titley, 1997 CarswellQue 1588, J.E. 98-736, 
REJB 1997-05978 (C.S. Que. Dec 09, 1997) at pars. 10-11; the document was not explicitly identified as a 
unanimous shareholder agreement in the judgment (though it seemingly met the criteria), so its 
applicability as precedent regarding unanimous shareholder agreements may be debatable, but regardless, 
the issue may be applicable. 
1081
 Bergeron c. Pare, 2005 CarswellQue 3313, J.E. 2005-995, EYB 2005-86736 (C.S. Que. Mar 21, 
2005) (hereinafter "Bergeron"). 
1082
 Ibid, par. 9. 
1083
 Ibid, par. 6.  The case was distinguished from Larvegne, supra note 965, because that precedent 
involved a unanimous shareholder agreement that specifically provided that, pending arbitration, a party 
contesting being fired would continue to receive the same advantages, privileges, and remuneration (pars. 
26-32). 
1084
 Ibid, par. 45. 
1085
 Ibid, pars. 46-47. 
1086
 Lemire c. Nault, 2011 QCCS 5356, 2011 CarswellQue 11153, J.E. 2011-1847, D.T.E. 2011T-725, 
209 A.C.W.S. (3d) 302, EYB 2011-197048 (C.S. Que. Oct 7, 2011) (hereinafter "Lemire"). 
1087
 Ibid, par. 33. 
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he requested thirty-three months of severance, later lowered to two months.
1088
  His framing of the claim in 
this manner, rather than demanding that the dismissal be nullified under corporate constitutional principles, 
may have been what led the judge's analysis to focus not on the agreement, but instead upon whether the 
termination had been for cause and whether there had been adequate warning of problems and potential 
consequences.
1089
  The award was four weeks severance.
1090
 
 It is self-evident that a payment of damages is quite different from having an act nullified, but it is 
also possible under a contractual approach to have the violation of the unanimous shareholder agreement's 
restrictions reversed, a form of specific performance.  This is still not the same as nullification, and the 
distinction can be important, as illustrated by Hurley v. Slate Ventures Inc.
1091
  While I have suggested that 
the most sensible reading of Duha is that the corporate constitutional approach should guide analyses of 
restrictions of the directors but a contractual one should govern situations where the unanimous shareholder 
agreement (also) includes personal rights of the shareholders, that division is not always clear-cut.  
Normally, for example, a shotgun provision would relate to personal rights,
1092
 but to the extent that the 
corporation gives effect to the share purchase thereunder, Hurley demonstrates how the application of the 
shotgun may involve governance issues.  One of two shareholders attempted to use a shotgun clause in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement to obtain the shares of the other, despite the other's objections that the 
clause had not been properly followed, and after paying funds to the alleged purchasee's bank account, 
caused the corporation to transfer the shares to the purported buyer.
1093
  Orsborn J. held that the offer did 
not comply with the terms of the shotgun clause.
1094
 
 Orsborn J. rejected the view that the defaults in the exercise of the shotgun clause were a matter 
for the oppression remedy, however, and explained that this was a case for contract law: 
                                                          
1088
 Ibid, pars. 33-34. 
1089
 Ibid, pars. 89-107. 
1090
 Ibid, par. 103. 
1091
 Hurley v. Slate Ventures Inc., 142 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 127, 28 B.L.R. (2d) 35, 1996 CarswellNfld 
168, 445 A.P.R. 127, [1996] N.J. No. 4071 (Nfld. T.D. Jul 19, 1996) (hereinafter "Hurley SC (TD)"). 
1092
 A "shotgun clause" is a term sometimes found in a unanimous shareholder agreement (or other 
shareholder agreement).  In its simplest form, it sets out a procedure whereby one shareholder can inform 
another that the clause is being invoked and name a price per share.  The shareholder receiving this notice 
then chooses either to buy all the other's shares at that price or to sell the recipient's own shares at the same 
price.  Often, though not always, both shareholders have the right to initiate this procedure.  This 
theoretically motivates the party invoking the clause to determine a fair price, neither too high nor too low.  
Shotgun clauses may be complicated by factors such as additional shareholders, multiple share classes, et 
cetera. 
1093
 Hurley SC (TD), supra note 1091, pars. 1, 36. 
1094
 The corporation had three classes of shares, and the offer was conditional upon the recipient 
accepting the offeror's interpretation as to how those classes would be dealt with in the structure of the 
respective "buy" and "sell" portions of the offer (Hurley SC (TD), supra note 1091, pars. 57-58).  Orsborn 
J. held that the way the share classes were dealt with in the offer did not follow the formula set out in the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, under which the price being offered for the other's shares was too low 
compared to the offer to sell (pars. 63-67). 
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91 But there is also authority which suggests that when dealing with disputes 
involving a shareholders' agreement, those disputes should be resolved within the 
parameters of the agreement - any remedy would be based on a breach of contract.  In 
other words, a breach of contract is not the sort of conduct which can ground relief under 
the oppression provisions.  See Bernard v. Montgomery (1987), 36 B.L.R. 257 (Sask. 
Q.B.): Camroux v. Armstrong (1990), 47 B.L.R. 302 (B.C.S.C.).  This view commends 
itself to me.  Where the parties have agreed upon and have carefully and at length set out 
the rules that will govern their relationship, it is their intention and expectation that the 
agreement will be the yardstick against which their conduct will be measured.  If the 
agreement is breached, the appropriate contractual remedy can be fashioned.  I have 
earlier indicated that, in a contractual situation, the Court should be able to fashion a 
remedy that addresses the consequence of a breach.  This flexibility of remedy is perhaps 
all the more necessary when dealing with the shareholders of a closely-held corporation.  
In such a small commercial 'family', ongoing relationships are critical, and the fact that a 
court is dealing with a breach of contract should not preclude remedial creativity.  
However, this flexibility would not, I believe, extend so far as the range of remedies 
contemplated by the oppression provisions - such as, for example, directing an issue or 
exchange of securities or amending a shareholders' agreement. 
 
92        Here, the improper acquisition of Hurley's shares is properly considered as a 
contract issue.  The allegation is that the contractual requirements were not followed.  
The conduct should be measured against those requirements and not the oppression 
standard. 
 
 No specific consideration was given to the actions taken by the defendant qua director in having 
the corporation give effect to the illegitimate share transfer.
1095
  It is unclear whether Orsborn J. intended 
those acts to be included in the above conclusion that the proper analysis was a contractual one, or whether 
that aspect was one that the judge simply had not considered. 
 Because the principles employed were contractual, the share transfer was not a nullity; instead, the 
remedy for the breach was for them to be transferred back.  The distinction was significant, because the 
alleged buyer had, while it was the "sole shareholder", issued substantial additional shares to itself in 
exchange for an injection of capital into the corporation, as a result of which it would have substantially 
diluted the interests of the other shareholder if only his original shares were returned.
1096
  Orsborn J. held 
that it was not necessary to use the oppression remedy to resolve this issue either, because "resorting to its 
inherent jurisdiction if necessary, the Court should be able to fashion a remedy to address the 
consequences, if any, of actions which, although legal in themselves, are made possible - their foundation 
laid - only through a breach of contract".
1097
  The judge suggested that the proper contractual remedy would 
                                                          
1095
 See the discussion of Gottlieb v. Adam, 21 O.R. (3d) 248, 16 B.L.R. (2d) 271, 1994 CarswellOnt 
246, [1994] O.J. No. 2636 (Ont. Gen. Div. Nov 17, 1994) (hereinafter "Gottlieb") later in this chapter for a 
similar situation. 
1096
 Hurley SC (TD), supra note 1095, pars. 73-74. 
1097
 Ibid, par. 75. 
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be to require the shareholder to offer 50% of the new shares to the other.
1098
  The judge described this as a 
means to "put [the shareholder] in the position he would have been in had his shares not been 
purchased".
1099
  This ignores the possibility that, had his shares not been purchased, he might have blocked 
the issuance of new ones that he did not wish either to pay for or to have his holdings diluted by.  Because 
the shareholder had already declined an offer to conditionally participate in the new share offering while 
the legal issues awaited resolution, Orsborn J. found it unnecessary to actually make an order to give him a 
second chance.
1100
 
 Orsborn J. did "without expressing an opinion [...] assume that Hurley is entitled to seek 
oppression relief" on the share issuance, for the purpose of considering that issue.
1101
  On the facts, the 
share issuance was held not to be oppressive, because of the opportunity to conditionally participate
1102
 and 
the legitimate business purposes of raising capital.
1103
  So as between the contractual approach and 
oppression, on these facts the same result would have been reached, given Orsborn J.'s wide view of 
contractual remedies. Indeed, given that broad take on them, there would be a much smaller difference 
between the contractual and corporate constitutional approaches as well. 
 The plaintiff was offered two alternatives: either his shares could be returned, with equal 
representation on the board of directors but not equal shareholdings, or he could have the full price that 
would have been payable under the agreement.
1104
  He selected the latter,
1105
 and while the general 
determination in the plaintiff's favour was not appealed, the specific award was.  The appellant raised both 
procedural issues
1106
 and the argument that, if the offer had not been made in compliance with the shotgun 
clause, it was therefore outside it, and that the events which had occurred should therefore be handled as 
conversion (subject to restitution) rather than a breach of contract.  Writing for the majority, Marshall J.A. 
held that the remedy was appropriate because, inter alia, simply reversing the share transfer would not be 
sufficient to restore the plaintiff to his original position due to the intervening share transfer, which was the 
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 Ibid, par. 106. 
1099
 Ibid, par. 106. 
1100
 Ibid, par. 107. 
1101
 Ibid, par. 93. 
1102
 Ibid, par. 97. 
1103
 Ibid, par. 103. 
1104
 Ibid, pars. 128-129. 
1105
 Hurley v. Slate Ventures Inc., 167 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1, 1998 CarswellNfld 195, 513 A.P.R. 1, 
[1998] N.J. No. 225 (Nfld. C.A. Aug 04, 1998) (hereinafter "Hurley CA") at par. 59.  Unlike Hurley SC 
(TD), supra note 1091, Hurley CA does not refer to the document as a unanimous shareholder agreement, 
but instead as a "Shareholder's Agreement". 
1106
 The plaintiff had not originally requested this remedy and it had been dealt with only incidentally 
at trial.  There were also questions raised about the trial judge's use of "inherent jurisdiction".  Marshall, 
J.A. found, for a variety of reasons, that these procedural issues should not bar the remedy (Hurley CA, 
supra note 1105, pars. 61-89) and also noted that the damages in conversion would not necessarily have 
been any different (pars. 103-107).  Conversely, Cameron J.A. found these objections convincing (pars. 
161-176). 
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appellant's fault.
1107
  In a dissenting opinion, Cameron J.A. found that even if (for the sake of argument
1108
) 
this was dealt with as a breach of contract claim, while the normal rule was that "[t]he object of damages 
for breach of contract is generally stated to be to put the innocent party in the position he or she would have 
been in had the contract been performed (the expectation interest)",
1109
 in these circumstances, had the offer 
been in made compliance with the agreement, it would have been at a different price, which made it unjust 
to enforce it as written
1110
 and compensating the plaintiff for any actual damages caused by the share 
issuance was sufficient.
1111
  Despite differing conclusions, both Court of Appeal judges were dealing with 
the limits of reversing breaches of contract as a means of restoring the parties to their initial state. 
 These decisions, like Sumner, illustrate that in a contractual model, actions contrary to a 
unanimous shareholder's agreement are not automatically nullities, but it also demonstrates that even when 
contractual enforcement leads to the reversal of the improper acts, rather than an award of damages, the 
result is not the same as retroactively voiding them.  Sometimes, as in Hurley, reversing the impugned 
actions may be so inadequate that an award of damages really is a better way to restore the parties to some 
approximation of their original states.  The line between enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements as 
contracts that govern the directors' exercise of their powers and as corporate constitutional documents that 
actually remove those powers may be blurred when the remedy is reversal, but the line still remains.  The 
next section, however, covers a situation where the line is blurred to the point where it almost disappears. 
 
4.(d) Negative Covenants 
 
 If the general hallmark of the corporate constitutional approach is that directors simply cannot 
exert powers they no longer possess, then this finds some echo in contract cases that deal specifically with 
injunctions to enforce negative covenants.  As the following two cases illustrate, an injunction issued by the 
court to prevent the directors from violating the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement has a similar 
effect to treating the instrument as a corporate constitutional document; the directors are legally barred 
from taking actions that ignore the restrictions placed upon them.  However, the sheer cumbersomeness of 
this procedure, whereby a court order is required to give substance to prohibitions in the unanimous 
shareholder agreement, highlights the theoretical difference between the two approaches even as it brings 
their practical results closer together.  The comparison is not favourable for the utility of the contractual 
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 Hurley CA, supra note 1105, pars. 72-73. 
1108
 Cameron J.A. determined that, since the offer was not in compliance with the agreement, it was 
outside it, and therefore the proper claim was not breach of contract (Hurley CA, supra note 1105, pars. 
139-141). 
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 Hurley CA, supra note 1105, par. 147. 
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 Ibid, par. 158. 
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model; as explored further below, the terms in these agreements are not exceptional, and all restrictions 
upon directors may be conceived of as negative covenants.  If the appropriate enforcement method is 
injunctions, it may be theoretically simpler and more efficient in practice to discard the contractual 
approach and proceed directly to a corporate constitutional model.
1112
 
 Klassen v. Klassen
1113
 concerned an interim motion to prevent the corporation and its directors 
from implementing a directors' resolution to remove the plaintiff from his positions as president and chief 
executive officer.
1114
  The corporation had a unanimous shareholder agreement that stated, "Sermelory and 
Eljo shall annually or more often as may be necessary, elect the Chairman of the Board and the President of 
the Corporation and such officers shall be subject to removal only with the approval of both Sermelory and 
Eljo."
1115
  In applying the first stage of the test for an injunction, De Graves J. concluded that on the basis 
of the agreement, the plaintiff had a strong prima facie case.
1116
  The judge stated that the board was 
"limited in its right"
1117
 to appoint a president.
1118
  (It is possible that this suggests some corporate 
constitutional element, since a purely contractual analysis would mean that their right to appoint a president 
could not be limited, but that they might be liable for damages if they did not follow the agreement.)  In the 
second stage of the analysis, irreparable damage, De Graves J. found that the standard had not been met
1119
 
but that that was unnecessary in the case of an implied negative covenant:
1120
  "Section 3(c) of the 
agreement of November 28, 1979, is in effect a prohibitive or negative provision preventing the 
appointment of anyone as chairman of the board and president other than the nominees of Eljo and 
Sermelory."
1121
  On that basis, after briefly and without analysis noting that the balance of convenience also 
favoured the plaintiffs, the injunction was granted. 
 Similarly, in MTM Commercial Trust v. Statesman Riverside Quays Ltd.,
1122
 two companies set up 
                                                          
1112
 One advantage of employing the corporate constitutional framework is that a general prohibition 
against violating a unanimous shareholder agreement might not be sufficiently specific and certain to form 
the basis of an injunction.  See note 1138.  
1113
 Klassen v. Klassen, 42 B.L.R. 261, 1989 CarswellMan 16, 62 Man. R. (2d) 106, [1989] C.L.D. 
695 (Man. Q.B. Mar 20, 1989) (hereinafter "Klassen"). 
1114
 Ibid, pars. 3-4. 
1115
 Ibid, par. 6.  The chief executive officer position was not mentioned in the section of the 
agreement reproduced, though De Graves J. appeared to treat it as if it was since no distinction was made 
between the two positions at issue, and on that point his analysis seems to have been in error. 
1116
 Ibid, par. 12. 
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 Ibid, par. 10. 
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limitation and the resulting strong prima facie case were treated as givens. 
1119
 Klassen, supra note 1113, par. 13. 
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1121
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1122
 MTM Commercial Trust v. Statesman Riverside Quays Ltd., 2010 ABQB 647, 2010 CarswellAlta 
2041, 98 C.L.R. (3d) 198, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1284, [2011] A.W.L.D. 5, [2011] A.W.L.D. 8, [2011] 
A.W.L.D. 35, [2011] A.W.L.D. 37, [2011] A.W.L.D. 66, [2010] A.J. No. 1189, 70 C.B.R. (5th) 233 (Alta. 
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a joint venture by creating a limited partnership and another corporation to serve as general partner.
1123
  
Under the terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement governing the general partner, both shareholders 
were represented equally on the board of directors and major decisions required unanimity.
1124
  
Management of the project was assigned to a related party of one of the shareholder corporations, although 
under the terms of the Management Agreement, it was required to submit a variety of major decisions for 
approval by the "Managing Committee".
1125
  Finally, there was also a Limited Partnership Agreement, 
which contained general obligations of good faith.
1126
 
 The by-laws of the corporation allowed one of the two shareholders a casting vote.
1127
  However, 
Romaine J. found that the wording of both the unanimous shareholder agreement and the by-law indicated 
the agreement should have precedence.
1128
  In addition to that fact-specific finding, Romaine J. noted that 
"the nature of a USA does not allow its provisions to be trumped by a procedural by-law, and the 
provisions of the USA that require approval by all directors of certain major decisions cannot in effect be 
vitiated by such a by-law".
1129
  As noted above in the discussion of Piikani, this view of unanimous 
shareholder agreements is associated with a corporate constitutional approach, but the balance of the 
judgment referred to the agreement explicitly as a "contract" giving rise only to "contractual rights".
1130
 
 Without the necessary approval by the directors (or any "Managing Committee"), one of the 
shareholders, through its control of day to day operations via the managing company, entered the 
corporation into over $12 500 000 of construction contracts of over $100 000 each.
1131
  The motion before 
the court was for an interim injunction to prevent further work being done without authorization.  Romaine 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Q.B. Oct 12, 2010) (hereinafter "MTM").  MTM also illustrated a different aspect of contract law, aside 
from the implications of injunctions for negative covenants.  The respondent argued that the applicant's 
refusal to give consent was not commercially reasonable (par. 28).  Romaine J. found that "[t]hat is not 
within the province of this court to decide: Matco is not under any contractual obligation to act in a 
commercially reasonable manner in giving or withholding its consent, and Matco's motives or judgments in 
respect of its decision are not properly at issue before me, except to the extent that they may relate to 
considerations of irreparable harm or balance of convenience" (par. 28).  A corporate constitutional 
approach would likely have come to the same conclusion; the commercial reasonableness of the proposed 
actions would have been insufficient to grant directors powers they otherwise did not have.  However, a 
different conclusion might have been reached under either a directors' duties or an oppression remedy 
analysis. 
1123
 Ibid, par. 14.  They each owned half the general partner's shares. 
1124
 Ibid, par. 15.  Major decisions included contracts for more than $100 000, related party 
transactions, and requiring capital contributions (par. 15). 
1125
 Ibid, par. 16.  The term "Managing Committee" was not clearly defined in the document, and 
Romaine J. noted that it may or may not refer to the board of directors (par. 42). 
1126
 Ibid, par. 17. 
1127
 Ibid, par. 29. 
1128
 Ibid, par. 30. 
1129
 Ibid, par. 30. 
1130
 Ibid, pars. 64, 65. 
1131
 Ibid, par. 22. 
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J. found that the plaintiff had a strong prima facie case for breach of contract
1132
 and that this was "a 
negative obligation, which is in substance the obligation not to proceed to the next phase of construction 
without obtaining Management Committee approval or the approval of all of directors of SRQL under the 
USA".
1133
  On the balance of convenience, Romaine J. found in favour of the applicant, as "failure to grant 
the injunction would nullify its contractual right to be part of the decision to proceed".
1134
 
 By definition, unanimous shareholder agreements restrict the powers of directors.  Viewed as a 
contract with the directors rather than an actual removal of their powers, such restrictions would be 
negative covenants.  Indeed, one early commentator, David H. Sohmer, hypothesized that it might be 
legally necessary to frame a de facto positive obligation in a unanimous shareholder agreement as a de jure 
negative obligation (a double-negative restriction against refraining from the desired act),
1135
 though 
subsequently this artificial procedure has never been required by the courts and positive obligations have 
been accepted as restrictions.
1136
  Indeed, the development of the law with regard to restrictions in 
unanimous shareholder agreements has illustrated the symmetry of all positive and negative obligations.
1137
  
The law on negative covenants, conversely, rests entirely upon a continuing distinction between the two. 
 If all restrictions upon directors in unanimous shareholder agreements are conceptually negative 
covenants, and if the appropriate means of enforcement for negative covenants on a going-forward basis is 
injunctions, then the contractual model creates a curious split between violations which occur before a 
court order and can only be reversed or compensated for by damages, and future violations, against which 
directors may be enjoined.
1138
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 One is reminded of Coase's writing on the symmetrical nature of rights in R. H. Coase, "The 
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 There are obstacles to using injunctions as a general method of giving greater effect to a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.  Even if the three part test were not a problem, the content of the 
injunction itself needs to be clearly defined.  General adherence to an agreement could be too broad.  In 
Placements G.N.P. inc. c. Kuen, 2007 QCCS 5465, 2007 CarswellQue 11044, J.E. 2008-358, EYB 2007-
126670 (C.S. Que. Nov 27, 2007) a request brought as part of an oppression claim (par. 79) for an 
injunction requiring the defendants to generally respect the law, the articles, and the unanimous shareholder 
agreement (par. 29) was rejected for being too vague (par. 103).  Jacques J.C.S noted that the agreement 
might be subject to different interpretations by the parties (par. 106).  (There was also no real threat that the 
agreement would be violated (par. 109).  Jacques J.C.S rejected a variety of complaints for failing to 
constitute breaches (pars. 42-80), and found that the parties were following the document (par. 71).  The 
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4.(e) Summation 
 
 Despite the Supreme Court of Canada endorsing the corporate constitutional approach over the 
contractual, the law of contract still holds substantial sway over judicial enforcement of unanimous 
shareholder agreements.  There is utility in this; contract law has a well-developed set of principles for 
enforcing the terms of a written agreement.
1139
  It must be understood, however, that these principles are 
neither inevitable nor neutral; they represent a certain perspective upon the enforcement of agreements and 
they directly affect outcomes.  The other three approaches discussed in this chapter present alternatives.  In 
particular, not all contract law rules may be appropriate in this area; some elements (such as the 
requirement that both parties to the suit be parties to the contract) might prove problematic given the 
unusual nature of unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 The most significant implication of using contractual rather than corporate constitutional 
principles is that they do not render acts in violation of the agreements null.  While some of the problems 
posed might be dealt with by obtaining injunctions or specific performance awards, the default rule of 
contractual enforcement is the award of provable damages ex post.  This limits the usefulness of unanimous 
shareholder agreements as a means of controlling corporate behaviour.  They become instead at best a 
means of incentive and form of limited insurance.
1140
 
 To the extent that injunctions and the reversal of prohibited acts are used to enforce contracts, they 
represent an imperfect substitute for nullification.  They replicate its benefits to a limited extent, but not 
fully.  This can only be justified if one starts from the assumption that unanimous shareholder agreements 
are a contract which directors remain free to break, until such time as a court order stops them from doing 
so or forces them to take steps to reverse what they have done, rather than an actual restructuring of the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
most interesting allegation related to the term mandating that shareholders must unanimously approve 
expenses above $50 000 (par. 51).  An expense of $51 000 had been incurred for repairing a wall (par. 50).  
The original contract had been for $48 000, but the cost ended up increasing by $3000 (pars. 52, 54).  The 
judge found that it had been reasonable for the directors to approve the additional amount, following the 
recommendations of the engineer, and shareholder consent had not been required (pars. 56-57).  This seems 
to have been an "agreements in context" approach to the oppression remedy, of the type discussed below.)  
1139
 As discussed earlier, it is arguable that a document that would not constitute an enforceable 
contract could still be considered a valid unanimous shareholder agreement.  Assuming this to be the case, 
then a claim of breach of contract per se could not be used for enforcement.  However, contract law 
principles might still underlie a judgment that enforced the agreement as a statutorily authorized corporate 
law tool. 
1140
 Alternatively, it might encourage the use of unanimous shareholder agreements which dispensed 
with directors, if that were allowable.  Whether it is permissible to eliminate directors entirely or whether a 
"powerless" board must be retained has been the subject of some debate among commentators.  See note 
1675.  But if directors' powers could not truly be restricted, then no board would ever actually be 
"powerless". 
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allocation of power within a corporation. 
 
5. The Directors' Duties Approach 
 
 The third possible approach to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements is to include 
adherence to them among directors' duties.
1141
  It is similar to the contractual model in that rather than 
                                                          
1141
 For parties other than directors, adherence to the unanimous shareholder agreement can also be 
classified as a duty owed to the corporation.  In HSBC Bank Canada v. 1100336 Alberta Ltd., 2011 ABQB 
748, [2012] 9 W.W.R. 596, 530 A.R. 177, 2011 CarswellAlta 2114, 209 A.C.W.S. (3d) 722, [2012] 
A.W.L.D. 3245, [2012] A.W.L.D. 3271, [2012] A.W.L.D. 3272, [2012] A.W.L.D. 3273, 97 B.L.R. (4th) 
264 (Alta. Q.B. Dec 01, 2011), a bank had lent funds to a corporation.  The corporation's business was 
subsequently transferred to another company (par. 18), leaving the original with no assets for the bank to 
collect upon (par. 22).  The bank sued for the tort of civil conspiracy (par. 57).  The second element of the 
tort of civil conspiracy is that the conduct in question must be unlawful (pars. 57, 72).  With regard to the 
three individual defendants, Marshall J. found their conduct to be unlawful because they had breached their 
statutory duties to the corporation (par. 92).  The analysis began by referring specifically to s. 122(1)(a) and 
the Supreme Court's definition of the duty of loyalty in Peoples (at par. 86), but the subsequent analysis did 
not maintain a rigorous distinction between the duties of care and loyalty (see e.g. pars. 88, 91).  In the 
midst of this, and without clearly integrating it, the judge wrote, "It is also noteworthy that 828 had a 
Unanimous Shareholders Agreement executed by Mr. Kendrick and HBC.  It included a provision that 
neither would compete with the business of 828.  Mr. Fuss signed the Agreement and was a directing mind 
of HBC.  His action in incorporating 1100 directly breached his covenant in the Agreement" (par. 90).  
Marshall J. may have found that fact "noteworthy", but it is unclear why it appeared where it did in the 
judgment, in a section generally concerned with directors' duties.  Fuss, who was singled out for violating 
the agreement, was not a director of 828.  It is possible that Marshall J. meant that the parties to a 
unanimous shareholder agreement can (and in this case did) owe duties to the corporation according to its 
terms, which Fuss was in violation of, despite not being a director, and that this violation was also an 
"unlawful act" that met the criteria for the tort of civil conspiracy.  (The bank, the plaintiff, was not a 
shareholder and thus presumably not a party to the agreement.)  This unanimous shareholder agreement 
was not mentioned in the appeal, HSBC Bank Canada v. 1100336 Alberta Ltd., 2013 ABCA 235, 553 A.R. 
342, 2013 CarswellAlta 1062, 583 W.A.C. 342, 229 A.C.W.S. (3d) 909, [2013] A.W.L.D. 3125, [2013] 
A.W.L.D. 3127, [2013] A.W.L.D. 3167, [2013] A.W.L.D. 3291, [2013] A.W.L.D. 3292, [2013] A.W.L.D. 
3293 (Alta. C.A. Jun 25, 2013). 
 
Secondly, Stevens v. HSBC James Capel Canada Inc., 1998 CarswellOnt 1537, [1998] O.J. No. 1692, 57 
O.T.C. 161 (Ont. Gen. Div. Apr 23, 1998) suggests that following the provisions of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement might be part of the employment duties of a corporate officer who is also a director.  
The plaintiff was the president of a corporation who sued for wrongful dismissal (par. 1).  He had involved 
the company, a securities dealer, in an announcement of a takeover bid in a foreign market that carried with 
it huge reputational, financial, and legal risks, against the advice of experts (summarized at pars. 201-209).  
These actions also ran contrary to a unanimous shareholder agreement that all "new major strategic 
business initiatives" were to be approved by the "executive committee" (par. 82).  Sutherland J. found that, 
given this bid's size and that the corporation had not previously been involved in this type of transaction, it 
qualified as the sort of decision referred to in the agreement (par. 83).  It was therefore a decision that the 
plaintiff "did not have the authority to cause [the corporation] to enter into" (par. 83).  It is unclear how 
much of a deciding role the breach of the unanimous shareholder agreement played in the finding that this 
was not a wrongful termination.  In a seven paragraph concluding summary, Sutherland J. devoted one 
paragraph to again noting, "The plaintiff contravened applicable provisions of the unanimous shareholders' 
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literally removing directors' powers, as the corporate constitutional view would have it, it instead regulates 
the powers which directors retain.  Instead of using contract law principles as the means of regulation, it 
incorporates the contents of the unanimous shareholder agreement into the directors' duties to the 
corporation, borrowing legal terms and concepts from that branch of the law instead. 
 According to the various corporate statutes, every director has a specific duty to obey the 
legislation, the articles, the by-laws, and unanimous shareholder agreements.
1142
  But the directors' duties 
approach (as herein considered) does not revolve around that legal obligation per se.  It is the wider 
position that the general enforcement of a unanimous shareholder agreement should be analyzed in terms of 
the principles and procedures governing the directors' duties of care and loyalty, regardless of the basis on 
which a claim is founded.  As the examples below demonstrate, attempts to invoke this model can appear in 
cases brought on other grounds, such as the oppression remedy or breach of contract, although their success 
has admittedly been limited. 
 It is well established in Canada that directors owe duties to the corporation.  These duties, at both 
common law and by statute, consist of both a duty of care and a duty of loyalty.
1143
  While some confusion 
exists around these duties, the former can be defined as a means of preventing incompetence, while the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
agreement, which required the transactions to be approved by the executive committee of Capel Canada.  It 
was an important part of the plaintiff's duties to understand and to comply with the main features of that 
agreement" (par. 203).  On the other hand, this factor was not singled out as especially important, and in 
context, there would likely have been enough problems with the plaintiff's conduct even absent it. 
 
It is also possible, in unusual circumstances, for adherence to a unanimous shareholder agreement to form 
part of some other legal duty.  In Fortin c. Fortin, 2008 QCCS 447, 2008 CarswellQue 847, J.E. 2008-569, 
EYB 2008-129677 (C.S. Que. Jan 28, 2008), one of the findings against an executor accused of negligence 
and bad faith was that he had used the estate's controlling interest in a corporation to grant himself a 
position and salary without the consent of all the other shareholders, as was required by a unanimous 
shareholder agreement (par. 71).  In Desjardins Capital de développement Estrie inc. c. Labbé, 2010 QCCS 
233, 2010 CarswellQue 937, 187 A.C.W.S. (3d) 339, EYB 2010-169549 (C.S. Que. Jan 29, 2010), a 
motion to dismiss a claim against receivers in bankruptcy for negligence was denied; the alleged negligence 
consisted of failing to follow a unanimous shareholder agreement that required shareholder approval for 
certain steps (par. 2). 
1142
 C.B.C.A. s. 122(2), A.B.C.A. s. 122(2), M.C.A. s. 117(2), N.B.B.C.A. s. 79(2), N.L.C.A. s. 203(2), 
N.T.B.C.A. s. 123(2), N.B.C.A. s. 123(2), O.B.C.A. s. 134(2), S.B.C.A. s. 117(2), Y.B.C.A. s. 124(2).  The 
Q.B.C.A. does not contain a similar section. 
1143
 C.B.C.A. s. 122(1), A.B.C.A. s. 122(1), M.C.A. s. 117(1), N.B.B.C.A. s. 79(1), N.L.C.A. s. 203(1), 
N.T.B.C.A. s. 123(1), N.B.C.A. s. 123(1), O.B.C.A. s. 134(1), S.B.C.A. s. 117(1), Y.B.C.A. s. 124(1).  These 
doctrines originated in common law principles.  See e.g. BCE Inc., Re, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, 
301 D.L.R. (4th) 80, 383 N.R. 119, 2008 CarswellQue 12595, 2008 CarswellQue 12596, 71 C.P.R. (4TH) 
303, 172 A.C.W.S. (3d) 915, J.E. 2009-43, [2008] S.C.J. No. 37, 52 B.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C. Dec 19, 2008) 
(hereinafter "BCE"), par. 37 ("The fiduciary duty [of loyalty] of the directors to the corporation originated 
in the common law.") and  Peoples, supra note 809, par. 59 ("That directors must satisfy a duty of care is a 
long-standing principle of the common law, although the duty of care has been reinforced by statute to 
become more demanding.").  Q.B.C.A. s, 119 is similar, but it bases the directors' obligations to the 
corporation in the C.C.Q. 
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latter prevents self-interest.
1144
  To the extent that directors' self-interest was involved in the violation of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, the duty of loyalty might be invoked; if the directors failed to take 
sufficient efforts to ensure compliance, the duty of care could cover the situation.  Because the former 
requires an additional element beyond the breach (self-interest), only the latter has theoretical validity as a 
blanket means of enforcing all unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 The purest form of this model would simply classify violations of the agreement in that manner.  
What appears in the case law, however, is not so straightforward.  Like the previous two approaches, what 
the cases demonstrate is often less the application of a clearly understood line of analysis and more the 
influence of a legal tradition.  Two elements of the directors' duties to the corporation in particular have 
been invoked to deal with enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements: the derivative action and the 
business judgment rule.  Neither of these would have relevance to any of the other approaches; judicial 
consideration of these principles in this context implies a directors' duties analysis.  Further, some cases 
have considered whether the directors' duty of care might override the terms of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement; ironically, this line of analysis actually suggests that the agreements are not in conflict with the 
duty, but rather one component of it, to be balanced against other considerations. 
 The very factors that illustrate this approach also provide arguments against it.  Thanks to the 
business judgment rule, the duty of care is notoriously unenforceable.  Generally speaking, the ephemeral 
nature of this duty might be inevitable in areas where directors must be free to operate within an uncertain 
business environment and to take risks without fear of being reviewed by judges armed with the benefit of 
hindsight.
1145
  But these well-worn justifications do not apply to a director's actions in contravention of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.  The clarity of a well-worded restriction, or even the relative clarity of a 
poorly-worded one, stands in sharp contrast to the uncertainty of the business environment, and it is not 
unreasonable second-guessing for a judge to determine whether it was properly adhered to.  Nor is it 
appropriate to encourage risk-taking even at the expense of such adherence.  To argue otherwise, that the 
business judgment rule includes the choice of whether to follow a unanimous shareholder agreement, 
makes the "restrictions" merely discretionary suggestions.  It would be simpler and more honest to 
eliminate this legal tool; non-binding shareholder proposals would serve the same purpose. 
 Case law considering the relevance of the derivative action and the business judgment rule to the 
enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements is reviewed in the following subsections.  The reception 
has been, at best, tepid, with these concepts rejected as often as accepted.
1146
  And yet, even when rejected, 
                                                          
1144
 Peoples, supra note 809.  In the last decade, the Supreme Court of Canada has presented a multi-
faceted view of the duty of care.  How unanimous shareholder agreements fit into that paradigm is 
discussed in Chapter Five. 
1145
 Consideration of the general problems with the duty of care and possible solutions is beyond the 
scope of the current discussion. 
1146
 In addition to the cases mentioned in the following sections, it was mentioned in passing in 
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the very fact that they were considered at all suggests that there may be some potential (or, at least, 
potential appeal) lurking in the directors' duties approach to unanimous shareholder agreements.  If nothing 
else, the directors' duties provide an existing framework for taking legal action against them when they 
have allegedly behaved inappropriately, and it is presumably for that reason that these concepts have found 
some limited life in the unanimous shareholder agreement case law. 
 
5.(a) Derivative Actions 
 
 The duties of care and loyalty are owed directly to the corporation, not to the shareholders.  As a 
result, they may only be enforced by the corporation or through a derivative action, wherein a shareholder 
is granted permission by the court to advance a suit on the company's behalf.
1147
  This stands in contrast to 
a contractual model, which would allow any party to the agreement to enforce it, and a corporate 
constitutional one, which arguably allows anyone to ask the court to recognize the agreement's 
consequences.  Invoking the directors' duties approach, a few cases have dealt with whether unanimous 
shareholder agreements must be enforced through derivative actions, rather than by shareholders on their 
own behalf.
1148
  The reported case law in this area is divided between cases where leave to bring a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
McAteer v. Devoncroft Developments Ltd., 2001 ABQB 917, [2002] 5 W.W.R. 388, 307 A.R. 1, 99 Alta. 
L.R. (3d) 6, 2001 CarswellAlta 1694, 24 B.L.R. (3d) 1, [2002] A.W.L.D. 108, [2001] A.J. No. 1481 (Alta. 
Q.B. Nov 07, 2001) (hereinafter "McAteer") that a director's violation of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement was a failure of his duties to the corporation (par. 737).  McAteer was primarily an oppression 
case, and is discussed later in this chapter. 
1147
   See C.B.C.A. s. 239, A.B.C.A. s. 240, M.C.A. s. 232, N.B.B.C.A. s. 164, N.L.C.A. s. 369, N.T.B.C.A. s. 
241, N.B.C.A. s. 241, O.B.C.A. s. 246, Q.B.C.A. s. 445, S.B.C.A. s. 232, and Y.B.C.A. s. 241.  The phrase 
"derivative action" is commonly used to refer to such actions, and that term appears in the headings for all 
the aforementioned sections except those of New Brunswick and Quebec. 
1148
   C.B.C.A. s. 247 provides that a shareholder (or other complainant) can apply to the court for an order 
directing that the corporation or its directors comply with or restrain from breaching a unanimous 
shareholder agreement and that the court may so order or make any other order it thinks fit.  Equivalents 
are found at A.B.C.A. s. 248, M.C.A. s. 240, N.B.B.C.A. s. 172, N.L.C.A. s. 378, N.T.B.C.A. s. 249, N.B.C.A. 
s. 249, O.B.C.A. s. 253(1), Q.B.C.A. s. 460, S.B.C.A. s. 240, and Y.B.C.A. s. 249.  These sections indicate 
that, under the current statutes, a derivative action cannot be the only means of enforcing a unanimous 
shareholder agreement against the directors.  The legislatures specifically permitted a different method of 
enforcement from the directors' duties approach. 
 
That said, these sections do not guarantee that such applications to court will result in the relief sought. If 
the directors' duties approach to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements were adopted by the courts, 
then the restrictions placed upon the board would be treated as obligations owed to the corporation, not its 
shareholders.  Such a premise could easily lead to attempts to enforce unanimous shareholder agreements 
under s. 247 (and its equivalents) finding little success.  One way to justify the existence of this statutory 
procedure in the context of the director' duties model would be to limit its applicability to terms that 
specifically benefit the complainant; this compromises the theoretical consistency of the directors' duties 
model, but would retain the idea that restrictions upon the board are in general obligations owed to the 
corporation itself and should only be enforced by it, while allowing that specific terms might constitute 
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derivative action was granted and where it was not required; from a practical perspective, this might 
suggest a judicial tendency toward allowing claims to proceed regardless of whether they are pursued 
personally or on behalf of the corporation, but at a theoretical level, it leaves confusion as to whether a 
derivative action is the appropriate means of enforcing a unanimous shareholder agreement.
1149
 
 In 1199918 Alberta Ltd. v. TRL Holdings Inc.,
1150
 the applicant sought leave to bring such a 
derivative action.  With regard to whether the proposed suit would be in the best interests of the 
corporation, Graesser J. wrote: 
 
79 To the extent that Mr. Liu's interests are in ensuring that the revenues and assets 
of TRL not be improperly diverted from the corporation, an action to recover assets for 
the corporation would certainly appear to be in its best interests as well.  Holding 
directors accountable for their actions is an important function of corporate law and is at 
the root of s. 240 of the ABCA. 
 
 As with some of the oppression claims discussed below, it is difficult to determine to what extent 
the violations of the unanimous shareholder agreement alluded to were influential in the decision to allow a 
derivative action, and to what extent one might have been allowed regardless in response to the offending 
acts, here the alleged improper diversion of corporate revenue.
1151
  There is also insufficient detail in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
exceptions. 
1149
 Pellin c. Bedco, division de Gérodon inc., 2002 CarswellQue 2735, J.E. 2003-217, REJB 2002-
36127 (C.S. Que. Nov 27, 2002) should be distinguished from this category.  While the claim was made in 
the context of a unanimous shareholder agreement (although the document was only referred to as such in 
reproduced pleadings at pars. 9 and 10), it was not a request for enforcement, but for the share valuation 
provisions of the agreement to not apply (par. 9).  The complaining investor alleged that various acts of the 
defendants had cost the company value in favour of a related one, which had in turn affected the value of 
his shares (summarized at par. 44).  Frappier J.C.S. found that this had to be brought as a derivative claim, 
since it was primarily a loss suffered by the company and only indirectly by the shareholder (pars. 45-58).  
It was further noted that the courts should not interfere with internal business decisions made in all 
legitimacy, with no fraud or "ultra vires" (pars. 74-75) and that, since the agreement set out a valuation 
procedure, the judge did not want to set it aside (pars. 60-69). 
1150
 1199918 Alberta Ltd. v. TRL Holdings Inc., 2011 ABQB 506, 523 A.R. 274, 2011 CarswellAlta 
1393, 205 A.C.W.S. (3d) 677, [2012] A.W.L.D. 326, [2012] A.W.L.D. 327, [2012] A.W.L.D. 328, [2012] 
A.W.L.D. 329, [2012] A.W.L.D. 330, [2012] A.W.L.D. 331, [2012] A.W.L.D. 332, [2012] A.W.L.D. 336, 
90 B.L.R. (4th) 73, 53 Alta. L.R. (5th) 68 (Alta. Q.B. Aug 12, 2011) (hereinafter "1199918") 
1151
 Ibid, par. 80:  
 
I am satisfied that some of the matters raised by the Applicants are not bound to fail.  It is 
arguable that 1252104 should have held Cornerstone and Mr. Ostermayer to the 
maximum per square foot cost for the construction of the units for McLeod Gardens.  
That may have resulted in profits for TRL albeit at Mr. Ostermayer's expense.  There are 
payments from TRL to Mr. Regenwetter or entities related to him that may have been 
made contrary to the unanimous shareholders agreement or otherwise made to divert 
funds from TRL.  It is curious and suspicious that all creditors of 1252104 have been paid 
but for Mr. Liu's Professional Corporation and CRA, and the latter in an amount similar 
to the amount of security placed for the Professional Corporation's builder's lien. 
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judgment to determine how those payments may have been in breach of the agreement.
1152
  However, 
because this appears in a motion for leave to bring a derivative action, it suggests that the duty to follow the 
agreement is a duty to the corporation.  While the applicant was also bringing a claim personally, Graesser 
J. specifically noted that the derivative action was necessary because it was the only way to bring suit 
against the directors for "breach of fiduciary duty or other wrongdoing".
1153
 
 Similarly, in Johnson v. Meyer,
1154
 the applicant sought leave to commence a derivative action 
against directors for alleged breaches of negative covenants and of their duty of good faith and fiduciary 
obligations.  The allegation that the defendants were, inter alia, violating the unanimous shareholder 
agreement by performing work apparently forbidden by it was treated as supporting the proposition that it 
was in the best interest of the corporation for the application to be allowed and the derivative action to go 
forward.
1155
  The respondents submitted that the derivative action should not proceed because there was 
also a personal suit ongoing to enforce the negative covenants.
1156
  (It is not clear whether these were 
distinct from whatever provisions of the unanimous shareholder agreement were being violated.)  Despite 
this, the action was allowed to proceed because the relief sought was different.
1157
 
 Malata Group (HK) Ltd. v. Jung,
1158
 on the other hand, rejected the view that violations of 
unanimous shareholder agreements were exclusively violations of the directors' duties to the corporation.  
The defendants brought a motion to dismiss oppression claims on the grounds that they were really 
derivative and no leave had been sought.
1159
  With regard to the portion of the statement of claim alleging 
violations of a unanimous shareholder agreement and seeking relief pursuant to it, Ground J. held that these 
were properly oppression claims of the plaintiff personally.
1160
 
                                                          
1152
 The unanimous shareholder agreement also contained a term that the applicant would be a 
director, though he was not, something which was noted in passing but of which nothing was made 
(1199918, supra note 1150, par. 5). 
1153
 1199918, supra note 1150, par. 75.  This may refer to the duty of care and not the fiduciary duty 
of loyalty. 
1154
 Johnson v. Meyer, 62 Sask. R. 34, 1987 CarswellSask 635, [1987] C.L.D. 1400, [1987] S.J. No. 
668 (Sask. Q.B. Oct 09, 1987) (hereinafter "Johnson").  This successful application corrected some 
technical defects (par. 15) that had resulted in the failure of an identical (par. 13) previous application (see 
Johnson v. Meyer, 57 Sask. R. 161, 1987 CarswellSask 631, [1987] C.L.D. 387, [1987] S.J. No. 123 (Sask. 
Q.B. Feb 12, 1987)). 
1155
 Ibid, par. 23.  The applicants made repeated demands to have the differences between the parties 
brought to arbitration, as the unanimous shareholder agreement provided, but they were refused (par. 20).  
This was treated as evidence of the applicant's good faith in bringing the motion (par. 21). 
1156
 Ibid, par. 30. 
1157
 Ibid, par. 31. 
1158
 Malata Group (HK) Ltd. v. Jung, 2007 CarswellOnt 2730, 157 A.C.W.S. (3d) 317, [2007] O.J. 
No. 1704 (Ont. S.C.J. May 01, 2007) (hereinafter "Malata"); The decision was appealed on other grounds 
and upheld, in Malata Group (HK) Ltd. v. Jung, 2008 ONCA 111, 89 O.R. (3d) 36, 290 D.L.R. (4th) 343, 
233 O.A.C. 199, 2008 CarswellOnt 699, 44 B.L.R. (4th) 177 (Ont. C.A. Feb 15, 2008). 
1159
 Malata, supra note 1158, par. 2. 
1160
 Ibid, par. 5. 
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 In Ellins v. Coventree Inc.
1161
 as well, an issue was raised that this was an improperly brought 
derivative action; the unanimous shareholder agreement stated that the CDO limitation (a term of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement that bound the parent company, which the applicant shareholders were 
trying to enforce against the parent company through an oppression claim) could only be enforced by the 
company, but this application had been brought by three minority shareholders.
1162
  Lax J. concluded, "It is 
not known what steps the Board would have recommended Nereus [the corporation] take, but I do not think 
it lies in Coventree's [parent company's] mouth to deny Nereus its day in court on this issue because three 
of its minority shareholders brought this application.  They are here because of Coventree's conduct.  
Nereus shall have carriage, instructed by management."
1163
  Obviously, this differs from the norm in that 
the agreement was being enforced against a parent company rather than the directors and because of the 
contractual requirement that the claim be advanced only by the corporation itself.  Nonetheless, the court's 
willingness to allow the action to proceed despite that suggests a strong amount of lenience for 
shareholders to directly enforce unanimous shareholder agreements, rather than requiring derivative 
actions. 
 All of these decisions invoke the idea, if in some cases only to reject it, that enforcement of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement is properly a claim of the company, and that a derivative action is the 
means whereby shareholders might advance it.  One thing this small group of cases has in common is that, 
in all of them, the claim was allowed to proceed, whether it was a judge granting permission for a 
derivative action or ruling one unnecessary.  There does not seem to be much enthusiasm for denying 
shareholders the right to enforce terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 The cases that grapple with the issue of derivative actions are therefore inconclusive as to whether 
obeying a unanimous shareholder agreement should be treated as part of the directors' duties to the 
corporation and enforcement handled through a procedure that classifies it as such, although the possibility 
is certainly not foreclosed so much as not consistently required. 
 
5.(b) The Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule 
 
 A few cases have considered whether the business judgment rule may be invoked to protect 
directors who decided to violate unanimous shareholder agreements, allegedly in the bona fide belief that 
doing so served the company's best interests.
1164
  If such a doctrine were adopted- and it generally has not 
                                                          
1161
 Ellins v. Coventree Inc., 2007 CarswellOnt 1725, [2007] O.J. No. 1118, 28 B.L.R. (4th) 292 (Ont. 
S.C.J. Mar 27, 2007) (hereinafter "Ellins"). 
1162
 Ibid, par. 68. 
1163
 Ibid, par. 68. 
1164
 Cramer v. Focus Group Holding Inc., 2013 ABPC 24, 2013 CarswellAlta 215, 225 A.C.W.S. (3d) 
998, [2013] A.W.L.D. 2458, 12 B.L.R. (5th) 299 (Alta. Prov. Ct. Feb 22, 2013) also raised the point that 
  
 
 
207 
 
been accepted- then it would implicitly incorporate the unanimous shareholder agreements into the duty of 
care, i.e. directors should consider them but have the discretion to ignore them without penalty if they 
reasonably believed that it was in the company's best interests.  Neither the corporate constitutional nor the 
contractual approach would allow directors to ignore a unanimous shareholder agreement without penalty 
simply because they believed that doing so was in the company's best interests, although such a belief 
might weigh in the assessment of damages. 
 In evaluating whether directors have met their duty of care, the courts have developed "the 
business judgment rule", a doctrine that judges should show deference to the "business judgment" of 
directors and not second-guess their decisions.
1165
  The basis of this deference is twofold; firstly, that it is 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the directors were bound to act in the best interest of the company when valuing shares the company was 
obliged to repurchased pursuant to a clause in a unanimous shareholder agreement (a clause they were 
alleged to be in breach of), it not being in the company's interest to give them a high value (par. 59, see also 
par. 71).  The situation was unusual, in that Sharek Prov. J. was not evaluating whether the board's actions 
were correct in the context of the unanimous shareholder agreement, but whether the directors had acted in 
bad faith that would invalidate a release (pars. 47, 51).  Further, the agreement had specifically allowed the 
board discretion in valuing the shares (par. 71).  On that standard and under the document's, the directors' 
choice of valuation procedures was found to be acceptable (par. 78), although the judge did note in coming 
to that conclusion that, "the Board did not act in bad faith and acted in what they believed to be in the best 
interests of the corporation in establishing the Share value" (par. 80) suggesting that their belief that they 
were acting in the best interests of the company (i.e. the business judgment rule) was a relevant factor in 
evaluating their compliance (or at least evaluating their lack of bad faith).  The fact-driven use of a "bad 
faith" standard limits this case as a means of understanding the enforcement of unanimous shareholder 
agreements generally. 
1165
   In Peoples, supra note 809, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the position that the business 
judgment rule was implicit in a proper understanding of the directors' statutory duty of care: 
 
64 The contextual approach dictated by s. 122(1)(b) of the CBCA not only 
emphasizes the primary facts but also permits prevailing socio-economic conditions to be 
taken into consideration.  The emergence of stricter standards puts pressure on 
corporations to improve the quality of board decisions.  The establishment of good 
corporate governance rules should be a shield that protects directors from allegations that 
they have breached their duty of care.  However, even with good corporate governance 
rules, directors' decisions can still be open to criticism from outsiders.  Canadian courts, 
like their counterparts in the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and New 
Zealand, have tended to take an approach with respect to the enforcement of the duty of 
care that respects the fact that directors and officers often have business expertise that 
courts do not.  Many decisions made in the course of business, although ultimately 
unsuccessful, are reasonable and defensible at the time they are made.  Business 
decisions must sometimes be made, with high stakes and under considerable time 
pressure, in circumstances in which detailed information is not available.  It might be 
tempting for some to see unsuccessful business decisions as unreasonable or imprudent in 
light of information that becomes available ex post facto.  Because of this risk of 
hindsight bias, Canadian courts have developed a rule of deference to business decisions 
called the "business judgment rule", adopting the American name for the rule. 
 
In BCE, supra note 1143, par 40, the Supreme Court elaborated, "The 'business judgment rule' accords 
deference to a business decision, so long as it lies within a range of reasonable alternatives[….]" 
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easy with the benefit of hindsight and the leisure of reflection to criticize decisions made when outcomes 
were uncertain and time may have been pressing, and secondly, because when attempting to guide a 
successful business, risk is often to be embraced rather than avoided, if there are potential profits to be 
made in the gamble.  In practice, the business judgment rule has made it all but impossible to successfully 
prove that directors failed to meet their duty of care in situations short of the most egregious incompetence 
or the violation of certain specific subsidiary rules.
1166
 
 Matthews Investments Ltd. v. Assiniboine Medical Holdings Ltd.
1167
 is the clearest example of how 
this might work in the context of a directors' duties framework for enforcing unanimous shareholder 
agreements; the business judgment rule was held to allow the board the discretion to disregard the 
agreement.  Joyal J. concluded that directors should firstly be granted judicial deference with regard to their 
interpretations of unanimous shareholder agreements and secondly should be allowed to weigh their 
obligations under the agreement against their views of the best interests of the corporation.  While not 
strictly speaking relegating adherence to these agreements to a component of the duty of care, which would 
have created standing issues, the judgment otherwise appears most consistent with the analysis one would 
expect in a duty of care case. 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement in question contained a provision that allowed the directors 
some discretion in retaining capital, but stated that to the "greatest extent reasonably possible" they must 
declare dividends.
1168
  Historically, the corporation had always paid dividends annually equal to the 
company's net income,
1169
 although it had run deficits and taken mortgages to accomplish this.
1170
  When 
the corporation stopped paying dividends, a suit was brought.
1171
  The situation was further complicated 
because the corporation had a multi-class share structure, and retired or deceased employees had their 
shares converted to a class that was non-voting and redeemed automatically after eight years, but received 
full dividends for those eight years.
1172
 
                                                          
1166
 e.g. the rules against fettering discretion and against delegation. 
1167
 Matthews Investments Ltd. v. Assiniboine Medical Holdings Ltd., 2008 MBQB 52, [2008] 12 
W.W.R. 493, 2008 CarswellMan 59, 227 Man. R. (2d) 9, 165 A.C.W.S. (3d) 453, 43 B.L.R. (4th) 206 
(Man. Q.B. Feb 14, 2008) (hereinafter "Matthews"). 
1168
 Ibid, par. 2.  The clause read in full: 
 
The directors of Assiniboine in each fiscal year when establishing operating budgets, 
shall be permitted in their discretion, to accumulate reasonable reserves in their discretion 
for operating expenses anticipated to be incurred by Assiniboine in the next fiscal year.  
Thereafter, to the greatest extent reasonably possible, the balance of Net Income (or 
Loss) for Tax Purposes as determined in paragraph 10.5, shall be allocated and 
distributed on an annual basis to those Shareholders of Assiniboine otherwise entitled to 
share the Net Income (or Loss) for Tax Purposes of Assiniboine. 
1169
 Ibid, par. 20. 
1170
 Ibid, par. 111. 
1171
 Ibid, par. 3. 
1172
 Ibid, pars. 15-16. 
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 Joyal J. first considered the situation without applying the oppression remedy.  In that context, the 
words of the document were held to be straightforward enough that extrinsic evidence would not be 
consulted to determine their meaning, per standard contract law principles.
1173
  The judge concluded that, 
under the agreement, the directors no longer had absolute discretion as to whether to declare dividends
1174
  
and that "[g]iven the comparatively exposed status of the plaintiffs in this case, the fettering of the directors' 
discretion pursuant to the 1993 agreement provides important protection from potential abuse of conduct at 
the hands of directors".
1175
  Given the subsequent conclusions, it is not entirely clear what those limits were 
or if they were anything but illusions.  On the wording, it was found that the directors retained "a necessary 
discretion".
1176
 
 Joyal J. then essentially imported the business judgment rule as the standard of review for 
directors' interpretations of their own power under a unanimous shareholder agreement: 
 
104 It is clear that a unanimous shareholder agreement like that of the 1993 
agreement can fetter the otherwise wide discretion afforded the directors of a corporation.  
However, even where that has occurred, while the directors' remaining discretion may no 
longer be absolute, it is a discretion with which interference by a court will take place 
reluctantly and cautiously. 
 
105 The phraseology of paragraph 10.7 in the 1993 agreement is such that it ensures 
that even if qualified, the directors of AMHL are provided and retain a necessary 
discretion that is consistent and compatible with exigencies of corporate governance. 
 
106 Absent error in the directors' legal interpretation of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, when examining the directors' exercise of their discretion - either in the 
context of their application of a unanimous shareholder agreement or in relation to the 
evaluation of possible oppressive conduct - courts are understandably cautious about 
substituting their own judgment for the judgment of the directors.  This is especially so in 
relation to the often subtle and nuanced considerations that interact to inform and impact 
corporate decision-making. 
 
[...] 
 
109 Assuming a correct interpretation of the 1993 agreement and more specifically, 
the correct interpretation of the clear but qualified discretion set out in paragraph 10.7 
(the correctness of the defendants' interpretation is indeed confirmed below at paragraph 
122), the satisfaction of the above three steps [essentially, the basic standards of the duty 
of care under the business judgment rule] may be taken into account when examining the 
defendants' application of paragraph 10.7 and the plaintiffs' attack on the genuineness of 
the defendants' justification to not declare dividends for the years in question. 
 
 It is not particularly novel to suggest that the directors' decision should not be disturbed if the 
                                                          
1173
 Ibid, par. 95. 
1174
 Ibid, par. 99. 
1175
 Ibid, par. 102. 
1176
 Ibid, par. 105. 
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agreement was correctly followed.  What is radical is the implication that the business judgment rule 
applies to the very question of whether the agreement was followed. 
 Joyal J. also brought in a related principle, that the court should not compel commercially 
unreasonable behaviour,
1177
 and held that the directors' decision not to declare dividends was commercially 
reasonable
1178
 and also that they were protecting the corporation's interests in accordance with what was 
called their "fiduciary" duty.
1179
  Further, the judge "accept[ed] the defendants' argument that any provision 
of a shareholder agreement that would compel a declaration of dividends in a way that would require a 
director to betray his or her fiduciary duties to the corporation could very well be ultra vires the 
shareholders of that corporation".
1180
  While the language is speculative and the comment possibly 
obiter,
1181
 Joyal J. nonetheless was openly sympathetic to the position that a director's own conception of 
their duties to the corporation would override the restrictions of a unanimous shareholder agreement.  This 
is clearly incompatible with any approach other than incorporating the agreements directly into the duty of 
care.  Just as an outvoted minority director could not assert power over the corporation to satisfy a 
perceived duty to it, a director stripped of power by a unanimous shareholder agreement could not, under a 
corporate constitutional approach, assert power that they simply did not possess, duty or no duty.  It is 
similarly outside of a contractual approach, under which the entire point of unanimous shareholder 
agreements is to allow for contracts that might fetter the discretion of directors, something otherwise 
forbidden, with the potential for contractual damages in the event of violations. 
 Ultimately, these points about the business judgment rule, commercial reasonability, and fiduciary 
duty lead to one of two inferences.  The first possibility is that Joyal J. was making determinations 
specifically regarding the discretion explicitly granted in this particular unanimous shareholder agreement, 
i.e. this ruling was unique to these facts.  Alternatively, despite some early indications that this decision 
was in line with a corporate constitutional or contractual approach, it was in fact an example of treating 
adherence to unanimous shareholder agreements as a component of the duty of care
1182
 and therefore 
subject to substantial judicial deference to directors under the business judgment rule. 
 While the use of the oppression remedy as an enforcement mechanism for unanimous shareholder 
agreements is discussed more fully in a later part of this chapter, it is useful to compare how that method 
was employed in Matthews Investments with the aforementioned analysis.  The plaintiffs argued that even 
if the directors were technically within their rights, the larger situation (including the history of the 
corporation, the unanimous shareholder agreement, the share structure, et cetera) could form the basis of an 
                                                          
1177
 Ibid, par. 110. 
1178
 Ibid, pars. 112-115. 
1179
 Ibid, par. 120. 
1180
 Ibid, par. 122. 
1181
 Since the unanimous shareholder agreement in question was interpreted in such a manner that it 
did not contain such a requirement. 
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oppression claim.
1183
  Joyal J. held that, for this branch of the analysis, extrinsic evidence could 
demonstrate reasonable expectations.
1184
  Nonetheless, the failure on the directors' duties grounds 
essentially proved fatal to the oppression claim: 
 
156 I have already expressed my determination that on my interpretation of the 1993 
agreement, if the decision of the directors of AMHL falls within the discretion provided 
by paragraph 10.7, the declaration of dividends is not obligatory.  Accordingly, with that 
determination, I have confirmed the existence of a qualified discretion to not declare 
dividends, a qualified discretion that, by definition, may be used if the circumstances 
warrant. [...] 
 
157 The very existence of a qualified discretion like that in paragraph 10.7 of the 
1993 agreement and the creation of a finite eight-year period attached to class C 
withdrawing shareholders, give rise to the possibility that in respect of the declaration of 
dividends, some class C shareholders (in some years or periods) may be treated 
differently than others in past years.  That result is rooted in the reasonable discretionary 
power found in the articles and further qualified in the 1993 agreement to which the 
plaintiffs contracted. 
 
 Joyal J. held that the expectations of the plaintiffs were therefore not reasonable.
1185
 
 While the decision in Matthews might be explained as entirely derived from discretion specifically 
granted in the wording of the agreement, the judgment as a whole contains numerous references to the need 
for directors to have such discretion, and indeed suggests that it might be impossible for a unanimous 
shareholder agreement to remove it.  It reflects, overall, a tendency toward the standard judicial habits 
when reviewing directors' conduct, the established deference toward their decision making, even when 
considering the enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements.  Several other cases, however, have 
taken the opposite stance.  A pair of judgments suggest that the business judgment rule cannot protect 
directors who disregard a unanimous shareholder agreement, while a further pair indicate only that 
violating the agreement would normally be so egregious a violation of the duties that it went beyond even 
the business judgment rule, leaving open the possibility that in unusual circumstances, it might be a 
legitimate exercise of their discretion. 
 The appeal in 2082825 Ontario Inc. v. Platinum Wood Finishing Inc.
1186
 centred around the 
respondents' attempt to invoke the business judgment rule, an issue not dealt with directly in the original 
judgment.
1187
   Even though it was an oppression case, the directors argued that their decision to fire the 
applicant despite the unanimous shareholder agreement was made in good faith and in the best interests of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1182
 Possibly aside from standing issues. 
1183
 Matthews, supra note 1167, par. 152. 
1184
 Ibid, par. 154. 
1185
 Ibid, par. 171. 
1186
 2082825 Div Ct, supra note 792. 
1187
 2082825 Sup Ct J, supra note 792. 
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the corporation, and therefore it should be respected according to the business judgment rule, because it 
trumped any specific provisions of a unanimous shareholder agreement (or other reasonable expectations of 
a shareholder).
1188
 
 The court rejected this argument.  According to Wilson J., the business judgment rule protected 
directors "making decisions on behalf of shareholders [...] in accordance with their responsibilities as 
agreed upon by shareholders".
1189
  Therefore, "the business judgment rule has no application where, as in 
the circumstances of this case, the shareholders have put their minds to a particular business issue and have 
agreed upon terms."
1190
  This is a definition of directors' duties within the context of the corporate 
constitutional approach; directors have discretion only in areas where unanimous shareholder agreements 
have not already predetermined the outcome.  The court also set out the obvious point that if the business 
judgment rule overrides a unanimous shareholder agreement, then the latter is effectively useless: 
 
If the business judgment rule were held to override the express terms of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, such agreements would be of negligible value to a minority 
shareholder who becomes an equity owner in reliance on the protection contained in 
terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Instead of providing protection, such 
agreements could easily become the instruments of a "bait and switch" if controlling 
shareholders were permitted to shelter under the business judgment rule when violating 
the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement to the prejudice of a minority.
1191
 
 
 While the above paragraph seems applicable regardless of how the unanimous shareholder 
agreement is conceived, the specific method being used to enforce it was the oppression remedy, and the 
court also endorsed the general principle that the business judgment rule does not allow directors to violate 
the "reasonable expectations" of the shareholders, i.e. to commit oppression.
1192
 
 In another oppression case, Le Maitre Ltd. v. Segeren,
1193
 it was similarly held that the business 
judgement rule and the director's own views as to his duties to the corporation did not permit him to 
override a unanimous shareholder agreement: 
 
46 [...] While a director owes a fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of a 
corporation, I do not believe that the Supreme Court's decision in BCE Inc. stands for the 
proposition that a director may violate agreements and the reasonable expectations of 
shareholders provided he or she considers the decision to be in the best interests of the 
corporation.  Rather, as the Court stated, "The corporation and the shareholders are 
entitled to maximize profit and share value, to be sure, but not by treating individual 
shareholders unfairly."  The business judgment rule accords deference to a business 
                                                          
1188
 2082825 Div Ct, supra note 792, par. 18. 
1189
 Ibid, par. 19. 
1190
 Ibid, par. 20. 
1191
 Ibid, par. 20. 
1192
 Ibid, par. 28. 
1193
 Le Maitre Ltd. v. Segeren, 2009 CarswellOnt 773, 174 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, [2009] O.J. No. 634, 
55 B.L.R. (4th) 123 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Feb 11, 2009) (hereinafter "Le Maitre"). 
  
 
 
213 
 
decision so long as it is within a range of reasonable alternatives.  Mr. Segeren's actions 
and decisions were not within that range. [Footnote omitted] 
 
[...] 
 
51        The more fundamental argument that Mr. Segeren advances, however, is that he is 
acting in the best interests of LMSE.  In making this submission, however, he ignores two 
key facts.  Firstly, in light of the provisions of the USA and the parties' reasonable 
expectations, the assessment of the best interests of LMSE is not his alone to make.  
Secondly he disregards the purpose for which LMSE was established, namely to serve as 
a distributor of LML products in North America. 
 
 The judges in both 2082825 and Le Maitre found that the business judgment rule cannot permit 
directors to override the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement, because deference to directors' 
decision-making would destroy the utility of a tool designed to limit that very discretion and because, under 
the terms of the document, the assessment of the interests of the corporation was no longer the directors' to 
make.  A further pair of decisions achieved a similar result, but were on a technical level more cautious; 
they asserted instead that the breach of a unanimous shareholder agreement is normally so blatant a 
violation of the directors' duties as to take their decision beyond even the generous protection of the 
business judgment rule. 
 While resolving the oppression allegations in Ellins v. Conventree Inc.,
1194
 Lax J. noted with 
regard to acts that ignored the shareholders' reasonable expectations, to which a limitation in the unanimous 
shareholder agreement was "central", that "[t]he business judgment rule will only shield directors and 
officers from court intervention in decisions that have been made in good faith and on reasonable grounds 
that appear to be in the best interests of the corporation".
1195
  Implicitly, Lax J. found that the acts in 
question were not made in good faith.  However, the corollary was that, if the actions were in good faith, 
the business judgment rule might apply even if the directors were violating a unanimous shareholder 
agreement and in so doing oppressively disregarding the shareholders' reasonable expectations. 
 Main v. Delcan Group Inc.,
1196
 yet another oppression case, might not have involved a unanimous 
shareholder agreement,
1197
 but is notable for being one of the cases cited by the Supreme Court of Canada 
regarding shareholder agreements and the oppression remedy.
1198
  It allows similar inferences, as Lederman 
J. found that "[i]t is difficult to imagine that any decision which runs contrary to both the CBCA and the 
Shareholders' Agreement could nevertheless be said to be honest, and in good faith.  Accordingly, I must 
                                                          
1194
 Ellins, supra note 1161. 
1195
 Ibid, par. 52. 
1196
 Main v. Delcan Group Inc., 47 B.L.R. (2d) 200, 1999 CarswellOnt 1605, 88 A.C.W.S. (3d) 788, 
[1999] O.J. No. 1961, 105 O.T.C. 27 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Jun 02, 1999) (hereinafter "Main"). 
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 The document in Main was never explicitly referred to as a "unanimous shareholder agreement" 
(or synonym). 
1198
 BCE, supra note 1143, par. 79. 
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find that the Respondent cannot rely on the Business Judgment Rule as support for its argument."
1199
   On 
the one hand, the principle is established that breaches of a shareholder agreement are violations of the 
directors' duties outside the permissible discretion covered by the business judgment rule, but on the other, 
it is only "difficult to imagine", not "legally impossible" for the outcome to be otherwise.  Given the correct 
facts, a violation of a shareholder agreement could be honest and in good faith.  If it were, this mode of 
analysis would allow the complainant no recourse, neither the nullification of the corporate constitutional 
model nor an award for contractual damages. 
 The majority of the preceding cases determined that the business judgment rule did not excuse 
directors who had chosen to violate a unanimous shareholder agreement, either because it was generally 
inapplicable or because only highly unusual circumstances would allow it to do so.  Any inclination to 
default to the usual judicial deference to directors' discretion seems to have, with one notable exception, 
been outweighed by a sense that the board could not freely disregard an explicit restriction upon them, else 
the restriction would have no meaning.  The normal rationale for the business judgment rule is that courts 
should not substitute their own decision-making for that of directors, but where the terms of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement are available as guidance, a review of the directors' actions does not constitute 
second-guessing legitimate business decisions with the benefit of hindsight.  Nonetheless, while there is 
only an isolated endorsement for the proposition that the business judgment rule would protect directors' 
choices to violate unanimous shareholder agreements, two of the judgments that rejected it still analyzed 
the board's obligation to obey the restriction as part of their duty to the corporation, just one that superseded 
their normal discretion. 
 
5.(c) Summation 
 
 A pre-existing mechanism through which the law controls directors' actions is their duties of care 
and loyalty.  The directives found in unanimous shareholder agreements could be explicitly categorized as 
part of the directors' usual duties to the company; the legislation does separately provide that directors have 
a duty to comply with them.  Even if adherence to the unanimous shareholder agreement is not explicitly 
being treated as one manifestation of the directors' general duties to the company, those larger obligations 
can serve as another model for enforcing these instruments.  As a theoretical conception of unanimous 
shareholder agreements and as a set of legal principles pertaining to them, directors' duties present an 
alternative to both the corporate constitutional and contractual approaches.  While the case law suggests 
that this method has limited favour, portions of the model nonetheless may have some currency; at the very 
least, the merits of invoking aspects of it have received judicial consideration, even if only to be rejected. 
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 Two implications of directors' duties in particular have emerged as objects of consideration.  The 
first is the requirement that enforcement occur through a derivative action, and the second, the "business 
judgment rule" that allows directors wide discretion in determining what is in the best interests of the 
company.  The (admittedly few) reported judgments have been almost entirely against the use of these 
principles to defeat claims, although the case law has left slightly more room in the abstract for the 
possibility that they have some relevance to the issue when circumstances warrant. 
 The directors' duties approach to the unanimous shareholder agreement is notable for providing a 
distinct contrast with the corporate constitutional and contractual models at both a theoretical and practical 
level, demonstrating that that dichotomy does not encompass all possible understandings of this legal tool, 
and that no conclusion regarding the unanimous shareholder agreement is inevitable.  Instead of the 
genuine removal of directors' powers or a set of contractual obligations, the restrictions in a unanimous 
shareholder agreement could be a part of the duties that directors already owe to the company.  Instead of 
the corporate constitutional approach's default nullification for want of authority or the many rules of 
contract law that might govern when breaches of these instruments result in damages, the legal principles 
governing directors' duties of care and loyalty might have application both for determining if a remedy is 
required and what it should be. 
 But there is a reason for the aforementioned judicial coolness toward this approach.  The directors' 
duties are designed to allow them flexibility to operate in an uncertain and unpredictable economic 
environment while still maintaining a measure of accountability.  They are thus an uneasy fit for the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, which can create clearly defined restrictions.  And yet, the final 
approach, the oppression  remedy, is even more flexible, and as the final section of this chapter explores, it 
has proven quite influential. 
 
6. The Oppression Approach 
 
 The oppression remedy is, like the unanimous shareholder agreement, a statutory addition to 
corporate law innovated in Canada.
1200
  Its purpose is to prevent directors and controlling shareholders from 
abusing their control of the corporation to "oppress" minority shareholders or creditors, and to that end the 
court is granted a wide range of powers.  While this explanation of the purpose of the oppression remedy 
might suggest that it should be reserved for situations where no other legal wrong is occurring, in fact the 
oppression remedy has evolved into a parallel structure, existing alongside whatever other rights and 
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 In jurisdictions that currently allow for unanimous shareholder agreements, the oppression remedy 
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remedies may or may not apply. 
 As a result, the commonplace use of the oppression remedy to enforce unanimous shareholder 
agreements against directors and the corporation- and more than half of the reported cases in this area 
invoke the oppression remedy
1201
- does not necessarily shed light on the legal theory underlying unanimous 
shareholder agreements.  The oppression remedy could exist alongside any of the three approaches 
described above.   It could also be applicable even if unanimous shareholder agreements were otherwise no 
more than unenforceable promises. 
 To the extent that the oppression remedy is viewed in isolation or as the primary means of 
enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements, however, there are two significant implications regarding the 
nature of this legal tool.
1202
  Firstly, the body of law surrounding oppression has its own emerging 
                                                                                                                                                                             
caught by these provisions, including unfair prejudice and unfair disregard. 
1201
 This estimate is based upon my own research.  It may reflect biases, including my research 
methodology and my own judgment about what constitutes the enforcement of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement and/or invoking the oppression remedy. 
1202
  The discussion that follows concerns the use of the oppression remedy as a means of enforcing the 
terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement, i.e. the alleged oppression consists (in whole or in part) of the 
violation of its terms.  This can be contrasted with a number of other scenarios where a unanimous 
shareholder agreement might itself give rise to an oppression lawsuit. 
 
The first is where the power arrangement set out in the document is alleged to be oppressive in and of itself, 
independent of any usage of it.  Such a claim seems unlikely to succeed, at least when brought by a 
shareholder, since the investor's reasonable expectations would not have been violated.  In Comuzzi v. 
705542 Ontario Inc., 1998 CarswellOnt 3461, 82 A.C.W.S. (3d) 464, [1998] O.J. No. 3572 (Ont. Gen. Div. 
Sep 01, 1998), a unanimous shareholder agreement that excluded a majority investor from any control over 
the company (by mandating who would be elected as directors) was found not to be oppressive; the 
company was being well-run (pars. 38-49).  In Equity Development Inc. v. Akokli Creek Development Inc., 
2012 BCSC 42, 2012 CarswellBC 105, [2012] B.C.W.L.D. 7379 (B.C. S.C. Jan 13, 2012), a term in the 
unanimous shareholder agreement requiring that decisions of the board occur by supermajority was 
accepted by Melnick J. as a justification for one large block of investors "control[ling] the show" (par. 29) 
to the displeasure of the few dissenters; the board's actual uses of that power were found not to have 
violated the petitioners' reasonable expectations (pars. 28-35).  In Hurley SC (TD), supra note 1091, 
Orsborn J. rejected the argument that a change in shareholdings from equal to vastly unequal rendered 
oppressive the term guaranteeing both parties equal representation on the board of directors; this conclusion 
was based both upon the wording of the document dictating this outcome and upon the responsibility for 
the change in investment ratio resting with the party now complaining of the result (as discussed earlier in 
this chapter) (pars. 108-124).  Finally, a variation appeared in Corp. immobilière, supra note 405, when a 
creditor to whom all of a company's shares had been pledged as security created a unanimous shareholder 
agreement after a default on the loan granted it the ability to do so, in order to remove the directors from 
power.  Lévesque J.C.S. rejected an oppression claim, noting that the creditor was entitled to exercise its 
rights and protect its investment without being accused of abusive behaviour (par. 20) and that no acts of 
oppression were occurring that needed to be rectified (pars. 23-27). 
 
A second way in which a unanimous shareholder agreement might give rise to an oppression claim is when 
empowered shareholders exercise the authority they have been granted in (what is alleged to be) an 
oppressive manner.  When this occurs, the remedy remains available, although of course the behaviour in 
question may not actually warrant sanction.  152581 Canada Ltd. v. Matol World Corp., [1997] R.J.Q. 161, 
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1996 CarswellQue 1211, [1996] Q.J. No. 4017, EYB 1996-87739 (C.S. Que. Dec 05, 1996) presents an 
example; a shareholder granted sole managerial power over a company proceeded to behave unilaterally 
and ignore the other investors/directors in a manner that was found to be oppressive (pars. 89-96).  Gomery 
J. stated that he "may have been legally entitled to adopt this attitude, in the sense that he may indeed have 
had the authority which he claimed to exercise as a result of the signature of the shareholders' agreement, 
but his disregard of the views and interests of the others was, in the circumstances, unfair" (par. 92).  An 
apparently more common variant occurs when an investor granted a veto power by a unanimous 
shareholder agreement proceeds to use it oppressively.  In Gillespie, supra note 524, one shareholder's 
refusal to attend meetings so that the quorum requirements in the unanimous shareholder agreement would 
prevent certain decisions from being made was found to be unfairly prejudicial (par. 177).  In Fiber 
Connections Inc. v. SVCM Capital Ltd., 2005 CarswellOnt 1963, [2005] O.J. No. 3899, 10 C.B.R. (5th) 
192, 5 B.L.R. (4th) 271 (Ont. S.C.J. Mar 10, 2005), a single investor's invocation of a term that required its 
approval for all changes to the corporate structure in order to block an insolvency Proposal supported by all 
other interested parties was held to be oppressive, and Campbell J. permitted the company to amends its 
unanimous shareholder agreement (pars. 21-34).  In McNeil c. Joly, 1987 CarswellQue 1325, J.E. 87-1118, 
EYB 1987-79639 (C.S. Que. Aug 28, 1987), Dionne J. initially remarked that when a unanimous 
shareholder agreement granted each of the two equal shareholders a veto, the exercise of that right was not 
oppressive (par. 32).  However, because the shareholder that was refusing to allow the company to raise 
funds required for its survival had implicitly accepted the necessity and was withholding its consent in 
order to put pressure upon the other investor to sell its shares, the judge granted the requested relief, 
ordering the intransigent shareholder be bought out, rather than resorting to liquidation (pars. 33-59).  This 
was not the only case to recognize that investors were entitled to use their veto rights without it necessarily 
constituting oppression, even if the result was a deadlock.  In Korogonas v. Andrew, [1992] 4 W.W.R. 399, 
128 A.R. 381, 1 Alta. L.R. (3d) 316, 1992 CarswellAlta 22, 32 A.C.W.S. (3d) 405, [1992] A.W.L.D. 333 
(Alta. Q.B. Mar 19, 1992) (hereinafter "Korogonas"), the deadlock between the two parties was found to be 
a foreseen result of them both being granted a veto over management decisions, and thus not oppressive; 
the dispute resolution method provided by the agreement, a shotgun clause, was the appropriate solution 
(pars. 30-45).  In Gold v. Rose, 2001 CarswellOnt 5, 102 A.C.W.S. (3d) 83, [2001] O.J. No. 12 (Ont. S.C.J. 
[Commercial] Jan 02, 2001), the refusal of the minority of the investors to agree with the majority's choice 
of manager, which under the unanimous shareholder agreement required a supermajority, was held to not 
be oppressive; the agreement was found to have effectively given the shareholders vetoes that they were 
entitled to exercise, and they were not doing so for an improper purpose (pars. 9-14).  Swinton J. did, 
however, find that the company was deadlocked and ordered that various parties buy out the others (pars. 
15-32).  In Klein, supra note 947, a shareholder used the requirement that cheques of more than $2500 have 
his approval to effectively freeze the company's assets for a brief time; Brockenshire J. found that this use 
of the agreement had not been oppressive, since the other shareholders were causing problems and this step 
led to "immediate remedies" (par. 86).  Further weighing against a finding of oppression, the context was 
not a request to rectify this alleged wrong per se, but rather an argument that it should render the agreement 
void in its entirety and thus validate share transfers that were in contravention of it (par. 86).  In Kirtzinger 
v. Schlosser, 2010 SKQB 478, 2010 CarswellSask 886, [2010] S.J. No. 812, 85 B.L.R. (4th) 306 (Sask. 
Q.B. Dec 30, 2010), the unanimous shareholder agreement provided that both investors would have a single 
director on the board, which resulted in deadlock and one party bringing an oppression claim.  Because the 
situation was causing the company immediate harm, Konkin J. ordered that there be a third director (pars. 
11-15).  This decision was more practical problem-solving than a true finding of oppression, as the judge 
made it "without pointing fingers at either the applicant or the respondent" (par. 13), a procedure that seems 
inconsistent with the remedy's nature. 
 
A third variation is when the agreement authorizes or contemplates a specific action or outcome.  In that 
situation, acts which otherwise would constitute oppression may not be.  If the parties have specifically 
anticipated or even intended something, it cannot be a violation of their reasonable expectations.  In 
Thomas v. Beringia Tours Ltd., 1999 CarswellYukon 3, [1999] Y.J. No. 21 (Y.T. S.C. Mar 23, 1999), a 
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corporation's refusal to provide business records to one of its investors beyond what was required by law 
(since that investor was a competitor of the company's clients) was found not to constitute oppression in 
part because the unanimous shareholder agreement to which the petitioner had consented specifically stated 
that this would occur (pars. 23-26).  In Novel Energy (North America) Ltd. v. Glowicki, 148 A.R. 161, 16 
Alta. L.R. (3d) 26, 1994 CarswellAlta 14, 45 A.C.W.S. (3d) 180, [1994] A.W.L.D. 181, [1994] A.J. No. 14 
(Alta. Q.B. Jan 07, 1994), debt financing, a corporate reorganization, and management bonuses were found 
not to be oppressive because they were each specifically contemplated in the unanimous shareholder 
agreement (pars. 122-123, 131, 133, 138). 
 
All of the above scenarios assume that the term giving rise to the oppression claim is a restriction upon the 
directors, the quintessential function of the unanimous shareholder agreement.  It is also possible that some 
other clause is at issue.  Where the document anticipates or authorizes specific behaviours, those would 
presumably no longer violate the reasonable expectations of any of the parties.  Where, however, the acts 
complained of constitute an unexpected abuse of general rights, oppression may be found.  Rosetown & 
District Community Bond Corp. v. Precision Metal Fabricating Ltd., 145 Sask. R. 231, 1996 CarswellSask 
407, 64 A.C.W.S. (3d) 575 (Sask. Q.B. Jun 11, 1996) dealt with the general misuse of the powers of the 
directors, who relied upon a shareholder agreement (generally not directly referred to as "unanimous", but 
Kyle J. specifically referred to the Court's power to amend a unanimous shareholder agreement at par. 12) 
that locked them in place as the board (par. 5), while they proceeded to act oppressively (pars. 12-15).  
Kyle J. amended the agreement to allow the replacement of the directors (par. 16).  The decision was 
successfully appealed, in Rosetown & District Community Bond Corp. v. Precision Metal Fabricating Ltd., 
152 Sask. R. 235, 1997 CarswellSask 251, 140 W.A.C. 235, 71 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1061 (Sask. C.A. May 06, 
1997), on the basis that Kyle J. had been incorrect in asserting that there were no facts in dispute (par. 1) 
and determinations on the evidence were required (par. 5), but the choice of remedy itself was not rejected. 
 
More specific terms of the agreement might also give rise to successful oppression claims if abused by the 
company.  In Deluce Holdings Inc. v. Air Canada, 12 O.R. (3d) 131, 98 D.L.R. (4th) 509, 8 B.L.R. (2d) 
294, 1992 CarswellOnt 154, 13 C.P.C. (3d) 72, 36 A.C.W.S. (3d) 724, [1992] O.J. No. 2382 (Ont. Gen. 
Div. (C.L.) Nov 10, 1992) (hereinafter "Deluce"), the corporation terminated the employment of a 
shareholder in order to trigger the share purchase clause in a unanimous shareholder agreement (pars. 7-
12).  Blair J. distinguished between strict legal rights and the wider interests that the oppression remedy 
protects (par. 51).  The judge, based upon the entire agreement and the parties' intentions in enacting it, 
found that there was a reasonable expectation that the shareholder would only be terminated for legitimate 
business reasons; what had occurred was therefore held to be oppressive (pars. 49-50).  In U v. Watters 
Environmental Group Inc., 2012 ONSC 7019, 2012 CarswellOnt 15670, 224 A.C.W.S. (3d) 16, 42 C.P.C. 
(7th) 401, 10 B.L.R. (5th) 165 (Ont. S.C.J. Dec 11, 2012) (hereinafter "Watters"), the plaintiff alleged that 
his termination and subsequent mandatory share repurchase pursuant to the unanimous shareholder 
agreement was oppressive (pars. 4-7), and although the matter was referred to arbitration, the judgment 
implied that these acts could have been so.  In an interim motion in Tremblay c. Michot, 2000 CarswellQue 
312, J.E. 2000-438, REJB 2000-17047 (C.S. Que. Jan 06, 2000) (hereinafter "Tremblay"), the claim was 
made that cash calls and share issuances pursuant to the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement had 
been oppressive insofar as they diluted the interests of a shareholder unable to participate; this argument 
was found to have enough potential substance to pass the first stage of the test for an injunction (pars. 29-
38), although the balance of convenience determined that the matter could wait for trial (par. 39).  In Bury 
v. Bell Gouinlock Ltd., 48 O.R. (2d) 57, 12 D.L.R. (4th) 451, 1984 CarswellOnt 1265, 28 A.C.W.S. (2d) 
151 (Ont. H.C. Nov 08, 1984) (hereinafter "Bury"), the company (without particular justification) invoked a 
term of the unanimous shareholder agreement that extended the period of the mandatory share repurchase 
of a departing employee, which due to securities law interfered with his attempts to seek new employment 
(par. 9).  Eberle J. found that this was oppressive (par. 10).  The fact that "the activities giving rise to the 
litigation were also the subject matter of a written contract between the parties" (par. 3) was an issue, and 
the judge concluded at par. 4: 
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Indeed, s. 247(3)(c) expressly provides that the court may make any order it thinks fit 
including without limiting the generality of the foregoing, 'an order to regulate a 
corporation's affairs by amending the articles or by-laws or creating or amending a 
unanimous shareholder agreement;' this is a far-reaching provision. Since the court has 
been given power to remodel a shareholders' agreement, it seems to me that the court 
must also have authority under the section to set limits to the exercise of a power given 
by a shareholders' agreement, if the court finds that a particular exercise of such power 
has the effect aimed at by s. 247(2). 
 
This reference to the court's authority to amend a unanimous shareholder agreement in apparent reference 
to the document in question is the sole use of that term in the judgment, which otherwise used only 
"shareholders' agreement".  Beauregard and Auger, supra note 16, agreed that this case dealt with a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, since they used it as an example of oppression leading a court to amend 
one. 
 
Finally, where the terms of the document grant rights to shareholders that do not correspond to restrictions 
upon the directors or even other governance issues, e.g. a shotgun clause, it is debatable whether the 
oppression remedy should be available to rectify misbehaviour.  If the portions of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement that deal with non-governance issues are part of their "contractual" and not "corporate 
constitutional" aspect, following the analysis of Duha SCC, then the abuse of such rights would be better 
dealt with through whatever contract law principles apply, if any, e.g. unconscionability.  In 119629 
Canada Inc. v. Heath Holdings, [1989] Q.J. No. 110 (C.S. Que. Jan 23, 1989), the shareholders' election of 
directors contrary to the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement was found to not be a valid source for 
an oppression claim, because they were acting qua shareholder, and not exercising the powers of directors.  
Further, s. 247 (s. 240 at the time the case was argued, but renumbered shortly before judgment) was found 
not to apply, because it specified that complainants could ask the court to enforce a unanimous shareholder 
agreement against "a corporation or any director, officer, employee, agent, auditor, trustee, receiver, 
receiver-manager or liquidator", but did not list shareholders.  Guthrie J. found that the ability of 
shareholders under the C.B.C.A. to apply to the court for liquidation if that right was granted to them in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, without the necessity of proving fault on the part of the corporation and 
therefore potentially as a means to resolve disputes among the shareholders, was an isolated one.  An 
election contrary to the unanimous shareholder agreement was also found not to trigger provisions in the 
statute concerning election controversies; interestingly, the judge noted that the election had not been 
contrary to the act, the articles, or the by-laws.  Guthrie J. concluded that a civil action (for breach of 
contract) might be possible, but not the requested relief.  Nonetheless, oppression claims are sometimes 
successfully brought against shareholders abusing powers granted them in a unanimous shareholder 
agreement that are not normally held by directors.  For example, in Woerly c. Banque de developpement du 
Canada, 2003 CarswellQue 4943, EYB 2003-39869 (C.S. Que. Apr 03, 2003), the agreement provided that 
two minority investors would have representatives on the board and that decisions required their 
participation (par. 13).  Those investors subsequently refused to select new directors after their initial ones 
resigned (par. 17).  This paralyzed the company; the judge agreed that it could not act (pars. 20, 57).  The 
majority shareholder brought an oppression action asking, inter alia, for the unanimous shareholder 
agreement to be rescinded (par. 31).  Notably, Woerly contains analysis of the same issues sometimes 
discussed in the context of the oppression remedy as a tool for enforcing these instruments.  As part of the 
motion to dismiss, one of the defendants argued that since the parties had agreed that the documents were 
their entire agreement, external evidence should be excluded (par. 39).  Blondin J.C.S. found that, under the 
circumstances, the exterior evidence could help explain their contractual obligations, and specifically could 
help identify the majority shareholder's reasonable expectations (par. 42).  The defendant also argued that 
this was not a proper oppression claim, and that it was really only an action for breach of contract (par. 43).  
The judge noted that the relief sought included things which were available under the oppression remedy 
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principles, most notably that it looks to the "reasonable expectations" that the shareholders have developed 
through their history together, and then it determines whether, in the context of those expectations, there 
has been oppression, unfair prejudice, or unfair disregard.
1203
  The principles and precedents that have 
developed differ from the more strict, "legalistic" rules that often govern contract law, and are just as far 
from the relatively clear-cut implications of corporate constitutionalism, or the deference with which courts 
interpret directors' duties. 
 The most obvious expression of this is that an oppression analysis might not be limited to the 
restrictions in the unanimous shareholder agreement, instead placing them in the context of other factors 
that may alter their meaning or even override them entirely.  The agreement might be treated not as 
enforceable in and of itself, but simply taken as evidence of the parties' positions.  The Supreme Court of 
Canada in BCE listed "shareholder agreements" (without the "unanimous", though citing at least one 
precedent that specifically dealt with a unanimous shareholder agreement) as a possible source of 
reasonable expectations,
1204
 immediately before referring to other documents that might also affect 
them,
1205
 all of which were in turn part of a long list of factors the Court put forth that can shape such 
expectations.
1206
  This context de-emphasizes the unanimous shareholder agreement as a significant tool for 
reshaping corporations, though it does not erase it entirely. 
 The corporate constitutional, contractual, and directors' duties approaches must often be identified 
via their characteristics.  Oppression, by contrast, is identified by the explicit framing of the claim.  As a 
result, it proves the most mutable of the four approaches; as will be discussed below, the oppression 
approach to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements contains a variety of different sub-approaches, 
and indeed contains some cases that might more properly be viewed as belonging to one of the other 
models, framing of the claim notwithstanding. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
but not through a civil action for contract damages, including the revocation of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement (par. 45).  Further, the actions of the minority shareholders were preventing the company from 
acting (par. 57).  Thus, Blondin J.C.S. found that a trial was necessary to determine whether there was a 
valid claim against the defendant shareholders concerning the way they were exercising their powers "as 
directors" ("à titre d'administrateurs", par. 58).  This was a misformulation of the issue; their refusal to 
nominate new directors should have been classified as an action qua shareholder.  That aside, the judge 
determined that, prima facie, the minority shareholders had acted against the other's rights and his 
reasonable expectations (par. 61).  The allegations of harm required the weighing of evidence (pars. 62-63).  
The claim was therefore allowed to proceed (par. 73). 
 
All of these examples illustrate that, in a number of a different ways, a unanimous shareholder agreement 
can lead to oppression even if, and possibly because, it is being followed.  The power structures it can 
create are just as vulnerable to abuse as the default ones.  While the consent of investors to the arrangement 
may place the result within their reasonable expectations, it is easily possible for what occurs to go beyond 
that, into the realm of oppression, unfair disregard, and unfair prejudice. 
1203
 BCE, supra note 1143. 
1204
 Ibid, par. 79. 
1205
 Ibid, par. 80. 
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 The next subsection will briefly discuss who the possible claimants under the oppression remedy 
might be and how that differs from the other approaches.  This is followed by a more general discussion of 
the appropriateness of applying the oppression remedy to the enforcement of unanimous shareholder 
agreements.  The subsequent three subsections each deal with one view of how these agreements interact 
with the "reasonable expectations" of the parties, a core component of the oppression remedy: as direct 
statements of their reasonable expectations, as one part of a larger fact pattern forming those expectations, 
and as the basis for expectations which might extend beyond the literal meaning of the terms themselves.  
Following the aforementioned subsections discussing how the oppression remedy might be used to enforce 
the parties' reasonable expectations as they relate to a unanimous shareholder agreement, two subsections 
deal with cases that are framed as oppression claims but that, in their analysis, do not follow a "reasonable 
expectations" model.  The first group appear to be applying a corporate constitutional understanding, while 
the second is more varied.  Finally, the last subsection on the oppression remedy concerns situations where 
the violation of a unanimous shareholder agreement was incidental to the alleged oppression, rather than 
the central component of it.
1207
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1206
 Ibid, pars. 70-88. 
1207
 There is a general question whether a unanimous shareholder agreement can explicitly remove the 
parties' ability to bring oppression claims.  In addition to the general impact of such a provision, it would 
exclude this method of enforcing the agreement itself.  Eliminating the oppression remedy is not a 
restriction upon the directors' powers, but might fall within the wider criteria found in some provincial 
statutes, and in any event, the documents can contain terms beyond their core function, assuming such 
clauses are either contemplated by statute or allowed by contract law.  Proponents of a renegotiable "nexus 
of contracts" corporation would presumably support allowing the shareholders to unanimously eliminate 
the oppression remedy, but it is doubtful that this is currently permissible.  As a matter of policy, permitting 
parties to generally waive it appears undesirable, as by definition that opens the door to the potential for 
abuse.  If the shareholders desire allowing specific actions that they fear might potentially run afoul of the 
remedy, they should be allowed to do so, in the same way they can agree to perform specific acts that might 
otherwise violate the directors' duties; this accords with the "reasonable expectations" standard.  Although 
caselaw on this point is not extensive, there is some indication that a unanimous shareholder agreement 
cannot eliminate the oppression remedy.  In Sumner QB 1, supra note 260, at par. 238, Manderscheid J. 
wrote, "I question whether a person can contract out of their right to seek an oppression remedy via the 
BCA.  This issue has been discussed but not determined by Canadian courts[....]"   Based upon the wording 
of the document, he found it unnecessary to settle the issue and the question was not dealt with in the 
successful appeal.  Further, it seems that while an agreement can move the oppression remedy from the 
jurisdiction of the courts to arbitration (e.g. Watter, supra note 1202), if the arbitration clause does not 
empower the arbitrator to settle oppression claims, the remedy endures and simply remains with the courts.  
(See Scozzafava v. Prosperi, 2003 ABQB 248, [2003] 6 W.W.R. 351, 2003 CarswellAlta 401, 32 B.L.R. 
(3d) 105, [2003] A.W.L.D. 192, [2003] A.J. No. 354, 13 Alta. L.R. (4th) 236 (Alta. Q.B. Mar 14, 2003), 
par. 68; Bouchan v. Slipacoff, 94 O.R. (3d) 741, 2009 CarswellOnt 155, 173 A.C.W.S. (3d) 988, 58 B.L.R. 
(4th) 96 (Ont. S.C.J. Jan 15, 2009), at pars. 21-29; Camirand c. Rossi, [2003] R.J.Q. 1081, 2003 
CarswellQue 555, J.E. 2003-828, REJB 2003-39879 (C.A. Que. Apr 07, 2003) generally; Tremblay c. Acier 
Leroux inc., 2003 CarswellQue 1876, J.E. 2003-1539, REJB 2003-45796 (C.S. Que. Jul 14, 2003), par. 23 
and Tremblay c. Acier Leroux inc., [2004] R.J.Q. 839, 2004 CarswellQue 449, J.E. 2004-669, REJB 2004-
55099 (C.A. Que. Mar 11, 2004), pars. 39-41 (only the former refers to the document as a unanimous 
shareholder agreement); Deluce, supra note 1202, pars. 71-72.) 
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6.(a) Eligible Parties to Enforce 
 
 The oppression remedy, like each of the other three approaches, has its own rules for when 
enforcement can occur.  In the corporate constitutional model, theoretically anyone could rely upon the 
terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement; only the parties to the agreement could use it as the basis of 
a contract claim; the directors' duties can only be enforced by the corporation itself or through a derivative 
action; and those eligible to take advantage of the oppression remedy as a means of protecting themselves 
and their interests are listed in the statute: "any security holder, creditor, director or officer".
1208
 
 The remainder of this section will focus upon investors as claimants under the oppression remedy, 
but it is also possible for creditors, directors, and officers to bring suits based upon the violation of 
unanimous shareholder agreements.
1209
  The most likely scenario is one where they were also parties to the 
document, but even if they were not, their reliance upon its terms may have constituted a reasonable 
expectation worthy of protection or otherwise given rise to oppression.  General references to 
"shareholders" as claimants under it should thus be read as potentially, if infrequently, applicable to these 
other groups as well. 
 While this might seem to offer the second-broadest list of potential claimants of any of the 
approaches, a threshold issue for enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements via the oppression remedy 
                                                          
1208
 C.B.C.A. s. 241(2).  Technically, it is open to a "complainant" to bring an application (C.B.C.A. s. 
241(1), A.B.C.A. s. 242(1), M.C.A. s. 234(1), N.L.C.A. s. 371(1),  N.B.B.C.A. s. 166(1), N.T.B.C.A. s. 
243(1), N.B.C.A. s. 243(1)), O.B.C.A. s. 248(1), Q.B.C.A. s. 450 (which uses the term "applicant"), S.B.C.A. 
s. 234(1), and Y.B.C.A. s. 243(1)).  "Complainant" is defined by C.B.C.A. s. 238 as  
 
(a) a registered holder or beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or beneficial 
owner, of a security of a corporation or any of its affiliates, (b) a director or an officer or 
a former director or officer of a corporation or any of its affiliates, (c) the Director, or (d) 
any other person who, in the discretion of a court, is a proper person to make an 
application under this Part. 
 
It is given roughly similar (but not necessarily identical) definitions by A.B.C.A. s. 239(b), M.C.A. s. 231, 
N.L.C.A. s. 368(b), N.B.B.C.A. s. 163, N.T.B.C.A. s. 240, N.B.C.A. s. 240, O.B.C.A. s. 245 and 248(1), 
Q.B.C.A. s. 439, S.B.C.A. s. 231(b), Y.B.C.A. s. 240. 
 
However, the oppression remedy specifically protects against conduct "that is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to or that unfairly disregards the interests of any security holder, creditor, director or officer" 
(C.B.C.A. s. 241(2); see also A.B.C.A. s. 242(2), M.C.A. s. 234(2), N.L.C.A. s. 371(2), N.B.B.C.A. s. 166(2), 
N.T.B.C.A. s. 243(2), N.B.C.A. s. 243(2) O.B.C.A. s. 248(2), Q.B.C.A. s. 450 (which omits creditors), 
S.B.C.A. s. 234(2), and Y.B.C.A. s. 243(2)). 
1209
 See Casurina Ltd. Partnership v. Rio Algom Ltd., 2002 CarswellOnt 2746, 28 B.L.R. (3d) 44, 
[2002] O.J. No. 3229 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Aug 22, 2002) (hereinafter "Casurina") in Chapter Five 
for a case where a creditor brought an oppression claim for the use, rather than the violation, of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement. 
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is raised in Khan v. Aquino.
1210
  The applicants were entitled under the terms of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement to have their shares repurchased by the corporation.
1211
  Other shareholders who were not 
applicants also had the same right.
1212
  The corporation did not have the funds to repurchase any of the 
shares.
1213
  The application for oppression was dismissed because: 
 
5 The onus is on the applicants under s. 234 to demonstrate that the actions of the 
corporation or its directors are or have been "oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to or that 
unfairly disregards the interests of..." themselves as security holders.  This, they have 
failed to do.  At the present time they are not being treated any differently than every 
other investor shareholder in the corporations who all have a right to have their shares 
repurchased under one clause or another in the unanimous shareholders agreement. 
 
 That oppression only occurs if shareholders are treated unequally was also considered in Lyall,
1214
 
although there it was found that the applicant had distinguished himself because, while all were treated 
equally financially, he alone had had his rights to participate in control of the corporation violated.   
 This threshold would not exist in either the corporate constitutional or contractual approaches, 
which allow every shareholder to enforce the agreement, regardless of whether that particular investor's 
personal interests were more significantly impinged than any other.  Given that unanimous shareholder 
agreements may restrict directors in ways that have nothing to do with differentiating between 
shareholders, this represents a crucial limitation on the use of the oppression remedy as an enforcement 
mechanism.  Hypothetically, were this to be the only approach available, that would severely limit what the 
tool could accomplish. 
 
6.(b) The Compatibility of the Oppression Remedy and Unanimous Shareholder Agreements 
 
 A central hurdle to the enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements via the oppression 
remedy is whether it is even appropriate to integrate these two areas of law.  The oppression remedy was 
meant to prevent directors and controlling shareholders from abusing their position within the corporation, 
but it is debatable whether it should create a parallel system for complaints that might otherwise be made, 
such as for the enforcement of legal rights granted by unanimous shareholder agreements.  In a subsequent 
part of this chapter, this issue will be revisited in the context of defining the parties' "reasonable 
                                                          
1210
 Khan v. Aquino, 143 Sask. R. 20, 1996 CarswellSask 225 (Sask. Q.B. Apr 11, 1996) (hereinafter 
"Khan"). 
1211
 Ibid, par. 2. 
1212
 Ibid, par. 3. 
1213
 Ibid, par. 3. 
1214
 Lyall v. 147250 Canada Ltd., 106 D.L.R. (4th) 304, 12 B.L.R. (2d) 161, 33 B.C.A.C. 64, 84 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 234, 1993 CarswellBC 281, 54 W.A.C. 64, [1993] B.C.W.L.D. 2202, [1993] B.C.J. No. 874 
(B.C. C.A. Aug 23, 1993) (hereinafter "Lyall"). 
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expectations", but before even that point is reached, there is the question of whether the oppression remedy 
is the right method at all for the enforcement of an agreement, or whether the parties must use one of the 
other three approaches instead.  As already mentioned, in Hurley it was determined that the oppression 
remedy was an inappropriate tool for enforcing a unanimous shareholder agreement; contractual principles 
should be used.  Other cases, however, have allowed for the integration of the two; this section is replete 
with examples.  But only a small handful of those judgments directly considered the question of whether 
oppression was the right tool for the task.  The passage from Hurley that rejected use of the remedy in the 
context of a unanimous shareholder agreement was discussed in the section of this chapter dealing with the 
contractual approach, and the first case in this subsection, Johnston v. Woodford, also suggested that where 
a unanimous shareholder agreement governs the relationship between the parties with respect to a given 
issue, the oppression remedy may not be appropriate.  The remainder of the judgments discussed, however, 
came to the opposite conclusion, for two different reasons.  First, a pair of cases explicitly found that the 
oppression remedy should be open to the complainants because it offered a wider range of considerations 
and remedies.  Second, a couple of judgments held that, despite the breach of an agreement, the substance 
of the case was the oppression one party had committed against the other.  These represent the two most 
obvious justifications for why the oppression remedy might be a suitable approach to enforcing unanimous 
shareholder agreements, as opposed to the corporate constitutional, the contractual, or the directors' duties 
models. 
 The rejection of the oppression claim in Johnston v. Woodford,
1215
 as in Hurley, was on the basis 
that the existence of a "contractual" arrangement between the parties should preclude the court from 
applying that particular remedy.  The plaintiff owned 75% and the defendant owned 25% of the shares of a 
corporation which was a franchisee.
1216
  They entered into a number of agreements, including a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.
1217
  The original agreement
1218
 of the parties was that the 25% shareholder would 
eventually own 100% of the shares.
1219
  The franchisor did not get along with the minority shareholder and 
threatened to terminate the franchise if he remained in charge.
1220
  A shareholders' meeting was held where 
he was removed from his position as director, contrary to the unanimous shareholder agreement.
1221
  The 
                                                          
1215
 Johnston v. Woodford, 2001 NBQB 50, 2001 CarswellNB 203, 17 B.L.R. (3d) 42 (N.B. Q.B. Jun 
06, 2001) (hereinafter "Johnston").  The case also involved interpretation issues with the shotgun clause in 
the unanimous shareholder agreement; see. Johnston v. Woodford, 2000 CarswellNB 394, [2000] N.B.J. 
No. 394, 100 A.C.W.S. (3d) 577, 230 N.B.R. (2d) 188, 593 A.P.R. 188 (N.B. Q.B. Oct 11, 2000) and 
Woodford v. Wilbur, 2006 NBQB 421, 2006 CarswellNB 695, 153 A.C.W.S. (3d) 990, 307 N.B.R. (2d) 
121, 795 A.P.R. 121 (N.B. Q.B. Dec 11, 2006). 
1216
 Johnston, supra note 1215, par. 5. 
1217
 Ibid, par. 5. 
1218
 It is unclear in which document, if any. 
1219
 Johnston, supra note 1215, par. 5. 
1220
 Ibid, par. 9. 
1221
 Ibid, par. 9. 
  
 
 
225 
 
minority shareholder was subsequently excluded from the business.
1222
  He alleged that the other had 
caused the corporation to be run in a manner that was oppressive,
1223
 and brought an application asking for 
an investigation and for his shares to be bought out.
1224
  The majority shareholder argued that to allow the 
defendant to continue to run the company would have been its ruin.
1225
 
 Rideout J. noted that a "third party" (namely the franchisor) was a possible cause for the problems 
between the parties
1226
 and continued: 
 
27 As a consequence, the Court is faced with a situation in which most, if not all of 
alleged "oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregarded" acts of the Respondents 
are either acts covered by contractual agreements or acts that could have been instigated 
by the Third Party.  In these circumstances, should the Court order the remedies 
requested? 
 
 Camroux v. Armstrong
1227
 was cited as authority for the proposition that the oppression remedy 
should not be applied where rights granted under a shareholder agreement were involved.
1228
  This is a 
misapplication of Camroux, where the acts that were alleged to be oppressive were performed in 
accordance with an employment agreement and a shareholder agreement.
1229
  The logic of Camroux would 
seem to have little application when the oppression alleged was a violation of the parties' agreements. 
 With regard to disclosure, Rideout J. said, "Clearly he has been provided with more than is 
normally available to a shareholder."
1230
  This ignored that the defendant, under the unanimous shareholder 
agreement, was entitled to be a director and therefore to greater disclosure, but the judge found that all 
requested information had either been provided or was in the process of being provided.
1231
  The judicial 
conclusion was that an investigation was not warranted, for a variety of reasons including the existence of 
contractual agreements that would need to be interpreted at trial, the (misapplied) precedent of Camroux, 
the shareholder's access to documentation under a previous court order, the involvement of a third party, 
                                                          
1222
 Ibid, par. 12 provides lengthy portions of the minority shareholder's affidavit summarizing the 
situation. 
1223
 Ibid, par. 24. 
1224
 Ibid, par. 1. 
1225
 Ibid, par. 24. 
1226
 Ibid, par. 26. 
1227
 Camroux v. Armstrong, 47 B.L.R. 302, 1990 CarswellBC 351, [1990] B.C.W.L.D. 1253, [1990] 
C.L.D. 627, [1990] B.C.J. No. 1027 (B.C. S.C. Apr 23, 1990) (hereinafter "Camroux"). 
1228
 Johnston, supra note 1215, par. 28. 
1229
 The agreement in Camroux, supra note 1227, although entered into by all the shareholders, was 
not a unanimous shareholder agreement.  That tool was not even available under the relevant legislation, 
the British Columbia Company Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 59.  The relevant term involved a mandatory sale of 
shares between the shareholders (par. 10). 
1230
 Johnston, supra note 1215, par. 29. 
1231
 Ibid, par. 29. 
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and the probability that the impugned acts had been necessary in the circumstances.
1232
 
 Because of the determination that, on the evidence presented, no oppression had occurred, the case 
is not necessarily a decisive rejection of the court's ability to find oppression in situations where unanimous 
shareholder agreements apply.  It does appear to represent authority for the position that, where a 
unanimous shareholder agreement exists, this may help to weigh against a finding of oppression, even 
when the agreement has been violated.  On the other hand, the conclusion that the acts taken were 
necessary to save the corporation may have had greater weight.  The rights of complainants under the 
oppression remedy might appear at first glance wider than those under the corporate constitutional or 
contractual approaches, but Johnston provides one example that such is not always the case; this will be 
returned to in following subsections. 
 While Johnston and Hurley largely rejected the oppression remedy approach, a number of other 
judgments have explicitly found that the existence of a unanimous shareholder agreement does not preclude 
this type of claim.  The first explanation for this, as put forth by the following two cases, is that the 
considerations and available remedies under the statutory oppression remedy are wider than might be 
available through the direct (contractual) enforcement of the agreement itself, and plaintiffs should not be 
denied access to those benefits. 
   The corporation in Curry v. CPI Plastics Group Ltd.
1233
 was the subject of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement that provided that the plaintiff would be the vice-president and that the corporation 
would enter into a specific distribution contract.
1234
  Subsequently, the company purported to fire the 
plaintiff.
1235
  It also cancelled the distribution contract and entered into a contract with the same company 
on different terms.
1236
  A lawsuit was commenced on a variety of grounds.
1237
  The personal defendants 
brought a motion to strike the statement of claim and dismiss the actions against them. 
 Regarding the oppression claim against all three personal defendants, Ground J. found: 
 
11 Where the oppressive acts complained of include an allegation of breach of 
contract, a finding of oppression allows the court to grant a wider range of remedies than 
would be granted in a simple action for breach of contract. (See Gottlieb v. Adam (1994), 
16 B.L.R. (2d) 271 (Ont. Gen. Div.)).  For an order to be made against directors and 
                                                          
1232
 Ibid, par. 34. 
1233
 Curry v. CPI Plastics Group Ltd., 2001 CarswellOnt 4344, [2001] O.J. No. 4870 (Ont. S.C.J. Dec 
06, 2001) (hereinafter "Curry"). 
1234
 Ibid, par. 4.  The unanimous shareholder agreement was signed by the plaintiff who owned 50% of 
the shares, one defendant who owned the other 50%, that defendant's father who had an option to purchase 
10% of the shares and who controlled the other company in the distribution agreement, and that other 
company, as well as the corporation itself (par. 4). 
1235
 Ibid, par. 6. 
1236
 Ibid, par. 5. 
1237
 Against the other shareholder, the other shareholder's father, the other corporation, and the 
Director/Chairman of the corporation (not a shareholder, but a shareholder of the other corporation (Curry, 
supra note 1233, par. 2)) who had purported to fire him. 
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officers personally, the court must be satisfied that there are acts pleaded as against 
specific directors or officers which, taken in the context of the entire pleadings, provide 
the basis for finding that the business of the corporation was conducted in an oppressive 
manner or that the powers of the directors of the corporation were exercised in an 
oppressive manner. [...] 
 
 The oppression claim was therefore allowed to proceed.
1238
  It is undeniable that this method has a 
wider range of possible remedies than contract law would typically allow, but this only serves to further 
emphasize the question of whether it is the appropriate vehicle for enforcing unanimous shareholder 
agreements. 
 I use the phrase "enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements" loosely throughout this chapter, to 
indicate a court granting a legal remedy when a unanimous shareholder agreement has been breached.
1239
  
                                                          
1238
 Another issues canvassed in the motion to dismiss (Curry, supra note 1233) was fiduciary duty, 
which was addressed as follows: 
 
13 The plaintiff is alleging a breach of fiduciary duty by the personal defendants, in 
their capacity as directors and officers of EOS, to the plaintiff as a shareholder of EOS.  It 
is trite law that directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation but not to 
individual shareholders of the corporation unless there are special circumstances 
establishing a fiduciary relationship between the director and the individual shareholder.  
The criteria to establish such a fiduciary relationship are that the fiduciary has scope for 
the exercise of some discretion or power, that the fiduciary can exercise this power or 
discretion so as to affect the interests of the beneficiary and that the beneficiary is 
peculiarly vulnerable to the fiduciary having such discretion.  No such allegations are 
pleaded in the statement of claim in this action.  Accordingly, in my view, it is plain, 
obvious and beyond doubt that the claim against the personal defendants based on 
fiduciary duty cannot succeed and should be struck. 
 
Breach of contract was also considered: 
 
14 The contract alleged to be breached is the USA relating to EOS.  The defendant 
Donaldson is not a party to the USA and, in my view, the claim for breach of contract 
cannot succeed as against Donaldson.  With respect to PFC and SJC, it appears to me that 
the statement of claim and in particular paragraphs 12, 13 and 19 thereof contain 
allegations which, if proven, establish actions taken by the defendants PFC and SJC 
constituting a breach of the USA to which they are parties and it is not plain, obvious and 
beyond doubt that such claim for breach of contract could not succeed as against PFC and 
SJC. 
 
Regarding the tort of inducing breach of contract, Gound J. found that because there were no allegations 
that any of the defendants were acting outside their roles as directors and officers to do anything 
independent of the breach itself, there were no grounds for that claim (par. 15). 
1239
  Similar issues can arise even when there is technically no breach alleged.  Grace c. Martineau, 
Provencher & Associates Ltd dealt with the question of whether the threat of violating a unanimous 
shareholder agreement in order to extract a waiver of other rights (not grounded in the agreement) was 
oppressive.  Since the tactic had been successful, the unanimous shareholder agreement itself had never 
been violated.  The ex-shareholder subsequently brought an oppression claim to invalidate the waiver.  The 
trial judge (Grace c. Martineau, Provencher & Associates Ltd., 1998 CarswellQue 345, J.E. 98-896, REJB 
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But there is a technical difference between enforcing the terms per se and allowing for a successful 
oppression action whose basis is those terms.  Herold J. called attention to that distinction in Reed v. Reed 
Monahan Nicholishen Investment Counsel Inc.,
1240
 with this comment early in the analysis: "In any event 
the law is clear that a S.247 application cannot be used to enforce the terms of a Shareholders' Agreement 
but the existence of the Agreement and the terms thereof are certainly relevant in putting the conduct of the 
parties into context."
1241
  No authority was cited for that proposition.  The degree to which the courts are 
willing to maintain a distinction between the terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement and the parties' 
reasonable expectations will be returned to, but Reed drew explicit attention to the idea that the oppression 
remedy is not intended to be a tool of contractual enforcement per se.  However, as explored in the 
following few subsections of this chapter on "Reasonable Expectations", the degree to which there is any 
real difference between enforcing the agreement itself and enforcing expectations based upon the 
agreement varies heavily, and at one extreme, it amounts to a "distinction without a difference". 
 As in Curry, Reed granted the complainant shareholder greater rights than the strict wording of the 
document would have allowed.  The applicant was a 20% shareholder
1242
 who left his employment with the 
company.
1243
  Under the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement, 90% of the retained earnings of the 
corporation were to be distributed as dividends each year.
1244
  Despite this, the company's practice for tax 
reasons was not to pay dividends but to instead pay management fees and bonuses to the four 
shareholders.
1245
  Herold J. found that these fees and bonuses were in fact distributions to the 
shareholders.
1246
  In the year that the applicant left the company, the other shareholders agreed that for one 
of the distributions, the applicant should receive only 7.5/12ths of 20%, representing the portion of the year 
he had worked.
1247
  Herold J. determined this to be oppressive, because the distributions were truly for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1998-06491 (C.S. Que. Mar 09, 1998)) found the company's acts oppressive and nullified the waiver (pars. 
34, 85).  On appeal (Grace c. Martineau, Provencher & Associates Ltd., [2001] R.J.Q. 2414, 29 C.C.P.B. 
214, 2001 CarswellQue 2413, J.E. 2001-1787, [2001] J.Q. No. 4272, REJB 2001-26513 (C.A. Que. Sep 24, 
2001)), the majority agreed that there had been oppression but upheld the waiver (pars. 15, 96, 143-159), 
with a dissent that the waiver was oppressive and that, given that it had been provided under protest, his 
rights were preserved (pars. 254, 255, 259).  The latter opinion in particular was explicitly based upon the 
reasonable expectation of shareholders that directors would abide by a unanimous shareholder agreement, 
although with some apparent confusion between the rights under that agreement (which had not been 
breached) and the shareholder's rights under another contract (which were the subject of the waiver) (par. 
255). 
1240
 Reed v. Reed Monahan Nicholishen Investment Counsel Inc., 1990 CarswellOnt 3456, [1990] 
C.L.D. 1153 (Ont. Gen. Div. Oct 05, 1990) (hereinafter "Reed"). 
1241
 Ibid, par. 4. 
1242
 Ibid, par. 2. 
1243
 Ibid, par. 3. 
1244
 Ibid, par. 13. 
1245
 Ibid, par. 13. 
1246
 Ibid, par. 13. 
1247
 Ibid, par. 14. 
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shareholding and not for work done.
1248
  Therefore, the judge "[found] this conduct on the part of the 
respondent corporation to be conduct which unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant".
1249
  The 
former employee had asked for an order that the corporation purchase his shares, but Herold J. found this 
too extreme, and instead ordered that he be paid the rest of the 20% of the distribution.
1250
 
 This was not enforcement of the unanimous shareholder agreement in a contractual sense, since 
the decision went outside its terms.  But it was also not a case where a larger pattern of oppression 
incidentally included a violation of a unanimous shareholder agreement as one component.  It appears the 
judge granted a broad interpretation to the agreement, one broader than strict contract law might allow, but 
in a way that was nonetheless meant to enforce the spirit of its terms.  This type of oppression approach 
will be considered at greater length in a subsequent subsection dealing with reasonable expectations. 
 The preceding two cases allowed the oppression remedy for what might be termed utilitarian 
reasons; it encompassed considerations and remedies that the judges perceived as otherwise unavailable, in 
large part because they were contrasting it with a contract claim.  That can be taken as a broad endorsement 
of the merits of the oppression approach to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements, presumably 
applicable in all or nearly all situations.  This justification is distinct from a determination that the 
oppression remedy is appropriate in the specific circumstances, as in the following two examples. 
 In the Ontario Superior Court of Justice's decision in 2082825 Ontario Inc. v. Platinum Wood 
Finishing Inc.,
1251
 discussed in more detail below, Wilson J. examined whether it was appropriate to deal 
with a wrongful dismissal as part of an oppression claim.  The judge determined that it was in this case.
1252
  
The applicant's decision to purchase a minority position in the corporation was inseparable from the terms 
of the unanimous shareholder agreement and the employment it guaranteed.
1253
  The benefits of the 
positions he was guaranteed balanced out his minority status.
1254
  Therefore, the two claims were linked. 
 The relationship between oppression and other methods of enforcing unanimous shareholder 
agreements was similarly examined in Alofs v. Temple Insurance Co.
1255
  The defendant in Fiorillo
1256
 (a 
case discussed in a later subsection), a former director, brought an application to have his insurance 
                                                          
1248
 Ibid, par. 14. 
1249
 Ibid, par. 14. 
1250
 Ibid, par. 15. 
1251
 2082825 Div Ct, supra note 792. 
1252
 Ibid, pars. 40-41. 
1253
 Ibid, par. 43. 
1254
 Ibid, par. 48. 
1255
 Alofs v. Temple Insurance Co., 2005 CarswellOnt 4983, 32 C.C.L.I. (4th) 40 (Ont. S.C.J. Oct 12, 
2005) (hereinafter "Alofs").  The document in question was referred to as a "shareholders agreement" 
except in an extract from the pleadings in Fiorillo v. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc., 98 O.R. (3d) 103, 2009 
CarswellOnt 3344, 178 A.C.W.S. (3d) 491, [2009] O.J. No. 2430, 60 B.L.R. (4th) 113 (Ont. S.C.J. 
[Commercial] Jun 09, 2009) (hereinafter "Fiorillo"), reproduced at par. 3.  In Fiorillo, the document was 
regularly called a "unanimous shareholder agreement". 
1256
 Fiorillo, supra note 1255. 
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company pay for his defence in that action under a Management Liability Insurance Policy.
1257
  Only acts 
of the defendant as a director
1258
 were subject to this insurance.
1259
  At issue was whether all the claims 
made were so covered or only some.
1260
  Siegel J. found that the essence of the entire lawsuit was 
oppression, and that specifically "the breach of contract claims based on breach of the shareholders 
agreement are 'derivative' claims in that they are subsidiary to the oppression claims".
1261
  However, Siegel 
J. also found (for the purpose of this suit) that the claims for misrepresentation and deceit did not represent 
separate causes of action but were also part of the oppression, which was not how those were ultimately 
dealt with in the resolution of the actual case.
1262
 
 It is easier for the oppression remedy to co-exist with the other three approaches than for any of 
them to co-exist with each other.  Allowing the use of the oppression remedy does not depend upon a 
particular conception of what the agreements are, but only how they affect the parties.  But as these cases 
demonstrate, there is still a determination to be made as to whether it is appropriate for the oppression 
remedy to be used in enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements.  An argument can be made that, where 
the parties have determined their rights by agreement, the oppression remedy is no longer the correct tool to 
govern the situation, and should neither enforce the document nor any parallel rights (which the agreement 
would implicitly preclude).  On the other hand, the temptation to allow the oppression remedy may be 
strong, due to its flexibility and its emphasis on the particular expectations of the parties rather than abstract 
doctrines, as well as its range of remedies.
1263
  Nonetheless, if the issue could be determined on the basis of 
clear legal principles, either corporate constitutional or contractual or even directors' duties, it is unclear 
why it is particularly appropriate here to replace those with a flexible, "equitable"
1264
 approach.  The 
alternative would be to limit the parties to one of the other three methods.  The relative merits of the four 
models will be returned to in the concluding portions of this chapter, but for now, it suffices to say that the 
oppression remedy is in fact frequently used to handle violations of unanimous shareholder agreements, as 
the rest of this section demonstrates, and careful consideration of those cases may help us to understand 
whether it really does offer a superior means of enforcement. 
                                                          
1257
 Alofs, supra note 1255, par. 1. 
1258
 Or otherwise specifically covered. 
1259
 Alofs, supra note 1255, par. 20. 
1260
 Ibid, par. 21. 
1261
 Ibid, par. 29. 
1262
 Ibid, pars. 32-34.  See discussion of Fiorillo in the next subsection. 
1263
 The list of available remedies for oppression can be found at C.B.C.A. s. 241(3) and includes s. 
241(3)(c): "an order to regulate a corporation's affairs by amending the articles or by-laws or creating or 
amending a unanimous shareholder agreement".  How judges interpret their broad discretion in crafting a 
remedy may also be influenced by which theory of enforcement they subscribe to.  Even in this context, 
logic influenced by corporate constitutional or contractual principles may encourage judges to grant 
remedies typical of those models, while a truly unique oppression response might incorporate more 
flexible, even unpredictable solutions. 
1264
 "Equitable" refers here to equitable principles, not equity investment.  See note 48. 
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6.(c) Reasonable Expectations 
 
 The statutory definition of the oppression remedy is vague.  As a result, the courts have had to 
develop methods of determining when conduct qualifies as oppression.  One way of doing so, which has 
been endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada
1265
 is to look to the shareholders' "reasonable expectations" 
as distinct from their legal rights, and then determine whether those have been oppressed or disregarded.  
The Supreme Court has actually specified that "[s]hareholder agreements may be viewed as reflecting the 
reasonable expectations of the parties".
1266
  Many of the cases dealing with unanimous shareholder 
agreements and the oppression remedy have adopted this approach, and used the agreements to inform an 
understanding of what the parties' reasonable expectations might be. 
 The specific relationship between the unanimous shareholder agreement and the shareholders' 
"reasonable expectations" therefore bears careful attention.  If the terms of the agreement automatically 
double as the shareholders' "reasonable expectations", then the first stage of the oppression analysis 
becomes subsumed.  Only at the second stage, determination as to whether the violation of a reasonable 
expectation amounted to conduct that oppressed, unfairly disregarded, or unfairly prejudiced the interests of 
the shareholder, does there remain a possibility that the oppression remedy would not collapse into direct 
enforcement of the document, but the case law indicates that when the agreements' terms are held to be 
"reasonable expectations", a finding of oppression, unfair disregard, or unfair prejudice almost always 
follows their breach.  Conversely, if the "reasonable expectations" of the parties are subject to further 
scrutiny, including consideration of other factors beyond the document, then the oppression remedy gives 
rise to a unique system of analysis at both the first stage, where the "reasonable expectations" might differ 
from the terms of the agreement, and the second stage, where oppression, unfair disregard, or unfair 
prejudice may require more than a breach of those terms.  Depending upon the facts, this can result in either 
a broader or narrower application of the rights and obligations specified in the agreement than standard 
rules of interpretation would allow.  Unfortunately, the case law does not always make this distinction 
clear; it is possible that decisions which appear to limit reasonable expectations to the terms themselves 
merely reflect a factual determination that, on the evidence, there were no other significant factors 
influencing those expectations. 
                                                          
1265
 BCE, supra note 1143. 
1266
 Ibid, at par. 79.  Notably, the reference was to shareholder agreements generally, not unanimous 
shareholder agreements specifically, and other documents that might influence such expectations were also 
listed; there was, in other words, no indication that the specific statutory ability of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement to alter the corporation was being referenced or that the oppression remedy was 
being put forth as the best method for enforcing it.  Two precedents were cited for the proposition that a 
shareholder agreement could affect reasonable expectations, without specific comment upon either case: 
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 The next subsection examines cases where the terms of the agreement were treated as equivalent 
to the parties' "reasonable expectations" and where their violation was more-or-less automatically sufficient 
to pass the second stage of the test.  The two following subsections deal with examples where the 
unanimous shareholder agreement was a factor in creating the parties' reasonable expectations, but not 
synonymous with them: first where the terms were considered in light of the full factual context that 
formed the parties' reasonable expectations, and then where the terms formed the basis of reasonable 
expectations that went beyond their contractual meaning.   
 
6.(c)(i) The Terms As Reasonable Expectations 
 
 The simplest way of using the oppression remedy to handle the violation of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement is to treat the terms of that document as identical to the shareholders' reasonable 
expectations and the breach as equivalent to oppressing, disregarding, or prejudicing those expectations. 
 Is there then any difference between what the oppression remedy is accomplishing and 
enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements?  There might be, as discussed, some question about the 
appropriateness of using the remedy to give effect to an agreement per se.  One possible answer is 
maintaining a distinction between actually enforcing the document itself and enforcing the expectations of 
the parties which, naturally, would be reflected by its terms.  The cases in this section demonstrate the 
artificiality and practical unworkability of maintaining such a distinction in that context.  If the contents of 
the agreement are all that is used to determine "reasonable expectations", then the former are not just 
evidence of the latter, they are the latter.  The only significant qualifier that remains is the degree to which 
judges stress the individual terms as reasonable expectations, rather than compliance with the document as 
a whole; this may constitute the first theoretical step toward a more context-dependant application of the 
oppression remedy, as discussed in the subsection following this one.  Regardless, many cases openly refer 
to compliance with a unanimous shareholder agreement as a reasonable expectation.   Others, as will be 
explored, come to the same conclusion implicitly.  In short, the oppression remedy is a fourth approach to 
enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements; it does not merely exist in parallel to them. 
 These factors are illustrated in Fiorillo v. Krispy Kreme Doughnuts Inc.
1267
  A director of the 
corporation secretly sold all his shares and resigned,
1268
 providing a false reason for doing so to another 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Lyall, supra note 1214, and Main, supra note 1196, both discussed in this chapter. 
1267
 Fiorillo, supra note 1255.  Newbould J. also held that the individual director was liable for 
fraudulent misrepresentation to the one investor to whom he had directly lied (par. 83), but not to the other 
two to whom he had not lied directly (par. 90).  For the same reason, Newbould J. found no negligent 
misrepresentation with regard to the other two shareholders (par. 113). 
1268
 Ibid, par. 34. 
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investor
1269
 and falsely suggesting he still owned shares to that same investor.
1270
 The other shareholder and 
two further individuals in the same informal group subsequently invested additional funds.
1271
  When the 
corporation eventually became insolvent, they sued, claiming that they would not have invested had they 
known the former director had withdrawn his own funding.
1272
 
 Under the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement, any transfer of shareholdings needed to 
be approved by a "special shareholders resolution"
1273
 which meant a resolution that had passed and was 
approved by all of the founding shareholders, who the plaintiffs were not among.
1274
  Newbould J. found 
that, based upon the wording of the agreement, a "special shareholders resolution" still had to be passed by 
all shareholders (not just the founding ones).
1275
  Instead, the share transfer had been approved at a 
directors' meeting, where the founding shareholders had been present and had all approved it.
1276
  
Newbould J. held that a fundamental right of shareholders was to vote, regardless of whether their votes 
would have changed the outcome.
1277
  That had been denied the plaintiffs.  Therefore: 
 
158 In this case, the plaintiffs had, on a proper reading of the USA, a reasonable 
expectation that they would be entitled to notice of the transfer of Mr. Alofs' shares and a 
right to consider whether to consent in writing to the transfer. 
 
 The reasonable expectations of the shareholders were directly derived from the terms of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement.  The second stage of the oppression analysis continued this trend, and 
here the impugned conduct was specifically identified as problematic because it was "a breach of the 
USA": 
 
161 While the conduct of the directors may not have been sufficiently harsh to 
constitute oppression, it was in my view conduct that unfairly prejudiced the plaintiffs 
and unfairly disregarded their interests.  It was a breach of the USA, a document 
fundamental to the rights of the plaintiffs, and a breach of the basic right of a shareholder 
to vote on shareholder matters.  The directors were required by s. 134(2) of the OBCA to 
comply with the USA. 
 
 At both stages of the analysis, the unanimous shareholder agreement was directly used as the 
standard for determining whether oppression (or rather, "unfair disregard" and "unfair prejudice") had 
                                                          
1269
 Ibid, par. 41. 
1270
 Ibid, par. 47. 
1271
 Ibid, par. 60. 
1272
 Ibid, par. 3. 
1273
 Ibid, par. 138. 
1274
 Ibid, par. 142. 
1275
 Ibid, par. 146. 
1276
 Ibid, par. 150.  Further, since it was not a written resolution, it was found to be only 
"questionable" whether it satisfied the requirements of the unanimous shareholder agreement even if the 
other investors did not need to be allowed to vote (par. 152). 
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occurred.  While the earlier passage could be interpreted to signify only that the agreement was evidence of 
the parties' expectations, in the latter one, breach of the agreement was found to be unfairly prejudicial and 
unfairly disregarded the plaintiffs' interests.  The oppression remedy served as an enforcement tool for the 
terms of the agreement.
1278
 
 A similar situation arose in McAteer v. Devoncroft Developments Ltd.
1279
  There, the terms of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement required that a director's financial interest in loans the corporation was 
obtaining be disclosed to the shareholder and her consent obtained, which did not occur.
1280
  Despite the 
finding that the terms of these loans were fair and enforceable
1281
 and that the company itself would have 
no claim for oppression,
1282
 the plaintiff's reasonable expectations were found to have been violated
1283
 
because "[t]he 'wrong to be remedied' was depriving [the plaintiff] of the choice, as a shareholder, to 
participate or not participate in the Loans which, while creating an opportunity for [the company], also 
created a risk for her as a trustee shareholder".
1284
  She was denied not just the information, but the ability 
to make choices based upon it, including the choice of exiting the company.
1285
  Although various other 
elements were collectively indicative of oppression,
1286
 the judge stated that "the primary infringing act was 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1277
 Ibid, par. 148. 
1278
 The former director in Fiorillo who had sold his shares was also found to be liable for oppression, 
on the grounds that he had been a director at the time and, it was specifically noted, was thus bound by the 
unanimous shareholder agreement (Fiorillo, supra note 1255, par. 162).  Newbould J. found it appropriate 
to hold all of the directors personally liable because they had benefited personally by buying the departing 
director's shares (par. 165).  They had also benefited by keeping the departure a secret and thus encouraging 
more investment, which they wanted (par. 167).  One director who had not been at the meeting in question 
was found by Newbould J. to have consented by virtue of the Act, since he did not dissent afterwards (par. 
165).  Another had resigned before this had happened and was therefore not liable (par. 169).  Newbould J. 
concluded with regard to their personal liability: 
 
168 The effort of the board of Kremeko to keep the sale by Mr. Alofs secret and not 
give notice to the shareholders was successful.  The plaintiffs invested in the third 
tranche, which they would not have done had they been given notice of the sale to which 
they were entitled.  Such notice and the right to consent or not was a reasonable 
expectation they had under the USA.  See BCE, supra.  Whether Kremeko would have 
been able to raise the needed funds from other investors is not the point.  The rights of the 
plaintiffs were disregarded and they have suffered by making their investment without 
knowledge of the sale by Mr. Alofs.  In these circumstances it is appropriate that the 
plaintiffs be compensated by the board members in the amount of their lost investment in 
the third tranche. 
1279
 McAteer, supra note 1146. 
1280
 Ibid, par. 441. 
1281
 Ibid, pars. 357-375. 
1282
 Ibid, pars. 449-450. 
1283
 Ibid, par. 439. 
1284
 Ibid, par. 450. 
1285
 Ibid, par. 455. 
1286
 Ibid, par. 448. 
  
 
 
235 
 
the lack of disclosure and consent contrary to the USA and ABCA".
1287
  The agreement itself was therefore 
key to the oppression.
1288
 
 The concept of compliance was further emphasized as the basis for the reasonable expectations of 
the shareholders in Lyall v. 147250 Canada Ltd.
1289
  Two of the three directors caused a corporation to take 
unsuccessful legal steps, via a defence and counter-claim, to avoid fulfilling contractual obligations to sell 
its shares in a subsidiary to another company.
1290
  The third director objected to this, and he went so far as 
to obtain separate counsel to support the opposing party's demand for specific performance.
1291
  
Subsequently, the directors sued each other for their respective legal expenses in those proceedings.
1292
  
The lone director took the position that the other two had behaved oppressively; the chambers judge found 
that they had not, since they had exercised their majority power in a good faith belief that they were acting 
in the interests of the corporation
1293
 and because all shareholders had been treated the same.
1294
  The 
chambers judge did not consider the implications of a unanimous shareholder agreement,
1295
 so that 
decision was not an example of the directors' duties approach to this topic. 
 The judgment of the Court of Appeal as delivered by Legg J.A., on the other hand, was entirely 
centred around that agreement.  Since the Court of Appeal did not explicitly reject the chambers judge's 
reasoning on its own terms- that absent a unanimous shareholder agreement there would have been no 
oppression- this decision provides an unusually clear demonstration that violating a unanimous shareholder 
agreement may be oppressive (or "unfairly prejudicial"
1296
) even if the actions themselves are not.  The 
centrality of the unanimous shareholder agreement to the successful appeal was emphasized by Legg J.A.: 
 
52 The learned chambers judge did not refer in his reasons to the Unanimous 
Shareholders Agreement or to Lyall's rights under it.  His reasoning proceeded on the 
basis that Lyall was bound by decisions of the majority of the shareholders.  In my 
respectful opinion, he overlooked the provisions of the Unanimous Shareholders 
Agreement and the restrictions imposed upon the majority of the shareholders by that 
                                                          
1287
 Ibid, par. 448. 
1288
 Oppression was found with regard to both directors for their failure to live up to the terms of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, despite one of them relying upon representations from the other that he 
had told the shareholder about the situation.  While the director who relied upon that representation was 
found liable for oppression, she was also entitled to an indemnity from the director who had made it  
(McAteer, supra note 1146, pars. 653-673). 
1289
 Lyall, supra note 1214. 
1290
 Ibid, pars. 8-23. 
1291
 Ibid, par. 25. 
1292
 Ibid, pars. 26-27.  The two directors sued the third for his pro rata share of the corporate legal 
expenses. 
1293
 Cited ibid, par. 28. 
1294
 Cited ibid, par. 29. 
1295
 Ibid, par. 52. 
1296
 The third director conceded that the actions were not "oppressive" in the sense of the first part of 
the three facets of the oppression remedy, and based the claim on the other two (Lyall, supra note 1214, 
par. 53). 
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Agreement. 
  
 The agreement required unanimous approval of the directors for actions outside the ordinary 
course of business.
1297
  Legg J.A. held that both refusing to perform the sale which the company had been 
formed to complete
1298
 and entering into legal battles over it were outside the ordinary course.
1299
  
Therefore, those actions required unanimous approval.
1300
 
 While Legg J.A. did not use the term "reasonable expectations", the analysis began with the 
statement that the third director "was entitled to expect from the other shareholders and directors that in 
making corporate decisions, they would respect and adhere to the provisions of the Unanimous 
Shareholders Agreement and would refrain from making corporate decisions contrary to the fundamental 
business purpose of the Company in the absence of [his] consent"
1301
 and that "acts of [the other directors] 
in repudiating the Share Purchase Agreement and then endeavouring to sustain their wrongful position in 
protracted litigation constituted a wrong to [him] in that they breached the Unanimous Shareholders 
Agreement entered into with him and abrogated his legitimate interests and expectations as a shareholder of 
the Company".
1302
  In other words, shareholders have a (reasonable) expectation that unanimous 
shareholder agreements will be complied with and their rights thereunder respected. 
 Legg J.A. also found that "[u]nder the Unanimous Shareholders Agreement, Duke and Klenman 
had no authority by themselves to effect such a fundamental change in the business of the Company"
1303
 as 
repudiating the contract which was its central purpose.  This is the logic of the corporate constitutional 
approach; one cannot validly do what one has no authority to do.  However, rather than proceeding down 
that analytic path, these actions were found to have been unfairly prejudicial to the third director.
1304
  
Similarly, the litigation "was unfairly prejudicial to Lyall's interests and contrary to the Unanimous 
Shareholders Agreement".
1305
 
 Legg J.A. noted that it was the agreement itself that formed the basis of a distinction between the 
shareholders; only one had had his rights under it denied.
1306
  It was therefore irrelevant that they had all 
received the same financial compensation.
1307
  Lyall provides an excellent demonstration of how the 
                                                          
1297
 Lyall, supra note 1214, par. 46. 
1298
 The purpose of the company, according to the unanimous shareholder agreement, was to complete 
the sale (Lyall, supra note 1214, par. 42). 
1299
 Lyall, supra note 1214, par. 46. 
1300
 Ibid, par. 46. 
1301
 Ibid, par. 48. 
1302
 Ibid, par. 49. 
1303
 Ibid, par. 50. 
1304
 Ibid, par. 50. 
1305
 Ibid, par. 51. 
1306
 Ibid, par. 53. 
1307
 Ibid, pars. 54-55.  There was also a dispute as to whether the shareholders had actually received a 
higher price because of the litigation and the implications for the oppression claim if that were true, but the 
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existence of a unanimous shareholder agreement can be crucial to determining the parties' reasonable 
expectations, rendering oppressive acts that otherwise would have been legitimate. 
 Similarly, in Agrium Inc. v. Hamilton,
1308
 it was found that compliance with the agreement was 
itself a reasonable expectation.  The majority shareholder of the corporation was negotiating to buy the rest 
of a company's shares.
1309
  At the same time, he entered into negotiations to sell the company to a third 
party,
1310
 without informing the minority shareholder.
1311
  As part of the external negotiations, the majority 
shareholder provided confidential information to the potential purchaser,
1312
 despite a unanimous 
shareholder agreement that forbade disclosing confidential information.
1313
  Hawco J. held that it was "not 
unrealistic or unreasonable for [the minority shareholder] to have expected that if [the majority 
shareholder] was giving any serious consideration to selling Flagstaff, he may well let [the minority 
shareholder] know"
1314
 (something not required by the unanimous shareholder agreement), but more 
importantly that, "[c]ertainly, he had a legitimate expectation that [...] Mr. Hamilton would abide by the 
terms of his shareholders' agreement and have the Board of Director's approve of such actions, as they were 
required to do under that agreement".
1315
  Later, the judge noted, "They had a unanimous shareholders' 
agreement.  Shareholders should be entitled to assume their agreements will be honoured."
1316
  Yet again, 
reasonable expectations
1317
 included compliance with the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement.  
Although other factors were also listed, such as the need for shareholders to be treated equally and the 
majority investor being aware that the other one had a concern that the shares would be "flipped",
1318
  the 
treatment of the unanimous shareholder agreement makes it seem probable that its violation alone would 
have been sufficient. 
 Champion Hiltz Venture Capital Ltd. v. Seely's Motel Ltd.
1319
 was slightly more ambiguous about 
whether compliance per se was an expectation or whether the agreement merely evidenced the parties' 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Court of Appeal declined to make a finding on this point because of the evidence available and the parties' 
agreement to the form of the trial (par. 61). 
1308
 Agrium Inc. v. Hamilton, 2005 ABQB 54, 2005 CarswellAlta 121, [2005] A.W.L.D. 1275, [2005] 
A.W.L.D. 1276, [2005] A.W.L.D. 1277, [2005] A.J. No. 83, 44 Alta. L.R. (4th) 177, 2 B.L.R. (4th) 3 (Alta. 
Q.B. Jan 19, 2005) (hereinafter "Agrium"). 
1309
 Ibid, par. 7. 
1310
 Ibid, par. 12. 
1311
 Ibid, par. 15. 
1312
 Ibid, par. 13. 
1313
 Ibid, par. 2. 
1314
 Ibid, par. 34. 
1315
 Ibid, par. 34. 
1316
 Ibid, par. 37. 
1317
 Assuming that the term "legitimate expectation" is not in any way different from "reasonable 
expectation". 
1318
 Agrium, supra note 1308, par. 37. 
1319
 Champion Hiltz Venture Capital Ltd. v. Seely's Motel Ltd., 2004 NBQB 123, 273 N.B.R. (2d) 322, 
2004 CarswellNB 134, 717 A.P.R. 322 (N.B. Q.B. Mar 26, 2004) (hereinafter "Champion Hiltz"). 
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expectations.  The plaintiff had invested in two related corporations, buying common shares of both and 
preferred shares of one, and entered into a pair of unanimous shareholder agreements (one for each 
company) with the two individuals who were the other shareholders of both.
1320
  One of the agreements 
included: that the company would set aside a certain amount of money each month as a reserve to pay the 
Preferred Share dividends, that a shareholder's loan to one of the existing investors was reduced and 
payment was to be postponed (without interest) until all realty mortgages were paid in full, that dividends 
on the Preferred Shares were to be declared and paid annually, and that, after a certain date, the holder of 
the Preferred Shares could tell the company to retract them.
1321
  Despite this, dividends were only paid on 
the preferred shares in one year,
1322
 payments were made on the shareholder's loan,
1323
 and the company did 
not retract the shares when asked to do so.
1324
 
 In analyzing the claim for oppression, Savoie J. found that "pursuant to those [unanimous 
shareholder] agreements"
1325
 the plaintiffs' reasonable expectations were that the shareholder loan would 
not be repaid, the reserve fund would be established, and the preferred shares would be retractable.
1326
  In 
other words, on the basis of the agreement, there were reasonable expectations reflecting each of its 
terms.
1327
  The wording implied that the reasonable expectations were directly derived from- rather than 
merely evidenced by- the document, but the division of the reasonable expectations into separate items 
rather than one unified expectation that the agreement would be followed may reflect an attempt to 
maintain at least a technical separation between the oppression remedy and contractual enforcement. 
 Le Maitre Ltd. v. Segeren
1328
 appeared at first to do the same, with reasonable expectations defined 
via a list of the terms of the agreement (and therefore possibly in parallel to the document itself), rather 
than compliance per se as a reasonable expectation, but then it turned to the latter approach.  Four investors 
together owned all the shares of a pyrotechnics manufacturing company in the United Kingdom.
1329
  The 
same investors collectively owned 50% of the shares of a Canadian company formed to help distribute their 
product in North America; the individual respondent owned the other 50%.
1330
   A variety of agreements 
were entered into, including a unanimous shareholder agreement (for the North American company both 
                                                          
1320
 Ibid, par. 7. 
1321
 Ibid, par. 10. 
1322
 Ibid, par. 12. 
1323
 Ibid, par. 16. 
1324
 Ibid, par. 21. 
1325
 Ibid, par. 23. 
1326
 Ibid, par. 23. 
1327
 The personal defendant who had received the shareholders' loan payment was ordered to repay 
that money to the corporation and the corporation was ordered to redeem the shares (Champion Hiltz, supra 
note 1319, par. 29). 
1328
 Le Maitre, supra note 1193. 
1329
 Ibid, par. 3. 
1330
 Ibid, par. 6.  A variety of subsidiaries of this company (also respondents) were to do the actual 
distribution. 
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sides owned half the shares of) that provided that the individual respondent would be the company's sole 
director and that 75% of the shareholders needed to approve any material change in the nature of its 
business.
1331
  The company in the United Kingdom, the jointly owned company, and its subsidiaries also 
entered into a distribution agreement, which subject to a few limited exceptions required the North 
American companies to only sell products manufactured by the one in the United Kingdom and not to 
manufacture their own.
1332
  Contrary to these agreements, the director eventually entered into arrangements 
with a different North American manufacturer, attempting to have the company buy it and, despite the 
actual purchase falling through, taking over the operations of the other manufacturer and operating it as if it 
were a subsidiary.
1333
  The other shareholders were not initially informed of this, and when they learned of 
it, first attempted to block it
1334
 and then eventually decided that their best option was to allow the purchase 
of the other company's assets in order to convert it to exclusively manufacturing their products.
1335
  As a 
result of this acquisition of manufacturing facilities, the North American companies' purchase of the United 
Kingdom-based manufacturer's products decreased even while the total North American sales increased.
1336
  
The director had also had the North American companies violate the exclusive distribution arrangement by 
selling products of yet a third manufacturer.
1337
 
 The United Kingdom shareholders brought an action for oppression.  Pepall J. first considered 
what their expectations were, and provided a list that ran parallel to the terms of the agreements without 
referring to it directly.
1338
  Next came consideration of whether these were reasonable and a finding that 
                                                          
1331
 Ibid, par. 10. 
1332
 Ibid, par. 13. 
1333
 Ibid, pars. 20-23. 
1334
 The subject of another judgment, Le Maitre Ltd. v. Segeren, 2007 CarswellOnt 3226, [2007] O.J. 
No. 2047, 33 B.L.R. (4th) 224 (Ont. S.C.J. May 24, 2007), regarding the applicants' earlier attempts to 
enjoin the purchase of the assets of the North American manufacturer.  On roughly the same logic, though 
with less detail, Pepall J. held at par. 31 that there was a prima facie case of oppression: 
 
In this case, the applicants meet the test regardless of the articulation of its application.  
Applying the test advocated by the respondents, the applicants have established a strong 
prima facie case of oppression.  They are 50% shareholders who had entered a 
unanimous shareholders' agreement, a distribution agreement, a service agreement and a 
management agreement.  In examining the interests of the shareholders as opposed to 
their strict legal rights, these agreements serve to inform the reasonable expectations of 
the shareholders. 
1335
 Le Maitre, supra note 1193, par. 21. 
1336
 Ibid, par. 27. 
1337
 Ibid, pars. 17-18. 
1338
 Ibid, par. 42.  The list provided in the reasons for judgment read: 
 
The UK Shareholders state that their expectations were that: i. Mr. Segeren would 
operate LMSE in a way that was mutually beneficial to LMSE's business as a distributor 
of LML's products and LML's business as a manufacturer of pyrotechnic products and 
FX machines; ii. the business of LMSE and its affiliates would be the sale of pyrotechnic 
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"[t]he agreements that governed the parties may be seen as a reflection of their reasonable expectations",
1339
 
and later similar language was used more specifically: "[The respondent] did not seek 75% shareholder 
approval as required by the USA which in turn reflected the parties' reasonable expectations."
1340
  These 
passages suggested that reasonable expectations flow in parallel to the agreement but may find reflection 
therein, rather than consisting of compliance with the document itself.  However, Pepall J. continued that: 
 
the evidence, objectively viewed, supports a reasonable expectation that Mr. Segeren and 
the corporate respondents would comply with the agreements, would not manufacture 
pyrotechnic products, would not purchase and sell third party pyrotechnic products absent 
compliance with the terms of the agreements, and would inform and seek the UK 
Shareholders' approval (up to the 75% threshold) to the entering into of a letter of intent 
with Luna Tech and that absent same, they would not transition LMSE and the other 
respondents into companies manufacturing product that competed with that of LML.
1341
 
(emphasis mine) 
 
 Adherence to the agreement per se was thus included as one of the reasonable expectations.
1342
 
 The next issue was fashioning a remedy, which was again guided in part by the parties' reasonable 
expectations as embodied in the unanimous shareholder agreement.  The applicants had asked for the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
products manufactured by LML, and the manufacture and sale of FX machines, including 
those manufactured by LML; iii. the business of LMSE and its affiliates would not 
change without the consent of the UK Shareholders; iv. LMSE and its affiliates would 
only purchase and sell LML pyrotechnic products unless there was a demonstrated 
customer need for products which LML did not manufacture and LML accepted that it 
could not fulfill that need; v. LMSE and its affiliates would not, under any circumstances 
manufacture pyrotechnic products; vi. the respondents would honour all contractual and 
other obligations to LML and the UK Shareholders; vii. the respondents would not 
directly or indirectly manufacture or sell competing products sold by LML; viii. the 
respondents would not undertake actions to dilute or jeopardize the 'Le Maitre' trademark 
by selling competing products; and ix. the respondents would obtain the approval of the 
shareholders for their activities.  They say that it was never expected that Mr. Segeren 
would operate LMSE and its affiliates in a manner that would undermine the North 
American sales of LML products or would compete with LML in North America and 
elsewhere in the world. In my view, the evidence does support the expectations asserted 
by the applicants. 
1339
 Ibid, par. 45.  In setting out the terms of the agreement that reflected these expectations, attention 
was also called to those that emphasized its limited exit provisions, presumably as further evidence that the 
shareholders had expected the document to be binding (par. 45).  Also, some of the language used had the 
ring of corporate constitutionalism, such as the statement that "there could be no material change in the 
nature of the corporation without the approval of at least 25% of the UK Shareholders" (par. 45). 
1340
 Ibid, par. 46. 
1341
 Ibid, par. 48. 
1342
 Having found oppression, Pepall J. went on to consider two arguments by the respondent.  With 
regard to the eventual approval of the United Kingdom shareholders of the purchase of another 
manufacturer, the finding was that the acts were still oppressive at the time they occurred, but that the 
approval would be taken into account in fashioning a remedy (Le Maitre, supra note 1193, par. 49).  The 
respondent also argued that what had occurred was in the best interests of the North American companies, 
as required by his statutory duties; that part of the judgment was discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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appointment of an additional director, which Pepall J. declined because "[i]t was also not within the parties' 
reasonable expectations that additional directors would be appointed absent consent by 75% of the 
shareholders".
1343
  This was apparently a reference to the unanimous shareholder agreement, though a 
mistaken one, since that agreement named a director and the 75% requirement was in a different clause.
1344
  
Pepall J. also considered this to be simply a flawed remedy in the circumstances that would not solve the 
company's problems.
1345
  The respondent had asked for an order that he purchase the applicants' shares,
1346
 
which Pepall J. was hesitant to grant given that he was the oppressor.
1347
  So, despite it not being the relief 
requested, the applicants were given the option to buy the respondent's shares, failing which he could buy 
theirs.
1348
  The terms of the agreement thus helped guide the choice of a remedy appropriate to the parties' 
reasonable expectations, although in coming to a decision, the judge had to consider not just the document 
but all the facts to determine an appropriate solution; other examples of that methodology and its 
implications are considered in the next subsection. 
 The present concern remains those cases that take the unanimous shareholder agreement as a 
representation of the parties' reasonable expectations and how they often blur the line between a reasonable 
expectation that the agreement itself will be followed and reasonable expectations which run in parallel 
with it.  In Claisse c. Simard,
1349
 a unanimous shareholder agreement
1350
 provided that a shareholder's 
employment wages could only be reduced if the investors unanimously agreed.
1351
  Without his agreement, 
his wages and benefits were subsequently cut
1352
 and then he was fired, which Gervais J.C.S. classified as a 
100% reduction in his wages contrary to the agreement.
1353
  On an oppression claim, the judge said simply 
that he had "no hesitation in finding"
1354
 that to continue to work for the company at his former salary was a 
reasonable expectation.
1355
  His firing was found to have been illegal and oppressive.
1356
  The Court of 
                                                          
1343
 Le Maitre, supra note 1193, par. 60. 
1344
 It is possible that the judge concluded that these two terms had combined to create a reasonable 
expectation not directly derived from either of them, but given the lack of explanation to that effect, it is 
unlikely. 
1345
 Le Maitre, supra note 1193, par. 60. 
1346
 Ibid, par. 55. 
1347
 Ibid, par. 58. 
1348
 Ibid, pars. 62-63. 
1349
 Claisse c. Simard, 2005 CarswellQue 6608, J.E. 2005-1586, EYB 2005-93210 (C.S. Que. Jul 27, 
2005) (hereinafter "Claisse CS").  The document was not generally referred to as a unanimous shareholder 
agreement in the judgment, except in an excerpt from the agreement itself at paragraph 78 and in 
reproduced correspondence at paragraph  155. 
1350
 Ibid, par. 29. 
1351
 Ibid, par. 35. 
1352
 Ibid, par. 153. 
1353
 Ibid, par. 340. 
1354
 Ibid, par. 396; my translation of "je n'hésiterais pas introduire ici le fait". 
1355
 Ibid, pars. 396-397. 
1356
 Ibid, par. 344; Certain other factors were also found to have been oppressive (par. 185). 
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Appeal,
1357
 however, disagreed.  They stated that the reasoning of the trial judge was erroneous.
1358
  They 
summarized his equation of termination with a reduction in salary subject to the agreement,
1359
 but declined 
to follow it.  Instead, the Court of Appeal found that the employee's conduct had warranted termination.
1360
  
Given the explicit rejection of the trial judge's treatment of the termination, this could have been a fact-
specific finding that it fell outside the terms of the agreement, but it seems at least as plausible that it was a 
ruling that, given sufficiently problematic behaviour by an employee, firing that individual may be justified 
and non-oppressive even if it violates a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 Stephanson v. Phillips
1361
 is a final example that simultaneously suggests that compliance per se is 
a reasonable expectation and that reasonable expectations run in parallel to the agreement.  The applicant 
alleged a variety of wrongful acts, some of them in violation of the (unspecified) terms of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, including unauthorized payments, withdrawal of funds, the cancellation of the 
applicant's signing authority, and a failure to provide financial information.
1362
  After briefly summarizing 
the principles of the oppression remedy, Foley J. determined that "[i]n this case the disregard for the 
unanimity required by the unanimous shareholder agreement and the violation of a reasonable expectation 
that the corporation's bank accounts and signing authority will not be interfered with are oppressive".
1363
 
 This is essentially the entire analysis regarding whether the acts specified justified a finding of 
oppression.  Foley J. was unable to determine on the evidence whether the disbursements and withdrawals 
"violate the terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement or are or are not legitimate expenses 
experienced by the corporation or are otherwise beyond the shareholders [sic] expectations"
1364
 and 
therefore ordered the corporation to first provide clearer financial records, after which the court would 
determine what to do.
1365
  The division in both passages between the concepts of violating the agreement 
and the shareholder's reasonable expectations suggests that, notwithstanding the findings that linked the 
two, Foley J. did not completely equate them, although they were clearly seen as intertwined. 
 The preceding cases demonstrate the difficulty of distinguishing between use of the oppression 
remedy to enforce a unanimous shareholder agreement and giving effect to reasonable expectations that 
exist in parallel with the document but are not, technically, the agreement itself.  In each of these cases, 
                                                          
1357
 Claisse c. Simard, 2007 QCCA 700, 2007 CarswellQue 4423, 165 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1036, 165 
A.C.W.S. (3d) 1048, J.E. 2007-1118, D.T.E. 2007T-506, EYB 2007-119870 (C.A. Que. May 22, 2007) 
(hereinafter "Claisse CA").  The document was never referred to as a unanimous shareholder agreement in 
this judgment.  See note 1349. 
1358
 Ibid, par. 152. 
1359
 Ibid, par. 152. 
1360
 Ibid, pars. 153-156. 
1361
 Stephanson v. Phillips, 2004 SKQB 356, 2004 CarswellSask 636, 1 B.L.R. (4th) 297 (Sask. Q.B. 
Aug 26, 2004) (hereinafter "Stephanson"). 
1362
 Ibid, par. 2.  The respondent admitted to some of these acts and denied others (pars. 3-4). 
1363
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1364
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however, those reasonable expectations were found to have actually been oppressed, disregarded or 
prejudiced.  Szijarto v. Densham
1366
 allows for the examination of this issue when the reasonable 
expectations of the plaintiff were not violated.  The shareholders of the corporation had entered into a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.
1367
  Eventually, only two of the original ones remained, and the shares 
of the departing investors ended up owned by a new company incorporated for the purpose, whose shares 
were in turn owned by the two remaining original shareholders.
1368
  The plaintiff resigned from the 
corporation and sued to, inter alia, enforce provisions of the unanimous shareholder agreement requiring 
the other shareholder and/or the corporation to buy his shares of both the original corporation and the new 
one.
1369
  The suit was brought both as a contract claim and an oppression claim.
1370
  Spence J. determined 
that, since the relief sought was the purchase of the shares in both corporations, it was not necessary to 
determine whether the plaintiff might be entitled to the purchase only of his shares of the original company, 
as that was not what had been requested.
1371
  Given the remainder of the analysis, that decision was crucial. 
 Spence J. undertook to follow the standard rules of interpreting business contracts when dealing 
with the unanimous shareholder agreement, i.e. to give effect to their intent and thus give business efficacy 
to them.
1372
  Much of the remainder of the analysis was distinctly contractual, focussing on technical 
arguments about the meaning of the terms; the significant issue was whether the buy-back provisions of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement applied to the shares of the new company.
1373
  It was a deemed party to 
the unanimous shareholder agreement, but that applied to the shares of the original corporation it held, not 
its own shares.
1374
  Despite the plaintiff appearing prima facie to have a good case under the agreement for 
at least the sale of his shares of the original company, Spence J. denied the claim on an all-or-nothing basis; 
because there was no right to sell back the shares of the second corporation, the whole claim failed.
1375
 
 The oppression argument was not seriously dealt with as an independent line of analysis.  Spence 
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 Ibid, par. 18. 
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 Szijarto v. Densham, 2006 CarswellOnt 6643, 24 B.L.R. (4th) 153 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Oct 
27, 2006) (hereinafter "Szijarto Sup Ct J").   In a brief oral decision, the Court of Appeal upheld this 
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Densham, 2007 ONCA 747, 2007 CarswellOnt 7500, [2007] O.J. No. 4211, 37 B.L.R. (4th) 50 (Ont. C.A. 
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J. simply stated that, if there was no claim on contract grounds that the other shareholder or the corporation 
must buy the plaintiff's shares, then "there would seem to be no basis for the claim that in failing to make 
an offer for such a purchase, Cast or Densham has unfairly disregarded the interests of the Plaintiff".
1376
  
The analysis with regard to reasonable expectations was brief: 
 
81 The dealings between the parties with respect to the proposed sale of the 
Plaintiff's interest in Cast were always directed entirely toward the effort to negotiate an 
acceptable contract for that purpose.  Nothing in the course of those dealings gave rise to 
a reasonable expectation on the part of the Plaintiff that he would be able to effect that 
sale under the terms of the Shareholders' Agreement.  Nor did he have any such 
reasonable expectation before those dealings commenced.  In the absence of such a 
reasonable expectation there is no basis for a claim that the Plaintiff had an interest in that 
respect for the purposes of s. 248(2) of the OBCA. 
 
 Given the fact situation, it is arguable that the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation that all his 
shares in the enterprise, being both the original corporation and the new one, would be bought back upon 
his leaving.  The dismissal of that argument was on the basis that he could not have had a "reasonable 
expectation" beyond the strict limits of his contractual rights, which extended only to one of the two 
companies.  For good or ill, closely integrating "reasonable expectations" with the terms of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement can eliminate the flexibility that is sometimes seen as the chief virtue of this tool.  In 
the next subsection of this chapter, the opposite perspective is explored. 
 The contrast between a flexible, responsive version of the oppression remedy and one where the 
exact wording of a unanimous shareholder agreement is determinative of the parties' "reasonable 
expectations" can be seen in the differences between the trial
1377
  and appeal
1378
 decisions in Sieminska v. 
Boldt.  The case was not an attempt to enforce an agreement per se, but rather to assert that corporate acts 
allegedly taken in accordance with one were oppressive because they did not actually follow its terms.  The 
document provided that if any shareholders became involved in divorce proceedings or entered a separation 
agreement, the company could force them to sell back their shares if the remaining investors so voted.
1379
  
The clause was invoked against two shareholders, who had left their respective spouses and become 
romantically involved with each other.
1380
  One of them argued that it was inapplicable against her because, 
while she had become estranged from her husband, there was no separation agreement to trigger the 
                                                          
1376
 Ibid, par. 71. 
1377
 Sieminska v. Boldt, 2013 SKQB 4, 2013 CarswellSask 31, 226 A.C.W.S. (3d) 739, 10 B.L.R. (5th) 
107 (Sask. Q.B. Jan 02, 2013) (hereinafter "Sieminska QB").  This decision referred to the document only 
as a "shareholders agreement", but the appeal specified that it was a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
1378
 Sieminska v. Boldt, 2013 SKCA 136, 427 Sask. R. 166, 2013 CarswellSask 859, 591 W.A.C. 166, 
236 A.C.W.S. (3d) 114, 22 B.L.R. (5th) 173 (Sask. C.A. Dec 17, 2013) (hereinafter "Sieminska CA"). 
1379
 Sieminska QB, supra note 1377, par. 4. 
1380
 Ibid, par. 5. 
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procedure.
1381
  Although the other shareholder was involved in divorce proceedings and the clause could 
apply to him,
1382
 he argued that since the first applicant was still a valid shareholder for the preceding 
reasons and she had not voted to invoke the clause, it had not properly been used against him either.
1383
  
They brought oppression proceedings.
1384
 
 At trial, Acton J. first reviewed the reasonable expectations standard.
1385
  Applying it to these 
facts, the judge found that the "intent of the parties"
1386
 was to avoid the company being affected by 
shareholders' marital difficulties, and therefore the applicants could not reasonably have expected the 
clause would not be invoked against them; the lack of an actual separation agreement was only a 
technicality.
1387
  In the alternative, it was found that even if their reasonable expectation had been that the 
clause would not be invoked if no actual separation agreement had been signed, its usage had been in the 
best interest of the company.
1388
  Presumably, this meant that it was not oppressive, unfair prejudice, or 
unfair disregard.  The second shareholder's claim consequently failed as well.
1389
  Acton J. thus declined to 
use a strict interpretation of the document's wording as a substitute for the parties' reasonable expectations, 
instead making an actual enquiry into what they would reasonably have expected in all of the 
circumstances. 
 On appeal, things went differently.  Caldwell J.A applied the rule that extrinsic evidence should 
only be used to interpret contracts when they were unclear and, this unanimous shareholder agreement 
having been clear, it was inappropriate to go beyond its literal wording.
1390
  The shareholder's reasonable 
expectations were found to be that the clause would only apply in the specific circumstances set out.
1391
  
Caldwell J.A provided a succinct summary of the logic guiding the decision, equating unanimous 
shareholder agreements with any other contract and their terms with reasonable expectations: 
 
I say this because a unanimous shareholders agreement is simply a contract by and 
among shareholders and their corporation by which they agree to alter their statutorily 
prescribed relationships in accordance with their expectations.  A unanimous 
shareholders agreement is therefore perhaps the best evidence of shareholder expectations 
at the time of its making.  Moreover, the shareholder expectations it evidences must be 
presumed to have been reasonable because they received the unanimous agreement of the 
                                                          
1381
 Ibid, par. 9. 
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 Ibid, par. 6. 
1383
 Ibid, par. 7. 
1384
 Ibid, par. 1. 
1385
 Ibid, pars. 13-20. 
1386
 Ibid, par. 24. 
1387
 Ibid, par. 24.  The delay in bringing the claim was also used as a factor to determine that no 
reasonable expectations had been violated (par. 26). 
1388
 Ibid, par. 28. 
1389
 Ibid, par. 30.  Additionally, it failed because it was found that even if the first shareholder had 
voted, she would have been outvoted (par. 31). 
1390
 Sieminska CA, supra note 1378, pars. 24-30. 
1391
 Ibid, par. 33. 
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shareholders and the corporation.
1392
 
 
 Any distinction between corporate law and contract law was thus erased. 
 The shareholder's reasonable expectations having been established, Caldwell J.A. continued that 
what had occurred was unfair prejudice or disregard of those interests;
1393
 each shareholder had, based upon 
the agreement, a reasonable expectation that the company would not take action against them without the 
proper procedures being followed, and the unanimous shareholder agreement enhanced rather than 
diminished those rights.
1394
  The second shareholder's rights, pre-existing and enhanced, had also been 
transgressed, regardless of whether he would have been removed in any event, and that likewise violated 
his reasonable expectations in an oppressive manner.
1395
 
 The Court of Appeal in Sieminska not only articulated that the terms of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement reflected the parties' reasonable expectations, but actively rejected the possibility that oppression 
requires a wider enquiry than a contract claim.  In this conception, oppression might offer some procedural 
advantages and a wider range of remedies, but in a very real way, it lacks distinct substance as a means of 
enforcing a unanimous shareholder agreement.  The underlying basis becomes nothing more than contract 
law.
1396
 
                                                          
1392
 Ibid, par. 33. 
1393
 Ibid, par. 34. 
1394
 Ibid, par. 35. 
1395
 Ibid, par. 36.  Caldwell J.A. did not, however, consider it appropriate under the circumstances to 
restore the shares.  Instead, on the basis that the first shareholder no longer had a place in the company, it 
was ordered that her shares were to be purchased for current market value, rather than the formula in the 
agreement, because her shares could not validly be purchased through that clause (par. 38).  The second 
shareholder, against whom the clause could be invoked, would have his shares purchased according to the 
formula, but recalculated at the current date, the original invocation having been invalid (par. 39).  The 
oppression caused by the company's procedural irregularities was further compensated via a small damage 
award (par. 41). 
1396
 A counterpart to the position that actions taken in accordance with the agreed-upon terms of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement must by definition be within the party's reasonable expectations is that 
they may violate such expectations but that they by definition do not do so in a manner that is oppressive, 
unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregarding of interests.  In Groupe Renaud-Bray inc. c. Innovation F.G.F. 
inc., 2014 QCCS 1683, 2014 CarswellQue 3835, EYB 2014-236339 (C.S. Que. Apr 10, 2014) (hereinafter 
"Renaud-Bray"), the terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement in question specified that the shares of 
a deceased investor were to be repurchased at a rate that, due to the company's massive increase in value 
over the years, would now take about forty years to complete in full, rather than about five as would have 
originally been the case (pars. 15-21).  After establishing in a contractual analysis that the terms were not 
ambiguous and therefore must be applied literally (pars. 27-52), Turcotte J.C.S. rejected the argument that 
this could be oppressive.  Although the judge did accept that the party's reasonable expectations were being 
frustrated (par. 57), it was found that this was not due to oppressive conduct, since the parties had clearly 
and freely consented to the terms that were now being applied (par. 61).  Interestingly, one of the passages 
reproduced as precedent specifically stated that, however bad the deal might be, a party could not have 
reasonable expectations beyond its contractual rights (the more common formulation as to why a contract 
precludes the oppression remedy) and thus did not support the alternative logic used here.  (The precedent 
was AbitibiBowater inc., Re, 2010 QCCS 6365, 2010 CarswellQue 14132, 197 A.C.W.S. (3d) 11, J.E. 
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 The foregoing cases demonstrate the trend of simply equating the terms of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement with the parties' reasonable expectations.  Even if one accepts this principle, 
however, it must be borne in mind that the meaning of the terms themselves is not necessarily beyond 
debate.  Contract law developed because documents are subject to interpretation, and this does not cease to 
be true when they become the basis of oppression claims.   
 Whatever debate there may be about the appropriateness of using the oppression remedy as a 
means of enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements, this is one of the approaches that the courts have 
employed.  When judges have equated unanimous shareholder agreements with the parties' reasonable 
expectations, it has proven unlikely that the courts would maintain any rigorous distinction between 
protection of expectations which simply happen to be exactly the same as the agreements' contents and 
enforcement of the agreements themselves.  Treating the documents strictly as a convenient list of 
expectations would make their unique legal status irrelevant- a contract that did not meet the statutory 
criteria would serve the same purpose- but judges' willingness to explicitly or implicitly accept compliance 
itself as a reasonable expectation more obviously acknowledges that these are instruments specially 
designated by statute to limit directors (unless even other documents, which shouldn't bind directors, were 
treated the same way in the oppression context
1397
).  If what actually constitutes compliance (or the lack 
thereof) is determined via some other approach, such as contract law principles, then the oppression remedy 
model would be distinct primarily for its particular range of remedies. 
 The cases discussed in this subsection, however, were specifically limited to only those which 
treated the terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement and the parties' reasonable expectations as 
functionally identical.  It is unsurprising that, when that occurs, the oppression remedy becomes a de facto 
tool for enforcing the agreement in a traditional sense.  On the other hand, if the specific terms were 
evaluated for whether they actually qualified as "reasonable expectations" and they were weighed against 
other factors, that might appear to make the oppression remedy something other than a fourth method for 
enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements.  I would argue, however, that this characterization remains 
accurate even then.  As these cases have established, the oppression remedy is an approach to enforcing 
unanimous shareholder agreements.  It simply happens to have, as the following subsection illustrates, its 
own particular set of principles for doing so. 
 
6.(c)(ii) The Agreements in Context 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2011-192, [2010] Q.J. No. 14,111, EYB 2010-184247 (C.S. Que. Dec 23, 2010) par. 156, cited at par. 60; 
that case did not deal with a unanimous shareholder agreement).  
1397
 A comprehensive review of what judges have accepted as constituting reasonable expectations is 
beyond the scope of the current discussion. 
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 If the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement always constituted reasonable expectations, if 
there were never any other factors considered in determining said expectations, and if violating those terms 
(according, presumably, to a contractual standard) always qualified as oppression, unfair disregard, or 
unfair prejudice, then the oppression remedy would barely constitute a fourth distinct model for enforcing 
unanimous shareholder agreements.  It would, in essence, collapse into something much like the contractual 
view, distinguished primarily by its much wider range of remedies, admittedly a significant feature. 
 But the three posits in the preceding paragraph do not fully describe the potential application of 
the oppression remedy to unanimous shareholder agreements.  One can question whether the terms of the 
agreement constitute reasonable expectations, consider them in the context of other factors, and find that 
their breach is not necessarily oppressive.  In so doing, the oppression remedy emerges as separate on every 
level from the other three approaches to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements.  A serious inquiry 
into the parties' reasonable expectations in all the circumstances, rather than a rote acceptance that the terms 
of the document can substitute for them, stands as an alternative to the principles of contract law, the 
rigidity of the corporate constitutional approach, and even the directors' discretion to determine the 
corporate interest in the satisfaction of their duties to it.   
 The two judgments in Sieminska, discussed in the preceding subsection, illustrate this 
dichotomy.
1398
  The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal took the document as the definitive guide to the parties' 
reasonable expectations and declined to look beyond it.  The trial judge, on the other hand, did not treat the 
oppression claim as a contract suit by another name, and attempted to discern the parties' reasonable 
expectations not through a narrow reading of the document's terms, but through a wider inquiry.  The 
differing results demonstrate the significance of the exact role a unanimous shareholder agreement plays in 
an oppression analysis. 
 But even if the document's terms are not taken as synonymous with the parties' reasonable 
expectations, the oppression remedy remains a method of enforcing them, albeit one subject to its own 
considerations.  That an agreement was not considered solely determinative of the parties' expectations 
does not mean that it was irrelevant to them, and often a serious examination of all the relevant factors 
leads right back to those terms.
1399
 
                                                          
1398
 Renaud-Bray, supra note 1396, also considered whether reasonable expectations might extend 
beyond the rights explicitly found in a unanimous shareholder agreement's terms and specifically rejected 
this approach (pars. 53-62). 
1399
 While not an oppression remedy case, the concept of reasonable expectations arising from a 
unanimous shareholder agreement in the context of all the circumstances was also considered in Hollinger 
v. Prados-Hollinger, 2012 QCCA 1682, 2012 CarswellQue 9746, EYB 2012-211490, 226 A.C.W.S. (3d) 
406 (C.A. Que. Sep 21, 2012).  The appellant asked the court to use its equitable jurisdiction to protect her 
reasonable expectations in the context of a liquidation (pars. 2-5).  A unanimous shareholder agreement 
provided that if the applicant had need of money, the corporation would first redeem her shares and then 
issue new shares to her of nominal value upon which it would provide dividends at her request  (par. 10).  
In determining whether reasonable expectations were at stake, the judge focussed on the wording of the 
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 Main v. Delcan Group Inc.
1400
 illustrates how a more contextual approach that treats a shareholder 
agreement as merely one element among several to be considered
1401
 can in the end lead to its terms being 
enforced, even while acknowledging that that result might not be inevitable.  Lederman J. stated that "the 
Shareholders' Agreement is often viewed as reflecting the reasonable expectations of the shareholders",
1402
 
thus accepting it as evidence of those expectations while implicitly limiting it to that role.  The judge found 
that the spirit and letter of the agreement might be looked to in order to determine the intentions of the 
parties,
1403
 implicitly equated here with their reasonable expectations.  However, it was also noted that 
shareholders' expectations were not static and evolved over time, and that a "practical standpoint" must be 
used to determine them.
1404
  The significance of these comments was not made explicit, but the implication 
is that the expectations found in the document might grow outdated, and that therefore subsequent 
developments can supersede its terms, at least insofar as the parties' reasonable expectations are concerned. 
 Lederman J. went on to consider reasonable expectations in light of both the terms of the 
agreement and other factors.  The respondents argued that the applicants sought to take advantage of a 
"minor technical inconsistency"
1405
 to assert a claim to a bonus paid after they were no longer shareholders, 
contrary to an established practice of the company.
1406
  The applicants argued that, if the agreements had 
been followed, they would not have been bought out until after the bonuses had been paid.
1407
  Lederman J. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
agreement and its use of the term "require", which was held to mean to need and not just to want (par. 13), 
and the applicant was on the facts unlikely ever to actually need funds (par. 19).  Although it was not 
explicit, the reference to external evidence to determine whether the applicant would need funds might be 
considered the inclusion of additional factors in the party's reasonable expectations, in conjunction with a 
contractual analysis of the agreement itself. 
1400
 Main, supra note 1196.  The document was never referred to explicitly in the judgment as a 
"unanimous shareholder agreement" (or synonym), but the case is important due to it being cited as a 
precedent in BCE alongside Lyall as to the relationship between shareholder agreements (including 
unanimous shareholder agreements) and the oppression remedy. 
1401
 The corporation had a program, set out in the unanimous shareholder agreement, whereby 
employee shareholders who wished to sell their shares to other employees would "bank" them with the 
company Secretary (Main, supra note 1196, pars. 9-10).  The shares could only be purchased by other 
employees, unless the selling shareholder opted to sell them back to the corporation (par. 9).  Despite this, 
the corporation at one point decided to purchase the currently banked shares, and notified the selling 
shareholders that it was doing so, using the power of authority already granted (pars. 16-20).  This was not 
in accordance with the unanimous shareholder agreement and also violated the C.B.C.A. since there was not 
a separate offer made to each selling shareholder (par. 17).  Subsequent to this share repurchase, the 
corporation paid a bonus to the remaining shareholders (par. 24).  This bonus, unpaid to the bought-out 
shareholders, formed the basis of an oppression application. 
1402
 Main, supra note 1196, par. 29. 
1403
 Ibid, par. 29. 
1404
 Ibid, par. 30. 
1405
 Ibid, par. 33. 
1406
 Ibid, par. 33. 
1407
 Ibid, pars. 38-29.  The shareholder agreement would have needed to be amended and the 
requirements of the Act followed regarding separate offers. 
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accepted the latter position as their reasonable expectation
1408
 and also examined the company's history of 
paying bonuses to recently bought-out shareholders, finding that although it was inconsistent, the 
corporation had always tried to treat investors fairly.
1409
  That too was part of their reasonable 
expectations.
1410
  The oppression analysis concluded: 
 
50 The case of Patel, supra, is authority for the position that the Shareholders' 
Agreement can be used as a guide when determining the reasonable expectations of the 
shareholders.  In the case at bar, the 1994 transaction directly violated the provisions of 
the Shareholders' Agreement.  In the absence of clear acquiescence by the Applicant 
shareholders, an action in violation of the Shareholders' Agreement and the CBCA cannot 
possibly be said to be reasonably expected by the Applicants.  Nor can the Business 
Judgment Rule be applied in such circumstances in order to prevent judicial intervention. 
 
51 There was a breach of the letter and spirit of the Shareholders' Agreement.  
Previous to the conduct in question, the Board had always sought timely shareholder 
approval and did not ratify its actions by way of retroactive amendments.  It is my 
conclusion that the unilateral manner in which the sale took place and the blatant 
disregard for the opinions and positions of the retired employees support the Applicants' 
position that they could not have reasonably expected this sale or the associative 
exclusion from the shareholder bonus.  As such, it follows that the transaction was 
oppressive, unfairly prejudicial to and/or it unfairly disregarded the interests of the retired 
shareholders, in contravention to s.241(2) of the CBCA.  Consequently, an Order pursuant 
to s.241(3) of the CBCA should issue directing that DGI compensate the Applicants for 
their loss resulting from such conduct. 
 
 Unanimous shareholder agreements being characterized as "a guide" to reasonable expectations is 
linked to the use of other factors to fully determine them.  They were ultimately found here to be fully 
consistent with the letter and spirit of the agreement, but that is not always the case. 
 A similar observation, that the agreement is to be looked to in determining the parties' reasonable 
expectations but is not solely determinative of them, appears in Gibson v. Gibson,
1411
 a dispute arising 
between two brothers who owned equal shares of a corporation.
1412
  One brought an oppression application 
to receive fair value for his shares, using the method specified in their unanimous shareholder 
agreement.
1413
  Flynn J. ordered that the issue be tried together with their pre-existing suit for wrongful 
dismissal.
1414
  In ordering that a full trial was necessary to determine the share value, despite the agreement, 
the judge noted that the related wrongful dismissal claim might be central to whether oppression 
                                                          
1408
 Ibid, par. 52. 
1409
 Ibid, pars. 42-47. 
1410
 Ibid, par. 52. 
1411
 Gibson v. Gibson, 2009 CarswellOnt 1015, 175 A.C.W.S. (3d) 59 (Ont. S.C.J. Feb 19, 2009) 
(hereinafter "Gibson"). 
1412
 Ibid, par. 2. 
1413
 Ibid, par. 12. 
1414
 Ibid, par. 37. 
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occurred,
1415
 and wrote: 
 
32 But in determining whether the impugned conduct is oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to Scott, and in deciding an appropriate remedy, the court must look to the 
reasonable expectation of the parties. 
 
33 While the court will look to the letter and spirit of the Unanimous Shareholders' 
Agreement to determine those reasonable expectations, one must be mindful in this case 
of the family dynamic in the business, a dynamic defined by a relationship between the 
principals of the business which may be very different than in a normal commercial 
setting. 
 
[...] 
 
35 In any event, this family dynamic and the reasonable shareholder expectations 
that flow from it can only come to full factual flower in a trial court. 
 
 The endpoint of such reasoning would be a finding that, in the circumstances, the parties' 
reasonable expectations did not include adherence to the unanimous shareholder agreement.  This was 
arguably what occurred in Cavendish Investing Ltd., Re.
1416
  A shareholder had a right under a unanimous 
shareholder agreement to demand dissolution of the company, which it exercised.
1417
  When that 
dissolution did not occur, it brought an application under s. 214, which expressly provides that the court 
may order a dissolution upon an application by a shareholder who is granted the ability to ask for one in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.
1418
  The applicant acknowledged that equity might limit its right and 
suggested that "reasonable expectations" were the guiding principles; it is unclear whether McMahon J. 
entirely accepted this framing of the issue.
1419
  The judge considered several precedents having to do with 
unanimous shareholder agreements, albeit none particularly similar to the case at hand; Korogonas v. 
Andrew
1420
 was described as "the reverse of the present application",
1421
  but Bury v. Bell
1422
 and Oakley v. 
McDougall
1423
 were acknowledged as cases that, while not precisely on point, illustrated that courts might 
                                                          
1415
 Ibid, par. 25. 
1416
 Cavendish Investing Ltd., Re, 190 A.R. 3, 42 Alta. L.R. (3d) 345, 29 B.L.R. (2d) 139, 1996 
CarswellAlta 692, [1996] A.W.L.D. 867, [1996] A.J. No. 743 (Alta. Q.B. Aug 14, 1996) (hereinafter 
"Cavendish"). 
1417
 Ibid, par. 8. 
1418
 Ibid, par. 11. 
1419
 Ibid, par. 23. 
1420
 Korogonas, supra note 1202, described at that note. 
1421
 Cavendish, supra note 1416, par. 24. 
1422
 Bury, supra note 1202, as well as its affirmal in Bury v. Bell Gouinlock Ltd., 49 O.R. (2d) 91, 14 
D.L.R. (4th) 448, 48 O.R. (2d) 57 (Ont. Div. Ct. Feb 22, 1985). 
1423
 Specifically, the second ruling of the Court of Appeal in the matter, Oakley v. McDougall, 14 
B.C.L.R. (2d) 128, 37 B.L.R. 47, 1987 CarswellBC 144, [1987] B.C.W.L.D. 2411, [1987] C.L.D. 973, 
[1987] B.C.J. No. 1226 (B.C. C.A. Jun 05, 1987) (hereinafter "Oakley CA 2").  The case did not involve a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, but it was nonethless identified in Cavendish as a precedent involving a 
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override the provisions of a unanimous shareholder agreement.
1424
  McMahon J. noted that the language of 
the statute was permissive ("may") and not mandatory,
1425
 and held that a variety of factors such as 
manifest unreasonableness and the interests of other classes of shareholders might lead a court to 
intervene.
1426
  Because of a lack of evidence about the exact consequences of doing so, the judge declined 
to order a dissolution on this application.
1427
  Instead, it was merged with an existing oppression suit 
between the parties.
1428
  While not a particularly strong precedent, Cavendish was later cited in Fulmer, 
discussed below, as authority for the proposition that the courts were not required to enforce the terms of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 Gillespie v. Overs.
1429
 was another oppression case where the court arguably departed from 
considering the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement to include other factors, although the judge 
framed the analysis as an interpretation of the agreement, by turns extremely narrow and extremely broad, 
rather than it being outright overridden by circumstances.  The two shareholders
1430
 had both brought 
oppression applications against each other.  There was a unanimous shareholder agreement in place which 
was relevant to both claims, and although Sutherland J. seemingly acknowledged its corporate 
constitutional status, noting that such instruments "restrict or reduce, to the extent stated in the agreement, 
the powers of management otherwise exercisable by the directors",
1431
 since the wrong had been framed by 
the parties as oppression, it was on that basis that the analysis proceeded. 
 Sutherland J. began by setting out the relationship between a unanimous shareholder agreement 
and the parties' reasonable expectations: 
 
61 Where, as here, there are applications under s. 247 of the OBCA alleging 
oppression or unfairly prejudicial conduct, the corporate structure and the power 
relationships under what may be termed the "constitution" of the corporation are usually 
not the end of the matter but rather the beginning.  However, such 'constitutional' matters 
form an important part of the continuing background against which the reasonableness of 
the expectations of the parties is to be considered, and in the light of which discretions 
conferred upon the Court by the OBCA are to be exercised if, but only if, the Court is 
satisfied that one or more of the threshold conditions in s.s. 247(2) are met.  They must 
also be considered no relation to the question of whether such threshold conditions have 
                                                                                                                                                                             
unanimous shareholder agreement.  In Oakley CA 2, Lambert J.A. declined to resolve the deterioration of 
the parties' relationship via the shotgun clause in their agreement, because "it requires the equitable remedy 
of specific performance. The trial judge made no findings of fact about the conduct of the parties or where 
the equities lay" (par. 16).  Instead, the parties who had been managing the company were granted the right 
to buy out the others (par. 18). 
1424
 Cavendish, supra note 1416, par. 30. 
1425
 Ibid, par. 21. 
1426
 Ibid, par. 25. 
1427
 Ibid, par. 34. 
1428
 Ibid, pars. 37-38. 
1429
 Gillespie, supra note 524. 
1430
 Including shareholdings held via their respective holding corporations. 
1431
 Gillespie, supra note 524, par. 49. 
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been met. 
 
 A unanimous shareholder agreement was thus a part of but not determinative of the parties' 
reasonable expectations, a distinction that would prove crucial. 
 The minority shareholder was guaranteed in the agreement the position of "president of the 
corporation with such duties as the directors may from time to time determine".
1432
  The board had by 
resolution defined those duties as the management of the corporation.
1433
  The unanimous shareholder 
agreement also specified that the two shareholders would be the only two directors, that a quorum would 
consist of two directors, and that the majority shareholder would have a casting vote.
1434
  Disagreements 
had arisen as to the management of the company.  The minority shareholder brought an action for 
oppression due in part to the majority shareholder attempting to intervene in the management of the 
corporation, despite the other's position as president.
1435
  The majority shareholder, meanwhile, brought an 
action for oppression
1436
 due to the minority shareholder's refusal to attend directors' meetings, without 
whom there could be no quorum, because at such a meeting the majority shareholder intended to strip the 
other of his management powers.
1437
 
 With regard to the former claim, the decisive element was that the powers of the president could 
be defined by the directors.
1438
  In Sutherland J.'s view, that was "subject [...] to the unwritten limitation 
that [he] could not be given duties and responsibilities of a menial or lowly nature or otherwise inconsistent 
                                                          
1432
 Cited ibid, par. 50. 
1433
 Ibid, par. 54. 
1434
 Cited ibid, par. 50. 
1435
 Ibid, pars. 117-126, 150-154. 
1436
 Sutherland J. confirmed that a majority shareholder can be a complainant in an oppression 
application (Gillespie, supra note 524, par. 174). 
1437
 Gillespie, supra note 524, pars. 104, 177, 182. 
1438
 This can be contrasted with Oakley v. McDougall, 1986 CarswellBC 1500, [1986] B.C.W.L.D. 
4206 (B.C. S.C. Apr 03, 1986), where an agreement (not a unanimous shareholder agreement) was 
interpreted to provide the exact opposite power.  It required unanimous consent of the directors to an 
amendment to any of their employment contracts, which Bouck J. determined covered alterations to e.g. 
"their salary, hours of work, or position" (par. 27) but excluded firing them.  The judge held that 
terminating their employment did not require unanimity, because, "[t]o give that interpretation to the 
agreement would allow either Oakley, McDougall or Fraser to continue as employees of Harbour Air no 
matter what wrong they did to the company" (par. 27).   Although presented as a matter of interpreting the 
document, Bouck J.'s conclusion that firing them was not an amendment to the terms of their employment 
seems somewhat strained; it suggests a general unease with actually preventing the directors from 
removing an individual from office, which could occur under a corporate constitutional approach.  The 
issue was not addressed in the two parts of the appeal, Oakley v. McDougall, 17 B.C.L.R. (2d) 134, 37 
B.L.R. 31, 1987 CarswellBC 257, [1987] B.C.W.L.D. 991, [1987] C.L.D. 503, [1987] B.C.J. No. 272 (B.C. 
C.A. Feb 27, 1987) and Oakley CA 2, supra note 1423.  (As discussed at note 1423, Cavendish, supra note 
1416, at par. 30 specifically identified Oakley CA 2 as dealing with a unanimous shareholder agreement, 
although that tool was not available under the relevant legislation.) 
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[with] the office of president",
1439
 but it was possible for some or all of the duties and authority normally 
associated with the position to be removed
1440
 or for the president to be placed entirely under the direct 
control of the board of directors.
1441
  Sutherland J. repeatedly emphasized that the minority shareholder was 
incorrect in asserting that the unanimous shareholder agreement granted him the power to manage the 
company, and that instead it granted him only the office of president, which merely happened at the time 
under a directors' resolution to have management authority over the company.
1442
 
 It is unclear on what basis Sutherland J. made that determination: reasonable expectations (this 
being an oppression claim), an "officious bystander" interpretation of the contract (as was used elsewhere 
in the judgment) or simply a general principle.  On the one hand, the result is not literally what appears in 
the document; a limitation against menial responsibilities is read in. On the other, the complete removal of 
all powers is apparently acceptable.  It is doubtful that either "reasonable expectations" or an "officious 
bystander" would permit the guaranteed position of corporate president to be a merely ceremonial title.  
The unspoken logic appears to be a resistance to an upending of the standard corporate form that would 
allow for a minority shareholder to be permanently guaranteed the office of president even in the face of 
the majority's wishes.  The document's explicit wording underlies the judge's reasoning that some degree of 
redefinition was contemplated, but even so, that was found to be subject to implied limitations, at which 
point the question that arises is how one decides where to draw the line. 
 This is even clearer when contrasted with how the other oppression claim was resolved.  There, 
while acknowledging that the casting vote could be interpreted consistently with the minority shareholder 
having a de facto veto through the quorum requirement, Sutherland J. held that it was not in the reasonable 
expectation of the parties that the minority shareholder have the office of president insulated from the 
majority's control of his responsibilities and that an "officious bystander" would assume a contractual term 
preventing him from avoiding meetings.
1443
  While Sutherland J. did not conflate the two standards, 
referring to the "officious bystander" as a relatively restrictive test in implicit contrast with "reasonable 
expectations", the use of contract law principles at all in the midst of this oppression analysis serves as 
another reminder of the co-existence of enforcement mechanisms and their influence upon one another. 
 It was found that the majority shareholder's interference in management decisions was not 
oppressive, but the minority shareholder's refusal to attend directors' meetings was, because the majority 
shareholder "already had ultimate management control all along".
1444
  Sutherland J.  further suggested that 
the minority shareholders' specific decisions on various issues "collectively [...] amounted to a situation 
                                                          
1439
 Gillespie, supra note 524, par. 53. 
1440
 Ibid, par. 53. 
1441
 Ibid, par. 52. 
1442
 e.g. Ibid, par. 55. 
1443
 Ibid, par. 118. 
1444
 Ibid, par. 125. 
  
 
 
255 
 
justifying, in the sense of making not unfairly prejudicial, formal action by [the majority shareholder] to 
reduce the powers and responsibilities of [the minority shareholder] as president".
1445
  It is unclear whether 
the reduction in powers might have been found oppressive absent these problematic decisions, i.e. whether 
the reasonable expectations were that the president's powers could be reduced only if justified by his 
actions.  Elsewhere in the reasons for judgment, Sutherland J. suggested the majority shareholder could 
have stripped the president of all powers as a simple right, but there was some implication that that might 
be, absent a good reason, unfairly prejudicial.  It was also determined that, following the normal rule, the 
court would not enforce specific performance of a contract of employment at the behest of either party.
1446
  
On this point, Sutherland J. confused the issue.  The employer here was the corporation, not the majority 
shareholder or directors; if the unanimous shareholder agreement bound the board, then they could not 
direct the corporation to fire the president; if the corporation was not so directed, then the employer (the 
corporation) and employee would both be consenting to the continuation of the employment contract.  The 
issue was one of corporate governance, not employment law. 
 On the other hand, by refusing to allow directors' meetings to occur, the minority shareholder was 
held to be behaving in an unfairly prejudicial manner.
1447
  The relief granted was firstly that the board be 
increased to three, with the third appointed by the majority shareholder, but more importantly with respect 
to the present topic, it was found that it would not be oppressive for the directors to remove all of the 
president's powers and that "[f]rom there it is but a short step for the court to amend the Agreement to 
remove therefrom the provision stating that Gillespie is to be president of PPL".
1448
  The judge wrote: 
 
185 In my opinion, given the unfairly prejudicial conduct of Gillespie toward Overs 
it is appropriate and just that, in addition to the power to re-define the duties of the 
president so as to remove almost all his executive power, Overs as majority shareholder 
and as the person to be in a position to control the board of PPL should have the power to 
cause PPL to dismiss Gillespie as president.  In other words the Agreement should be 
amended to delete the provision requiring that Gillespie be president of PPL.  Upon such 
deletion the board of directors will resume its normal control powers with respect to the 
employment and dismissal of a president.  Those corporate powers include the power to 
act in breach of contract, if that be the case. 
 
 Despite this, Sutherland J. did not actually order the minority shareholder removed as president, 
and left open the possibility that such removal might give rise to a wrongful dismissal claim.
1449
  The judge 
also declined to remove the minority shareholder's guaranteed position as a director, though he left the 
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 Ibid, par. 153. 
1446
 Ibid, par. 169. 
1447
 Ibid, par. 178. 
1448
 Ibid, par. 183. 
1449
 Ibid, par. 186. 
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matter open to a subsequent application.
1450
 
 While the issue in Gillespie may appear to be fact-specific, turning upon an explicit right in the 
agreement to redefine the president's role, the implications of the case cannot be dismissed so easily.  Given 
other guaranteed-position unanimous shareholder agreement cases, a line of reasoning that classified those 
as guaranteeing only a title and not a role
1451
 would be a significant development.  It is difficult to justify 
such a position on either "reasonable expectations" or contractual interpretation grounds, but as this 
judgment demonstrated, such a result can occur.  And this is because of the second significant aspect of this 
case, an apparent bias toward the normal corporate form.  At its most extreme, and despite Sutherland J.'s 
framing, this leads to the parties' "reasonable expectations" being determined by the standard corporate 
power structure, not the unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 A similar issue and a similar analysis,
1452
 but the opposite conclusion, can be found in Fulmer v. 
                                                          
1450
 Ibid, par. 189. 
1451
 Unless, of course, the parties had the foresight to guarantee the role as well. 
1452
 A similar issue but a different analysis appears in Timoschuk c. Indoco Industrial Door Co., 
[1989] R.J.Q. 1880, 1989 CarswellQue 1597, J.E. 89-1095, EYB 1989-77187 (C.S. Que. May 18, 1989).  
While also dealing with the oppression remedy, and specifically an application for an injunction under it 
(par. 1), the description provided of the criteria for the remedy did not include reasonable expectations 
(pars. 16-17) and the analysis did not refer to them.  Similar to Gillespie and Fulmer, the unanimous 
shareholder agreement in Timoschuk named individuals who would be the company's chairman, president, 
and secretary-treasurer (par. 9) and one of the alleged grounds for oppression was that the individual who 
was named as president in the agreement had been constructively dismissed from his role as "Chief 
Executive Officer" by the board limiting his powers and refusing to grant him a raise (heading b above par. 
37).  Legault J. noted that, firstly, the agreement did not mention the term "chief executive officer" (par. 
37), and that while it did grant him the position of "President", it was stated at par. 37 that there was "no 
indication that he was assured of the post no matter what for the rest of his days".  (My translation of "S'il 
est vrai qu'au moment de la signature du document P-7, le titre de président fut assigné au requérant 
Timoschuk, il n'existe aucune indication que celui-ci était assuré de conserver ce poste contre vents et 
marées pour le reste de ses jours.")  That aside, the case also considered whether it was necessary that the 
officers named would have the ability to exercise the functions normally attached to those titles (par. 38) 
and found that there was insufficient evidence to determine that (par. 38), indicating that the titles did not 
necessarily have to be associated with their typical authority.  Furthermore, Legault J. found, based on 
various precedents, that as an employee/shareholder who had been constructively dismissed, the petitioner 
could not make use of the oppression remedy, because the wrong related to him in his capacity as 
employee, not shareholder (par. 39).  The fact that a unanimous shareholder agreement on this point was in 
place was not considered specifically.  The judge also commented that there was a personality conflict 
between the president and the majority shareholders, and that the point of the oppression remedy was not to 
settle personality conflicts among investors (par. 40).  In contrasting this judgment with the others 
discussed in this section, one can see how "reasonable expectations" arising from a unanimous shareholder 
agreement lead to a very different analysis than is found in an oppression remedy case that does not focus 
upon them. 
 
A second alleged violation of the agreement was also an issue, wherein the majority shareholders passed a 
motion that they be issued additional shares in contravention of the term specifying shareholdings and 
proportions (par. 41).  The judge found that this was sufficient grounds for an oppression claim to pass the 
first stage of the test for an injunction (par. 44) but that it did not meet the second stage, because a final 
order would be sufficient to undo any harm done by the shares being issued (par. 47). 
  
 
 
257 
 
Peter D. Fulmer Holdings Inc.
1453
  The applicant owned 49% of the company's shares.
1454
  Under the terms 
of the unanimous shareholder agreement,
1455
 the applicant was entitled to elect one director and the 
majority shareholder to elect two.
1456
  Moreover, unlike in Gillespie, the agreement provided that the 
minority shareholder was "vested with the day-to-day operating control and management".
1457
  McDermid 
J. found that the applicant "was president, (or had the day to day management and control of the 
corporation, which in all practical terms was the same thing under the by-laws)".
1458
  The majority 
shareholder informed the other that he intended to have him removed as president if he did not resign (the 
implications of the unanimous shareholder agreement not being discussed at that time) and the minority 
shareholder, believing that the other had the power to remove him, resigned.
1459
  McDermid J. determined 
that, under the circumstances, the resignation could not be treated as voluntary. 
1460
 
 The respondent argued that this was a dismissal for cause.  Citing Cavendish,
1461
 McDermid J. 
wrote that "although counsel were unable to provide any authority directly on point, there appears to be 
some suggestion that the Court has a discretion to override part or all of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement where there is bad faith or fraud, or where it would be unjust or unfair to allow a party to insist 
on its strict legal rights".
1462
  McDermid J. essentially settled this question by boiling it down to the issue of 
"reasonable expectations", as part of the oppression remedy, to determine whether the agreement needed to 
be followed.
1463
 
 McDermid J. found that the applicant's reasonable expectations were based on a combination of 
the agreement, the corporate by-laws, and the general understanding between the parties: 
 
14 What were the reasonable expectations of the parties?  From Fulmer's point of 
view, it was understood and agreed between him and Richardson that as long as Fulmer 
                                                          
1453
 Fulmer, supra note 756. 
1454
 Ibid, par. 2 sub 29. 
1455
 McDermid J. actually considered whether the agreement met the definition of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement, and found that it did (Fulmer, supra note 756, pars. 8-9). 
1456
 Fulmer, supra note 756, par. 5. 
1457
 Ibid, par. 7. 
1458
 Ibid, par. 23.  The by-law was set out more fully in paragrah 14, which defined the president as 
"the chief operating officer and, subject to the authority of the Board, shall have general supervision of the 
business of the corporation, and he shall have such other powers and duties as the Board may specify.  
During the absence or disability of the Managing Director or if no Managing Director has been appointed, 
the President shall also have the powers and duties of that office."  In equating the powers granted by the 
agreement with the position of president, McDermid J. ignored the possibility that the applicant might 
theoretically have been moved to a different position with similar powers, such as Managing Director, a 
situation that admittedly did not actually occur.  McDermid J. did note instead that no powers were taken 
from the minority shareholder as president to create a managing director (par. 15). 
1459
 Ibid, par. 2 sub 34. 
1460
 Ibid, par. 33. 
1461
 Cavendish, supra note 1416, discussed above. 
1462
 Fulmer, supra note 756, par. 12. 
1463
 Ibid, par. 13. 
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was a shareholder of the corporation he would have the day to day operating control and 
management of it and, therefore, would be its president.  He did not see himself entering 
into an employer/employee relationship with Richardson.  Rather, in accordance with the 
partnership agreement outline, he and Richardson were going to be "partners", albeit in 
the context of a corporate entity.  I find this was a reasonable expectation and perception 
on Fulmer's part.  It was he who knew the steel business and brought Richardson into 
Misteelco.  When Richardson and Fulmer bought Anderson's interest, Richardson 
became a shareholder in Holdings, which had been incorporated by Fulmer in 1988, 
when he and Anderson were operating Misteelco.  Fulmer's reasonable expectations 
would be conditioned by his understanding with Richardson, by the partnership 
agreement outline and the shareholder agreement with Richardson, and by the by-laws of 
Holdings. 
 
 While the unanimous shareholder agreement obviously played a central role in McDermid J.'s 
analysis of the applicant's reasonable expectations, it was not an exclusive one.  Expectations were 
"conditioned by" and "in accordance with" the agreements; they were not simply that the terms would be 
followed. 
 On the other hand, McDermid J. also considered the defendant's claims of his own reasonable 
expectations, which all amounted to variations on the applicant doing a good job as president.
1464
  This is an 
idiosyncratic approach to oppression remedy analysis; it would be more appropriate to categorize these 
elements as qualifiers on the applicant's own reasonable expectations, rather than introduce them as 
competing ones. 
 McDermid J. was "not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the corporation suffered any 
decline in profit under Fulmer's management or that they were sufficient to permit Richardson to engineer 
Fulmer's dismissal from the office of president in the face of the unanimous shareholder agreement".
1465
  
The implication was that there might be some decline in profit sufficient to allow for a dismissal contrary to 
a unanimous shareholder agreement.  The analysis surrounding the applicant's honesty was more lengthy, 
and ultimately more qualified; he was found to have been dishonest in some small ways, but nothing that 
substantially affected the corporation,
1466
  and despite the company's profitability, the respondent did have 
some legitimate grounds for complaint.
1467
  Despite these issues, McDermid J. concluded: 
 
23 One must bear in mind that Fulmer was not president under an express or 
implied contract of employment, or at the pleasure of the Board of Directors, or at 
Richardson's pleasure, as Richardson seemed to think.  Fulmer was president, (or had the 
day to day management and control of the corporation, which in all practical terms was 
the same thing under the by-laws), by virtue of the unanimous shareholder agreement 
between himself and Richardson.  It specifically provided that he was to enjoy the day to 
day operating control and management of the corporation so long as he was a 
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 Ibid, pars. 16-22. 
1465
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shareholder.  There were no qualifications attached to that absolute position.  Given the 
essential nature of the relationship between Fulmer and Richardson, namely that of 
partners, and their joint intention as expressed in Article 4.03 of the shareholder 
agreement, I am not prepared to import into the agreement any additional terms.  I take 
the agreement to express the intention of the parties completely and refrain from inferring 
that they intended that Fulmer might be dismissed for cause.  Fulmer was not hired to be 
the President of Misteelco.  He became President because he recruited Richardson to be 
his partner and they reached an agreement about his role that was expressed clearly and 
fully in Article 4.03.  If either wanted to end their relationship, he could resort to the 
shotgun clause.  Therefore, as repugnant as some of Fulmer's actions may have been to 
Richardson, I find that Richardson did not have the right in these circumstances simply to 
remove or cause the board of directors to remove the day to day operating control and 
management of the corporation from Fulmer by dismissing him from the office of 
president.  Although Fulmer was motivated to some degree by a desire to retaliate against 
Anderson when he invoked the shotgun clause in their shareholder agreement, he also 
very much wanted to secure control of Misteelco in order to take charge of its operations 
and to continue in the steel business.  Fulmer's reasonable expectation in aligning himself 
with Richardson was that he would have the day to day operating control and 
management of the corporation so long as he was a shareholder. 
 
 It is clear that elements of the corporate constitutional approach informed this oppression remedy 
analysis, e.g. absent a term in the agreement authorizing the dismissal of the president for cause, it was 
impossible for that to occur.
1468
  Further, despite discussion elsewhere of other elements that might 
influence the parties' reasonable expectations, there was in this passage a finding that the agreement 
represented the complete intention (here apparently synonymous with reasonable expectations) of the 
parties and was not qualified by additional factors.  Nonetheless, in context, this was a conclusion about the 
particular situation, after a serious consideration of the alternatives; the reasons for judgment explicitly, if 
inconsistently, suggested that other elements might be taken into consideration if appropriate, and that here, 
it was that very consideration of external factors that had led to the understanding that the agreement itself 
fully and accurately represented the parties' reasonable expectations. 
 Such expectations being formed not just by the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement but 
also by surrounding circumstances was similarly what occurred in King City Holdings Ltd. v. Preston 
Springs Gardens Inc.
1469
  Three investors in a corporation had a falling out.
1470
  The applicant, who owned 
40% of the corporate shares
1471
 but had voting control under the terms of the unanimous shareholder 
                                                          
1468
 The applicant also brought a separate claim for wrongful dismissal based on the terms of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, but McDermid J. determined that there was always a risk of losing his 
position if the shotgun clause were to be employed (Fulmer, supra note 756, pars. 70-71).  While that was 
not what had occurred, it was found that there was no entitlement to notice beyond that which the shotgun 
clause would have provided (par. 71). 
1469
 King City Holdings Ltd. v. Preston Springs Gardens Inc., 2001 CarswellOnt 1364, 14 B.L.R. (3d) 
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agreement,
1472
 sought a winding up order.
1473
  One of the respondents, who owned 50% of the shares,
1474
 
opposed the winding up and asked instead that the applicant be removed as a director so that the respondent 
could manage the company.
1475
  The respondent alleged that the applicant had breached the unanimous 
shareholder agreement by treating as a builder's lien funding which the agreement specified would be 
considered a shareholder's loan.
1476
  MacKinnon J. found that the applicants had apparently breached the 
agreement and that this would be an issue for trial.
1477
  However, the judge did not find that those actions 
negated it being just and equitable to wind up the corporation as they asked, because "the court should 
strive to craft a remedy that is both minimally intrusive and is consistent with the reasonable expectations 
of the parties".
1478
  Immediately following that statement, and therefore presumably as an implicit 
determination of what formed the parties' reasonable expectations, MacKinnon J. noted that "[t]he 
unanimous shareholder's agreement provided during construction for Dancy to have the right to sell the 
property and for voting control of the Corporation."
1479
  Still in the same apparent context, MacKinnon J. 
also found that the facts "equate to the concept of unforeseen circumstances in the shareholder's 
agreement".
1480
  It was deemed inequitable to impose a shotgun clause due to one party's superior financial 
position, even though that party already had a right under the unanimous shareholder agreement to sell the 
lands.
1481
  MacKinnon J. determined that ordering the corporation be wound up and there be a trial 
regarding the breaches would be "minimally intrusive on the rights of the parties in the context of the terms 
of the unanimous shareholders' agreement, and is an effort [...] to meet the reasonable expectations of the 
parties".
1482
  While the analysis was not always explicit, it appears that the unanimous shareholder 
agreement served to inform part of the reasonable expectations, but what were allegedly "unforeseen 
circumstances" were also included.  This raises the obvious contradiction of reasonable expectations 
regarding the unforeseen, a limit to what this method can handle. 
 In Richards v. Richards,
1483
 as part of an oppression claim, a motion was brought for an injunction 
to inter alia enforce the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement under which the applicant's consent 
would be required for various corporate acts.
1484
  There was disagreement as to whether the agreement was 
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in force
1485
 and evidence that it had historically been adhered to in part
1486
 but not strictly.
1487
  In analyzing 
whether this passed the first stage of the test for an injunction, Muise J. stated that a trial judge could 
ultimately find that the reasonable expectations of the parties were that the agreement should be followed 
"in spirit" as it allegedly had been historically,
1488
 strictly given the current relationship of the parties,
1489
 or 
that parts of the agreement might no longer be considered reasonable expectations in light of the situation 
and history;
1490
 the judge also noted that, even if the conduct in question did not violate the agreement, it 
might be oppressive.
1491
  This (along with other alleged oppression) was sufficient to pass the first stage of 
the test for an injunction.
1492
 
 On another interim motion for relief from oppression, 829194 Ontario Inc. v. Garibotti,
1493
 the 
requests included that the plaintiff be appointed to co-manage the company and financial disclosure.
1494
  A 
shareholder agreement
1495
 provided that the company have four directors, although it only had two, of 
which the plaintiff was one.
1496
  For reasons that are not entirely clear, Broad J. characterized the relief 
requested as being in line with rights granted by the act and the shareholder agreement.
1497
  Unless the 
document specifically promised the plaintiff the position of director, something not mentioned in the 
judgment, the relief was not in fact grounded in it, but rather in the position of director that he had been 
elected to. 
 Broad J. considered s. 253(1) of the O.B.C.A. (which allowed for applicants to ask the court to 
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 Ibid, pars. 135, 138. 
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 Ibid, pars. 147-152. 
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 Ibid, par. 137. 
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 Ibid, par. 310.  While the remainder of the analysis was technically outside the ambit of the 
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determining that there was a credible oppression claim, Muise J. found that given the corporation's 
continued profitability (pars. 337-338), the second stage of the injunction test was not met as there was no 
risk of harm (par. 349).  Even if there were, the judge found that the balance of convenience was against 
granting the relief sought, because of the danger that the applicant would assert her veto power under the 
agreement to pressure the other parties and not for "legitimate business reasons" (par. 424).  While this 
decision was made on an injunction motion and not as a final determination of rights, the disregard for the 
terms of the agreement in favour of contextual elements is striking, and stands in contrast not just to the 
principles of a corporate constitutional approach, but even to injunctions enforcing negative covenants. 
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enforce the act, articles, by-laws, or unanimous shareholder agreements) and noted that the language was 
permissive, not mandatory.
1498
  Similarly, it was stated that under the oppression remedy, the court could 
make any order it saw fit in the circumstances.
1499
  The judge concluded that "[a]ccordingly, an interim 
order of this nature may deviate from or override the strict requirements of a shareholders agreement in 
order to achieve these objectives".
1500
  Because "notwithstanding the Shareholders Agreement",
1501
 the 
defendant director had historically managed day-to-day operations, the least disruptive course was to allow 
him to continue to do so for the time being,
1502
 although the plaintiff director would be allowed to exercise 
the overall powers of the position with regard to non-routine matters.
1503
  Despite giving some effect to the 
terms of the agreement, this is yet another example of an oppression analysis that treated them as one factor 
among many, to be enforced or not as the overall circumstances dictated. 
 These cases represent the point at which the oppression approach to enforcing unanimous 
shareholder agreements truly comes into its own.  The corporate constitutional and contractual models both 
take the obligations in the agreement as a given, subject to very little qualification and minimal extrinsic 
evidence.
1504
  Only the directors' duties approach is at all similar, contextualizing the restrictions as part of 
a larger responsibility, but the standard that governs the duty of care is quite distinct from the "reasonable 
expectations" of the shareholders.  A wide "reasonable expectations" approach is therefore a true 
alternative.  It possesses both the positive and negative aspects of any "equitable" doctrine: at best, a 
flexible sensitivity to the parties' situation, and at worst, an unpredictable replacement of defined legal 
rights with judicial sensibilities.  While there are undoubtedly benefits to being responsive to realities 
beyond the confines of a written document, a "reasonable expectations" approach that puts too little stock 
in said agreement risks rendering it unenforceable (or driving parties to use other approaches, if those 
alternatives remain open) and replacing the rights the parties' bargained for with whatever the judge thinks 
is an appropriate "reasonable expectation" in the circumstances.  
 
6.(c)(iii) Extending the Terms 
 
 The complement to treating the rights in a unanimous shareholder agreement as subject to 
interpretation or limitation based upon other reasonable expectations is allowing for them to give rise to 
expectations greater than the wording actually sets out.  This is another departure from the corporate 
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constitutional or contractual approaches, which again would normally be associated with a more restrictive, 
literal reading of the document, and a further demonstration that the oppression remedy is a distinct model 
for enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements.
1505
 
 That was exactly the path taken in 864789 Alberta Ltd. v. Haas Enterprises Inc.
1506
  The personal 
plaintiff had owned through his holding company (also a plaintiff) 10.1% of the corporation which 
employed him.
1507
  Subsequent to a restructuring, his holding company instead became owner of shares of 
the employer's parent company.
1508
  Under the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement, if the personal 
plaintiff's employment was terminated (as it eventually was), his shares would be repurchased.
1509
  
Unfortunately, because the unanimous shareholder agreement entered into after the restructuring referred to 
employment with the parent company, but the employee had continued to receive payment and T4s from 
the subsidiary,
1510
 the parent corporation eventually took the position that he had never been its employee 
and therefore had not been terminated by it and thus the repurchase of his shares was not required.
1511
  
Shelley J. determined that the plaintiff had performed duties for the parent,
1512
 but that regardless the 
unanimous shareholder agreement should be interpreted to mean employment within the corporate group in 
order to give it sense.
1513
  After the termination of the employee but before trial, both the parent company 
and subsidiary in question had had their assets distributed and were dissolved.
1514
  The employee had not 
taken advantage of any dissent rights, due to his position that he was no longer a shareholder.
1515
 
 Shelley J. considered whether this suit was properly framed as an oppression claim, and if so 
which defendants should be liable.  After noting the basic principles of the remedy, including that it 
pertained to reasonable expectations
1516
 and that bad faith could be a factor but was not a necessary 
element,
1517
 the judge determined that a corporate restructuring that left a company unable to pay for breach 
of contract actions disregarded the applicants' reasonable expectation that a fund would be maintained to 
cover this potential liability, and that this was oppressive regardless of whether it was specifically intended 
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to frustrate recovery.
1518
  In deciding which of the respondents bore liability, it was noted that all of them 
were parties to the unanimous shareholder agreement.
1519
  Shelley J. found the personal defendant, the sole 
director, had caused oppression, first by taking (and thus causing the corporation to take) an interpretation 
that would have rendered portions of the unanimous shareholder agreement meaningless, and then making 
"significant decisions regarding acquisitions and restructuring without consulting with the Applicants as 
required under the [unanimous shareholder agreement]".
1520
  Shelley J. rejected the respondent's position 
that those obligations were meaningless and not intended to be binding, as that would require accepting that 
the parties to the document had not intended its provisions to have any effect.
1521
  Instead, the judge 
emphasized that unanimous shareholder agreements were entered into for a reason, which was here 
presumed to be rewarding the applicant for his work.  The purposive, rather than literal, manner in which 
the unanimous shareholder agreement had created reasonable expectations was summed up thus: "The 
USAs provided an escape to all parties, in case they decided to part ways.  It was a reasonable expectation 
that the shares would be purchased when Gibson was no longer personally involved in day-to-day 
operations."  Additionally, apparently also as part of determining reasonable expectations, Shelley J. 
examined the respondents' conduct after the applicant's employment had ceased and found it consistent 
with that interpretation.
1522
  This is an example of how reasonable expectations can be intertwined with 
unanimous shareholder agreements without being synonymous with them; ultimately, the expectation was 
slightly wider than what the documents literally provided.  This is the opposite logic and result to that 
found in Szijarto, discussed earlier, in which on similar facts, it was found that the reasonable expectations 
of the parties extended only to the rights literally provided. 
 Another case where "reasonable expectations" arising out of a unanimous shareholder agreement 
arguably went beyond its actual contents, Ellins v. Coventree Inc.,
1523
 concerns an application brought by 
three minority investors not over a violation per se but over another shareholder's attempts to block 
enforcement of the agreement.  The terms specified that the corporation and its corporate majority 
shareholder
1524
 would focus on different aspects of the CDO business.
1525
  A dispute arose as to whether the 
parent company had violated that agreement.  A Special Committee of the board determined that the parent 
had violated the CDO limitation provisions.
1526
  The unanimous shareholder agreement required that at 
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least one nominee director representing the parent corporation be at meetings.
1527
  Presumably in order to 
frustrate events, the two nominee directors first refused to attend a meeting
1528
 and then resigned, with the 
parent refusing to replace them.
1529
  The parent company purported to hold a shareholders meeting at which 
four of the existing directors were removed from office, three new ones (all employees of the parent) were 
elected to replace them, and the size of the board was reduced.
1530
  Lax J. held that this meeting violated 
provisions in the unanimous shareholder agreement requiring at least one employee shareholder be 
present
1531
 and provisions in the Act and by-laws requiring that shareholder meetings be chaired by a 
shareholder.
1532
 
 These technical barriers aside, Lax J. held that the parent company's replacement of the board was 
oppressive, because "[t]he CDO Limitation is central to the reasonable expectations of [the] 
shareholders".
1533
  It was further held that it was a triable issue whether those actions had been contrary to 
the best interests of all shareholders and not just oppressive to the minority.
1534
  Lax J. ordered that the 
parent company appoint two replacement directors and take no other steps to affect the board 
composition,
1535
  and also ordered a trial regarding the CDO limitation violation.
1536
  The replacement of 
the board of directors was at a significant enough remove from the CDO limitation itself to raise a question 
as to whether that was an enforcement of a term of the unanimous shareholder agreement (through its status 
as a reasonable expectation) or whether the term created wider expectations that not only would the 
majority shareholder refrain from entering that aspect of the CDO market (the term) but would also not 
abuse its control of the corporation to prevent it from taking necessary legal action (beyond the scope of the 
term). 
 Finally, Johnson v. Cava Secreta Wines & Spirits Ltd.
1537
 contained a variation.  The agreement 
was not mentioned during the "reasonable expectations" portion of the analysis,
1538
 but was referred to 
during the stage establishing that the shareholders' interests had been unfairly disregarded.
1539
  The 
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unanimous shareholder agreement guaranteed each investor one nominee on the board of directors.
1540
  
While that promise itself was not broken, the majority shareholder functionally ignored the board.  This 
would probably have been oppressive in any event, but the existence of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement helped bolster the finding that interests were being unfairly disregarded, even though it only 
guaranteed board representation, which had technically been granted. 
 While each of these cases could arguably fit under a very broad, purposive approach to 
interpreting the documents in question, the "reasonable expectations" method of enforcing unanimous 
shareholder agreements makes it analytically easier to justify expansive readings.  The meaning of the 
words need not be tortured nor somehow found ambiguous enough to require an "officious bystander"; it 
suffices to determine that the parties would not have reasonably expected this outcome.  As with weighing 
the agreement against other "reasonable expectations", however, there is the possibility that gains in 
fairness may be traded off against increased uncertainty. 
 
6.(c)(iv) Summation on Reasonable Expectations 
 
 The Supreme Court of Canada recently noted that the oppression remedy has two stages; the first 
involves consideration of the parties' reasonable expectations, and the second a determination as to whether 
the violation of those expectations has resulted in them being oppressed, unfairly prejudiced, or their 
interests unfairly disregarded.
1541
  Up to this point, my discussion of the oppression remedy has focussed 
upon cases that more-or-less proceeded in line with this methodology,
1542
 and in particular that emphasized 
"reasonable expectations" or some analogous term.  Taken collectively, despite all their contradictions, they 
arise from a specific conception of the oppression remedy, and it is possible to treat them as one approach 
to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements based upon protecting reasonable expectations. 
 If a unanimous shareholder agreement is in place and contains restrictions, those have an obvious 
relevance to the reasonable expectations of the shareholders.  While it is theoretically possible to maintain a 
distinction between expectations that exist in exact parallel with the terms of the agreement and the 
agreement itself, the case law demonstrates that, in practice, the two are largely inseparable.  To enforce 
one is to enforce the other.  What therefore makes the oppression remedy a distinct fourth approach to 
enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements is that the "reasonable expectations" of the parties do not 
have to precisely correlate with the document's terms.  The surrounding circumstances, existing 
relationships, changes since the documents were enacted, et cetera, are all also considerations in 
determining what the parties can expect.  Further, "reasonableness" itself provides a unique standard by 
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which to interpret the restrictions contained in a unanimous shareholder agreement.  Sometimes all of these 
will reinforce that the document reflects the parties' expectations, but not always. 
 This method thus allows for different outcomes than either the strict nullification of unauthorized 
acts through the corporate constitutional model or the principles and remedies of contract law.  "Reasonable 
expectations" in the circumstances may not include some terms of the document, or might be variations 
upon them, and it is possible for the agreement to give rise to expectations beyond its actual contents. 
 The second stage of the test has received less attention, but even if there are "reasonable 
expectation" based upon a unanimous shareholder agreement, their breach in some circumstances might not 
constitute conduct that was oppressive, unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregarding of interests.  Again, 
this would be a contextual determination, based upon all of the surrounding facts. 
 Judgments using this method can take into account considerations beyond the document and may 
come to conclusions that are prima facie inconsistent with it, but this remains nonetheless a model for 
enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements.  That its principles differ from, for example, contract law is 
the point.  A context-dependant approach to enforcement is still an approach to enforcement. 
 Like the previous three, the oppression model suggests particular understandings of this legal 
tool's nature.  But while the others each presented a single theory- that it was a fundamental rearrangement 
of power, that it was a contract, that it was part of the directors' existing obligations to the company- there 
are two possible variations of what the unanimous shareholder agreement is in this paradigm.  On the one 
hand, it might be nothing more than a list of agreed-upon items to serve as evidence of expectations.  If that 
is all that it is, then its special statutory status is irrelevant; even a document that failed to meet the 
legislative requirements could serve as a record of the parties' expectations.
1543
  On the other hand, the very 
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reason why the parties might have a reasonable expectation of compliance with the agreement could be 
because it is, by virtue of its statutory status, understood to be binding upon directors, as only a unanimous 
shareholder agreement can be. 
 As the following subsection explores, not all decisions nominally decided as oppression claims 
have gone this route.  Some rely more heavily upon one of the other three approaches.  But it is not the 
basis on which the claim is brought that defines this as a true fourth alternative;
1544
 it is the distinct analytic 
principles surrounding "reasonable expectations" that make the oppression remedy a unique model for 
understanding and enforcing the unanimous shareholder agreement, alongside the corporate constitutional, 
contractual, and directors' duties approaches. 
 
6.(d) Alternative Oppression Approaches 
 
 The most distinctive version of the oppression remedy approach is the contextual analysis of the 
parties' "reasonable expectations".  This incarnation, whatever its merits and flaws, can be understood as a 
coherent and unique model for addressing violations of these agreements.  But because the oppression 
remedy provides a statutory basis for bringing a claim, rather than just an analytic framework for 
determining one, decisions in unanimous shareholder agreement cases that are nominally brought in this 
manner do not, in fact, all adhere to any given theoretical model.  This may be attributable to wider issues 
with the remedy, debates concerning it and evolutions it has undergone.  While it is developing a degree of 
rigour, as seen in BCE, its governing principles have not always been as clear.
1545
  If the resulting analyses 
were devoid of any reference to oppression, the heading under which these claims were brought would be 
strictly of technical interest.  The statutory provision authorizing these claims would become just another 
door through which lawsuits could be brought, differing only in the available remedies, while the resulting 
decisions fell under one of the other three approaches. 
 The more likely alternative, as the case law demonstrates, is that the oppression remedy will be 
applied in a manner that presupposes the correctness of one of the other three approaches to understanding 
and enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements, while using its language and some elements from it.  
The next subsection examines those oppression cases where a corporate constitutional understanding was 
assumed.  The following subsection considers judgments where the principles guiding the analysis do not 
refer to "reasonable expectations", and instead contractual principles seem to be having an influence on the 
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determination of whether oppression occurred.  Ultimately, both types are problematic, and review of them 
suggests that there is little productive to be gained by this merger of doctrines.  Regardless of their 
outcomes, they are analytically unsatisfying, the unfortunate result of a claim brought under the heading of 
oppression before judges more inclined to a different model. 
 The other extreme is also possible.  Cases may arise which are quite clearly decided on the basis 
of oppression, but where the violation of a unanimous shareholder agreement was largely incidental, rather 
than a decisive factor.  In such circumstances, an oppression claim is appropriate, though the resulting 
judgments may have little to say about enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements, as the last of the 
following subsections explores. 
 
6.(d)(i) Oppression and Corporate Constitutional Analyses 
 
 The cases discussed in this subsection, while framed as oppression claims, include discussions of 
unanimous shareholder agreements that fit the description of "corporate constitutional"; the directors' 
behaviour in contravention of restrictions is described as being without authority, invalid, or some similar 
phrase.  These do not appear to be conclusions regarding the allegations of oppression, but rather simple 
statements that such actions were not within the board's legal powers.  They seem to be the result of judges 
operating from a corporate constitutional position as they hear an oppression claim.  Although it is 
impossible to completely dismiss the view that they were nullifying actions contrary to unanimous 
shareholder agreements on inadequately articulated oppression grounds, the result is, at the very least, a 
strong corporate constitutional influence on one strand of the oppression cases.  At most, these are a series 
of decisions nominally concerned with oppression that, at least with regard to these issues, were making 
findings on an outright corporate constitutional basis quite apart from any principles unique to that remedy.  
One can reconcile this by using the corporate constitutional model to understand the default nature and 
effect of unanimous shareholder agreements, but also acknowledging that disregarding them might be 
oppressive- i.e. that the oppression remedy coexists with other legal rights rather than being precluded by 
them- but this conflation of two different frameworks can lead to unnecessary confusion. 
 For example, in 2082825 Ontario Inc. v. Platinum Wood Finishing Inc.,
1546
 the individual 
applicant had entered into business with the defendants on a minority basis, paying slightly more than his 
proportional share to do so,
1547
 and they created a unanimous shareholder agreement which specified that 
he would be the corporate defendant's president and general manager and set his salary.
1548
  Despite this, 
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the other directors
1549
 cut off his salary when he became ill
1550
 and, shortly after he returned to work, 
removed him from his positions.
1551
  The applicant claimed oppression,
1552
 for which he sought his shares 
being bought out, and wrongful dismissal.
1553
 
 Newbould J. began the oppression analysis using the terminology developed for that area of the 
law: 
 
32 This situation does not reflect, to use the language of Farley J. in 820099 
Ontario Inc. v. Harold E. Ballard Ltd. [(Ont. Gen. Div.)], the compact made by the 
shareholders of Platinum.  The compact made by the shareholders, and thus their 
expectation, was that Mr. Barbieri invested $350,000 into a company that he was to run 
as president and general manager and over which he, through his holding company, had 
secured protection for his position as against the Herwynen brothers by virtue of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement.  [...]  To exclude Mr. Barbieri from management and 
the board of directors of Platinum while keeping his equity in the company was not only 
to unfairly disregard his interests as a shareholder, officer and director but was also 
conduct that was harsh and wrongful amounting to oppression. 
 
 The final sentence suggested that any finding of oppression need not rely upon the unanimous 
shareholder agreement; taking his money but denying him input into management was inherently 
oppressive.  But the earlier direct equation of the "compact" amongst the shareholders with their 
expectations presaged a turn to what appears to be simply a corporate constitutional approach, without the 
accouterments of oppression analysis.  The determination shortly thereafter was that, "[u]nder the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, his salary could not be changed without his consent".
1554
  Newbould J. 
elaborated on that point, fully in the mode of corporate constitutionalism: 
 
35 If, as asserted by the respondents, the meeting of June 14, 2008 at which Mr. 
Barbieri was said to be voted out of his position was a directors' meeting, the removal of 
Mr. Barbieri was not in accordance with the unanimous shareholder agreement and there 
was no power in the directors to do what they did.  By virtue of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement, the directors did not have the ability to change matters that were 
covered by the unanimous shareholder agreement.  It had been agreed by the shareholders 
that Mr. Barbieri was to be the president and general manager and his salary was 
something over which he had control.  Purporting to terminate him at a directors' meeting 
and terminating his salary was contrary to the unanimous shareholder agreement.  Taking 
steps to remove him as a required signatory to cheques was also contrary to it.  So far as 
purporting to remove Mr. Barbieri as a director is concerned, directors do not have such 
power. 
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36 It is doubtful that the meeting on June 14, 2008 was a shareholder meeting 
because there was more than one Herwynen brother there voting at it.  Each shareholder, 
being a holding company, would have the right to nominate one person to attend on its 
behalf.  However, assuming that it was a shareholder meeting, it would be a breach of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement for the Herwynen interests to vote against Mr. Barbieri 
being president and general manager. 
 
 While the overall nature of the judgment was a finding of oppression, this passage does not appear 
to be in that vein.  Instead, it rests upon the corporate constitutional argument that the restrictions in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement simply cannot be overridden by directors; the oppression remedy is 
beside the point. 
 The analysis then returned abruptly to that topic, as Newbould J. considered the respondents' 
arguments that they dismissed the applicant out of concerns regarding his management, ruling that these 
"came nowhere near what would justify a dismissal and the exclusion of Mr. Barbieri contrary to the their 
[sic] shareholder expectations, the compact made by the shareholders".
1555
  Along similar lines but with an 
additional qualification, Newbould J. found that "even if the respondents were not precluded by the 
unanimous shareholder agreement from purporting to terminate Mr. Barbieri in the manner which they did, 
the concerns raised by Peter Herwynen come nowhere close to justifying a dismissal contrary to the 
shareholder expectations of the shareholders.  They also come nowhere close to justifying a dismissal with 
cause."
1556
  The framing is significant; even a warranted dismissal would be contrary to the shareholder's 
expectations.  Presumably, it is at the second stage of the test that termination in such circumstances would 
have been found not to be oppressive. 
 2082825 did not completely abandon the oppression remedy in favour of corporate 
constitutionalism, since it contained some consideration of whether violating a unanimous shareholder 
agreement might ever be possible or permissible.  But the language in establishing the wrong exhibited a 
clear corporate constitutional character, not simply equating the agreement with reasonable expectations 
but outright declaring that directors had no power to do that which they had attempted. 
 Another case to decide an oppression claim on largely corporate constitutional logic was 827365 
Alberta Ltd. v. Alco Gas & Oil Production Equipment Ltd.
1557
  The corporation had three shareholders, two 
of whom held equal numbers of voting shares and one of whom held non-voting shares.
1558
  Eventually, 
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they each transferred their shares to their holding companies.
1559
  The parties entered into a series of 
unanimous shareholder agreements, with the eventual result that the two owners of voting shares were 
named therein as the only directors, and the quorum was set at two directors.
1560
  One of the shareholders 
was also named in the unanimous shareholder agreements as the corporate president and the other as vice-
president.
1561
  The director/president subsequently died.  After his death, the remaining director purported 
to name himself president and to appoint a third party as a director.
1562
 
 The heirs of the deceased brought an oppression claim to, inter alia, retroactively invalidate any 
acts taken during that period.  As part of the oppression analysis,
1563
 Murray J. retroactively nullified any 
and all resolutions passed during that time.  The logic employed took much from the corporate 
constitutional model, since it did not explicitly invoke oppression remedy language, instead treating 
nullification as a given; the analysis consisted of little more than a statement that the judge was "satisfied 
that the resolutions [...] were invalid and if not already rescinded are set aside".
1564
  Further, although 
Murray J. specifically noted that no loss or damage had been caused by these actions, they were 
nonetheless invalid because the quorum had not been met.
1565
  Despite this, the conclusion was that the 
proper course of action would have been to call a special meeting of the shareholders to appoint a new 
director;
1566
 this would have been inconsistent with the unanimous shareholder agreement unless it was 
amended. 
 The reasons for judgment contained other deviations from corporate constitutional principles as 
well.  Following the period described above, the heirs of the deceased, the holding company of the 
deceased, the surviving director, and his holding company entered a so-called "stand still agreement" with a 
defined expiration date, the terms of which included appointing one of the heirs as a director.
1567
  A 
resolution was then passed by the three shareholders, which did not directly mention the stand-still 
agreement, naming the surviving director and one of the heirs as the two voting directors and the (indirect) 
owner of non-voting shares as a non-voting director.  The resolution set their term of office as until the next 
general meeting.
1568
  Upon the subsequent expiration of the "stand still agreement", the original director 
took the position that he was once again the only one; the heirs asserted that the shareholders' resolution 
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was still in force.
1569
  Without discussion, Murray J. wrote, "I am of the opinion, as noted, that this [the 
heirs' position] is correct."
1570
  Potentially the shareholders' resolution itself constituted a unanimous 
shareholder agreement modifying the earlier ones, but Murray J. did not pursue this; on the face of it, the 
reasoning appears to have been that the appointment of a director by shareholders' resolution simply trumps 
a unanimous shareholder agreement, an unusual result.  The decision may have been pragmatic, rather than 
principled. 
 Another issue was the validity of certain share transfers.  The unanimous shareholder agreements 
allowed for transfers to holding companies.
1571
  There had been transfers on both sides which Murray J. 
determined were technically not to holding companies as described in the document,
1572
 but were within the 
spirit of the agreement, because the corporations were controlled by the heirs of the original 
shareholders.
1573
  The holding company's status as a shareholder was contested, and Murray J. determined 
that it could not be granted standing as a shareholder, and therefore could not invoke any statutory right 
dependant upon that status.
1574
  However, the judge stated that the applicants would "likely"
1575
 be able to 
apply to the court under s. 240, which allowed "a complainant" to apply to enforce a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.
1576
  Unfortunately, since the holding company which had previously held shares no 
longer existed, Murray J. concluded that an application under s. 240 could not work, on the basis that the 
only possible remedy under it would be to order shares that had been purportedly transferred contrary to the 
unanimous shareholder agreement to be transferred back, which would have been functionally 
impossible.
1577
  For reasons not clearly explained but presumably having to do either with fairness, 
consistency, or relative simplicity in the judgment, Murray J. decided that if one of the transfers could not 
be determined using s. 240, neither would be,
1578
  and instead resorted to the general authority of the court 
to determine contracts (under the judicature act).
1579
 
 The various methods and conclusions in 827365 illustrate both the influence that corporate 
constitutional logic can have on oppression analyses and the confusion and uncertainty that results when 
the oppression remedy is applied to unanimous shareholder agreements without clear, consistent principles 
to guide the analysis. 
 The view that directors cannot disregard restrictions on their authority also found expression in the 
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oppression claim of Zysko v. Thorarinson,
1580
  The corporation had two 50% shareholders, each a holding 
company wholly owned by an individual.
1581
  One of the shareholders (the respondent) provided greater 
amounts of capital, some in the form of a loan
1582
 while the other (the applicant) provided management 
services and was a contractor for the construction of the building the corporation owned, which was 
acknowledged in the unanimous shareholder agreement as constituting part of its contribution to equity.
1583
  
The agreement specifically provided that any financing of the project, as well as all "material or important 
decisions", required the shareholders' unanimous consent.
1584
  Despite this, two of the three directors 
executed a mortgage against the building that was the corporation's principle asset to secure their 
companies' loan to it.
1585
  They also, again acting as directors (and also as president), executed a general 
security agreement to cover the loan.
1586
  Neither of these was agreed to by the remaining director, who 
controlled the other shareholder.
1587
  The respondent, acting as president, also purported to pass by-laws 
that granted the board of directors greater borrowing power.
1588
  Finally, at a meeting of the three directors, 
the two-to-one majority passed a resolution ratifying their borrowings
1589
 and a resolution removing the 
third director from any power over the project and building.
1590
 
 Chrumka J. first held that adding security to an existing loan violated the unanimous shareholder 
agreement and was thus simply invalid.
1591
  After apparently having already concluded that, on corporate 
constitutional grounds, the security was void, the judge proceeded to consider whether it was oppressive, 
labelling this "the next issue".
1592
  This was apparently considered necessary in order to set it aside, despite 
the earlier conclusion: "If the granting of the Bluebird security is either oppressive, unfairly prejudicial or 
unfairly disregards the interests of ES'J Developments or Joseph Zysko pursuant to 242(3) of the Act a 
Court can set aside the Bluebird security."
1593
  Oddly, after a review of some general principles of 
oppression, Chrumka J. did not return to the question of the loan security and determine whether it was 
oppressive, but instead turned to the directors' resolutions that removed the applicant from "their 
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contractual role".
1594
  They were found to be oppressive and therefore invalid.
1595
  On the other hand, the 
mortgage was invalidated on corporate constitutional grounds (it contravened both the unanimous 
shareholder agreement and the by-laws) and because it violated a different section of the Act relating to 
disclosure.
1596
  This judgment represents another confusing mix of multiple approaches, without a clear 
rationale for which applies when and why. 
 These cases were overtly brought under the oppression remedy, but careful reading indicates that 
they were heavily influenced by the corporate constitutional approach, with its axiom that directors cannot 
disregard restrictions on their authority and any attempts to do so are void.  Framing them as oppression 
and using related concepts only served to add complications and unnecessary ambiguity; in the next 
subsection, a similar pattern involving the intermingling of the oppression remedy and the contractual 
approach will yield similar problems.  If it is not going to be applied through a "reasonable expectations" 
test unique to it, it would be preferable to dispense with the oppression remedy and simply use whichever 
other method seems most apt for handling the enforcement of these instruments.  In these cases, similar 
results could have been achieved through a straightforward corporate constitutional approach, with greater 
simplicity, certainty, and consistency. 
 
6.(d)(ii) Oppression and Contractual Analyses 
 
 Without a clearly developed set of principles to guide judgments, such as "reasonable 
expectations", use of the oppression remedy to enforce unanimous shareholder agreements requires some 
substitute standard to serve as the basis for judgment.  In the previous subsection, claims brought under the 
oppression remedy but decided using a corporate constitutional model were examined.  That is not the only 
available alternative.  The contractual approach provides another. 
 I earlier suggested that even when "reasonable expectations" determine the outcome of an 
oppression claim, insofar as they are themselves derived from the wording of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, the contractual approach may play a role, either implicit or explicit, in determining whether 
they are met.  When the notion of "reasonable expectations" is removed from the analysis, a similar 
phenomenon can occur.  Sometimes, the lack of consideration given to them may be because the judgment 
was too preliminary to contain much substance at all, as in Klianis v. Poole
1597
, Tremblay c. Michot,
1598
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 In Klianis v. Poole, 1992 CarswellOnt 3204, 33 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1228, [1992] O.J. No. 1172 (Ont. 
Gen. Div. Jun 05, 1992), a corporation had three shareholders, all of whom were directors (par. 4).  Two of 
them requested that the court order they have access to the records of the company, pursuant to the 
legislation and a term of the unanimous shareholder agreement (par. 7).  Ground J. ordered that they have 
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Hames v. Greenberg,
1599
 and Groeneveld v. 1034936 Alberta Ltd.
1600
  In other cases, such as the five 
discussed below, something akin to a contractual analysis appears to be taking place, although each 
provided its own spin.  The first, while framed as an oppression claim, used what were clearly contract law 
principles as the entire basis for the judgment.  In the second, a finding of breach of contract was followed, 
with minimal explanation, by the statement that this constituted oppressive and unfairly prejudicial 
conduct, although the damages were determined to be identical.  The next two simply took violations of a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the access guaranteed by the statute and that, in accordance with the terms of the agreement, they could 
have a chartered accountant appointed to audit the records (par. 9).  This issue was dealt with first outside 
the realm of the oppression remedy, and it is not entirely clear whether it was a contractual or corporate 
constitutional approach being used, although the choice of forcing the parties to comply with the 
document's terms rather than awarding damages might imply the former.  With regard to the claim that 
having been prevented from accessing the records (in contravention of the legislation and the agreement) 
was oppressive, Ground J. simply stated that "authorities have been cited to me as to whether a failure by a 
majority shareholder to cause the corporation to permit inspections or audits provided for by statute or by 
shareholders' agreement, amounts to oppressive action within the meaning of s. 248 of the Act so as to give 
the court jurisdiction to make orders of the nature listed in subs. 248(3) of the Act.  In my view, it is 
premature to decide this question at this time" (par. 10).  Ground J. found that the minimum remedy for 
such a finding would be to order that access to the records be allowed, as was being done regardless (par. 
10).  Any further finding of oppression would depend upon what those documents revealed (par. 10). 
1598
 Tremblay, supra note 1202.  On an interim motion as part of an oppression claim, among other 
determinations, an injunction was granted against removing the plaintiff from the position of director he 
was guaranteed in the unanimous shareholder agreement; the brief analysis focussed on the balance of 
convenience, with the underlying substance addressed only through a reference to his "apparent right" 
("droit apparent") to be a director (par. 39). 
1599
 Hames v. Greenberg, 2014 ONSC 245, 2014 CarswellOnt 664, 237 A.C.W.S. (3d) 649, 23 B.L.R. 
(5th) 117 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Jan 20, 2014).  On a motion for interim costs in an oppression claim, 
Brown J. listed possible violations of a unanimous shareholder agreement that it was determined would 
require a trial, then stated that the allegations constituted a case of sufficient merit to meet that stage of the 
test for interim costs (pars. 34-38).  Other possible sources of oppression had also been alleged (pars. 26, 
31), but the judge's finding of a case of sufficient merit rested primarily upon the violation of the 
agreement.  (The agreement was usually referred to simply as a shareholder agreement or "SHA" in the 
judgment, but was referred to as a "unanimous shareholder agreement" in a reproduced statement of the 
plaintiff at par. 24.) 
1600
 In Groeneveld v. 1034936 Alberta Ltd., 2005 ABQB 834, 2005 CarswellAlta 1681, 144 A.C.W.S. 
(3d) 471, [2006] A.W.L.D. 148, [2006] A.W.L.D. 208, [2005] A.J. No. 1554 (Alta. Q.B. Nov 07, 2005), 
the minority shareholder brought an application for an interim injunction removing the two majority 
shareholders from control of the company and giving it to him, pending the trial of his oppression claim.  
The applicant's position was based on allegations that he had been excluded from management of the 
company and that it was mismanaged (par. 13).  There was a unanimous shareholder agreement in place 
which specified that the applicant was to be the company's treasurer (par. 12); the majority shareholders 
had removed him from this position, which Gallant J. found "appears to offend" (par. 12) the agreement.  
There had also been an investigation by an inspector pursuant to an earlier consent order, which had found 
a variety of problems with the management of the business (par. 14).  These included accounting practices 
contrary to the unanimous shareholder agreement (par. 14) but no emphasis was placed on that element in 
the judgment as compared to the other mismanagement.  Gallant J.'s analysis regarding the oppression 
claim per se was limited to setting out the facts and then stating during the first stage of the three part 
injunction test that "there is a serious issue to be tried" (par. 21).  The judge did not find that there was a 
strong case for the remedy sought in this injunction (par. 21).  The potential harm could be rectified by 
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unanimous shareholder agreement as prima facie oppressive.  In the final one, relief was granted even 
though the conduct was found not to be oppressive, on contractual grounds.  Like the oppression claims 
determined through corporate constitutional principles, the oppression remedy adds little to what were 
essentially examples of the contractual approach.
1601
 
 In the nominally oppression-based case 3356175 Canada Inc. (Judithco) c. Kruco Inc. (Kruco),
1602
 
one of the investors had executed a put option found in the unanimous shareholder agreement.
1603
  It stated 
that the price paid was subject to subsequent recalculation in the event that the government reassessed the 
corporation's tax obligations for a period prior to the exercise of the option in a manner that would have 
affected the price calculation under the prescribed formula.
1604
  The corporation successfully appealed tax 
assessments for that period.
1605
  There was a dispute as to whether the term in the unanimous shareholder 
agreement only worked to retroactively lower the put price, or whether it could raise it as well. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
damages (par. 26) and the balance of convenience favoured the respondents (par. 29). 
1601
  Callahan v. King George Square Properties Inc., 2002 CarswellOnt 3025, [2002] O.J. No. 3513 (Ont. 
S.C.J. Sep 03, 2002) also illustrates how the assumptions of the contractual model can influence the 
enforcement of a unanimous shareholder agreement through the oppression method, specifically the choice 
of remedy.  The decision was part of an oppression claim (par. 2).  The applicant sought as injunctive relief 
that, pending trial, he not be removed from his position as manager of the corporation (par. 1), a position 
guaranteed in the unanimous shareholder agreement (par. 3).  The company continued to pay him his salary 
(par. 2).  Ground J. denied injunctive relief on the basis that there was no irreparable harm to him being 
removed as manager (par. 2) but there might be if he was not (par. 4).  Though an on-the-facts 
interpretation of this particular agreement, it included the declaration that a unanimous shareholder 
agreement never completely insulates a manager from being fired when the majority of the investors have 
lost trust in them, and that damages are the appropriate remedy: 
 
3 Moreover, I am unable to interpret the Unanimous Shareholders Agreement as 
giving Mr. Callahan some entrenched right to continue on as manager until the 
Unanimous Shareholders Agreement is terminated or the corporation wound up.  It 
cannot be that Section 3.12 of the Agreement prevents the directors from terminating Mr. 
Callahan as manager if they believe, rightly or wrongly, that he has not been performing 
his duties competently, honestly and in the best interests of the corporation, and in my 
view, Section 3.15 sets out the mechanism for doing so.  If the court should ultimately 
find that the directors are acting improperly, Mr. Callahan will be compensated in 
damages. 
 
Although it is common to award damages for oppression, and thus this is not necessarily an example of the 
contractual approach being applied through the mechanism of the oppression remedy, the out-of-hand 
dismissal of any other remedy suggests it as a possible influence.  Certainly, a judge inclined to the 
contractual method of enforcement would be likely to, if faced with a claim framed as oppression, turn to 
damages as the solution. 
1602
 3356175 Canada Inc. (Judithco) v. Kruco Inc. (Kruco), 2006 QCCS 3994, 2006 CarswellQue 
7335, J.E. 2006-1812, EYB 2006-108106 (C.S. Que. Jul 28, 2006) (hereinafter "3356175 CS"). 
1603
 Ibid, par. 10. 
1604
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 Although the shareholder who had exercised the put option brought an action for oppression,
1606
 
the analysis of Tingley J.S.C. was distinctly contractual in nature.  There were no references to "reasonable 
expectations".  Instead, the language of the agreement was interpreted in light of the stated intent and 
purposes in the preamble and of the document as a whole,
1607
 the subheadings,
1608
 the apparent intent of the 
provision in question,
1609
 the parties' knowledge that their tax appeal might be successful,
1610
 the exact 
language of the document,
1611
 and whether contingent claims are normally considered assets under 
accounting principles.
1612
  The parties' intent and understanding of the document could theoretically speak 
to their "reasonable expectations", but that terminology was not invoked, and the overall structure and 
language of the judgment was simply one of contract. 
 The Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the lower court judgment.
1613
  Three of their four reasons 
involved the specific wording employed in the document, although the last one was a general principle of 
equality amongst the shareholders that the Court of Appeal found underlay the agreement.
1614
  The 
oppression remedy was again handled little differently from how one might expect the analysis to run in 
any breach of contract case.
1615
 
 Gottlieb v. Adam,
1616
 on the other hand, made a point of drawing a distinction between contractual 
enforcement and the oppression remedy, but in applying the latter, it contained no mention of "reasonable 
expectations", skipping to what the Supreme Court described as the second step of the oppression remedy 
analysis.  The corporation in question had two shareholders.  The minority one purported to exercise a 
shotgun clause, in which she set a nominal price for the shares
1617
 and attempted to offset the parties' 
shareholder loans against one another "in proportion with [their] shareholdings" such that she offered to 
pay nothing for the other party's shareholder's loan and would accept a reduced amount as compensation for 
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"3356175 CA").  Unlike 3356175 CS, supra note 1602, 3356175 CA does not refer to the document as a 
unanimous shareholder agreement. 
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 The Court of Appeal did mention that this claim has been brought under the oppression remedy, at 
3356175 CA, supra note 1613, par. 22, but there is no elaboration of any legal principles that might 
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 Gottlieb, supra note 1095.  The document is generally referred to only as a "shareholder's 
agreement" in the reasons for judgment, but is called a unanimous shareholder agreement in 
correspondance reproduced at par. 18. 
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hers.
1618
  Despite protests from the other investor, the minority shareholder then used the power of attorney 
granted by the agreement and her status as director to transfer the applicant's shares to her.
1619
  Spence J. 
held that the treatment of the shareholder's loans was not in accordance with the agreement, because the full 
amount should have been part of the offer.
1620
  After finding that the respondent was liable for breach of 
contract under r. 14.05 (presumably qua shareholder), Spence J. went on to consider the oppression 
remedy: 
 
40 It appears to me that this is a proper case for relief under s. 248, given the 
actions of the respondent.  She took steps in her capacity as a director of the corporation 
to cause the company to give effect to her acquisition of the applicant's interest in the 
company and his consequent removal from any involvement in its affairs.  Since her 
acquisition was in breach of the shareholders' agreement, her use of her capacity as a 
director to implement the acquisition was oppressive and unfairly prejudicial to the 
interests of the applicant as a security holder of the company.  I recognize that s. 248 
might at first glance not be expected to apply in this case.  The respondent was a minority 
shareholder and the applicant was the majority shareholder at the time.  The oppressive 
conduct related to a shareholders' agreement, a private contractual arrangement between 
the parties rather than an element of the corporate structure of the company.  While these 
facts, viewed in isolation, might seem to make the oppression remedy inapplicable, 
further consideration leads to the opposite conclusion.  The minority shareholder 
employed her capacity as a director to carry out the appropriation of the shares of the 
majority holder.  It is the use of the director's position in this manner, to effect that 
appropriation, that is oppressive.  The fact that the respondent was only a minority 
shareholder and that the appropriation came about as a result of a purported exercise of 
rights under a shareholders' agreement does not make the conduct any less oppressive. 
 
 The relationship between the unanimous shareholder agreement and the oppression remedy in this 
passage is unclear and almost contradictory.  On the one hand, the rather vague analysis suggested that 
simply because the acquisition breached the terms of the agreement, the respondent's actions qua director in 
implementing it were prima facie oppressive; indeed, no further explanation was given for this conclusion.  
On the other, it was then suggested that since the agreement was merely a private contract and not a part of 
the corporate structure (an incorrect position, per Duha) that that might "in isolation" make the oppression 
remedy inapplicable, but that "further consideration" revealed that appropriation in violation of an 
agreement is not less oppressive than any other appropriation.  Spence J. also emphasized that the 
oppressive acts were those done qua director in giving effect to the transfer, not those done qua shareholder 
in making the defective offer; this was an enforcement of the unanimous shareholder agreement as a 
component of the corporate governance structure, not as an ordering of private rights between investors. 
 Spence J. found that contractual damages (owed in the capacity of shareholder) should put the 
applicant in the position he would have been in had there been no breach, i.e. if he had been paid the 
                                                          
1618
 Gottlieb, supra note 1095, par. 15. 
1619
 Ibid, par. 19. 
  
 
 
280 
 
recorded (rather than actual) value of the shareholder loans.
1621
  Despite the respondent's arguments that the 
loans were worthless, the amount awarded against her qua director for the oppression
1622
 was the same as 
that for breach of contract.
1623
  Although it was noted that normally the remedy would only have entitled 
the applicant to the fair value of the security, on these facts "it would seem unfair"
1624
 to the judge for him 
to receive less than the amount the respondent would have had to pay but for the oppressive conduct.
1625
  
Despite this, and despite noting that the respondent's arguments that the actual value of the loans (zero) 
should be used "[did] not seem compelling",
1626
 the judge technically declined to decide the matter because 
the conclusions already reached made it unnecessary.
1627
  Even after explicitly contrasting the oppression 
remedy with contract law, Gottlieb ultimately used contractual damage as the yardstick for measuring the 
oppression award. 
 The judgment in Clarfield v. Manley
1628
 was a winding-up order,
1629
 not technically an oppression 
one, but nonetheless, the conduct of one of the shareholders/directors was found to be oppressive.
1630
  In 
establishing that, two elements were specifically highlighted, both tied to the unanimous shareholder 
agreement.  First, he had called a directors meeting without informing the other shareholder (who was not 
then a director but had been promised he would be appointed one), at which important decisions were 
made; Blair J. noted, "At the very least, this conduct contravened the provisions of the unanimous 
shareholders' agreement."
1631
  Further, the judge wrote, "the unanimous shareholders' agreement requires 
that 'all decisions (apart from those requiring unanimity) affecting the operations of the Company shall be 
determined by a majority of the [parties to the agreement]' [....]  Mr. Manley has been utilizing his position 
as a director of Clear Customs to frustrate Mr. Clarfield in this regard.  He is not entitled to do so, in my 
view."
1632
  Since that was the extent of the analysis, the implication was that violating a unanimous 
shareholder agreement is prima facie oppressive.  Arguably, this was not an example of the contractual 
approach, since it was not explicit that contract law principles were used, but something along those lines is 
the most likely explanation, since there was no reference to "reasonable expectations" nor suggestion that 
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the improper acts were nullities. 
 Similarly, in Boulanger c. GSI Environnement inc.,
1633
 an ex-employee argued that the company's 
refusal to buy back his shares in accordance with a unanimous shareholder agreement was oppressive.
1634
  
The analysis of Viens J.C.S was brief, avoiding any detailed oppression remedy methodology and 
apparently accepting that a violation of the agreement was prima facie oppressive: 
 
114 A notre avis, le simple fait qu'il a quitté son emploi en septembre 1999 sans que 
tout soit mis en oeuvre pour que ses actions soient rachetées par la compagnie montre 
qu'on refuse de prendre en considération ses intérêts et qu'en conséquence, on abuse de 
ses droits comme actionnaire minoritaire de GSI.
1635
 
 
115 Nous sommes d'opinion qu'en ce sens, le demandeur est victime d'oppression et 
qu'il y a lieu d'intervenir, de passer outre aux dispositions de la convention unanime des 
actionnaires (P-3) et d'enjoindre la société GSI de racheter les 780 actions catégorie A de 
son capital-actions détenu par le demandeur.
1636
 
 
 Despite finding that the refusal to buy back the employee's shares was prima facie oppressive and 
ordering them bought- a step described by Viens J.C.S as outside the agreement, but apparently only in a 
procedural sense, rather than a substantive one- the judge declined to hold the company liable for moral 
damages for its oppressive acts,
1637
 including but not limited to the aforementioned refusal to buy back the 
shares.
1638
  Despite the various other allegations of oppression reviewed, the methodology and result with 
regard to the share purchase appear less like a judgment under that remedy than one in contract.
1639
 
 The recent case of Matic c. Trottier
1640
 took this even further.  Despite being brought in part as an 
oppression claim
1641
 and Corriveau J.C.S. specifically noting the wide range of remedies this made 
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 Boulanger c. GSI Environnement inc., 2002 CarswellQue 1784, J.E. 2002-1680, [2002] R.J.D.T. 
1089, REJB 2002-33553 (C.S. Que. Aug 05, 2002). 
1634
 Ibid, par. 109. 
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everything being in place for his shares to be purchased by the company shows that they refused to 
consider his interests and consequently, they abused his rights as a minority shareholder in GSI." 
1636
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 Boulanger, supra note 1633, par. 136. 
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 Ibid, pars. 100-109. 
1639
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court's intervention as outside the agreement per se speaks against that interpretation. 
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 Matic, supra note 1040.  The dispute between the shareholders involved the interpretation of a 
term specifying a 2.1% raise for all corporate employees if benchmarks were met and whether certain 
expenses had to be taken into account in such calculations (pars. 9-12).  The case is also authority that the 
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available,
1642
 the general principles of contract interpretation from article 1426 of the Civil Code of 
Quebec
1643
 were applied in order to determine which of the two shareholders' understanding of the 
agreement was correct.
1644
  Demonstrating the extent to which this judgment veered away from oppression 
and toward contract, Corriveau J.C.S. specifically declined to find that disagreement was abusive,
1645
 even 
while ordering specific performance.
1646
  Given that choice of remedy, and that there was no serious 
consideration that the unanimous shareholder agreement could be ignored subject to damages, a corporate 
constitutional influence is visible as well. 
 It is perhaps inevitable that contract law will play some role in enforcing unanimous shareholder 
agreements.  While the choices represented by it are not the only possible principles for interpreting 
documents, it is simply too convenient and too ingrained in legal minds to be ignored.  But while the 
corporate constitutional model or a "reasonable expectations" framework might make use of contract law 
principles, they integrate them into a distinct methodology.  When an oppression analysis discards 
"reasonable expectations" and uses breach of contract as a proxy instead, there is little point to avoiding 
direct resort to the contractual approach.  The only advantage that oppression retains is its wider range of 
remedies, and while that is a significant benefit, it could easily be granted by statute to the contractual 
enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements as well.  This would allow for a straightforward 
contractual approach, and avoid unnecessary complications or uncertainty arising from its conflation with 
the oppression remedy.  Conversely, a principled oppression analysis that was not overly reliant upon 
contract-based logic, such as the "reasonable expectations" model, would also be preferable. 
 
6.(d)(iii) Larger Patterns of Oppression 
 
 Unlike the corporate constitutional and contractual approaches to enforcing unanimous 
shareholder agreements, the oppression remedy can make it difficult to determine what role the agreement 
itself plays in the analysis.  Whatever acts are occurring in violation of it are most likely also generally 
detrimental to the interests of the complainant.  This is true in other models as well, but in those cases, the 
very nature of the analysis will call attention to the agreement.  In oppression cases, the fact pattern as a 
whole can be set out and then deemed oppressive.  Even when violations of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement are identified as part of that pattern, the judicial emphasis might be elsewhere to the point where 
it seems likely that the same conclusion would have been reached even had the agreement not existed, as in 
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Journet c. Superchef Food Industries Ltd.,
1647
 101114752 Saskatchewan Ltd. v. Kantor,
1648
 Metcalfe v. 
Anobile,
1649
 Trackcom Systems inc. c. Trackcom Systems international inc.,
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1647
 Journet c. Superchef Food Industries Ltd., [1984] C.S. 916, 29 B.L.R. 206, 1984 CarswellQue 28, 
J.E. 84-698 (C.S. Que. May 23, 1984).  The respondent took a variety of illegitimate and dishonest steps to 
take over a corporation (summarized at par. 48).  Among other things, these violated a unanimous 
shareholder agreement that required equal shareholdings between the family of the petitioner and the 
respondent (par. 10), but there was no emphasis on this in the judgment; in Gomery J.'s summary of all the 
oppressive acts, it is subsumed without being specifically mentioned into item 12, "operating and 
administering the business and affairs of Superchef in complete disregard of his legal and contractual 
obligations to the other shareholders, and as though he were its only shareholder" (par. 48). 
1648
 101114752 Saskatchewan Ltd. v. Kantor, 2012 SKCA 64, [2013] 2 W.W.R. 425, 399 Sask. R. 36, 
2012 CarswellSask 434, 552 W.A.C. 36, 218 A.C.W.S. (3d) 417, [2012] S.J. No. 396, 3 B.L.R. (5th) 171 
(Sask. C.A. Jun 25, 2012).  As part of an oppression action, an injunction was granted to have the proceeds 
of the sale of potash paid into court (pars. 2-3).  The minority shareholder had concerns that these funds 
would otherwise be appropriated by the majority shareholder, and while only an incidental part of the 
judgment, Jackson J.A. did briefly note that a unanimous shareholder agreement guaranteed the minority 
shareholder a portion of the company's potash product (par. 50) and that "[i]f 9711 SaskCo distributes all of 
the proceeds from the sale of the potash proceeds, it is highly unlikely that Article 7.1 [of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement] will be fulfilled" (par. 52). 
1649
 Metcalfe v. Anobile, 2010 ONSC 5087, 2010 CarswellOnt 8036, 194 A.C.W.S. (3d) 476, [2010] 
O.J. No. 4548, 77 B.L.R. (4th) 293 (Ont. S.C.J. Oct 26, 2010).  The defendants bought 96% of the shares of 
a company, with the plaintiff owning almost all of the remainder (par. 16), and proceeded to ignore the 
plaintiff's interests while removing all corporate value for themselves (par. 64).  The plaintiff had expected 
to have a buy-back clause in the unanimous shareholder agreement used to have the corporation redeem his 
shares for "fair value",  but it never was (par. 67).  The judge noted that the agreement specified it could be 
amended by shareholders owning two-thirds of the shares, which the defendants possessed, and thus they 
could have amended it in their favour, but they never did (par. 66).  While this suggests that compliance 
with the agreement (in a hypothetical amended form) might have avoided the finding of oppression, and 
that therefore the violation of the agreement was a key factor, the general behaviour of the defendants 
seems very likely to have constituted oppression regardless. 
1650
 Trackcom Systems inc. c. Trackcom Systems international inc., 2013 QCCS 4487, 2013 
CarswellQue 9378, EYB 2013-226943 (C.S. Que. Sep 23, 2013).  In this interim motion, Castonguay J.C.S. 
described the oppressive acts of the defendants as numerous (par. 101) and then proceeded to list eight 
principal examples- while noting that there were others- which included two that were identified as in 
contravention of a unanimous shareholder agreement: the de facto firing of the plaintiff from his position as 
director and the de facto cessation of operations without approval (par. 103).  Although the appeal, 
Trackcom Systems inc. v. Trackcom Systems international inc., 2014 QCCA 1136, 2014 CarswellQue 5192, 
J.E. 2014-1060, EYB 2014-238036 (C.A. Que. Jun 02, 2014), primarily concerned the choice of remedy, 
the Court of Appeal did confirm the finding of oppression, mentioning violation of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement twice in passing while listing off various oppressive elements the trial judge had 
identified (pars. 27 and 39), but placing the greatest focus on the failure to provide financial information 
(par. 41). 
1651
 Trudel-Giguere c. Tremblay, 2011 QCCS 7258, 2011 CarswellQue 14823, 216 A.C.W.S. (3d) 
634, EYB 2011-200895 (C.S. Que. Jan 16, 2011).  The reasons for judgment reproduced a lengthy list of 
allegations from the plaintiff's affidavit, including that the defendant causing the company to purchase a car 
without approval of the board of directors and in violation of a unanimous shareholder agreement, then 
subsequently put the vehicle to personal use (par. 10). 
1652
 167806 Canada Inc v. Ain & Zakuta (Canada) Inc., 1996 CarswellQue 2535, J.E. 96-1758, [1996] 
Q.J. No. 2689, EYB 1996-85038 (C.S. Que. Aug 23, 1996).  The corporation made an offer to the 
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petitioner to redeem its shares; it was inspired by provisions in the unanimous shareholder agreement 
granting the other shareholders the option to purchase its shares, but did not actually follow any terms of 
said agreement (par. 49).  The petitioner accepted, but it subsequently became apparent that the corporation 
would soon be wound up and that, by virtue of the terms of the share redemption, the petitioner could 
receive more per share than the other investors (par. 55).  This prompted them to have the corporation 
declare a dividend, which was paid in priority to the amount owed for the share redemption (par. 59).  In 
analyzing whether oppression had occurred, Dalphond J.C.A. listed the following factors: that the 
shareholders (other than the petitioners) had transferred shares amongst themselves in a manner that did not 
comply with the unanimous shareholder agreement (par. 58); the declaration of a dividend while ignoring 
the corporation's commitment to pay the petitioner for its shares and without obtaining approval from the 
shareholders as required by the unanimous shareholder agreement (par. 58); that the majority shareholders 
had earlier set up a competing company and caused the corporation to invest in it, all without informing the 
petitioner, in breach of obligations to its shareholders and creditors, and in violation of provisions of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement (par. 60); the termination of the petitioner as an employee while 
retaining the majority shareholders (par. 61); and the purported cancellation of unpaid portions of a 
dividend owed to the petitioner (under the corporation's then position that the earlier offer to redeem had 
been revoked rather than accepted) without notice or consent, something not permitted by law in any event 
(par. 62).  Given all these factors, it is difficult to sort out the degree to which breaches of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement constituted oppression, but it is noteworthy that the share transfer between minority 
investors was listed, since that does not seem particularly oppressive, save that it violated the agreement.  
On the other hand, the declaration of the dividend was described in substantially negative terms and 
Dalphond J.C.A. stated that it was unfairly prejudicial to the petitioner, all before adding that "moreover" it 
was in violation of the agreement (par. 59). 
1653
 Tilley v. Hails, 7 O.R. (3d) 257, 6 B.L.R. (2d) 298, 1992 CarswellOnt 141 (Ont. Gen. Div. Jan 30, 
1992).  Two 50% shareholders had had a falling out and become deadlocked (par. 12).  Although normally 
this would have been a situation where winding up the company was appropriate, both parties asked that 
the court make use of the broad powers it would have under the oppression remedy (par. 13).  Borins J. 
determined that the question to be resolved was which party was responsible for the deadlock (par. 47).  
The two shareholders had a unanimous shareholder agreement (the reasons for judgment do not usually 
describe it using that term, although the phrase does appear when the judge notes that the court has the 
power to amend a unanimous shareholder agreement (par.  53)) in place that named them both as directors, 
with one named as president and the other as vice-president (par. 8).  After relations between the two 
soured, the vice-president took various steps to interfere in aspects of the company normally overseen by 
the president and to otherwise harass him, including having him arrested on spurious firearms possession 
charges (pars. 14-22).  Various allegations were also made against the president (pars. 29-39).  Borins J. 
concluded that the vice-president was the one at fault.  The bulk of the analysis referred to the history of the 
parties and their actions and expectations generally, without invoking any violation of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement (pars. 48-51).  However, and although technically this was not an oppression claim, 
Borins J. stated, "The evidence satisfies me that the conduct of Hails [the vice-president], which I have 
summarized, was intended to remove Tilley from asserting his proper role in the management of Tilley 
Endurables contrary to the terms of their shareholders' agreement with the ultimate goal of forcing him out 
of the company and is a clear case of oppression contrary to s. 247 of the Business Corporations Act, 1982" 
(par. 50).  On appeal, Tilley v. Hails, 8 O.R. (3d) 169, 6 B.L.R. (2d) 320, 1992 CarswellOnt 142, [1992] 
O.J. No. 937 (Ont. Div. Ct. May 05, 1992), the judgment was substantially upheld (par. 19), although the 
evidence of an oral agreement was excluded because of a whole agreement clause in the document (par. 15) 
and details of the award were altered.  (The appeal did not refer to the document as a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.) 
1654
 Joffre c. A.V.I. Financila Corp. (1985) Inc., 2003 CarswellQue 1054, J.E. 2003-873, REJB 2003-
40956 (C.S. Que. Mar 14, 2003).  There was a finding of oppression based upon a violation of the parties' 
reasonable expectations (pars. 152-153), mostly arising out of the failure of the company to maintain and 
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Management inc.
1656
 
 The contrast between an oppression analysis based significantly on the violation of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement and one wherein any such violation is incidental is illustrated by the different 
emphases in the trial and appeal judgments for White v. True North Springs Ltd.
1657
   The various claims 
amongst the parties included opposing accusations of oppression, arising in part from violations of a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.  The agreement itself was the source of substantial debate, particularly 
concerning whether it was legitimately formed, and it is clearly not an insignificant part of the reasons for 
                                                                                                                                                                             
provide financial records required by the C.B.C.A. and the unanimous shareholder agreement (pars. 48-50).  
Although there are repeated references throughout the reasons for judgment to this being in violation of the 
agreement, these were almost always accompanied by the statement that it was in violation of the 
legislation as well (pars. 71, 72, 79, 142, 169, 170, 173, etc.), and it seems probable that the latter would 
have sufficed to succeed in the claim.  Additionally, the company had made consulting fee payments to the 
majority shareholder without the periodic approval of the directors required by the unanimous shareholder 
agreement (pars. 111-113), and while it was specifically noted that a reasonable payment would have been 
warranted but only in compliance with the agreement (par. 131), the judge's discussion of this as a benefit 
to one investor at the expense of the others was generally reproving, (see e.g. pars. 126-130) even aside 
from references to the agreement being violated. 
1655
 Murphy v. Wise, 2010 ONSC 5185, 2010 CarswellOnt 6964, 193 A.C.W.S. (3d) 421, 17 
P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 308, 75 B.L.R. (4th) 94 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial] Sep 22, 2010).  The assets of a 
corporation in which the applicant had a 30% interest were transferred to another company in which he had 
no interest, without his consent or even knowledge (pars. 52-55).  Newbould J. found this transaction to be 
in violation of a unanimous shareholder agreement, related party restrictions in the O.B.C.A., and the 
Personal Property Security Act, RSO 1990, c. P.10.  (Par. 79 sums up his conclusions.)  Ultimately, 
drawing upon the broad discretion with regard to remedies provided by both the oppression provision and 
the P.P.S.A. (par. 79), it was ordered that the new corporation held the old corporation's assets in trust (par. 
82), because a franchise had been transferred to the new one and it would require the franchisor's consent to 
transfer it back (par. 80).  With regard to the unanimous shareholder agreement, the specific analysis was 
brief, explaining what clause was violated and then noting immediately afterward that the transfer was 
"clearly oppressive" without it even being explained whether that was because of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement, the other agreements and statutes being violated, or simply general principles of the 
oppression remedy and the overall facts (par. 68). 
1656
 Global Aviation Concept c. Richthofen Management inc., 2014 QCCS 1208, 2014 CarswellQue 
2713, EYB 2014-235233 (C.S. Que. Mar 31, 2014).  On this interim motion, various allegations of 
oppression were made against a director, including that he was involved with a rival business (in violation 
of a non-compete clause in a unanimous shareholder agreement) (pars. 20-22), that he was violating the 
unanimous shareholder agreement in various other ways (par. 15), and that he unilaterally cancelled a 
service contract the company had with one of the plaintiffs (par. 19).  There were repeated mentions of the 
unanimous shareholder agreement in the judgment, most notably it being listed as one reason there was a 
strong prima facie case, (par. 31), and the relief granted included orders that the terms of the agreement be 
abided by (pars. 45, 50, 52).  Nonetheless, while the unanimous shareholder agreement received more 
attention in the reasons for this judgment than some others discussed in this subsection, many of the 
impugned acts would likely have been considered prima facie oppressive regardless of the agreement's 
existence.  The judgment was appealed and upheld, in Global Aviation Concept c. Richthofen Management 
inc., 2014 QCCA 1103, 2014 CarswellQue 5127, J.E. 2014-1091, EYB 2014-237878 (C.A. Que. May 30, 
2014); see pars. 22-24 for a brief confirmation that the unanimous shareholder agreement was one basis for 
the oppression claim. 
1657
 White SC (TD) 2, supra note 463, and White CA, supra note 459. 
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the trial judgment.
1658
  With regard to one party's oppression claim, the breaches were critical to the 
analysis,
1659
 although with regard to the opposing party's claim, the agreement was largely incidental.
1660
  
This was made clearer in the Court of Appeal decision wherein they upheld the finding that the 
shareholders' meeting had been oppressive, but did not even mention the violations of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement in that context.
1661
  Instead, the justification for determining that oppression had 
occurred was simply that "[i]ndeed, if their actions to strip Jerry White of his 350,000 Class B shares did 
not amount to oppression, it is difficult to see what use or meaning s. 371 of the Corporations Act could 
possibly have".
1662
  This underscored that, despite all the attention given to the unanimous shareholder 
agreement at the trial level, oppression existed independent of it.  The trial judgment may have implied as 
much, but the appeal left no doubt. 
 Situations such as this, where actions happen to violate a unanimous shareholder agreement but 
would have been oppressive regardless, are where the most coherent argument can be made that this 
remedy should coexist with other enforcement approaches.  It is debatable whether oppression is the 
appropriate tool to enforce unanimous shareholder agreements, but in these cases, that is not truly what is 
                                                          
1658
 The validity of the agreement was itself the subject of dispute, and was discussed in Chapter 
Three. 
1659
 The first claim, wherein the unanimous shareholder agreement was treated centrally, consisted of 
objections to a directors' meeting that had been called without the amount of notice required by the 
document, and Hall J. found that the meeting was invalid for that reason (White SC (TD) 2, supra note 463, 
par. 18).  The judge determined that the actions taken at the meeting were not themselves oppressive, but 
that calling it with less than the required notice was (par. 102).  Even here, the analysis was not necessarily 
determined on the basis of strict rights under the agreement, as Hall J. also noted that the lack of notice had 
been unnecessary and had made it impossible for the complainant to attend in person (par. 102). There were 
$5000 in damages awarded to the excluded director, to compensate him for steps he had taken to determine 
whether the meeting had been valid (par. 103). 
1660
 There was a complaint that abusive events had occurred at a shareholders' meeting the party had 
not attended, including the declaration that no unanimous shareholder agreement existed, a change in the 
number of directors from that specified in the unanimous shareholder agreement, the merger of the two 
share classes into one without the unanimous consent of Class B shareholders (of which he was one); that 
the changes to the authorized and issued share capital were fundamental changes under the Act but were not 
authorized by special resolution as required; that a decision was made to offer shares without the 
unanimous consent of both classes of shareholders as required by the unanimous shareholder agreement; 
that there had been a refusal to recognize that he had held 350 000 class B shares (which were essentially 
stripped from him in the revised single class structure adopted); and other complaints not related to the 
unanimous shareholder agreement, such as his removal as director and the failure to make records available 
to him (White SC (TD) 2, supra note 463, par. 31). The argument that individuals acting qua shareholders 
when voting at a shareholders meeting cannot be oppressive was rejected, although the analysis stressed 
that the individuals in questions were also directors, potentially differentiating this from any situation 
where individuals who were not directors are accused of acting oppressively when voting as shareholders 
(par. 88).  Despite much discussion earlier of the unanimous shareholder agreement, in concluding that 
these acts were oppressive, the trial judge's emphasis was simply on the attempt to remove the other party's 
shareholdings, rather than the violations of the agreement (pars. 77-93). 
1661
 White CA, supra note 459, par. 64. 
1662
 Ibid, par. 64. 
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occurring.  The agreements (and their enforcement) exist in true parallel with the oppression claim.  It is 
necessary to distinguish, however, between cases where the existence and breach of a unanimous 
shareholder agreement is central to the alleged oppression and those where it is incidental, and the line is 
not always clear. 
 
6.(d)(iv) Summation on Alternative Oppression Approaches 
 
 Because the oppression remedy is a statutory basis for bringing a claim, rather than just a model of 
the unanimous shareholder agreement, cases that nominally fall under it exhibit a variety of analytic 
approaches.  A model unique to the oppression remedy exists, based around "reasonable expectations".  But 
not all oppression cases fall into that mould.  Some of them are decided in a manner that presupposes the 
correctness of a corporate constitutional view of unanimous shareholder agreements.  Others apply 
contractual principles to determine their outcomes.  While they may involve findings of oppression for 
procedural reasons, these judgments- properly understood- endorse whichever other model they draw upon 
as a means of understanding and enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 There seems little benefit to this mixing of approaches.  It is a mislabelling at best, and at worst, 
confusion and uncertainty can result when concepts from different models are blended without a coherent 
framework.  If the analysis is not to be grounded in the unique principles of the oppression remedy itself, if 
the logic of another approach is the preferred method of determining such claims, then it would be best if 
they were not brought under this heading at all.  Such cases therefore do not represent viable alternatives.  
Only the "reasonable expectations" version of oppression stands as a truly coherent and unique fourth 
method of enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements, equal to but distinct from the corporate 
constitutional, contractual, and directors' duties views. 
 On the other hand, some oppression cases tell us little about how the remedy interacts with 
unanimous shareholder agreements because the breach of one's restrictions was incidental, not the basis for 
the finding.  This can be obvious, but it is occasionally tricky to determine whether improper acts were 
oppressive primarily because they violated a unanimous shareholder agreement or whether they were 
inherently so.  If the latter, then they fall outside the scope of the current question; there does come a point 
when the oppression remedy ceases to be a flexible method of enforcement for unanimous shareholder 
agreements and becomes something else entirely. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
 This chapter has examined in depth many of the reported judgments concerning the enforcement 
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of unanimous shareholder agreements, to determine how the law in this area has developed.  But rather than 
a single definitive answer, the cases have borne out that there are at least four distinct analytic threads that 
continue to find expression: the corporate constitutional, the contractual, the directors' duties, and the 
oppression remedy.  The case law has demonstrated not only that all four approaches continue to exist, if 
not always in clearly delineated form, but that they can come to very different results on the basis of very 
similar or even identical facts.  Further, because the law in this area remains poorly articulated, the same 
judgment may shift between or intermingle them, resulting in yet further confusion. 
 The decisions in Sumner represent perhaps the clearest illustration of the significance of this issue.  
At the trial level, the judge applied a corporate constitutional approach (distinguishing it from both the 
contractual and oppression remedy models) and came to one conclusion.  The Court of Appeal disagreed, 
holding that the contractual view of unanimous shareholder agreements was correct, and accordingly, on 
the exact same facts,
1663
 arrived at a quite different result. 
 A detailed review of cases dealing with the enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements has 
revealed not just the persistence of four models, but also has given some insight into their unique features. 
 The corporate constitutional approach treats the unanimous shareholder agreement as a genuine 
reassignment of power.  Any attempt by the directors to make decisions or take actions in contravention of 
the restrictions upon them would therefore properly be viewed as null and void; they would no more be 
able to exert the board's default authority than would a director who had resigned or been outvoted, or 
indeed an officer or employee.  While not quite on point, the discussion of unanimous shareholder 
agreements by the Supreme Court of Canada in Duha provides support for this view.  Although only a few 
cases employ the phrase "corporate constitution", the premise that directors' (purported) breaches of these 
agreements are void has found expression in a number of judgments, including some nominally under the 
oppression remedy.  A second hallmark of this approach is that the inability of the directors to ignore the 
limitations upon them is simply a fact, not a right, and thus could potentially be relied upon by anyone, 
including non-shareholders, including even directors themselves as a "shield".  As elaborated upon below, 
the corporate constitutional approach is highly compatible with a "nexus of contracts" view of the 
corporation, but it does not necessarily require that model as a basis. 
 The second approach, the contractual, stands as a stark contrast.  It treats the unanimous 
shareholder agreement as a contract binding the directors, but there is a difference between contracting how 
one will use (or not use) power and losing that power.  Directors would retain the ability to violate 
unanimous shareholder agreements, subject to liability for damages. The use of contract law principles 
when enforcing these agreements is one sign of the influence of this model; although they are a convenient 
tool for the interpretation and application of legal documents, and they might find some place in any 
approach- as indeed they have- they are not an inevitability.  It is debatable whether concepts such as 
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privity or consideration should have relevance here.  Other rules could also be created to handle unanimous 
shareholder agreements.  The clearest indicator of the contractual model, though, is the remedies it offers.  
The default order for breach of contract is an award for damages.  This has a very different practical effect 
from giving force to the restrictions placed upon directors.  It is still possible under a contractual model for 
improper actions to be ordered reversed, but that is distinct from nullifying them, or for courts to grant an 
injunction, which is the most similar to the true reassignment of power in the corporate constitutional 
model. 
 A third method, which has found relatively little judicial favour, is to treat restrictions upon 
directors' powers in a unanimous shareholder agreement similarly to the general obligations they owe the 
corporation.  Almost all the relevant statutes explicitly state that directors must obey unanimous 
shareholder agreements, but this approach extends beyond that; even when the agreements are not being 
explicitly categorized as part of the directors' duties, the influence of principles normally applied when 
claims are brought against them can sometimes be seen.  In particularly, two such rules have been 
discussed, if not necessarily adopted.  One is the notion that the company itself might be the proper 
complainant if the restrictions upon the board are breached; while shareholder requests to bring claims as 
derivative actions have been granted, arguments that this is the required procedure have met little success.  
The other is the "business judgment rule", the deference which courts normally exhibit toward directors' 
decision-making so that they can pursue what they perceive as the corporate interest without being subject 
to undue after-the-fact scrutiny.  There has been some question whether this might allow directors a 
discretion to disregard the restrictions in a unanimous shareholder agreement if they thought doing so 
would benefit the company.  Courts have more commonly (but not universally) rejected this position and 
found that these limitations are not subject to the board's own judgment. 
 Finally, the oppression remedy may be used as a means of enforcing unanimous shareholder 
agreements.  As a statutory tool itself, it has its own list of eligible parties and available remedies.  Because 
it is a basis for a claim, rather than just an analytic approach, not all cases that nominally apply the 
oppression remedy should be considered true examples of this theoretical model; many are actually far 
more influenced by a corporate constitutional or contractual understanding.  (Conversely, a finding of 
oppression may be derived from the overall facts, not an incidental breach of the agreement.)  The 
oppression remedy as a distinct model of enforcement for unanimous shareholder agreements begins by 
identifying "reasonable expectations" and then protects them from conduct that is oppressive, unfairly 
prejudicial, or that unfairly disregards interests.  In practice, this often does mean enforcing the agreement, 
and the case law demonstrates the futility of maintaining a technical distinction between "reasonable 
expectations" reflected in the terms of the document and a reasonable expectation that the agreement itself 
will be complied with.  However, these expectations, and what constitutes their oppression (or unfair 
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 Although admittedly subject to a few somewhat different inferences. 
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prejudice or disregard) are determinations that should be made in light of all the relevant facts.  Other 
elements- the surrounding circumstances, the parties' relationships with one another, any changes since the 
agreements' formation, et cetera-  may mean the literal contents of the unanimous shareholder agreement 
do not perfectly reflect the parties' "reasonable expectations".  They may be narrower, wider, or just 
different.
1664
 
 At present, then, there exists neither consensus not predictability as to how cases enforcing 
unanimous shareholder agreements will be brought, who can bring them, how they will be decided, or what 
the available remedies are.  As a reflection of this, there seems to be no commonly accepted answer as to 
what unanimous shareholder agreements actually are: a fundamental part of the corporate constitution, a 
contract, a component of the directors' duties, or a factor in the parties' reasonable expectations. 
 Taking it as axiomatic that it would be better if the situation were clearer, some further 
prescriptive analysis is warranted as to how the law in this area should develop.  Effectively, this means 
choosing between the four approaches discussed.
1665
  Although the Alberta Court of Appeal in Sumner 
disagreed, Duha suggests that the corporate constitutional approach has the weight of the Supreme Court of 
Canada behind it.
1666
  But even there, the Court was not directly addressing the issue, and clearly the 
indirect implications of its decision have hardly proven definitive as yet. 
 One must therefore extend the inquiry beyond the case law.  The next place to turn is the statutes.  
As already discussed, whether the particular section creating the unanimous shareholder agreement 
supports a corporate constitutional or a contractual view depends upon where one puts the emphasis: is it 
the restriction or the agreement that the legislation declares valid? 
 The legislation, however, also states that to the extent that directors' powers are restricted, their 
duties and liabilities pass to the shareholders.
1667
  As a matter of statutory interpretation, that should settle 
the question of whether the restrictions on directors are genuinely limits upon their authority or merely 
contracts as to the use of that power.
1668
  If they still retain the ability to disregard the agreement, excusing 
them from liability makes no sense.  Only if their power has been removed would it be consistent to 
absolve them from responsibility for decisions which they can no longer control.  This is made even clearer 
                                                          
1664
 It is also possible that, even if the terms of the document reflect "reasonable expectations", an act 
in contravention of them might not be oppressive, unfair disregard, or unfair prejudice.  See the discussion 
of Renaud-Bray, supra note 1396. 
1665
 It is possible to create or adapt yet another framework, but the justification for it would need to be 
strong enough to be worth the further complications.  No such candidate springs to mind.  The "judicial 
discretion" model, discussed at note 895, is at best an inferior alternative to the oppression approach. 
1666
 See the discussion earlier. 
1667
 C.B.C.A. s. 146(5); A.B.C.A., s. 146(7); M.C.A., s. 140(5); N.B.C.A., s.148(7); N.B.C.C.A., s. 
99(5); N.L.C.A., s.245(8); N.T.B.C.A., s.148(7); O.B.C.A., s.108(5); Q.B.C.A., s. 214; S.B.C.A., s. 140(4); 
Y.B.C.A., s. 148(7). 
1668
 Although the fact that the statute explicitly removed their powers should itself have been 
sufficient. 
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by the fact that the shareholders themselves assume the liability the directors shed; it would be doubly 
unfair to allow directors to override unanimous shareholder agreements (even if they were potentially liable 
in damages) while holding shareholders responsible for the areas covered by those agreements. 
 As between the corporate constitutional and contractual approaches, then, the legislative intent is 
clear.
1669
  Unanimous shareholder agreements are meant to genuinely restrict the directors' powers; this is 
why their liability is removed to the same extent. 
 Similarly, if such restrictions are real, then the directors' duties and the oppression remedy cannot 
be the intended methods of enforcement.  The scope of the former is limited to the areas where the directors 
have power.  As will be discussed in Chapter Five, it appears that the statute removes the directors' duties of 
care and loyalty in the areas affected by a unanimous shareholder agreement; it would be contradictory to 
suggest that that was then the expected enforcement mechanism.  The sections of the various statutes 
explicitly stating that directors must obey unanimous shareholder agreements are thus misleading, but they 
serve as redundant reminders that directors cannot disregard these documents.
1670
 
 Because the oppression remedy has a wider ambit, covering any business or affairs of the 
corporation that might oppress or unfairly prejudice a shareholder's interests,
1671
 it is more compatible with 
the unanimous shareholder agreement provisions.  It can work in parallel with other legal remedies, when 
warranted, so such co-existence is unproblematic.
1672
  However, the strand of oppression cases most 
consistent with the statute are those in which the remedy was applied against a background understanding 
that the agreements had, in a corporate constitutional manner, genuinely limited the directors' powers.  By 
contrast, judicial determinations that the parties' "reasonable expectations" allowed directors to circumvent 
restrictions upon them are less consistent with the statute. 
 Moving another step away from the doctrinal and toward pure prescription, it remains to be 
considered what approach would be ideal, regardless of the current statute, both because the legislation can 
                                                          
1669
 With one caveat in Ontario.  O.B.C.A. s. 17(3) states, "[N]o act of a corporation [...] is invalid by 
reason only that the act is contrary to [...] a unanimous shareholder agreement[....]"  The degree to which 
this conflicts with the corporate constitutional approach is discussed at  note 892.  At the very least, it must 
be acknowledged that, in the Ontario statute, s. 17(3) can be read as inconsistent with a pure corporate 
constitutional approach to enforcement, under which an act of a corporation would be invalid by reason 
only that the decision to act had not been made by those authorized to do so pursuant to the restrictions in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement.  If that enforcement method is adopted as the standard one, this 
subsection should therefore be amended.  (Third parties are adequately protected by O.B.C.A. s. 19(a).)  
This provision aside, the remainder of the Ontario Act is, like the other statutes, most consistent with the 
corporate constitutional approach. 
1670
 The same sections list the statutes themselves as among the items which the directors must obey, 
and it is not as though directors would have the power to ignore provisions in the legislation absent this.  
See C.B.C.A. s. 122(2), A.B.C.A. s. 122(2), M.C.A. s. 117(2), N.B.B.C.A. s. 79(2), N.L.C.A. s. 203(2), 
N.T.B.C.A. s. 123(2), N.B.C.A. s. 123(2), O.B.C.A. s. 134(2), S.B.C.A. s. 117(2), Y.B.C.A. s. 124(2). 
1671
 C.B.C.A. s.241; A.B.C.A., s. 242; M.C.A., s. 234; N.B.B.C.A., s. 166; N.B.C.A., s. 243; N.L.C.A., s. 
371; N.T.B.C.A., s. 243; O.B.C.A., s. 248; Q.B.C.A., s. 450; S.B.C.A., s. 234; and Y.B.C.A., s. 243. 
1672
 Or, depending upon one's perspective, part of a much larger issue with the oppression remedy. 
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be amended and in the interest of intellectual rigour.  Which of the four approaches would be the best 
method of enforcing these agreements? 
 This returns us to the most fundamental question of unanimous shareholder agreements: to what 
degree should the corporation be customizable?  More specifically, should the roles of directors and 
shareholders be subject to change at the behest of the latter group.  In Chapter Two, the theory of the 
corporation as a "nexus of contracts" was reviewed.  That doctrine has many adherents, but is also in some 
ways out of step with contemporary Canadian law and its increasing attention to stakeholder groups, an 
issue that will be returned to in the next chapter. 
 If it is true that the corporation is merely an elaborate web of implied contract, then the terms of 
those contracts could be changed.  The powers of directors would only exist in the first place because they 
were set out in those notional agreements; they could be restricted or altered in any way imaginable, and 
those alterations would be real.  Just as an employee's authority can be determined by an employer, made 
greater or lesser, the directors' could.  This is the same reasoning that underlies the corporate constitutional 
model.
1673
 
 That does not mean that only a "nexus of contracts" model of the corporation can justify a 
corporate constitutional approach to enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements.  Even conceived of as 
bound by the legislative framework, the corporation is customizable in many ways.  It is not a contradiction 
to assert that the ability to genuinely alter the directors' powers via a unanimous shareholder agreement has 
been included amongst those legislatively-authorized options, but the corporation still remains an entity 
created by the statute, tied to a large number of predetermined elements found therein, and possessing 
unique features not available through contracts.  That said, because the balance of power between directors 
and shareholders is such a key element, allowing it to be altered does represent a shift, however qualified, 
away from a predetermined structure and toward agreement-based, shareholder-selected ones.   
 Because it is compatible with both the "nexus of contracts" and statutorily-defined entity theories, 
it might appear that the corporate constitutional approach contributes nothing to the debate regarding which 
understanding of the corporation is correct.  But that is not true.  This method of enforcement does align 
Canadian corporate law more with the "nexus of contracts" model than has historically been the case.  That 
alignment is not definitive, however; given the limits upon the unanimous shareholder agreement as a tool 
for customizing the corporate structure, applying this model of enforcement within that scope does not 
require a rejection of the statutorily-defined entity view of the corporation as a whole.  The theoretical 
implications of the corporate constitutional approach may therefore be described as ambiguous.  That very 
ambiguity is telling, however, when contrasted with the contractual, directors' duties, and oppression 
models.  Although all four methods of enforcement can be rationalized within either theoretical framework, 
choosing any of the other three would constitute a rejection of the principle that the division of power 
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within the corporate structure is derived from the consent of the shareholders and thus can genuinely be 
rearranged by them.  If directors cannot truly have their powers removed by a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, that would significantly undermine the "nexus of contracts" model of the corporation, or at least 
the shareholder-centric, libertarian version of the theory that is often advocated.   If, on the other hand, the 
corporate constitutional approach is accepted as the method for enforcing unanimous shareholder 
agreements, then while that does not mean that the "nexus of contracts" view is necessarily correct, it 
would indicate that it is at least still viable.  Bearing this association in mind, the choice between the 
corporate constitutional approach and one of the other three has implications for the fundamental nature of 
the corporation.  Some judges have been resistant to the redistribution of authority associated with this 
method of enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements; it seems likely they would be even less 
comfortable with a true "nexus of contracts" framework. 
 While both traditionalism and paternalism might underlie reluctance to allow shareholders to 
freely remove directors' powers, the perceived role of the board as a mediator amongst different groups in 
the corporation might also justify hesitancy.  An inherent assumption of unanimous shareholder agreements 
is shareholder primacy.
1674
  Investors can directly or indirectly use them to advance their own interests at 
the expense of other groups.  Adopting one of the other three approaches to enforcement could theoretically 
help mitigate that problem; when they are not merely serving as indirect vessels for corporate constitutional 
reasoning, they all assume that directors still retain the power to override the restrictions upon them, albeit 
respectively subject to contractual damages, meeting the standards of the duty of care, or avoiding unfairly 
disregarding "reasonable expectations".  They reject, in other words, a fundamental altering of the directors' 
role in the corporation, in favour of one more layer of potential liability for the misuse of that role. 
 This creates problems for terms that explicitly assign some or all of those powers to the 
shareholders, if any approach but the corporate constitutional were adopted.  Whether the statutes would 
necessitate the retention of a "phantom board", one stripped entirely of its powers but required by statute to 
exist, has been debated by commentators.
1675
  The contractual, directors' duties, and possibly oppression 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1673
 But not the contractual approach, an unfortunate conflict in nomenclature. 
1674
 This is the position that corporations exist for the sole purpose of serving shareholder interests, 
generally assumed to be profit maximization.  It should not be confused with the shareholder-centric 
version of the "nexus of contracts" model discussed in Chapter Two, but the two are compatible.  Such a 
framework can acknowledge that the de jure beneficiary of the directors' duties is the corporation, but the 
underlying justification is still assumed to be profiting the shareholders. 
1675
 It should be noted that "phantom board" is not a standardized phrase  in the literature on 
unanimous shareholder agreements, but the concept referred to has been frequently discussed; for 
convenience, I will use the term here.  (I do not believe I am originating its usage in this context, but I have 
been unable to relocate the source I am adopting it from.)  The Alberta Report, supra note 223, p. 25, 
advocated for the retention of a phantom board to create the illusion of regularity and as a source of 
apparent authority for outsiders to rely upon.  The Industry Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 9, pp. 40-
44, argued that "the retention of a board of directors without any powers seems to make little sense" (p. 41) 
but noted that director-less corporations might be problematic if the shareholders were corporations (pp. 
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models would mean that this "phantom board" could still exercise powers it was not supposed to have.  A 
similar challenge is posed when directors retain some authority but have had the rest passed to the 
shareholders.  This sort of arrangement is contemplated by the statute- note again the transfer of liability to 
the same extent- but can only truly be accommodated by the corporate constitutional approach.  This, 
however, is merely a new variant of the question as to whether shareholders should be allowed to change 
the role of directors. 
 If they should not, then the unanimous shareholder agreement itself is a mistake, an anomaly that 
needs to be corrected.  It is possible, albeit through the use of controversial assumptions, to construct a 
rationale for the corporate constitutional approach from base principles, that is while assuming that the 
unanimous shareholder agreement did not already exist.  One possibility, already mentioned, is to resort to 
"nexus of contract" notions, from which the corporate constitutional approach easily follows.  Another is to 
locate policy reasons why such flexibility should be included as one of the customization options within a 
statutory framework.  To the extent that the result is problematic, one adjusts what restrictions are 
permissible,
1676
 rather than the nature of the restrictions themselves.  If expanded shareholder control of 
corporations proves undesirable regardless, then the very idea of unanimous shareholder agreements would 
need to be rethought, although that direction might lead to other, even more profound, reconsiderations of 
the corporation.
1677
 
 It is more difficult to justify, from base principles, a contractual approach to enforcing unanimous 
shareholder agreements.  In essence, what this amounts to is a "penalty clause", where money would need 
                                                                                                                                                                             
42-43) or if outside parties proved reluctant to deal with such an unfamiliar power structure, while 
acknowledging that a misleading power structure was itself detrimental. (p. 43)  Sohmer, supra note 311, 
pp. 674-675, interpreted the statute as not permitting for the elimination of a board of directors, only the 
restriction of its powers.  Hay and Smith, supra note 319, p. 447, asserted that since some individuals will 
always be needed to exercise managerial power, it would be best to mandate that at least one director be 
retained in order to preserve the applicability of existing precedents regarding such control; they did not 
fully consider the difficulties posed if the nominal director is no longer the person(s) filling the function 
they describe.  Disney, supra note 9, pp. 106-110 argued against retaining phantom boards who hold no 
power.  Dennis, supra note 9, p. 123-124, also argued that if directors no longer have any power 
whatsoever to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, they should be eliminated.  Scavone, 
supra note 9, pp. 341-342, suggested that a phantom board should be retained in order to satisfy statutory 
obligations such as residency requirements, rather than transferring those to shareholders, although he 
admits this is "a bit absurd" (p. 342).  Martel, supra note 11, p. 20, simply assumed that the board must be 
retained, and used this as one basis for his argument that it is not permissible to remove all of its powers, 
hence it would never be a true phantom board; he argued, however, that if it was made permissible to 
render the board powerless, then the law should be amended to allow for its elimination in order to avoid 
confusion (p. 41).  See also Robitaille, supra note 267, p. 172; Ratti, supra note 16, pp. 111-112; Turgeon, 
supra note 9, pp. 233, 258. 
1676
 For example, for policy reasons, one might forbid a unanimous shareholder agreement that 
prevented directors from cooperating with employee unionization attempts. 
1677
 A departure from shareholder-elected boards of directors, for example. 
  
 
 
295 
 
to be paid if a restriction was violated.
1678
  That assumes, of course, that provable damage actually 
occurs.
1679
  If the limitations on directors in these agreements are simply a means for investors to insulate 
themselves from the perceived potential for provable harm, that might suffice; they would be compensated 
up to the level of the harm, which achieves effectively the same result. 
 But it would discard the possibility of unanimous shareholder agreements that did anything else.  
Restrictions can be attempts to foreclose avenues leading to harms that would be impossible to estimate or 
even definitely confirm.  They might even be restrictions that were themselves "harmful" to the 
shareholders, at least in the economically quantifiable sense, such as ones enshrining "corporate social 
responsibility" principles.  A contractual approach to enforcement renders such terms meaningless, just as it 
makes difficult a more substantial role for direct shareholder participation in corporate governance via the 
assumption of some or all of the board's normal authority. 
 If unanimous shareholder agreements serve only as a form of de facto insurance for investors 
against the provable harm that might befall them should directors choose to violate their terms, it would be 
preferable to frame them that way, rather than as "restrictions" upon the board. 
 The directors' duties also seem a poor method for enforcing unanimous shareholder agreements.  
By their very nature, they set the standard that directors must meet in the exercise of their discretion.  If the 
terms of the agreement are absolute obligations, they must almost by definition not be part of the duties at 
all.  But if they are merely one factor that directors have to consider as they weigh their options, then they 
would be easily ignored.  The difficulty of enforcing the duty of care in the face of the business judgment 
rule has been widely noted.  That might be a necessary evil when dealing with areas where directors must 
have discretion to deal with a range of unpredictable situations, but it is hardly ideal for handling clearly 
defined restrictions. 
 Finally, the oppression remedy (taken in isolation) has the advantages of flexibility and context-
sensitivity.  But like the duties of care and loyalty, its design is most suited to dealing with the misuse of 
the directors' legal power; it is questionable whether it should be used to police the defined limits of that 
power.  Further, its outcomes have a relatively high degree of uncertainty as compared to the other 
methods, with the potential for a variety of factors creating "reasonable expectations" at odds with the 
obvious meaning of the document.  A unanimous shareholder agreement would seem to be an attempt to 
impose certainty.  For all the drawbacks of contract law, there is a reason why it has developed as it has; 
some unpredictability is inevitable, but parties seeking to determine their future rights would usually be 
best served by having it minimized.  The oppression remedy should nonetheless retain a role in situations 
where enforcement of the instrument is not the primary goal, such as larger patterns of behaviour that only 
                                                          
1678
 It also assumes there are no privity issues, or that these are disregarded. 
1679
 There is also an issue as to who would pay the damages.  If it was the directors, perverse 
incentives arise; they would likely only subject themselves to such liability if they personally stood to gain, 
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incidentally involve breaching its terms or acts which the agreement might permit but are nonetheless 
oppressive. 
 One returns then to two alternatives: either shareholders can customize the corporation (within 
limits) by restricting directors' powers or they cannot.  If they can, then the corporate constitutional method 
is superior.  If they cannot, then the contractual approach is the next best alternative, but it would be better 
to rethink the entire idea of unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 The corporate constitutional method also has the implicit support of the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Duha and is the only consistent way of reading the statutes.  So long as unanimous shareholder 
agreements do continue to be a part of Canadian corporate law, it is the direction that one should hope 
future cases follow.
                                                                                                                                                                             
but not if the corporation or some other constituency would benefit from violating the agreement. 
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Chapter 5: The Transfer of Directors' Duties 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The unique feature of the unanimous shareholder agreement is its ability to restrict the powers of 
corporate directors, which now appears to non-controversially include directly transferring those powers to 
shareholders.  In previous chapters, the questions of what constitutes a valid restriction and how it might be 
enforced have been examined.  And yet, there is a third aspect that also deserves consideration: the 
accompanying elimination or transfer of directors' duties and liabilities.
1680
 
 As usual with the unanimous shareholder agreement, the drafting of the C.B.C.A. and its 
counterparts opens the door to a variety of technical questions as to how this might work and whether it is 
open to exploitation.  It is simple to say that if directors have all of their power restricted, they should 
likewise have their liability removed.
1681
  But the statute allows for them to retain some or most of their 
                                                          
1680
 Although all statutes currently specify both duties and liabilities, this was not always the case.  
C.B.C.A. '74-'75 relieved directors of both to the extent that their powers were restricted, but only stated 
that shareholders received the directors' duties, without mentioning their liabilities.  The Alberta Report, 
supra note 223, p. 29, mentioned this, but simply recommended that Alberta not repeat this anomaly.  The 
Industry Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 9, p. 31 described it as an ambiguity and noted that it "may 
not be clear" (p. 31) whether statutory liabilities are imposed upon the shareholders or removed from the 
directors.  Martel, supra note 11, p. 29, and Hay and Smith, supra note 319, p. 451, both described the 
omission as "curious"; Hay and Smith suggested that the legislators may have considered "liabilities" 
implicit in "duties".  Disney, supra note 9, pp. 93-94 believed this wording created genuine amibiguity.  
Most extremely, Scavone, supra note 9, p. 348, argued that this distinction had significance, because in his 
view, some of the directors' liabilities, including for unpaid wages, did not arise from duties and were 
therefore not covered by the wording.  Subsequent amendments have fortunately resolved this issue.  This 
historical controversy nothwithstanding, throughout this chapter, general references on my part to the 
transfers of directors' "duties" and "liabilities", as well as occasionally "responsibilities", are all meant to 
refer to both directors' legal duties and legal liabilities, unless context clearly indicates otherwise. 
1681
 From a transfer of liability perspective, it appears relatively straightforward that where all powers 
of the directors are restricted, so too should all their responsibilities be assumed by the shareholders.  
Perhaps the only dissent on this point is that of Ratti, supra note 16, p. 119-120, who took the position that 
these sorts of statutory responsibilities are tied to the office of director, regardless of power, and thus 
liability for unpaid employee wages and taxes et cetera would remain with the board (except where the 
legislation expressly alters this rule, as the C.B.C.A. does with regard to employee wages); he 
acknowledged that this would be a difficult situation for directors who had had their powers removed but 
retained some liability.  Even accepting for the sake of argument that this is consistent with the letter of the 
provision (presumably falling into a loophole in the qualifier that responsibilities shift "to the same extent" 
as powers), it serves neither justice nor policy goals to hold powerless office-holders liable while allowing 
the real decision-makers to escape the consequences of their choices.  Although the use of the phrase "in 
whole or in part" in the C.B.C.A. has generally pre-empted controversy about whether the directors' powers 
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traditional authority while nonetheless being restricted in some areas, and it is in no way clear what the 
exact implications would be for their liabilities.  These questions are of practical concern (although in fact 
have seldom or ever been litigated, at least not in reported cases), but perhaps just as importantly, they 
force us to reconsider the nature and purpose of directors' responsibilities. 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement thus serves as a sort of "stress test".  By considering how 
legal principles should adapt to fit the new arrangements these instruments can contort the corporation into, 
we learn more about the principles that underlie the law generally.  To know how to handle the removal or 
transfer of responsibilities when directors' powers are restructured in unusual ways, we must first 
reconsider the purpose and function of those duties and liabilities. 
 There are also issues specific to the possible transfer of the duties of care and loyalty, which again 
force us to examine not just how they can be adapted to fit new arrangements, but their very nature.  One 
conception of them is that they are designed to ensure that directors safeguard shareholders' interests.  A 
debate has therefore arisen amongst commentators as to whether these duties are necessary or meaningful 
when investors have assumed direct control.  I argue that even assuming a shareholder-driven rationale for 
these duties, they remain useful as a means of protecting empowered investors from one another. 
 The decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada over the last fifteen years cast this question in a 
different light.  If directors' duties are not designed solely to serve shareholders (with the "corporation" 
serving as a proxy for investors' presumed desire for maximized financial gain), but instead may take into 
account the interests of other stakeholders, what are the implications of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement and its potential effect upon those duties?  Various scenarios suggest that it could subvert 
attempts to develop a stakeholder model of the corporation.  But the difficulties with making this legal tool 
practically or philosophically compatible with a model of corporate law that recognizes stakeholder 
interests are only reflections of a broader problem; the unanimous shareholder agreement is simply the 
most explicit manifestation of the assumption of shareholder primacy that underpins corporate law in this 
country. 
 As the previous chapters have explored, these agreements to some extent bring aspects of a "nexus 
of contracts" understanding of the corporation into Canadian law.  Although such a shift should not be 
overstated, this legal tool does allow shareholders to, by agreement, alter significant aspects of the normal 
                                                                                                                                                                             
could be restricted in their entirety, earlier Quebec legislation lacked that phrase; see however Martel, 
supra note 11, pp. 19-20, and Ratti supra note 16, p. 112, who found some ambiguity in the wording of the 
C.B.C.A.  Martel argued that the legislation only permitted the transfer of some powers, and did not allow 
all of the directors' powers to be removed, based on a counterintuitive reading of the phrase "in whole or in 
part" as referring to the selection of directors' powers that might be affected, but not the degree.  Ratti 
considered the provision's wording contradictory, with "restricts" implying only partially but "in whole or 
in part" meaning the opposite.  The current version of the Q.B.C.A. clearly allows for the removal of all the 
board's powers, as acknowledged by Martel and Martel, supra note 16, p. 358 and Beauregard and Auger, 
supra note 16.  If any individual power of the directors can be removed, the only additional difficulty of 
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corporate structure.  Insofar as the directors' liabilities are a part of that structure, the friction this creates 
and how it is handled represent yet another manifestation of a conflict between two possible conceptions of 
the corporation. 
 This chapter will focus on these issues, beginning with the general justification for director 
liability and what that means when their powers have been split between them and shareholders.  After this 
framework has been established, the transfer of the duties of care and loyalty will be considered, first in the 
context of a shareholder primacy understanding of the corporation and then through stakeholder theory. 
 
2. General Considerations for the Transfer of Responsibilities 
2.(a) The Basis for Director Liability 
 
 The Canada Business Corporation Act currently provides that: 
 
146(1)(5)  To the extent that a unanimous shareholder agreement restricts the powers of 
the directors to manage, or supervise the management of, the business and affairs of the 
corporation, parties to the unanimous shareholder agreement who are given that power to 
manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the corporation have 
all the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a director of the corporation, whether they 
arise under this Act or otherwise, including any defences available to the directors, and 
the directors are relieved of their rights, powers, duties and liabilities, including their 
liabilities under section 119, to the same extent.
1682
 
 
 The first question that this raises is why the duties and liabilities of directors are removed 
alongside their rights and powers, and why they are then imposed upon whomever is given those rights and 
powers.  This might appear self-explanatory, but some commentators have approached the consequences of 
this section (and its equivalents) as a trap for shareholders to avoid if possible, while still obtaining their 
desired outcomes. 
 Sohmer began from the premise that the goal of the unanimous shareholder agreement provision 
was to allow investors to control small corporations
1683
 and that this was a laudable development.
1684
  The 
                                                                                                                                                                             
removing all of them simultaneously would be the "phantom board" issue discussed at note 1675. 
1682
 This provision has not always had this form and the wording does not precisely correspond to any 
of the current analogues in the provincial statutes.  See A.B.C.A., s. 146(7); M.C.A., s. 140(5); N.B.C.A., 
s.148(7); N.B.C.C.A., s. 99(5); N.L.C.A., s.245(8); N.T.B.C.A., s.148(7); O.B.C.A., s.108(5); Q.B.C.A., s. 
214; S.B.C.A., s. 140(4); Y.B.C.A., s. 148(7).  While each of these sections causes the directors to be 
relieved of their duties and liabilties to the extent that they are restricted, all the provincial statutes except 
the Q.B.C.A. still assume that when such restrictions occur, all of the shareholders automatically receive 
those powers as well as the accompanying responsibilities.  Generally speaking, the following discussion 
assumes a C.B.C.A. framework, although much of it remains applicable to the provincial equivalents. 
1683
 Sohmer, supra note 311, p. 673. 
1684
 Ibid, p. 674. 
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limitations of taking a purely shareholder primacy approach, at the expense of considering the interests of 
other groups and wider principles of accountability, can be seen in his argument that investors may prefer 
to use amendments to the articles of incorporation rather than this method, as that would enable them to 
avoid the "danger" of the duties and liabilities that a unanimous shareholder agreement would impose upon 
them.
1685
  At the time, the articles could contain any provision which a unanimous shareholder agreement 
might, a feature of the 1975 Act
1686
 that was later removed.  What is striking is how neutrally he presents 
the argument that shareholders might prefer to utilize a method whereby they assumed power without 
corresponding responsibility.  They well might, but one would think that it would be noteworthy that the 
position of directors and third parties is thereby compromised.  The only drawback Sohmer identified to 
going this route would be that, without the unanimity requirement, minority shareholders might be 
unprotected from the tyranny of the majority. 
 Similarly, Fitzwilliam, writing about the importation of the unanimous shareholder agreement 
from Canada to Trinidad and Tobago, stated that its introduction into the legislation precluded an 
apparently previously valid practice in that country of granting additional control rights to minority 
investors via agreements that were entered into by all the shareholders, but were not "unanimous 
shareholder agreements" in the current sense.
1687
  Under the new regime, such arrangements would be 
deemed to be unanimous shareholder agreements with the full legal consequences that would imply.  This 
would either discourage investors from entering into them or else result in minority shareholders receiving 
additional rights only at the cost of potential liability.  The difficulty with Fitzwilliam's analysis is that it 
included no particular acknowledgment that there is any logical or legal reason why unanimous shareholder 
agreements shift duties and liabilities as well as powers.  He treated it as a purely arbitrary decision by 
legislators.  It was from that perspective that he preferred a similar mechanism lacking said responsibilities, 
rather than questioned it. 
 Hay and Smith also considered circumstances in which articles or by-laws might limit directors' 
powers, for example by raising voting requirements.
1688
  They noted the obvious advantage for shareholders 
is that the statute does not explicitly transfer liability if they use these alternate methods.
1689
  However, Hay 
and Smith concluded that resorting to these mechanisms was ultimately pointless, since "liability for 
misuse of traditional director prerogatives must ultimately fall on some human actors in the 
corporation",
1690
 and therefore, the shareholders would bear responsibility anyway.  But it is uncertain if 
this would hold true in practice, given the traditional reluctance of courts to hold shareholders liable for 
                                                          
1685
 Ibid, p. 677. 
1686
 C.B.C.A. '74-'75, section 6(2). 
1687
 Fitzwilliam, supra note 9, at section 5.  The legal status of such agreements under the former legal 
regime in Trinidad and Tobago was not fully explained and is beyond my own fields of study. 
1688
 Hay and Smith, supra note 319, p. 449. 
1689
 Ibid, p. 449. 
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corporate acts.  It is possible that no humans would be found responsible or that the wrong humans, the 
powerless directors, would be.  Further, as the duties of care and loyalty illustrate, there is significant 
disagreement on the degree to which the responsibilities of directors would fall unaltered upon empowered 
shareholders even in the context of statutory language explicitly transferring duties and liabilities; in the 
absence of such a provision, the situation could be even murkier. 
 Turgeon similarly classified the statutorily-mandated assumption of responsibilities by empowered 
shareholders as simply a particular application of the doctrine of de facto directors.
1691
  Following the same 
logic in reverse, he also concluded that it would be unjust to impose the normal responsibilities of directors 
upon a board rendered powerless, because not only they did not make the decisions that presumably gave 
rise to any liabilities, they legally could not have made those decision.
1692
 
 The point which Hay and Smith and Turgeon grasp, and which Sohmer and Fitzwilliam downplay, 
is that directors' powers are accompanied by their responsibilities in order to serve purposes.  This is not to 
say that the current structure of directors' duties and liabilities is anywhere close to perfect at achieving 
those objectives, or even that the desired ends themselves are never dubious, but their responsibilities 
reflect attempts by legislators and judges to accomplish goals that have been deemed worthy of pursuit.  
While it might be in the shareholders' self-interest to get the benefits of directors' powers without the 
drawbacks, that would defeat those larger purposes. 
 The constitutional ramification of this transfer, specifically whether as a matter of law it affects 
duties and liabilities set out in other statutes, is one area where commentators have recognized that 
directors' responsibilities exist for a reason.
1693
  Disney argued that, despite some possible ambiguity in the 
legislation, the exclusion of responsibilities under other statutes was illogical, as their presumed purposes 
were only served if they fell upon the corporation's true decision-makers.
1694
  Having established that, he 
dismissed the constitutional problem of liabilities under provincial legislation being altered by a unanimous 
shareholder agreement authorized by the federal statute or vice versa, as neither legislature would be 
purporting to eliminate a responsibility created by the other, merely to identify who it applied to, and 
holding the true decision-makers accountable served the purposes of statutory liability rather than defeating 
them.
1695
  Similarly, Scavone addressed the constitutional implications by denying there was a problem.  
Who the liable "directors" under a statute were was, in his view, a question of fact, and the statute under 
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 Ibid, pp. 449-450. 
1691
 Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 242. 
1692
 Ibid, p. 241. 
1693
 Alberta Report, supra note 223, p. 29, raised the constitutional issue without such a purposive 
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with regard to responsibilities imposed by federal legislation. 
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which the corporation operated was only evidence to help settle it.
1696
  Liability would fall upon those who 
actually operated as the directors, exercising the powers typical of that office.
1697
  It was also in the context 
of this jurisdictional dilemma that the Industry Canada Discussion Paper noted that most of the statutory 
penalties that directors face arise either out of their actions or their failure to exercise the appropriate due 
diligence,
1698
 concluding that "[i]t might defeat the purpose of the statute imposing the liability on a 
director if the shareholders were not effectively subject to such liability where they had entered into a 
unanimous shareholder agreement removing the powers of the directors, since only the shareholders would 
then have the necessary degree of involvement in the conduct constituting the offence to attract statutory 
liability".
1699
  Such logic applies even where no jurisdictional issues arise.  It is the basic justification for 
ensuring that, when a unanimous shareholder agreement is in effect, the powers and responsibilities 
normally held by directors remained linked, and whoever wields one must bear the other. 
 In Vaszi v. Ontario (Ministry of Labour),
1700
 a case heard by the Ontario Labour Relations Board, 
the principle was summed up as follows: 
 
21 A director is someone who has the power and duty to manage the business 
affairs of the corporation.  Where no USA exists, a director is not subject to shareholders' 
control in the exercise of his or her powers.  In the absence of an USA, directors have the 
power to make decisions that directly impact on whether the business will be in a position 
to pay employees their vacation pay and wages.  The OBCA thus renders them liable 
where their decisions result in a situation where employees are not paid. 
 
22 A director's powers can be limited by a valid USA.  A USA allows the 
shareholders to effectively take over the powers that would otherwise belong to the 
directors.  In such cases, given that the shareholders have the power to make decisions 
that affect whether the business will be able to pay its employees their vacation pay and 
wages, it is the shareholders that are made liable in the event of default and not the 
directors. 
 
23 It is apparent that the OBCA and the Act are designed to impose liability on the 
individuals who have the power to make decisions for the corporation that will directly 
impact on the corporation's ability to pay its employees.  No liability is imposed on 
officers or senior management of a corporation notwithstanding that such individuals 
typically have considerable influence with respect to the operation of the corporation.  
Liability is imposed on directors or shareholders signatory to a USA alone as it is those 
individuals who have ultimate control over the decisions made by the corporation. 
 
 The board applied this principle to determine that, with regard to shares held in trust, the beneficial 
owner would be liable only if she had the power to control how the shares were voted, which she did 
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not.
1701
  Involvement short of actual control was insufficient to incur penalties, because "[t]he Act does not 
impose liability [...] on advisors or investors.  It imposes liability on those who have the power and 
responsibility to make decisions that impact on the corporation's ability to pay."
1702
 
 Similarly, in Perricelli v. R.,
1703
 a unanimous shareholder agreement specified that three investors 
would each elect one director, and initially they selected themselves.
1704
  Most of the judgment proceeded 
as if the document had specifically designated those individuals as directors and would technically require 
amendment for them to vacate those positions.
1705
  One of them subsequently resigned,
1706
 although there 
were a variety of issues surrounding the validity of that resignation,
1707
 including that the agreement had 
not been amended.  In determining whether the (ex-)director was liable for unremitted G.S.T., Miller T.C.J. 
first found that his resignation was effective such that he was no longer a de jure director, in which analysis 
no reference was made to the agreement,
1708
 and then further found that despite a few facts to the contrary, 
including a "lack of attention"
1709
 to the unanimous shareholder agreement, he was also not a de facto 
director because "he never thought he had any authority to advise, influence or control the management or 
direction of the Company".
1710
  Regardless of the conclusions reached about the amendment and breach of 
unanimous shareholder agreements, this judgment demonstrated again the connection between exercising 
the authority of a director and bearing the responsibilities of that office. 
 Although this dissertation has generally avoided the debates about what procedures should govern 
decision-making after investors have assumed control through a unanimous shareholder agreement, they do 
have one potential consequence for the current discussion.  Turgeon considered whether, if empowered 
shareholders still vote on a per share basis (rather than per shareholder), it is unjust to hold each investor 
equally responsible.
1711
  In the situation that illustrates this most obviously, a majority shareholder would 
have total control over the company, and the others would be limited to, at most, attempting to influence 
outcomes indirectly.
1712
  The minority might be able to exercise dissent rights, but not in all 
circumstances.
1713
  Turgeon concluded that even if it seemed inequitable, one who has consented to an 
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action must accept the consequences, and that this is not as exceptional as it seems, given that directors on a 
board may be the puppets of a controlling shareholder as well.
1714
  This response avoided the deeper issues 
raised; responsibilities only have purpose if borne by those who wield the corresponding power.  It 
therefore might be better either to mandate that empowered shareholders vote per individual or, 
alternatively, to treat a majority shareholder as the sole decision-maker, just as if so designated in the 
document.
1715
 
 While all of the foregoing establishes why empowered shareholders should be subject to the 
responsibilities normally borne by directors, there remains an argument that the board should not 
necessarily be excused from them in turn.  As a means of influencing corporate decision-making, it is 
useless to impose duties and liabilities upon those without authority.
1716
  But it is possible that third parties 
relied upon the appearance that those individuals were in charge, either as a signal of the company's quality 
or as reassurance that they could look to those specific people to satisfy the board's potential liabilities.
1717
  
The "indoor management rule"
1718
 generally applies to claims made against companies, not directors.
1719
  It 
might therefore be open to powerless directors to assert that, according to the statute, the agreement had 
removed their liabilities, even against a third party who had no knowledge of it.  The C.B.C.A. specifically 
authorizes them to do so in the case of unpaid wages.
1720
 
 Given that partially or fully depowered directors have colluded in the creation of a potentially 
misleading situation, if only through their continued membership on the board, it is reasonable that they 
should bear some responsibility when innocent third parties are indeed misled.  The "indoor management 
rule" has long held that outsiders are not required to investigate whether a corporation's inner workings 
deviate from the norm; this should be extended to the liability of directors.
1721
  The specific reference in the 
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legislation to employee wages as among the responsibilities removed should be eliminated.  None of this is 
as onerous as it might at first appear, since directors can restore their freedom from liability through the 
simple expedient of making it known that they are no longer the decision-makers.
1722
  Encouraging such 
disclosure would, in addition to compensating misled third parties, be the policy goal of such a rule. 
 It is clear, when one takes a wider view of the law instead of focussing on what benefits 
shareholders, that the duties and liabilities of directors should pass to investors when they assume power 
over the corporation.  That is the only way to ensure that responsibilities meant for the company's ultimate 
decision-makers are borne by the proper parties.  However, as the following subsections will explore, 
possible arrangements under unanimous shareholder agreements complicate this apparently simple 
principle. 
 
2.(b) Shareholder Corporations and Residency Requirements 
 
 Before considering various divisions of power that the unanimous shareholder agreement makes 
possible, there is a general issue that can apply even to the most straight-forward arrangement: the 
implications of corporations entering into unanimous shareholder agreements with regard to other 
companies in which they have invested. 
 It is not possible for a corporation to be elected director of another corporation.
1723
  It is, however, 
possible for one corporation to own shares in another, and it seems clear that corporations may therefore be 
parties to unanimous shareholder agreements.  In addition to corporations just happening to own shares in a 
company whose investors wish to enter into a unanimous shareholder agreement,
1724
 common uses of this 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that directors retained their full powers and responsibilities, and therefore unpaid employees, receivers in 
bankruptcy, and government organizations and municipalities enforcing laws against directors could all 
bring claims against the board as normal, with the directors being limited to indemnification from the true 
decision-makers, the shareholders. 
1722
 Ratti, supra note 16, pp. 119-121, argued that statutory liabilities of directors remain with those 
who hold that office even if all their powers are transferred (unless the legislation explicitly provides 
otherwise), and therefore if claims were brought against them pursuant to those, their only recourse would 
be to turn to the shareholders as guarantors.  Although I disagree with the position that as a matter of law 
their statutory liabilities do not transfer, in the event that a claim was successfully brought against a 
powerless director, the idea of pursuing the shareholders as guarantors has potential.  Curiously, if one 
accepts Ratti's logic, it is unclear under what basis such a claim would be advanced, since the provisions 
transferring liability to the shareholders are inoperative. 
1723
 At least, corporations cannot become directors under present Canadian law.  In the statutes 
relevant to unanimous shareholder agreements, see C.B.C.A. s. 105(1)(c), A.B.C.A. s. 105(1)(c), M.C.A. s. 
100(1)(b), N.B.B.C.A. s. 63(1)(c), N.L.C.A. s. 172(1)(c), N.T.B.C.A. s. 106(1)(a), N.B.C.A. s. 106(1)(a), 
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tool include exerting control over "wholly-owned subsidiaries"
1725
 and "joint ventures" involving a small 
number of companies.  Unfortunately, these scenarios raise questions concerning the transfer of directors' 
duties and liabilities to corporations, duties and liabilities that were not intended to be borne by legal 
entities. 
 The case law is replete with examples of unanimous shareholder agreements which included 
amongst their parties a shareholding corporation.  Generally speaking, that passes without comment.  An 
exception is Allard c. Myhill,
1726
 which addressed whether the fact that the shareholder was a corporation 
was an obstacle to the transfer of responsibility for unpaid wages.  The case concerned whether or not 
certain individuals
1727
 would be excused from liability, not directly whether it could attach to the 
shareholding corporation, but that would seem to be the corollary of the conclusion reached.  The decision 
of the trial judge was that while removing the individuals' responsibility "raise[s] certain issues",
1728
 it was 
"not only legal, it [was] specifically contemplated and authorized in section 146 of the CBCA".
1729
  On 
appeal, however, it was found that since the purpose of directors' liabilities was to hold accountable the 
people who possessed ultimate decision-making power in the company,
1730
 and that since a corporation can 
only "act" through the actions and decisions of humans,
1731
 it was "absurd"
1732
 to allow those humans to so 
act and decide without holding them to those responsibilities.
1733
  The Court of Appeal found that it was the 
individuals who managed the company on behalf of the corporate shareholder and subject to its control 
who were nonetheless the relevant parties to bear this burden, although that appears to have been a 
determination of fact, not law.
1734
  No other individuals were explicitly considered as candidates, but the 
obvious alternative would have been to look to the directors of the shareholder company. 
 Martel criticized the Court of Appeal for going beyond a factual determination that these 
individuals were de facto directors and denying in principle the possibility that shareholder corporations 
could use a unanimous shareholder agreement to take on the powers and responsibilities normally held by a 
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subsidiary's board.
1735
  He argued that only if a corporation has been inserted into the position of 
empowered shareholder specifically so that human directors can avoid liability should the court disregard 
what would otherwise be the legal result: the shareholder corporation itself possessed of a director's normal 
rights and responsibilities.
1736
 
 Although the law allows for corporations to enter into unanimous shareholder agreements,
1737
 this 
ability was one of the subjects put forth in the Industry Canada Discussion Paper as a possible target for 
legislative reform.  After acknowledging the utility this option offered parent companies,
1738
 some potential 
problems were summarized: 
 
81 On the other hand, from an accountability perspective, there may be some 
concerns raised about corporate shareholders using unanimous shareholder agreements, 
particularly in conjunction with the issue of whether the board can or should be entirely 
eliminated where all of the powers of the directors have been reserved to the shareholders 
under a unanimous shareholder agreement.  The CBCA and other corporate laws require 
directors to be natural persons.  It could therefore be questioned whether it is incongruous 
to allow the transfer of directors' responsibilities to corporate entities. 
 
82 A key accountability consideration is whether the powers or responsibilities 
imposed on directors can/should be transferred to a corporate entity.  If the purpose of the 
liability (for example, penal environmental liability) is to encourage key decision-makers, 
through the imposition of personal liability, to monitor the corporation's actions and 
change its conduct where required, the transfer of powers to a corporate entity could 
undermine this purpose. 
 
83 If the purpose of the liability is to ensure adequate compensation for injured 
parties (for example, directors' liability for employee wages), a plaintiff may benefit from 
being able to sue the shareholder, which may have larger resources.  However, a 
corporate structure might be designed to see that liability is transferred to an under-
capitalized corporate entity.  Again, the purpose of directors' liability might be 
defeated.
1739
 
 
 The Industry Canada Discussion Paper also noted that unanimous shareholder agreements could 
be used to bypass director residency requirements.
1740
  Proposed solutions included the retention of the 
status quo, a rule that only some but not all of the board's powers could be transferred to corporations, a 
requirement that some parties to the agreement be natural persons and only they receive the powers and 
duties of the directors, and entirely forbidding corporations from entering unanimous shareholder 
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agreements.
1741
 
 Dennis, responding to a draft of this Discussion Paper,
1742
 expressed puzzlement at the 
recommendation that if the unanimous shareholder agreement removed the board of directors (i.e. entirely 
transferred their powers to shareholders), then only natural persons
1743
 be allowed to be parties, but by 
implication corporations could enter agreements that only partially altered those powers.
1744
  He asked what 
reason existed to limit such a prohibition to situations where the directors' authority was entirely 
removed.
1745
  One explanation might be that it ensures that some humans are still involved in running the 
company who could be held accountable if necessary, but that would seem to hold little comfort if the 
relevant powers were removed from those individuals and placed in the hands of unaccountable 
shareholder corporations.  Perhaps taking this into account, Dennis suggested that it would be sufficient to 
instead limit the recipients of transferred powers to natural persons rather than all shareholders,
1746
 an 
additional scenario found in the final draft of the Discussion Paper.  He is correct that this would normally 
satisfy the underlying policies.  It would ensure the applicability of responsibilities designed under the 
assumption that ultimate power over corporations would always be held by human beings. 
 That was not Dennis' recommendation per se, however, merely one of his critiques of the 
opposing position.  He asserted that limiting unanimous shareholder agreements in this manner would 
remove a significant function, controlling subsidiaries.
1747
  He did not believe that residency requirements 
should be maintained at all; he rather vaguely asserted that the real reasons for them were "not germane to 
corporate law".
1748
  Notwithstanding this, he posited that even if there was some legitimate justification, it 
must have to do with protecting passive investors, and therefore did not apply to close corporations.
1749
  In 
focussing only on shareholders, he missed another possible explanation; despite having elsewhere 
discussed the transfer of directors' liabilities under various statutes,
1750
 Dennis did not consider that 
residency requirements may have relevance in enforcing them.  His conclusion was therefore that the 
C.B.C.A. should be amended to allow for corporations to exert power over their subsidiaries through this 
method;
1751
 presumably he meant amended to make it explicit. 
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 Disney
1752
 noted that, thanks to unanimous shareholder agreements, powerless directors who have 
no liabilities may satisfy residency requirements.
1753
  However, he argued that limiting the transfer of 
authority to individuals the majority of whom were Canadian (a hypothetical proposal to deal with the 
alleged issues) would worsen the situation, as it would encourage foreign investors to use "tame" directors 
instead of a unanimous shareholder agreement, there being no true way to prevent foreign control of 
Canadian corporate decision-making.
1754
  He did admit that where shareholders were not residents of this 
country, bringing proceedings against them may be difficult, and this might incline courts to find Canadian 
directors liable as convenient targets, but he denied that there was any reason to believe that this might be 
the basis of residency requirements.
1755
  This ignored the genuine utility to the legal system of having 
resident Canadian individuals to serve as defendants.  Further, some statutes specifically allow jail time for 
directors, and whether this is intended as a deterrent or a punishment, it is clear that it relies upon the 
existence of individuals who can be incarcerated.  The danger that even directors who de jure retain full 
power can be no more than fall guys controlled by shareholders is undoubtedly real, but one might hope 
that their fear of personal consequences could make them serve at least sometimes as gatekeepers, resisting 
control to protect themselves, which is perhaps a reason not to dismiss their existence as readily as Disney 
did. 
 Scavone analyzed this issue first in terms of whether shareholders "became" directors under an 
agreement granting them full control.
1756
  He took the position that this was not what the Act said, and that 
therefore elements such as residency requirements arguably did not apply.
1757
  He suggested that the 
purpose of retaining a powerless board might be to satisfy those provisions; he considered this situation 
"absurd" but noted that it provided a buffer between shareholders and certain procedural requirements.
1758
  
His critique was more compelling than his counter-argument.  If powerless directors are to be retained, 
some more legitimate reason should be advanced. 
 For present purposes, the most important aspect of residency requirements is their relevance to 
enforcement.  This extends beyond shareholder corporations; unanimous shareholder agreements also allow 
individuals who reside in other countries to control Canadian companies.  Unless empirical data emerges 
suggesting otherwise, extra-jurisdictional enforcement could be adequate.  If that does not prove to be the 
case, then it might be necessary to impose residency requirements upon empowered shareholders (or in the 
case of empowered shareholder corporations, upon their directors).  The commentators discussed above 
have criticized this as hampering unanimous shareholder agreements' ability to facilitate the management of 
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corporate groups, but that cannot be the law's sole priority.  While "tame" directors might be largely under 
the control of investors regardless, they can serve some gatekeeper function if they must weigh benefiting 
the shareholders against their personal risk. 
 Scavone warned of the potential for harm to third parties posed by empowered shareholder 
corporations, that "the personal liability to which members of the board are subject may become 
meaningless or attenuated".
1759
  He noted that while on the one hand, recourse to asset-rich shareholder 
corporations may be a boon to plaintiffs, the other extreme, shell companies, was just as possible.
1760
  He 
considered capitalization requirements as a solution, but that raised the questions of how such requirements 
would be set and whether they might create problems if the shareholder corporation's assets declined, 
perhaps unexpectedly reviving director liability as a result.
1761
  An alternative considered was responsibility 
flowing through to the directors or managers of the shareholder corporation.
1762
  Scavone argued that it 
would be inappropriate, however, for the board of a minority shareholder to be liable for decisions that 
were de facto wholly made by the board of a majority shareholder.
1763
  That objection might be raised by 
any minority investor, though, and there is no reason for this scenario to receive special treatment.  His 
proposed solution, also his proposed general model for empowered shareholder liability, was that certain 
individuals (in this case, directors of the parent companies) would be designated as responsible for 
decision-making for the subsidiary, but that this would be a rebuttable presumption.
1764
  Scavone also 
identified as a problem the conflict of interest such directors would allegedly face between their duties to 
the parent and the subsidiary.
1765
  He apparently considered it unsolvable and therefore another argument 
against holding directors of shareholder corporations liable.
1766
  This issue is discussed below in the context 
of the Indalex decision; properly understood, it is not as difficult as Scavone believed, since the parent 
company itself owes a duty to the subsidiary, and its directors should give effect to that. 
 Beauregard and Auger also identified frustrating creditors by moving liability to asset-less shell 
companies as one of the potential reasons to employ a unanimous shareholder agreement, if perhaps an 
illegitimate one.
1767
  They argued that the boards of the shell companies would not in turn bear these 
responsibilities, and indeed would functionally have no potential liabilities at all since the shell companies 
would have no employees, et cetera.
1768
  The oppression remedy was their recommended solution, 
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particularly given that it allows for the modification of unanimous shareholder agreements.
1769
  Although 
Beauregard and Auger concluded that this strategy to avoid liability might be unlikely to survive such a 
legal attack, they asserted that there was little downside to trying.
1770
  Oppression is certainly one method 
of dealing with problematic corporate arrangements, but that remedy is best reserved for situations that are 
not amenable to pre-existing rules.  If transferring power to shell companies is always oppressive, one 
might as well simply prohibit it, or else create a standardized doctrine with a predictable outcome.
1771
  That 
would create greater certainty, serve as a clearer deterrent to misbehaviour, and aid in efficiently redressing 
wrongs. 
 The primary recipient of the directors' duties and liabilities after a unanimous shareholder 
agreement has transferred their powers to a shareholder corporation should be that company.  Only to the 
extent that this fails to meet policy goals is it necessary to look beyond it.  Therefore, for example, if the 
only issue is recovery of funds (such as to pay employee wages) and the parent company can meet those 
needs, nothing more is required.  If, however, those are insufficient, then further recourse may be 
appropriate.  While it is true that directors themselves do not always have adequate assets to meet their 
legal liabilities, the easy transfer of those responsibilities to undercapitalized companies would allow for 
claimants to go unsatisfied and policy goals to be completely frustrated while allowing decision-makers to 
escape unscathed.
1772
  The same justifications for forcing directors to bear certain duties and liabilities 
personally should cause the board of an empowered shareholder corporation to do so as well.  Similarly, 
where legislation holds directors liable in an attempt to alter and/or penalize behaviour at the individual 
level, that too should be transferred to the humans who run the parent company.
1773
 
 This solution, the one that Scavone rejected, seems the best method of avoiding many of the 
problems presented by corporations assuming the powers of directors.  It moves the duties and liabilities 
from one group of humans to another; to the extent that they were effective upon the first, they can be 
expected to be effective upon the other.  The objections he raised to this proposal are not as significant as 
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of the second attempted to enforce the unanimous shareholder agreement, specifically the arbitration 
clause, against the third company (par. 9).  It was found not to be bound by the terms of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement that its subsidiary had signed (par. 22).  One reason given for this was that "[e]ach 
of IREIT and I.M.H.L. has separate Boards of Directors and management albeit with some common 
members" (par. 23). 
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he made them out to be; holding the board of directors of a minority shareholder liable is no more 
problematic than holding an individual minority shareholder liable.
1774
  The alleged conflict of interest 
between their duties to the two companies can be easily resolved by remembering that the primary 
obligator of the duty to the subsidiary is the parent company itself; since the parent must therefore look to 
the subsidiary's interests before its own, so too should the directors in the exercise of their double duties 
place the subsidiary's interests first.
1775
  Such an approach might be contrary to current expectations and 
practice, but it is theoretically sound. 
 
3. Unusual Restrictions 
 
 Having established that there is a justification for the removal or transfer of directors' duties and 
liabilities when their powers are restricted, the next question is how this would function.  The provision 
might seem straightforward, but the unanimous shareholder agreement is a flexible tool, and the phrase "to 
the extent" hides a complex series of options whose implications are not at all clear.  These include 
transferring specific powers to shareholders while leaving others in the hands of the directors,
1776
 pre-made 
decisions on particular issues while leaving the board to manage the company otherwise,
1777
 making some 
or all corporate decisions subject to shareholder approval or override while leaving primary management 
responsibility with the directors,
1778
  and transferring powers to parties other than the shareholders.
1779
  
                                                                                                                                                                             
1773
 If necessary, this would flow up several levels of a corporate ladder. 
1774
 It is still problematic, but this is best addressed by a general rule dealing with majority 
shareholders, e.g. treating them as the sole decision-makers.  There is no need to create a special rule where 
the majority and minority investors are both themselves corporations. 
1775
 This approach is discussed further with regard to Indalex Ltd., Re, 2013 SCC 6, 354 D.L.R. (4th) 
581, 301 O.A.C. 1, 439 N.R. 235, 2013 CarswellOnt 733, 2013 CarswellOnt 734, 223 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1049, 
J.E. 2013-185, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1591, [2013] W.D.F.L. 1592, D.T.E. 2013T-97, 20 P.P.S.A.C. (3d) 1, 
[2013] S.C.J. No. 6, 96 C.B.R. (5th) 171, 8 B.L.R. (5th) 1 (S.C.C. Feb 01, 2013) (hereinafter "Indalex") 
later in this chapter. 
1776
 For example, transferring the power to declare dividends to the shareholders while leaving other 
management decisions to the directors. 
1777
 A common example would be guaranteeing employment to a named individual, as happened in a 
number of the cases discussed in Chapter Four.  In theory, a wide variety of business decisions could be 
"pre-made" through a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
1778
 For example, requiring shareholders to approve any single expense exceeding a set amount. 
1779
 LaFortune, supra note 552, p. 212 used slightly different categories, listing them as the transfer of 
all powers to all shareholders, the transfer of some powers to all shareholders, the transfer of some or all 
powers to some shareholders, the imposition of supermajority requirements for decisions of the board of 
directors, or requiring directors to obey the instructions of shareholders.  He wrote that in the case of 
imposing supermajority requirements, there would be no transfer of responsibilities (p. 214).  Martel, supra 
note 11, pp. 12-22, also used slightly different categories: supermajority requirements for director 
decisions, terms in the agreement of the type I refer to as "pre-made decisions" (although he does not use 
that phrase), requiring shareholder ratification for certain decisions, and directly transferring powers from 
the directors to the shareholders.  Ratti, supra note 16, p. 126-128, classified the different possible power 
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These intermediate situations raise questions about what "the same extent" means in terms of removing or 
transferring liability, and in the following subsections, each are considered in turn.
1780
 
 Virtually all of the reported cases on unanimous shareholder agreements set out facts that fall into 
these problematic categories; that is, there is some restriction on the board's powers,
1781
 but they retain 
significant authority to manage the company.
1782
  Situations that give rise to complicated questions about 
how directors' duties and liabilities change when their powers are partially but not fully restricted are 
therefore common, at least by the standards of unanimous shareholder agreements.  Curiously, however, 
despite some academic interest, there is very little reported case law actually on that topic, resulting in a 
contradictory sense that these unanswered questions are both pressing and yet largely theoretical. 
 
3.(a) Only Some Powers Transferred 
 
 The section of the C.B.C.A. that outlines how directors' legal responsibilities are affected by a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
arrangements as veto rights, power of instruction, agreements that specify how empowered shareholder will 
vote, supermajority requirements for board decisions, and general transfers of power to the shareholders, 
although he cautioned that these are not all valid under all statutes.  McCarthy, supra note 8, p. 469, listed 
the transfer of all powers, of specific powers, making director decisions subject to approval of shareholders 
or creditors, requiring supermajorities or unanimity for board decisions, and the exercise of directorial 
power on a one-time basis (i.e. pre-made decisions).  These alternative classifications largely overlap with 
the ones discussed in this subsection, with one notable exception.  Supermajority or unanimity 
requirements are not dealt with at length herein because, generally speaking, their implications for 
directors' duties and liabilities need not be complex.  An individual director is either on the side whose 
votes carry the decision or the one whose do not.  The respective responsibilities associated with those two 
positions is well-established.  The actual threshold for decision-making is thus irrelevant.  Smith, supra 
note 228, p. 308, and Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 230 fn 435, pp. 250-251 agreed that supermajority 
requirements for board decisions do not transfer responsibility to the shareholders. 
1780
 Since the arrangement must restrict the directors, it at first glance seems impossible to create a 
structure where shareholders assume the same power as the board but do not either relieve the latter of it or 
directly subordinate them to the investors' authority.  Although primarily making the point in rejection of 
veto/approval powers, Smith, supra note 228,  pp. 307-308, argued that restrictions always had the effect of 
fully removing authority over the specified area from directors and vesting it in shareholders; he theorized 
that the (Quebec) legislature did not want two groups concurrently exercising power.  On the other hand, 
Robitaille, supra note 267, p. 170 took the position that having a power be concurrent between the directors 
and shareholders is a "very partial" restriction upon the former.  (Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 233, explicitly 
agreed with Robitaille and rejected Smith.)  Robitaille gave as one example allowing both groups the 
ability to declare dividends.  While such a scenario is not a "restriction" upon the power of the directors in 
any traditional sense, it does mean that they would no longer have absolute control over the topics normally 
within their authority, a limitation of sorts.  In the preceding example, their normal ability to ensure that a 
dividend is not declared is compromised.  The situation is not that dissimilar from a supervisory power; the 
directors remain the default authority until and unless the shareholders become involved.  Depending upon 
the exact arrangement, it might be appropriate to divide liabilities either as if only some powers had been 
transferred or as if a supervisory power had been created, as discussed later in this section. 
1781
 Necessary by definition, of course. 
1782
 See, for example, most of the cases discussed in Chapter Four. 
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unanimous shareholder agreement has the strange quality of explicitly anticipating a very specific way in 
which the tool might be used- to transfer some but not all of their powers to other individuals- and 
purporting to set out the consequences of such a situation, while still utterly failing to deal with the 
implications of that very scenario.
1783
 
 Westlake devoted the bulk of his brief comment on unanimous shareholder agreements to 
exploring possible configurations of the restrictions in them.  He distinguished between a "comprehensive" 
agreement which affected all of the directors' powers and "restricted" agreements that were limited in some 
way,
1784
 and identified several subtypes of the latter.
1785
  These included transferring power over certain 
activities, such as borrowing money or altering banking arrangements, to the shareholders while leaving 
other powers with the board.
1786
  Despite identifying these arrangements, Westlake did not consider their 
full implications, addressing liability issues only to state that the concept of de facto directors and statutory 
language defining "directors" as the persons occupying such a position regardless of title should resolve 
any issue.
1787
 
 Disney addressed this problem more directly, noting that "[i]f a unanimous shareholder agreement 
restricts the powers of the directors only in part, it may be difficult to determine to what extent the 
liabilities of the directors have thereby been limited".
1788
  He recommended firstly that if the liability could 
be clearly tied to a power that was or was not restricted, that should be determinative.
1789
  Where the 
situation was not so clear-cut, such as when a general failure of management was to blame, he suggested 
that the courts might apportion the liability based upon degree of fault.
1790
  This seems reasonable at first 
                                                          
1783
 Some commentators have questioned whether partial restrictions upon the directors are limited to 
those powers which the statute explicitly provides are subject to a unanimous shareholder agreement.  
Since no rational basis has been identified for the seemingly arbitrary way that this qualifier appears 
throughout the legislation, the consensus has been that it is redundant and all director powers are subject to 
potential restriction.  See Robitaille, supra note 267, pp. 169-170; McCarthy, supra note 8, p. 469; 
Turgeon, supra note 9, pp. 224-225. 
1784
 Bruce C. Westlake, Comments On "The Unanimous Shareholder Agreement: Opting Out Of 
Statutory Norms" in The Future of Corporation Law: Issues and Perspectives: Papers Presented at the 
Queen's Annual Business Law Symposium 1997 (Scarborough: Carswell, 1999) 380, at p. 381. 
1785
 Another subtype put forward is agreements which have only a limited lifespan and then return 
power to the directors, which Westlake suggested might be useful for some transactions such as corporate 
reorganizations or to circumvent situations where the directors are unwilling or unable to take a certain 
action (Westlake, supra note 1784, p. 381).  Beauregard and Auger, supra note 16, also mentioned this 
type. 
1786
 Westlake, supra note 1784, p. 381-382. Westlake was writing when restricting director powers in 
such areas (probably) automatically transferred the powers to shareholders, which is no longer true under 
the current C.B.C.A. 
1787
 Ibid, p. 383. 
1788
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 129. 
1789
 Ibid, p. 129.  The example he used is of a dividend made in contravention of statute.  If it was the 
shareholders who had been granted the power to declare that dividend and had done so, liability would fall 
upon them. 
1790
 Ibid, p. 129. 
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glance, but is ultimately only a slightly broader version of the first recommendation, and it ignores 
situations where degree of fault is co-extensive, impossible to determine, or legally irrelevant.
1791
  Even if 
liability is apportioned as between the directors and investors, there needs to be a more detailed analysis as 
to how that might function than a vague reference to "degree of fault".
1792
 
 To illustrate this, consider a situation where shareholders were empowered to hire, fire, and set 
salaries for senior officers, but all other powers of the board remained unaltered, including their authority 
over those same senior officers in the normal course of business.
1793
  The corporation subsequently 
becomes insolvent, with employees still unpaid.  Directors normally have a responsibility for those wages.  
But in this circumstance, how should that liability be handled?  Alternatively, consider the board's "due 
diligence" requirements to insure that environmental statutes are being followed by those senior 
employees.
1794
  Should the directors be relieved of those responsibilities in whole, in part, or not at all?  
Should those responsibilities be imposed on the shareholders in whole, in part, or not at all?  And is it 
realistic or desirable to treat the answers to the preceding two questions as automatically symmetrical? 
 Although not strictly on-point, the trial judgment in Allard c. Myhill
1795
 suggests that if the only 
powers that the board continues to possess are closer to the responsibility level that one might associate 
with officers, while the more important ones have been shifted to the shareholders, this should be treated as 
if it was a full transfer of all the directors' powers and accompanying liability.  The decision was reversed 
on appeal; for reasons that are not fully articulated but were seemingly based upon testimony regarding the 
actual powers and responsibilities of the individuals in question,
1796
 Dalphond J.C.A. stated that they were 
                                                          
1791
 Directors have some statutory liabilities that are independent of any finding of fault, such as 
liability for unpaid wages. 
1792
 It is also worth considering burden of proof issues.  Who has the burden of proof for holding the 
directors and/or shareholders at fault?  What is the default assumption? 
1793
 I am not aware of any cases involving a corporation with a unanimous shareholder agreement 
containing this precise set-up, but the example is not particularly implausible or artificial. 
1794
 See e.g. R. v. Bata Industries Ltd., 9 O.R. (3d) 329, 70 C.C.C. (3d) 394, 7 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 245, 
1992 CarswellOnt 211, [1992] O.J. No. 236 (Ont. Prov. Div. Feb 07, 1992) (hereinafter "Bata"). 
1795
 Allard CQ, supra note 1726.  In Allard, as discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the question was 
whether individuals who had resigned as de jure directors were liable as de facto directors; the shareholder 
company had assumed power through a unanimous shareholder agreement, but the individuals continued to 
have day-to-day management responsibility, subject to significant control by it, with the trial judge finding 
that they made only a single decision that was "comparable to a decision normally made by corporate 
directors" (par. 203) and that particular action was further described as not so much a decision in the 
circumstances as the only rational reaction (par. 205).  They were found at trial to have no liability for 
unpaid wages (par. 212).  On appeal, the individuals were found on the facts to be de facto directors (Allard 
CA, supra note 1726, pars. 40-41).  Even assuming that the standard used in the trial judgment was not 
overturned by the appeal, only its application, it may not have been meant to apply to individuals who held 
the title of director (see on this point the remarks at Allard CQ, par. 210 that stressed that the legislation 
used the word "director" exclusively).  Granting all of these cautions, when a unanimous shareholder 
agreement has created an unusual power arrangement, evaluating the roles and responsibilities of 
individuals to see whether they are more akin to officers or directors is a potentially useful standard. 
1796
 Allard CA, supra note 1726, par. 40. 
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de facto directors.
1797
  Since this was apparently a finding of fact rather than law, it does not necessarily 
preclude the principle that a director sufficiently stripped of power is no longer a de facto director but 
instead akin to an officer.  Regardless, the model advanced by the trial judge is worth taking seriously as a 
means of handling situations where the board no longer have any of the substantive powers normally 
associated with their offices.  This still leaves open the question of how to respond when the powers unique 
to directors are truly split. 
 The Industry Canada Discussion Paper, like Disney, distinguished between situations where the 
decision that incurred the liability is clearly tied to a specific power exercised by either the directors or the 
shareholders- such as declaring a dividend- and ones where the responsibility is not as obvious, particularly 
if the general management of the company is to blame.
1798
  Two alternatives were proposed to handle these 
more complex scenarios: either, as previously discussed, leave it to the courts to determine degree of fault 
in specific instances, or else impose joint and several liability as the general rule.
1799
  The paper noted that 
the latter would be more effective at ensuring that third parties are compensated for harms done to them,
1800
 
but there are other reasons it might be preferable as well.  Joint and several liability has the advantages of 
greater legal certainty for both claimants and defendants, greater deterrent effect in forcing all concerned to 
make decisions as if the full cost might fall on them rather than hoping they will be found less at fault, and 
less incentive to create arrangements that would mislead the courts as to the exact balance of power.
1801
 
 Broadly speaking, there are three ways that directors can face liability.  First, they can be found 
liable for a specific decision that they made or action they undertook; for example, authorizing a dividend 
contrary to the statute.
1802
  Second, they can be found liable because they did not make some decision or 
undertake some action that they should have; for example, failing to meet their due diligence requirements 
under environmental law.
1803
  Third, they can be found liable automatically by virtue of their offices, 
without any specific action or inaction being impugned; for example, simply for having been a director at 
the relevant time, they may owe unpaid employee wages.
1804
 
 With the first type, it will sometimes be easy to determine whether the directors or the empowered 
                                                          
1797
 Ibid, par. 41. 
1798
 Industry Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 9, p. 45.   
1799
 Joint and several liability is also the recommendation of Quack, supra note 289, for the 
supervisory arrangement discussed in a subsequent subsection. 
1800
 Industry Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 9, p. 45.   
1801
 Smith, supra note 228, p. 308, proposed that where there is doubt as to who had authority, the 
directors or shareholders, the default assumption should be the directors, as an agreement that alters the 
statutory balance of power should be read narrowly.  The difficulty with employing this as a means of 
determining liability is that it could easily be abused by the very investors who drafted the document. 
1802
 C.B.C.A. s. 118(2)(c). 
1803
 See Bata, supra note 1794, which applied the Ontario Water Resources Act, RSO 1980, c. 361, s. 
75(1) and Environmental Protection Act, RSO 1980, c. 141, s. 147a to corporate officers and directors who 
incurred but failed to meet due diligence requirements. 
1804
 C.B.C.A. s. 119(1). 
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shareholders should be liable, because one or the other clearly held the relevant power and made the 
troublesome decision.  If both groups took steps that (may have) led to the problem, then there are two 
possible ways of proceeding; either full joint and several liability or else the determination of respective 
contributions to the harm.  Unless one group clearly bears the overwhelming majority of responsibility, 
joint and several liability is preferable.  It will decrease litigation, increase certainty, and provide stronger 
deterrence incentives.  There are some fairness concerns, but given that both directors and shareholders 
entered a joint power arrangement and both took steps that (may have) helped cause the harm, it is not 
overly harsh that they bear the responsibility for it, even if strictly speaking their share of the liability may 
be disproportionate to their actual degrees of fault. 
 A similar logic can be employed for liability arising from inaction.  If one group clearly had the 
authority to take the required steps and the other did not, then responsibility would naturally attach to the 
former.  Where it is unclear which group had it, or where both had some relevant power, then joint and 
several liability is again appropriate.  This will motivate both partially empowered shareholders and 
partially depowered directors to be diligent in meeting their legal duties and encouraging each other to do 
so.
1805
 
 The most difficult scenarios involve liability that arises solely as a result of the directors' position, 
with no further requirement that anything they have done or failed to do form the basis of the claim.
1806
  
                                                          
1805
 A situation of approximately this type arose in Wong c. R., 1996 CarswellNat 2860, 1996 
CarswellNat 2861 (T.C.C. Apr 16, 1996).  A unanimous shareholder agreement split a company into two 
divisions that operated autonomously and kept their own finances, each one operating a separate restaurant, 
and further transferred certain powers to the shareholders (par. 10).  When one "division" ended up owing 
unpaid taxes, the Minister of National Revenue pursued the individuals who ran the other (pars. 4-8).  
Tardif T.C.J. held that the agreement offered no protection against third parties (par. 18).  The judge further 
found that the directors could not rely upon the instrument to excuse them from their legal responsibility to 
monitor the entire corporation's affairs and ensure compliance with the law (par. 20); their adherence to the 
agreement and the company's division into two autonomous operations had nothing to do with the directors' 
legal responsibilities, which continued to encompass the entire corporation, and they could not ignore fifty 
percent of it (par. 32).  Presumably, Tardif T.C.J. was assuming that the directors remained empowered to 
manage the whole company either as a determination of fact or law, i.e. either the specific terms of this 
document did not effectively restrict the board in such a manner, or else the agreement was something other 
than a corporate constitutional removal of powers.  Otherwise, the position that they were neglecting half 
their duties makes no sense.  The result was that even when a unanimous shareholder agreement arguably 
removed half the directors' powers, they were found to have a liability arising out of their positions and 
failure to exercise the care required of them. 
1806
 This is a distinction that was perhaps missed by Smith, supra note 228, pp. 310-311, who argued 
that shareholders would be subject to statutory liabilities if the relevant power was transferred to them, but 
in addition to listing abilities that must be positively exercised to trigger liability (such as declaring 
dividends), he included the responsibility for unpaid wages, which he tied to the authority to pay 
employees.  Others have appreciated the difficulties this situation poses.  Robitaille, supra note 267, p. 172, 
pointed out that some director responsibilities, such as for employee wages, are difficult to tie to a given 
power, and thus found it unclear under what circumstances they were removed.  Ratti, supra note 16, p. 
119-120, took the position that, unless the legislation explicitly provides otherwise, these sorts of statutory 
responsibilities are tied to the office of director regardless of how their powers are curtailed.  That position 
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However, while such responsibilities do not rely upon a finding of fault, they are nonetheless grounded in 
the fact that the board were the ultimate decision-makers in the corporation and thus bear responsibility for 
it, otherwise holding them accountable would be arbitrary and senseless.
1807
  When that ultimate decision-
making power is divided, it might be tempting to suggest that in order to determine who bears 
responsibility and in what proportion, causality should be established for whatever situation has given rise 
to a liability (likely the insolvency of the corporation), even though that is not normally a required element 
of the claim.  But such a test might very easily prove impossible to satisfy and defeats the very purpose of 
this category, which by definition is not based upon the actions or inaction of the directors.  If both groups 
possess ultimate control over some significant aspect of the corporation, as opposed to powers that are 
more akin to officers
1808
 or largely trivial, then joint and several liability should once again apply.
1809
 
 It has been suggested that a unanimous shareholder agreement might empower investors regarding 
a given area without restricting the board's own authority.
1810
  For example, the ability to declare dividends 
might be granted to the shareholders, but not removed from the directors.  It is debatable whether such a 
term would fall within the meaning of the word "restricts" in the unanimous shareholder agreement 
provisions.
1811
  If this was permissible, then the same rule of joint and several liability for overlapping 
authority would apply, except where a given exercise of that power was the problem and could be clearly 
attributed to either group. 
 
3.(b) Pre-Made Decisions 
 
 One of the necessary characteristics of a unanimous shareholders agreement is that it must in some 
way restrict the powers of the directors.  Such limitations can take many forms, but one of the most obvious 
is to predetermine some decision(s) that would normally be within their authority.  A common restriction of 
this type is installing a specified individual into some position in the corporation.
1812
  Another simple 
example would be requiring that a specified minimum dividend be paid if there are sufficient profits to do 
                                                                                                                                                                             
seems likely to create injustice and frustrate policy goals. 
1807
 See the quotation from Vaszi, supra note 418, pars. 21-23, reproduced above.  I would like to 
acknowledge Edward Waitzer for pointing out to me that responsibility could be grounded in decision-
making capacity without implying a fault requirement. 
1808
 See the discussion of Allard CQ and Allard CA, supra note 1726, elsewhere in this chapter. 
1809
 Martel, supra note 11, p. 29, noted that this is a difficult problem.  He suggested that where 
shareholders have assumed all or nearly all of the directors' powers, they would be liable.  Short of that, he 
did not provide recommendations, only a caution that the liability should not be tied to direct power over 
payroll, since the capability to make payments was affected by other decisions. 
1810
 See note 1780. 
1811
 Arguably, it restricts the directors' ability to ensure that something within their normal authority 
does not occur.  See note 1780. 
1812
 Numerous examples were discussed in Chapter Four. 
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so.  Conversely, the restriction might be literally that, a prohibition on some undesired activity, such as 
excessive borrowing or engaging in business practices that the shareholders considered unethical.
1813
  The 
key feature of this arrangement is that it is not a transfer of future decision-making power to the investors, 
either directly or in an oversight capacity; the decision is made at the time the unanimous shareholder 
agreement is entered into and cannot be changed thereafter other than by amending or terminating the 
agreement itself.  The term "pre-made decisions" will be used for these. 
 Such scenarios are consistent with the current wording of the C.B.C.A., seem very much in line 
with a general concept of "restricting" directors' powers, and have a long history in practice,
1814
 but this is 
actually a relatively new development from a strictly statutory perspective.  Earlier versions of the federal 
legislation
1815
 and most current provincial and territorial equivalents
1816
 automatically deem that any power 
of the board that is restricted has been passed to the shareholders.
1817
  The current version of the C.B.C.A., 
by contrast, separates the concepts of powers that are restricted and powers that are given without 
automatically equating the two, and this in turn allows for the possibility that some powers might be 
restricted yet given to no one.  This may have been an inadvertent effect of a revised drafting meant to deal 
with a separate issue,
1818
 but it nonetheless opens up new and potentially useful possibilities. 
 This approach to the unanimous shareholder agreement is not entirely without precedent.  Despite 
the former wording of the C.B.C.A. providing that shareholders received all the powers of the directors that 
were restricted, Sohmer, writing soon enough after the original enactment of the provision and before any 
                                                          
1813
 Such as selling firearms or doing business in countries with a history of human rights violations, 
and other familiar topics from corporate social responsibility and ethical investing. 
1814
 Many of the cases discussed in Chapter Three and Chapter Four involved such limitations.  
Although on rare occasions restrictions that did not function as transfers have been rejected for failing to 
meet the statutory requirements (see the discussion in Chapter Three of 9109 CS and 9109 CA and Couvre-
Plancher) and Ming considered the issue specifically to allow them, the vast majority of cases in which 
they appeared simply accepted the validity of these terms as a given.  In some cases, they were actively 
found to be valid ways of meeting the statutory criterion that unanimous shareholder agreements restrict the 
directors. 
1815
 C.B.C.A. '74-'75, s. 140(4). 
1816
 A.B.C.A. s. 146(7), M.C.A. s. 140(5), N.B.B.C.A. s. 99(5), N.L.C.A. s. 245(8), N.T.B.C.A. s. 148(7), 
N.B.C.A. s. 148(7), O.B.C.A. s. 108(5), S.B.C.A. s. 140(4), Y.B.C.A. s. 148(7).  The sole exception is 
Q.B.C.A. s. 214, which, similarly to the C.B.C.A., specifies "parties to the unanimous shareholder 
agreement who are given those powers" rather than all the shareholders. 
1817
 It was, however, never certain what this meant in the context of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement that set out a defined decision of the type discussed here.  Possibly the shareholders were 
granted some unspecified power to overturn those decisions, but it is worth considering that the statutory 
provisions are also totally unclear as to how decision-making amongst empowered shareholders should 
work.  A well-drafted agreement could set such arrangements out, but one that makes a decision or places a 
restriction but does not explicitly transfer powers at all would presumably be the least likely to define such 
a decision-making process, unless perhaps arrangements were set out for a different purpose (a different 
power that was explicitly transferred) that could be used. 
1818
 The most obvious intent for this change would be that it allows for some designated shareholders 
to receive directors' powers, rather than all of them. 
  
 
 
320 
 
tradition had developed around this facet of the law, was guided in his understanding by the key word 
"restricts".  His interpretation veered to the opposite extreme, considering the narrow possibility that a 
"restriction" might not even include a requirement for positive action,
1819
 and explicitly denying that a 
transfer of powers to shareholders was even permissible,
1820
 let alone automatic.  (Sohmer viewed these as 
defects, it must be noted.
1821
)  Turgeon pointed out that Sohmer's anti-transfer interpretation was not 
supported by the rest of the provision, and in particular noted that it cannot be reconciled with the ability to 
remove the directors' powers as a whole, given that it would mean that no one would then have the power 
to initiate corporate action.
1822
  Hay and Smith also explicitly rejected Sohmer's view that the word 
"restricts" precluded terms mandating positive steps,
1823
  and they argued that "[t]he legislators cannot have 
expected that shareholders would restrict director power when the result is a power vacuum".
1824
  In support 
of this, they pointed out that the statute as it then was contained a separate provision which granted to 
shareholders who were parties to the agreement the "rights, powers, and duties" of a director.
1825
  Recent 
amendments to the Act have rendered this more ambiguous, as the C.B.C.A. now grants the rights and 
powers of directors only to "parties to the unanimous shareholder agreement who are given that power to 
manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the corporation",
1826
 a more tautological 
wording that allows for a vacuum to exist. 
 Welling acknowledged that the current C.B.C.A. provision contains what he perceived as 
ambiguity about the result of powers being restricted without a specified transferee, but his own analysis 
begs the question.  He began by asking, "Who, then, exercises those managerial powers [that have been 
restricted]?"
1827
  He did not appear to have considered that managerial powers might simply be restricted.  
Instead, he pointed out that some of the provincial statutes clearly transfer any restricted powers to 
shareholders.
1828
  He therefore "reckon[ed] that would be the default position under the C.B.C.A. if the 
unanimous shareholder agreement fails to state who will exercise the restricted powers, although the 
                                                          
1819
 Sohmer, supra note 311, p. 675. 
1820
 Ibid, p. 674. 
1821
 Ibid, p. 674. 
1822
 Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 223.  Turgeon, at pp. 223-224, acknowledged that linguistically 
speaking the word "restricts" is not normally synonymous with the concept of "transfers", but he countered 
that the additional phrase "in whole or in part" changed matters.  As a result, he concluded that a partial 
restriction did not transfer power to the shareholders, but a restriction of all the directors' powers must. 
1823
 Hay and Smith, supra note 319, p. 450. 
1824
 Ibid, p. 450.  Fitzwilliam, supra note 9, section 8, considered Hay and Smith's point about a 
"fiduciary vacuum", when he conceded that his proposal to allow shareholders to restrict directors without 
assuming their responsibilities would create such a vacuum, although in that case, it was not a power 
vacuum, but only a responsibility vacuum. 
1825
 Hay and Smith, supra note 319, p. 450. 
1826
 C.B.C.A., s. 146(5). 
1827
 Welling 3rd ed., supra note 256, p. 464. 
1828
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section isn't clear on that point".
1829
  This view takes for granted a transfer of power, excluding any other 
arrangement. 
 Beauregard and Auger also considered it nebulous whether a pre-made decision (using the 
example of an annual dividend or pre-determined directors) would be a valid restriction.  They suggested 
instead that shareholders who needed to circumvent the directors on a one-time basis implement a very 
narrow time-limited transfer of power to themselves.
1830
  This would be effective at achieving their 
objective in the short-term, but would require a steady stream of agreements to influence corporate 
behaviour on an ongoing basis. 
 As discussed in greater detail later in this chapter, unanimous shareholder agreements that include 
specific decisions have traditionally been analyzed by commentators (but not the courts) as if they were 
firstly a transfer of power to the shareholders and secondarily an agreement (not necessarily binding in an 
absolute sense) as to how the transferees would exercise that power, a so-called fettering of their discretion.  
There is apparently some resistance to conceiving of a restriction that does not function as a transfer, 
although the current wording of the C.B.C.A. allows for it.  And yet any objection rests on a surprisingly 
unstable foundation, the belief that all the powers normally possessed by directors must be exercisable by 
someone lest problems ensue.  This claim is not convincing, and allowing for the alternative (a restriction 
that does not function as a transfer) may in some cases be a practical solution, when the desired outcome 
genuinely is to prevent or mandate a specific act.  It is absurd to argue that a corporation cannot function 
unless all legally permissible options are at all times open to some decision-maker.
1831
  While any 
restriction, no matter how narrow, might eventually become a problem, the agreement can be amended or 
terminated.  In fact, if a transferred power requires unanimity amongst shareholders for its exercise, then it 
is no easier (and in some cases harder) to use that authority than amend the agreement itself. 
 This does create questions as to how the corresponding duties and liabilities would be dealt with.  
There do not appear to be any reported cases dealing with this issue, although Parton v. R.
1832
 may come 
the closest.  The corporation's directors
1833
 were held liable for its failure to remit the source deductions it 
                                                          
1829
 Ibid, p. 465. 
1830
 Beauregard and Auger, supra note 16. 
1831
 The history of the ultra vires doctrine (the principle that the corporation itself lacked the legal 
capacity to perform actions in violation of its articles, and therefore its attempts to do so would be void) 
demonstrates a similar point, although admittedly that principle did prove problematic and Canadian law 
has largely done away with it.  (See generally Communities, supra note 807, and in particular the Supreme 
Court's critique of the ultra vires doctrine at par. 34.)  The distinction between "pre-made" decisions in 
unanimous shareholder agreements and the ultra vires docrine is discussed further at note 807. 
1832
 Parton v. R., 45 B.L.R. (2d) 298, [1999] 2 C.T.C. 2755, 1999 CarswellNat 573, 1999 CarswellNat 
3921, 99 D.T.C. 738 (T.C.C. Apr 06, 1999) (hereinafter "Parton"). 
1833
 Whether they were directors or not was itself the subject of dispute, although it was found that 
they were (Parton, supra note 1832, pars. 47-48). 
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had made, pursuant to the Income Tax Act.
1834
  There was a unanimous shareholder agreement in place, the 
only term of which the reasons for judgment set out was that "[t]he board of directors did not have power or 
authority to allot, reserve or issue additional shares in the capital of the Corporation".
1835
  Despite 
examining whether the directors' powers were curtailed on other grounds,
1836
 Lamarre Proulx T.C.J. did not 
explicitly consider the ramifications of the restriction mentioned in the unanimous shareholder agreement, 
which plausibly might be connected to the corporation's ultimate insolvency and inability to pay to the 
fiscal authorities the remitted funds it had instead put to other business purposes.  The directors' liability 
was not curtailed, and they were found fully liable.
1837
  This was a missed opportunity for the judiciary to 
weigh in on the question, but it at least serves to demonstrate that, while rare, such situations do actually 
occur. 
 Martel asserted that shareholders would assume the full responsibility for "instructions" (as he 
called them) in unanimous shareholder agreements, with the directors having acted only as their agents.
1838
  
He qualified that with an exception: where the pre-made decision was a negative restriction, neither power 
nor liability passed to the shareholders.
1839
  Although the simplicity of this may hold appeal, it fails to 
address the complexities that might emerge with either type of pre-made decision. 
 As already noted, it serves neither policy goals nor justice to hold directors accountable for 
choices that they did not have the power to make.  Therefore, they should not be held liable for 
consequences obviously attributable to decisions placed beyond their control.  Conversely, if they still 
possessed the relevant authority, the corresponding obligations would naturally continue with them as well.  
When the connection between the liabilities that have arisen and their remaining powers is either complex 
or legally irrelevant, they should also retain responsibility just as was argued for split powers. 
 When authority is relocated from directors to shareholders, duties and liabilities follow.  But if it is 
possible to restrict the board's powers without transferring them- as seems true under the current C.B.C.A.- 
then the result might be that directors can be absolved of some of their responsibilities without anyone else 
receiving them.  Indeed, on a strict wording of the statute, this might currently be the state of the law. 
 One alternative- not well supported by the current wording but perhaps theoretically valid- would 
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 Parton, supra note 1832, par. 1. 
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 Ibid, par. 17.  It is unclear whether those powers were transferred to the shareholders or simply 
restricted. 
1836
 Aside from the restriction discussed, the directors argued that they were subject to the supervision 
of a "group of advisors" representing the shareholders (Parton, supra note 1832, par. 5), and should thus 
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be to consider the creation of the unanimous shareholder agreement itself as a form of exercising the 
"power to manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the corporation"
1840
 and thus 
susceptible to the attendant responsibilities.
1841
  (There is no reason to exclude negative restrictions, as 
Martel does, if they have somehow led to liability.)  This would mean that the shareholders who originally 
implemented the agreement would be liable for any harm it caused.  However, at the time that the 
agreement was entered into, the problems that it eventually resulted in may not have been foreseeable, or at 
least not probable.  Where liability derives from action or inaction, policy goals are unlikely to be served if 
one penalizes decision-making that may have been reasonable, even desirable, at the time.  Furthermore, 
this approach binds shareholders almost inescapably to the company, until such time as the agreements are 
terminated (or perhaps amended), because even if they divest their holdings, they can still be found 
responsible for having helped create the unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 Another possible answer would be to hold current investors liable.  This could be justified on the 
grounds that they have an obligation to update the unanimous shareholder agreement on an ongoing basis 
to reflect changing circumstances, and thus they are de facto decision-makers similar to shareholders in the 
split powers arrangement.  Directors, after all, must revisit corporate decisions and policies in light of new 
developments.  Unfortunately, unanimous shareholder agreements may be more difficult to amend than 
director decisions are to overturn. 
 These difficulties may justify the transfer-then-fetter interpretation, which reduces to the split 
powers arrangement already discussed, but that has its own drawbacks, discussed later in this chapter. 
 
3.(c) Shareholder Supervision 
 
 Another potential power structure which a unanimous shareholder agreement can create is one 
where the directors remain the primary decision-makers but are subject to some level of shareholder 
supervision.  Such oversight could apply to some or all of their decisions.  It might take the form either of a 
veto/ratification right where actions would de jure still need to originate with directors, or alternatively, 
shareholders might grant to themselves the ability to make decisions if and when they so chose (with an 
authority that superseded the directors'), but in the absence of such investor decision-making, the board 
would continue to manage the corporation as normal. 
 Dennis argued that "[a] common form of agreement among some or all of the shareholders of a 
                                                          
1840
 This exact phrase is taken from C.B.C.A. s. 146(5). 
1841
 Put another way, to consider "restrict[ing], in whole or in part, the powers of the directors" as a 
form of "exercising the powers of directors".  That perspective also has implications with respect to the 
exact statutory language in the current C.B.CA. that permits shareholders to fetter their discretion when 
exercising the powers of directors under a unanimous shareholder agreement.  See the discussion later in 
this chapter. 
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close corporation currently in use [...] may [...] impose the requirement for specified majority shareholder 
approval of certain decisions of the directors where no such approval is required under the Act[....]  Such an 
agreement should continue to be permitted under the new regime without the necessity to qualify as a 
unanimous shareholder agreement."
1842
  He suggested that such restrictions could be placed into by-laws, 
but that the law should also be amended to allow these agreements to be recognized as contracts "in much 
the same fashion as a pooling agreement"
1843
 without being unanimous shareholder agreements as currently 
defined.  Dennis' objection was to the unanimity requirement, which he believed unnecessary for this type 
of arrangement.  He implicitly contrasted them with what he believed the unanimous shareholder 
agreement provisions were "really intended"
1844
 to govern, documents which "affect the internal 
governance of a close corporation in one or more ways and opt out of some or all of the procedural 
requirements of the Act".
1845
  For those, Dennis believed the unanimity requirement necessary.
1846
  It is 
dubious whether a non-unanimous group of shareholders should have the authority to place themselves as a 
supervisory body over the directors, or how doing so fails to meet his own definition of a change in 
governance structure that opts out of the provisions of the Act.  But Dennis did not even address how this 
might affect the duties and liabilities of directors. 
 Ewasiuk did reflect upon that issue, specifically as part of his consideration of the duties of care 
and loyalty, although his logic could apply to any responsibility of the board.  Presenting several competing 
theories, he proposed that investors could be subject to duties when they directly assume power, but not 
when they merely have supervisory authority, using as an example the distinction between shareholders 
who are given borrowing powers versus directors who must obtain shareholder approval for borrowings 
over a certain amount.
1847
  However, Ewasiuk noted that any such distinction was initially "compelling" but 
ultimately "artificial"
1848
 because "in exercising supervisory or veto-like powers, the shareholders are still 
making directors' decisions".
1849
 
 There is no consensus upon this question.  Martel once declared that, since a ratification power 
meant that shareholders ultimately decide whether or not a resolution comes into effect, it constitutes a 
genuine transfer of authority to them, and would thus subject them to the entire responsibility normally 
borne by directors; initiative might remain the domain of the board, but the final decision-making power 
has been transferred.
1850
  Despite that being his understanding of the state of the law, he argued that it 
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would have been preferable if the statute had provided for joint and several liability between directors and 
shareholders in such circumstances, because both had participated in the process.
1851
  He more recently 
wrote, without explanation for what had prompted his admitted reconsideration, that perhaps liability 
actually was joint.
1852
  LaFortune thought, similarly to Martel's original position, that if directors were 
following instructions in accordance with the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement, they would be 
viewed as the agents of the investors.
1853
  Turgeon took the opposite position, on the basis that there were 
longstanding precedents of shareholders having approval rights regarding certain types of decisions, and 
that this had not entailed the assumption of responsibility for them.  In his view, approval/veto powers 
granted through a unanimous shareholder agreement would simply represent an expansion of that, not a 
transfer of power and accompanying responsibilities, and as a result imposed absolutely no additional 
duties or liabilities upon investors.
1854
  McCarthy, like Martel more recently, posited that the directors 
would not be relieved of their responsibilities but the shareholders would receive them as well, although he 
admitted to being "by no means certain" of this.
1855
  This very uncertainty was one of the reasons that Smith 
warned against the possibility of such arrangements; based upon the Q.C.A. as it then was, which was 
clearer that investors empowered by a unanimous shareholder agreement would manage the company as if 
they were the directors, he argued that a term requiring the board to submit decisions to shareholders for 
approval (rather than transferring primary decision-making power to them) would not be a valid 
restriction.
1856
  This statutory basis aside, he presented a theoretical justification for his objections: 
questions would be raised as to the shareholders' responsibilities if they approved acts of the directors that 
were illegal.
1857
  In Smith's view, it would be unjust to hold them liable when the harms had been initiated 
by others.
1858
 
 The difficulty that such a situation presents, that has so confounded and divided commentators, is 
that in one sense the directors have had no power removed, and in another, they have had all their powers 
removed.
1859
  So long as the board remain the primary decision-makers for the corporation, there might be a 
continuing benefit to holding them accountable for the consequences of those choices.  On the other hand, 
to the extent that they are not the ultimate decision-makers, it is unfair to hold them solely responsible 
when their decisions were subject to override. 
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 One temptation might therefore be to look to the actual exercise of the shareholder's supervisory 
authority as determinative; where they did not intervene, the directors remain liable, and where they did, 
liability transfers.  But this can be misleading.  Investors who decline to intervene are giving tacit 
endorsement to decisions made, and their failure to appropriately exercise powers that they possess might 
itself be a valid source of liability.  Further, whether or not they actually exercise their override abilities, a 
power dynamic could be created such that directors' decisions are subject to control even without a formal 
exercise of the shareholders' authority. 
 One possible analogy for this situation, albeit an imperfect one, is corporate officers.  Officers bear 
duties and can face liabilities, and they often make choices that have a significant impact upon the 
company, but they are not the de jure ultimate authority in the corporation, and are not subject to all of the 
same responsibilities as directors.  Directors subject to override by shareholders might be considered 
analogous, in that they inhabit an intermediate level in the corporate power structure, despite making 
decisions not normally within the authority of officers. 
 It has been noted that in many companies, the de jure power relationship between directors and 
officers can bear little resemblance to the de facto one, if disengaged directors allow entrenched officers to 
dictate corporate policy.
1860
  And that might be equally true as regards shareholders empowered to override 
directors.  This presents a danger that the board might de facto retain their full powers, while transferring 
away their duties and liabilities via the creation of a never-exercised override authority.  At the very least, a 
supervisory power structured in a way that makes it difficult or impossible to actually use should not shift 
responsibility from those who actually make the decisions onto those who cannot effectively exert control. 
 Where the override is at least potentially useable, the issue remains as to how to deal with the 
board's duties and liabilities.  The same three questions posed earlier apply.  Should the directors be 
relieved of their responsibilities in whole, in part, or not at all?  Should those responsibilities be imposed on 
the shareholders in whole, in part, or not at all?  And is it realistic or desirable to treat the answers to the 
preceding two questions as automatically symmetrical? 
 This issue was considered in National Bank of Canada v. Bronfman,
1861
 where a motion was 
brought to dismiss the third party claim against individual directors.
1862
  Although they were struck on other 
grounds,
1863
 Spence J. considered in the alternative the implication of a unanimous shareholder agreement 
that was in place.  The basis of the suit was that the directors were allegedly participants in a threatened 
veto of a settlement proposal, which would take the form of their company refusing to amend a partnership 
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agreement.
1864
  Under the terms of a unanimous shareholder agreement, the directors could not cause their 
company to agree to said amendment without the approval of its shareholders,
1865
 one of whom had 
actually threatened the aforementioned veto.
1866
  The question therefore became, if the company refused to 
amend the partnership agreement, could liability attach to the board? 
 
11 The argument for the defendants is that the terms of s. 3.03 of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement do not go far enough to engage the exemption from directors 
duties and liabilities in s. 146(5) of the CBCA.  Reference was made to legal articles 
which propose that the exemption should not apply where the directors are not entirely 
dispossessed of the powers in question.  Whether that proposition has merit is of course a 
matter to be assessed by reference to the terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement 
and the relevant CBCA provisions.  Sections 3.03(2) of the unanimous shareholder 
agreement is clear that on "Important Matters", which apparently includes an amendment 
to the Partnership Agreement of the type envisaged, "the Board of Directors shall not 
adopt any resolution... without the prior unanimous consent of the Shareholders".  This 
provision "restricts the powers of the directors" as contemplated by s. 146(5) of the 
CBCA and gives to the shareholders the veto provided in s. 3.03(2).  Accordingly, 
pursuant to the terms of s. 146(5) of the CBCA, s. 3.03(2) relieves the directors of their 
duties and liabilities in respect of such a resolution until it has been approved by the 
shareholders.  On this basis, a threat that a resolution to approve the amendment would 
not be approved in Topco would have to be construed as a threat that NBC would 
exercise its shareholder's veto.  There would be nothing for the directors to do in respect 
of the resolution unless and until the resolution had received unanimous shareholders' 
consent, and if that had happened (contrary to the "threat") there is no evidence the 
directors would not have done as the Agreement provided.  So a threat of the kind alleged 
is not a threat of a director's negative vote. 
 
 Therefore, the only situation in which they would be liable would be if the shareholders approved 
the action but the board failed to carry it out.  If the shareholders refused, the directors would be powerless 
to act and could not be held liable.  While not explicit in the judgment, the corollary would be that the 
investors had assumed responsibility for the decision. 
 If shareholders have placed themselves in a supervisory role vis-a-vis the directors, then they must 
bear the duties and liabilities that accompany ultimate power over the corporation.  This would, firstly, 
include those that normally derive from the office itself and are independent of action or inaction.
1867
 
 It is obvious that investors with this authority must bear responsibility for decisions in which they 
actively took part, but they must also be held responsible for decisions which they were empowered to 
participate in but chose not to.  If that restraint allowed harm to occur, they must bear the same liability for 
that as if they had actively endorsed it.  This would doubtless not be popular with investors, who would 
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presumably prefer the power to intervene when it suited them without any accompanying responsibility to 
monitor corporate decision-making otherwise, but power brings with it duties and liabilities. 
 When the directors are subject to shareholder supervision, then they are, in substance, officers.  
The decisions they make might be more high-level than those which officers normally do, but they 
nonetheless are no longer the ultimate authority in the corporation.  Their duties and liability should be 
adjusted accordingly.  Typically, this would involve some degree of continued responsibility for their 
actions and inaction, as determined by whatever statute or part of the common law was relevant, but 
liability exclusively reserved for directors, including that which arises simply from holding the office, 
should no longer apply.
1868
 
 If the shareholders' powers do not include originating corporate decisions, but only 
vetoing/ratifying those of the board, then it is still appropriate to hold them liable for actions that they have 
explicitly or implicitly endorsed (through a failure to intervene).  It is, however, neither fair nor does it 
serve any policy goals to hold them liable for the directors' inaction, since they had no ability to rectify it.  
Conversely, the board should bear full responsibility for that inaction; they are the sole cause of it, and 
holding them accountable provides the necessary incentives to meet their obligations.  Because directors 
retain a significant exclusive power in this arrangement, the ability to initiate action, they should be jointly 
and severally liable for position-derived responsibilities that are independent of action or inaction. 
 
3.(d) Designated Shareholders and/or Third Parties Empowered 
 
 A final configuration is for a unanimous shareholder agreement to transfer power from the 
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directors to specified individuals, either a subset of the shareholders or third parties.
1869
  This was not 
always possible, and is not currently possible in all jurisdictions,
1870
 at least according to the strict wording 
of the legislation.
1871
  The exact statutory language has had other unfortunate results here as well.  The 
Alberta Report noted that, while the C.B.C.A. as it then was allowed shareholders to transfer the directors' 
powers to third parties, a literal reading would be that their duties still fell upon the investors.
1872
 
 Scavone recommended that liability attach only to shareholders who expressly assumed decision-
making authority;
1873
 the C.B.C.A. has since done exactly that.  Because of the danger that judgment-proof 
nominees could be used, he suggested that the agreement only constitute prima facie evidence as to who 
the true decision-makers were and thus who would be liable, leaving room for proof that it was actually 
someone else.
1874
  Dennis, also writing before those amendments to the C.B.C.A., similarly recommended 
that it should be possible for only some shareholders to assume power, and that only they "should be 
treated as directors",
1875
 presumably including the accompanying responsibilities.  Turgeon went further, 
objecting not just to the imposition of liability on the owners of non-voting shares (who he assumed would 
still have no vote after the shareholders assumed power), but also to extending it to "passive investors" who 
simply agreed to some exercise of the directors' powers.
1876
  (One might ask whether such an investor still 
qualified as "passive".)  He argued that there was a distinction between the transfer of power and the 
exercise of it, and that while all shareholders must agree to the former, only those who actually utilize that 
authority afterward should bear responsibility for it.
1877
  In support of this, he pointed out that shareholders 
normally bore no legal liabilities for electing the directors, and that there was no reason to deviate from that 
principle simply because a different mechanism for selecting the company's ultimate decision-makers was 
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used.
1878
  The merits of that justification aside, it would not extend to shareholders granted de jure power 
who decline to be active in its use.  It would be preferable for agreements to empower only those investors 
prepared to accept the benefits and drawbacks of increased authority. 
 Given that policy goals require directors' duties and liabilities to affect the same individuals who 
have the powers they were meant to regulate, it is self-apparent that when a unanimous shareholder 
agreement only empowers a subset of shareholders, those individuals alone should bear the corresponding 
responsibilities.
1879
  While there are arguments to be made that the other shareholders, who are also parties 
to the agreement, bear liabilities as a result, these are essentially the same points that one would use to 
attack shareholder limited liability generally, being at heart arguments that shareholders should be 
responsible for corporate debts and harms even when not in control because they have selected those who 
are.  If one accepts that investors should normally be protected by limited liability when their ability to 
affect corporate decision-making is largely confined to electing directors,
1880
 then the same logic would 
suggest protecting a shareholder who selected the corporate decision-maker by becoming a party to a 
unanimous shareholder agreement but who has no direct managerial power. 
 A variation of this occurs if a non-shareholder is granted the directors' authority through the terms 
of a unanimous shareholder agreement.
1881
  This must be distinguished from investors being granted power 
that they then attempt to delegate, a scenario that Hay and Smith found likely
1882
 and Disney argued should 
be permissible.
1883
  The assumption that empowered shareholders might nominate agents, whether a subset 
of their number or someone else, to handle routine functions seems reasonable.  It is, however, questionable 
whether, as Hay and Smith argue, these individuals should be considered directors for even limited legal 
purposes.  They would seem more akin to employees, specifically senior officers, who have "administrative 
and managerial functions" subject to override.  This was the conclusion arrived at in the trial judgement of 
Allard c. Myhill, when a corporation assumed direct control over a subsidiary and then placed individuals 
                                                          
1878
 Ibid, p. 260. 
1879
 Or co-extensively with the directors, if they retain some power as well. 
1880
 This can be debated, but that is beyond the scope of the current discussion. 
1881
 Allard CQ, supra note 1726, stated that this was at one time impossible and only shareholders 
could receive the powers of a director (par. 155), but that was explicitly based on the wording of the Act as 
it then was, which had since been changed to a more open-ended wording.  The issue was not addressed in 
the successful appeal.  Indalex, supra note 1775, mention such a scenario, as discussed below. 
1882
 Given that unanimous shareholder agreements may completely remove the powers of directors, 
Hay and Smith, supra note 319, discussed whether it should be permissible for corporations to dispense 
with the board of directors, arguing on p. 447 that  "companies will always require parties who perform at 
least some of the administrative and managerial functions that directors currently discharge."  Therefore, 
they warned that removing the board would simply result in the creation of a position with a similar role, 
which would not only make the move pointless but possibly require re-litigation of settled corporate law 
surrounding directors (p. 447).  In their view, this outweighed the problems posed by directors retaining 
apparent authority, which they classify as a standard risk whenever agents of any sort are used (p. 447).  
See the discussion of this topic at note 1675. 
1883
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 123. 
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in charge of it, although that decision was reversed on appeal.
1884
 
 If, on the other hand, the unanimous shareholder agreement specifically grants the directors' 
powers to a non-shareholder (who apparently must still, under the current wording of the C.B.C.A., be a 
party to the agreement), that would be analytically identical to a subset of investors receiving them.  Duties 
and liabilities are included because that is what serves the social goals that underlie their existence; they 
must be imposed upon the individuals who have the corresponding powers and not upon those who do not. 
 Would be it possible for someone who was not a party to the unanimous shareholder agreement to 
receive the directors' powers?  The section governing liability does not contemplate such an arrangement, 
but that is not the primary provision authorizing the agreements themselves.  Since the section of the 
C.B.C.A. that allows for the creation and validity of unanimous shareholder agreements speaks only of 
"restricting" directors' powers, the same logic that expanded permissible "restrictions" to include the 
transfer of authority to shareholders could theoretically allow for the transfer of powers to anyone.  A 
restriction that read, "The directors must follow any instructions
1885
 given by (non-shareholder) John 
Smith," would arguably be valid even if John Smith was not a party to the agreement, but in that case, the 
provision governing the transfer of duties would not apply; any liability that John Smith faced would have 
to be derived from another source, such as a determination that he was a de facto director.
1886
 
 In the trial judgment
1887
 of Allard, De Michele J.C.Q found that "[t]he new version of subsection 
146(5) stipulates and establishes that a director's normal duties and liabilities pass to the person who has a 
director's liability, [sic?] regardless of his or her title. The scope is much broader than the pre-2001 
version."
1888
  While not completely clear, this implies that in the current version of the Act, any individual 
may be granted the directors' powers and is then subject to the attendant liabilities, whether or not a 
shareholder.  This becomes more obvious in the contrast with the judge's interpretation of the pre-2001 
equivalent: 
 
154 In addition, a literal interpretation of the former version of subsection 146(5) of 
the CBCA seems to indicate that the rights, powers and duties of a director may be 
transferred only for the sole benefit of the shareholders.  The wording of the former 
version of subsection 146(5) clearly indicates that only the shareholders who are party to 
a unanimous shareholder agreement may assume such rights, powers and duties. [...] 
 
155 Therefore, only shareholders may assume the rights, powers and duties taken 
away from directors [under the Act as it then was]. 
 
                                                          
1884
 See discussion elsewhere in this chapter. 
1885
 Alternatively, for a specified list of decisions, as described in previous sections. 
1886
 See C.B.C.A. s. 2(1). 
1887
 Whether a unanimous shareholder agreement could transfer the directors' powers to a third party 
was not addressed in the appeal judgment. 
1888
 Allard CQ, supra note 1726, par. 149. 
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 De Michele J.C.Q held that empowered shareholders could not delegate that authority, due to the 
rule of delegatus non potest delegare,
1889
 discussed further below.  In an apparent contradiction, however, 
the judge also stated that a unanimous shareholder agreement under the old Act could grant powers to third 
parties, but that the attendant liability would vest not in them but the shareholders who granted it: 
 
150 Subsection 146(5) of the CBCA, as applicable in the period relevant to this 
dispute, does not state that the title of director applies to the person who performs the 
duties normally discharged by the person with this title, that is, the de jure director or the 
de facto director.  Consequently, officers appointed under the unanimous shareholder 
agreement or the officer appointed under a declaration by the single shareholder are not 
subject to the liability of the directors set out in subsection 119(1), to the extent that the 
unanimous shareholder agreement or the declaration by the single shareholder gives these 
officers the powers that would otherwise be vested in the directors. 
 
 Although the past and present drafting of the acts have been imperfect, this issue is not 
complicated and a recommendation is easy.  The directors' duties and liabilities should accompany their 
powers, wherever they are transferred.
1890
  Only then can they serve the purposes for which they exist.  To 
the extent that any legislation fails to adequately reflect this principle, some simple amendments can 
remedy the situation. 
 
3.(e) Conclusion on Unusual Restrictions 
 
 Directors' duties and liabilities are supposed to accompany their powers, but the situations that 
unanimous shareholder agreements can create may lead to uncertain outcomes.   The overly vague statutory 
provision that purported to govern such eventualities does not adequately address them.  In analyzing four 
scenarios wherein directors' powers are not transferred in full to shareholders, recommendations were made 
as to how best to achieve the objectives that the board's responsibilities are intended to further. 
 The most straightforward is the transfer of power to third parties; it is they who should shoulder 
the corresponding duties and liabilities, not shareholders.  The combination of, on the one hand, 
responsibilities relating to action, inaction, and position, and on the other, divisions of power by area or by 
the creation of a "supervisory" authority (which may or may not include the ability to originate actions) led 
to a variety of recommendations, but are all at least potentially resolvable.  The result may not be simple, 
but it flows from the consistent premise that the duties and liabilities of directors should attach to the 
individuals who possess ultimate decision-making power in the corporation and/or the particular aspect of 
it that has given rise to difficulties. 
 What may not be solvable is the problem posed by pre-made decisions.  It is unclear what party, if 
                                                          
1889
 Ibid, pars. 156-157. 
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any, should be held liable for specific decisions made in a unanimous shareholder agreement.  There is no 
answer that adequately safeguards policy goals.  It may simply be impossible to resolve this issue in a 
meaningful way.  As useful as pre-made decisions could be, this is cause to reconsider whether they should 
be permitted in a unanimous shareholder agreement.  The topic will be returned to in the following section, 
in the specific context of the duty of care. 
 The foregoing has proceeded with a necessary vagueness as to exactly what social purposes 
directors' myriad responsibilities serve; the explanations are varied and contested.  But it has been assumed 
that they did serve some goals, and if they had legitimacy when imposed upon the normal ultimate power in 
the corporation, the directors, that suggested they should not be evaded or undermined by the transfer of 
that authority.  The following sections challenge that axiom as it applies to the directors' duties to serve the 
interests of the corporation itself. 
 
4. The Duties of Care and Loyalty 
 
 The preceding section dealt with various combinations of the transfer of duties and liabilities that 
occur when shareholders restrict the authority of directors.  As the foundation of that discussion, it was 
assumed that the responsibilities that the board bears are attached to their powers in order to serve societal 
goals, which would be thwarted if either those who no longer managed the corporation were still made to 
shoulder those burdens or if those who had assumed control escaped them. 
 A specific subset of those duties and liabilities stands as a potential exception to this general 
principle.  These are the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
1891
  One conception of them is that they exist 
only to solve agency problems as between the directors and the shareholders (the latter implicitly 
monolithic); when investors represent themselves directly, this thinking runs, there is no longer any need 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1890
 Turgeon, supra note 9, pp. 260-262, recommended the same.  
1891
 I avoid the term "fiduciary" here in order to prevent confusion.  Per B. (K.L.) v. British Columbia, 
2003 SCC 51, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 403, 230 D.L.R. (4th) 513, [2003] 11 W.W.R. 203, [2003] R.R.A. 1065, 187 
B.C.A.C. 42, 309 N.R. 306, 2003 CarswellBC 2405, 2003 CarswellBC 2406, 19 C.C.L.T. (3d) 66, 2004 
C.L.L.C. 210-014, 307 W.A.C. 42, 44 R.F.L. (5TH) 245, [2003] B.C.W.L.D. 790, J.E. 2003-1874, [2003] 
W.D.F.L. 374, 38 C.P.C. (5th) 199, [2003] S.C.J. No. 51, 18 B.C.L.R. (4th) 1, REJB 2003-48042 (S.C.C. 
Oct 02, 2003) and Peoples, supra note 809, in Canadian law the term "fiduciary" should be reserved for the 
duty of loyalty, not the duty of care, a usage roughly consistent with the term's meaning in law outside the 
corporate context (see Robert Flannigan, "Reshaping the Duties of Directors" (2005) 84 Can. B. Rev. 365, 
online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=859628, at pp. 366-373; Flannigan found some fault with the Supreme 
Court's analysis in Peoples, but accepted their description of the statutory duty of loyalty as "broadly 
congruent with the content of conventional fiduciary responsibility" (p. 369); Juzda, supra note 167, pp. 
23-24 fn 68, attempted to address these concerns).  However, the American tradition is to use the term 
"fiduciary duties" in the corporate context to refer collectively to both the directors' duty of loyalty and 
duty of care (and sometimes apparently even includes any other legal duty the directors owe or which a 
writer wishes to impose upon them); this wider usage is sometimes adopted by Canadians as well. 
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for duties whose only function is to police a relationship that no longer exists. 
 Before proceeding, it is useful to set out what the duties of care and loyalty are.  According to the 
C.B.C.A.:
1892
 
 
122. (1) Every director and officer of a corporation in exercising their powers and 
discharging their duties shall 
(a) act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation; and 
(b) exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise 
in comparable circumstances.
1893
 
 
 The first subsection corresponds to the duty of loyalty; this is the negative obligation
1894
 which 
bars them from deriving direct or indirect unauthorized personal benefit from their position.
1895
  The second 
corresponds to the duty of care; this is the positive obligation to demonstrate at least a minimum level of 
competence. 
 In a shareholder-primacy model of the corporation, both of these can be seen as primarily 
concerned with agency problems that prevent directors from maximizing corporate profits and therefore 
investor returns.  The duty of loyalty prevents the diversion of assets and opportunities away from the 
                                                          
1892
 This may be a codification of duties that would arise through common law regardless.  (See note 
1143.)  Disney, supra note 9, p. 121, stated that in order for the unanimous shareholder agreement 
provisions of the Alberta statute to make sense, it must be presumed that the sections on directors' duties 
entirely displace the common law on that topic, since it allowed for a unanimous shareholder agreement to 
modify directors' statutory conflict of interest duties, but did not mention any common law conflict of 
interest duties they might have.  The analysis in M.E.N. Electric Co. v. Rumble, 2005 CarswellOnt 4040 
(Ont. S.C.J. Sep 06, 2005) (hereinafter "M.E.N."), discussed later in this chapter, raises this issue as well. 
1893
 A.B.C.A. s. 122(1), M.C.A. s. 117(1), N.B.B.C.A. s. 79(1), N.L.C.A. s. 203(1), N.T.B.C.A. s. 123(1), 
N.B.C.A. s. 123(1), O.B.C.A. s. 134(1), S.B.C.A. s. 117(1), and Y.B.C.A. s. 124(1) are substantially identical, 
although minor variations in wording are present.  Q.B.C.A. s, 119 is loosely similar, but it has a 
significantly different wording and invokes obligations found in the C.C.Q.  Except where noted, the 
discussion in this chapter of the directors' duties to the corporation assumes a common law framework and 
may not be entirely applicable in Quebec. 
1894
 The duty of loyalty is inherently a negative obligation, in that it consists of refraining from 
prohibited behaviour, in this case refraining from using the position of corporate director for purposes other 
than advancing the corporation's interests.  Under certain circumstances, this negative obligation may give 
rise to limited positive obligations, e.g. to disclose conflicts of interest, but the overall character of the 
obligation remains negative.  Analysts (including judges) sometimes conflate this obligation not to use the 
position of director to benefit other interests ahead of the corporation with the directors' positive obligation 
to advance the corporation's own interests, but the latter is more properly categorized as part of the duty of 
care. See the discussion later this chapter, and Juzda, supra note 167, pp. 20-32. 
1895
 Subject to certain limited exceptions, or to having their self-interested actions ratified by the 
shareholders.  The legislation also imposes upon directors a specific obligation to disclose conflicts of 
interest and refrain from voting upon them (see C.B.C.A. s. 120, A.B.C.A. s. 120, M.C.A. s. 115, N.B.B.C.A. 
s. 77, N.L.C.A. s. 198, N.T.B.C.A. s. 121, N.B.C.A. s. 121, Q.B.C.A. s. 122 through s. 133, O.B.C.A. s. 132, 
S.B.C.A. s. 115, and Y.B.C.A. s. 122); although the procedures governing such situations are set out 
separately, the duty to avoid conflicts of interest is a subset of the duty of loyalty.  (See Peoples, supra note 
809, par. 35, whose definition of the directors' "statutory fiduciary duty" included that "[t]hey must avoid 
conflicts of interest with the corporation".) 
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corporation, and thus ensures that those assets and opportunities flow to the shareholders as profit.  It might 
also occasionally prevent directors form taking advantage of opportunities that could not or would not have 
been available to the company, but that can be explained as an unfortunate yet necessary overreach to 
achieve the aforementioned goals.  The duty of care is similarly designed to ensure that directors are not 
utterly incompetent in a manner that costs the company and therefore its shareholders money.  Avoiding 
incompetence is not the same as guaranteeing success, and so the business judgment rule recognizes that 
financial failure does not prove that the board fell short of meeting their duty of care.  This is fully 
compatible with maximizing shareholder returns.  A duty to succeed would be implausible and 
counterproductive even from that perspective, penalizing competent individuals for factors beyond their 
control and thus discouraging them from becoming directors, and providing strong disincentives for risk-
taking even when it might benefit investors (particularly diversified ones). 
 As will be discussed in a later part of this chapter, this view of the duties of care and loyalty has 
been at the very least complicated, if not outright discredited, by recent Supreme Court of Canada 
decisions.  But it forms the basis, either explicitly or implicitly, of virtually all of the commentary to date 
on the interaction of these duties with unanimous shareholder agreements.   
 The next subsections discuss those analyses, which have intertwined the question of whether 
empowered shareholders inherit the duties of care and loyalty with whether or not they are permitted to 
"fetter their discretion" by pre-determining corporate decisions in the agreement.  This is followed by my 
own analysis of the "fettering discretion" issue, which determines that it is best separated from the context 
of the duty of care and reconceived of as "pre-made decisions".  Following that, case law concerning 
empowered shareholders and their potential duties is reviewed, and the section concludes with my 
argument that maintaining these responsibilities will be beneficial to the shareholders collectively. 
 
4.(a) "Fettering Discretion" and the Debate on the Duties of Care and Loyalty 
4.(a)(i) Before the C.B.C.A. Amendments 
 
 Few aspects of the unanimous shareholder agreement have interested commentators as much as 
the question of whether it might impose the directors' duties of care and loyalty (or some equivalent) upon 
shareholders.  Prior to recent amendments to the C.B.C.A., the Act did not specifically address this 
possibility; the discussion therefore centred around whether the provision that transferred "duties" in 
general included (or should be taken to include) them. 
 Much of the debate appears to have at its root the discussion of the unanimous shareholder 
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agreement in Bruce Welling's textbook Corporate Law in Canada.  In the first edition,
1896
 the general issue 
of whether the duties of care and loyalty might bind shareholders is not discussed beyond passing remarks 
that they would apply.  Instead, one specific aspect was focussed upon, as part of Welling's analysis of what 
these agreements are and how they function: 
 
The nature of the agreement is to specify certain endeavors concerning which the 
directors will be rendered powerless, rather than to express a shareholder consensus as to 
a particular course of action the corporation is to pursue.  This does not appear to be what 
most practitioners currently think of as a unanimous shareholder agreement.  However, it 
seems an inevitable conclusion when one recalls that the effect is to catapult each 
shareholder into a director's seat vis-a-vis certain defined subject matters.  If each 
shareholder then owes the corporation the same types of equitable duties as a director 
would, then each shareholder qua acting director will be obliged to make up his mind 
afresh as he is confronted by each new problem within the scope of the agreement.  He 
cannot agree in advance as to how he will decide because he will have inherited the 
director's obligation to decide each issue as then appears to be to the corporate advantage.  
Far from being free, as a shareholder, to contract, sell, or give away his precious vote, 
each shareholder qua acting director will be caught by the rule in Motherwell v. Schoof; 
he who owes a fiduciary duty (here, each shareholder, because of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement) cannot fetter his discretion; he is required to remain free to vary 
his opinion as seems to him to suit the occasion and the person (here, the corporation) to 
whom the duty is owed.  In short, a unanimous shareholder agreement is an agreement by 
100 per cent of the shareholders setting out certain areas of corporate endeavor in which 
the directors' power is to be limited; it is not a binding agreement as to how each of the 
shareholders will exercise his judgment in voting on corporate affairs.
1897
 
  
 It is not just "most practitioners", but most judges as well, who have believed that unanimous 
shareholder agreements could set out specific decisions.  As many of the examples discussed in previous 
chapters demonstrate, the courts have seldom hesitated in accepting that this fell within the scope of the 
tool.  This may not have been consistent with the literal meaning of the statute, but it is almost undeniable 
that has it been the de facto state of Canadian law.  Nor did judges view such clauses through the two-step 
transfer-then-fetter analysis, outlined below, that has underlain so much of the commentary.  Instead, any 
ambiguity on their part about this practice has usually been expressed not through holding these terms 
invalid per se or in violation of the rule against fettering discretion, but through choices of enforcement 
mechanism that rendered the restrictions less than fully binding upon directors.
1898
  Exceptions such as 
9109 and Couvre-Plancher did conclude that terms other than transfers fell outside the statutory definition 
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 Welling 1st ed., supra note 250. 
1897
 Ibid, pp. 452-453.  In the second edition, Bruce Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The 
Governing Principles, Second Edition (Toronto: Butterworths, 1991) (hereinafter "Welling 2nd ed."), he 
retained the above-cited passage (pp. 483-484), but added additional discussion.  Following upon the 
already established line of analysis, he asserted that if the agreement did purport to decide corporate 
matters, then such terms could not be enforced, because of the rule against fettering discretion (p. 486).  He 
continued not to address wider questions of the duty of care and duty of loyalty. 
1898
 See Chapter Four generally. 
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of the unanimous shareholder agreement, but not because they would limit empowered investors' freedom 
of choice.  Only Ming, discussed below, considered the issue in that manner.  One consequence is that 
while judges have permitted unanimous shareholder agreements to set out specific decisions, they have, 
unlike most commentators, done so in a manner that has no obvious implications for the duties that 
empowered shareholders owe to the corporation.  It should therefore be understood that the debates covered 
over the following several subsections of this chapter have been, in more than one sense, academic. 
 Welling accepted that shareholders had the freedom qua (unempowered) shareholders to enter into 
a unanimous shareholder agreement that purported to fetter their discretion regarding the authority they 
were acquiring.
1899
  But, in his analysis, that only prevented document with such a term from falling afoul 
of the statutory requirement that the contract be lawful; the term itself would be ineffectual once they had 
assumed power. 
 It is unfortunate that Welling framed this as he did.  The prohibition against fettering discretion is 
a manifestation of the directors' duty of care; if they cannot consider each choice as it arises, bearing in 
mind all relevant factors, they cannot exercise reasonable care, diligence, and skill in their decision-
making.  But Welling was not questioning, really, whether shareholders who assumed power should owe a 
duty of care to the corporation; in general, he took as a given that they did.  The issue he was truly 
concerned with was whether, under the wording of the statute, it was possible for the parties to a 
unanimous shareholder agreement to make a specific corporate decision, or only to transfer power to 
investors.  Because the legislation at the time automatically passed all restricted powers to the shareholders, 
Welling's method for interpreting a specific decision in the agreement was to break it into two steps: it 
firstly transferred powers from the directors to the shareholders, and it secondly constituted an agreement 
amongst the shareholders as to how they would exercise that authority.  The first step brought such 
contractual terms within the scope of the provision, but the second ran afoul of general corporate law.   
 Welling's comments regarding fettering discretion should not, therefore, be taken as generally 
applicable to the duties of care and loyalty.  They were, instead, an examination of whether unanimous 
shareholder agreements were allowed to specifically set out corporate decisions, rather than transfer 
directors' powers.  But by framing the issue in this manner, he set a troublesome foundation for analyzing 
both the duties of empowered shareholders and permissible terms in unanimous shareholder agreements. 
 One of the first commentators to follow him understood this correctly.  Ratti quoted the same 
passage from Welling reproduced above,
1900
 and identified the key point as being that only a transfer of 
authority was permissible, contrasting that with supervisory arrangements or the inclusion of specific 
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 Welling 1st ed., supra note 250, p. 452. The passage was retained in Welling 2nd ed., supra note 
1897, at p. 483, with an additional footnote that specifically emphasized that "this covers only the setting 
up of the unanimous shareholder agreement; once the agreement comes into existence and each shareholder 
becomes a fiduciary, each must manage with equitable obligations in mind" (p. 483 fn 66). 
1900
 Plus a few additional sentences. 
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corporate decisions in the document.
1901
  Although he considered it logical that if an actual relocation of 
power was allowed, then a "lesser" change should be as well, Ratti concluded that the federal and Quebec 
legislation of the time were fully consistent with the former but did not explicitly permit the latter.
1902
  Both 
were contrasted with the Alberta version, whose wider criteria might permit such alternatives.
1903
  He 
further concluded that, if under the C.B.C.A. '74-'75  and Q.C.A. terms other than transfers of power were 
not properly the contents of unanimous shareholder agreements and were thus subject to the rules that 
normally governed contracts, they would be mostly ineffective at controlling directors.
1904
 
 Unfortunately, Ratti was an exception in identifying Welling's real concern as the permissibility of 
including specific decisions in the document, an issue that is in most ways distinct from whether 
empowered shareholders are bound by the same duties that normally govern directors; Ratti himself dealt 
with the former as an independent issue, as just described, though he also revisited it in the context of those 
duties.
1905
  Instead, Welling's framing, invoking the duty of care related phrase "fettering discretion" and 
setting out why he believed empowered shareholders were bound by this principle, has led to the debate 
about the sorts of clauses unanimous shareholder agreements might contain being tied to the question of 
whether empowered investors assume the directors' duties of care and loyalty, to the detriment of each. 
 Disney, for example, also connected the two topics, beginning his discussion of both of them by 
asking: 
 
Does a shareholder thereby lose the relative freedom normally possessed by shareholders 
to act in their own interests, delegate their powers and otherwise behave in ways that 
would not necessarily satisfy the standard of care of directors?  For example, would 
shareholders thereby become subject to the common law principle that the discretion of 
directors cannot be fettered, even though the entire purpose of creating unanimous 
shareholder agreements was to escape this principle?
1906
  
 
 This attached arguments regarding the permissible content of unanimous shareholder agreements 
to questions regarding the investors' duties after they come into effect. 
 Disney considered the unanimous shareholder agreement to represent "a shareholder-chosen 
contractual model of corporate governance formerly absent from Canadian law".
1907
  It is clear from what 
followed that he preferred this to a statutorily-determined one.  His reasoning was that many close 
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 Ratti, supra note 16, pp. 106-108. 
1902
 Ibid, p. 109, citing Welling 1st ed., supra note 250, pp. 452-453. 
1903
 Ratti, supra note 16, pp. 109-110. 
1904
 Ibid, p. 110.  At p. 119, for reasons discussed later in this chapter, Ratti did note that under his 
understanding of the Quebec legislation, while shareholders could not include specific decisions in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement per se, the same result could be achieved by transferring powers to 
themselves while simultaneously agreeing how they would exercise them. 
1905
 See the following subsection regarding that portion of Ratti's analysis. 
1906
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 119. 
1907
 Ibid, p. 118. 
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corporations and their participants were not in compliance with the Act; in particular, directors behaved as 
if they were nominees for specific shareholders, rather than as if they owed a duty to the company itself.
1908
  
Disney saw the legitimization of this practice as a positive step.
1909
  Consequently, he was opposed to the 
view that empowered shareholders should lose their freedom to pursue their own self-interest.  He 
acknowledged that the statute (as it then was) passed without qualification the duties of the directors to 
investors who assumed their authority, but found the literal meaning problematic, because it might cause 
them to lose "the relative freedom normally possessed by shareholders to act in their own interests, delegate 
their powers and otherwise behave in ways that would not necessarily satisfy the standard of care of 
directors".
1910
 
 Disney put forth as an example the rule against fettering discretion, specifically in response to 
Welling's position on that topic.
1911
  His view was that distinguishing the shareholders' freedom to enter 
into a contract that purports to govern their decision-making once they have assumed power from the 
(in)ability of that contract to actually bind them "does not represent the statutory intent and leads to an 
absurd result".
1912
   He rejected Welling's interpretation of the legislative wording, instead finding it 
compatible with allowing for shareholders to place restrictions on their own powers as part of the 
agreement.  Disney went so far as to argue that Welling's approach would make the unanimous shareholder 
agreement a useless tool.
1913
  Instead, there was "no apparent reason shareholders of a corporation should 
not be permitted to agree unanimously"
1914
 to include specific business decisions in the document, even if 
those arrangements might constitute self-dealing or otherwise deviate from the duty of loyalty a director 
would normally owe.
1915
 
 Turning to wider consideration of the directors' duties to the corporation, Disney's analysis 
remained similar.  Of particular concern to him was the hypothetical stalemate caused by a potential 
corporate decision of benefit to some or all shareholders.  The statutory and common law duties of directors 
prohibit them from voting on transactions if they have a conflict of interest, but the shareholders may be 
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 Ibid, p. 118. 
1909
 Ibid, p. 118. 
1910
 Ibid, p. 119. 
1911
 He also reproduced portions of the same oft-quoted passage found above, at Disney, supra note 9, 
pp. 119-120. 
1912
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 120. 
1913
 Ibid, p. 120.  The passage is reproduced below in the discussion of Ming. 
1914
 Ibid, p. 120. 
1915
 The three examples Disney provided all involved committing the company to enter predetermined 
business dealings with specific shareholders (Disney, supra note 9, p. 120; the passage is reproduced below 
in the discussion of Ming).  While it is possible that such arrangements would not violate the duty of 
loyalty, particularly given that the other shareholders could approve them, the choice of examples suggests 
a belief that placing these decision in a unanimous shareholder agreement itself might help circumvent that 
duty. 
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able to ratify such decisions.
1916
  The shareholders, in doing so, are permitted to vote in their own self-
interest, so Disney found it "peculiar"
1917
 that they would not be allowed to behave in a self-interested 
manner if they themselves initiated events.
1918
  He considered it "ridiculous" that they might first be bound 
qua primary decision-makers
1919
 to disclose conflicts of interest before ratifying them qua shareholders.
1920
  
While this would undoubtedly be an artificial process, it actually is a feasible answer to any concerns about 
corporate paralysis that remains consistent with the statute.
1921
  His objection was that "such procedures are 
hardly conducive to the simplification of management of a closely-held corporation that unanimous 
shareholder agreements were designed to facilitate".
1922
  What this overlooked was that simplification, if 
such was indeed the legislative goal in creating this tool, should not outweigh all other concerns. 
 But Disney largely denied the validity, or even the existence, of any other concerns that might 
result from dispensing with these obligations to the company.  He argued that the point of the unanimous 
shareholder agreement was to recognize that in small corporations, there is no meaningful distinction 
between directors who function as agents (and therefore must be bound by duties to their principals) and 
the shareholders who are principals (and free to act in their own interest),
1923
 by which he apparently meant 
that there was no longer an agency relationship in place and therefore no need for the duties one would 
involve.  To settle any remaining corporate governance problems that might arise after shareholders 
assumed power- he doesn't list any, but inter-investor conflicts are an obvious one- Disney speculated that 
courts might not bother attempting to precisely set out which of the directors' duties of care and loyalty 
bind empowered shareholders or how, instead resorting to the "common sense approach of evaluating the 
conduct of shareholders by the broad fairness standard of the oppression remedy",
1924
 although this may 
make attempts at compliance more uncertain.
1925
  What little reported case law exists on such situations 
                                                          
1916
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 121.  Disney used the example of O.B.C.A. 132(8) permitting shareholder 
ratification if the transaction is "reasonable and fair to the corporation".  He noted that this was also 
possible at common law. 
1917
 Ibid, p. 121. 
1918
 Disney gave qualified support to the approach taken by the A.B.C.A., which allowed for 
unanimous shareholder agreements to restructure or eliminate statutory rules governing directors' conflicts 
of interests (and their potential transfer to shareholders), but is critical of statutory drafting that suggests 
that, if the agreement is silent on this issue, shareholders might in some manner be bound to avoid conflicts 
of interest  (Disney, supra note 9, p. 122). 
1919
 He refers to this capacity as "directors" (without quotation marks), but that's not necessarily an 
accurate term (Disney, supra note 9, p. 122). 
1920
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 122. 
1921
 And, as discussed later in the chapter, actually might have genuine utility.  Among other things, it 
is possible that the voting arrangement for empowered shareholders as primary decision makers would not 
be the same as for ratification. 
1922
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 122. 
1923
 Ibid, p. 122.  This description of the corporation does not accurately reflect the current state of 
Canadian law; see the discussion later in this chapter. 
1924
 Ibid, p. 123. 
1925
 Ibid, p. 123. 
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does not bear this out.
1926
 
 Dennis' analysis was similar.  In his view, the rule against fettering discretion should not apply to 
empowered shareholders, because it normally ensured that directors acted for the corporation and not for 
the benefit of specific investors only, but by contrast, the unanimous shareholder agreement was designed 
to "legitimate shareholder control" and therefore the rule against fettering had no basis in that context.
1927
  
He apparently interpreted the assumption of power by shareholders as dissolving the normal corporate law 
distinction between the "best interests of the corporation" and the interests of its investors, and it is on those 
grounds that the rule against fettering became meaningless.  This ignored that the interests of the 
shareholders are individual, not monolithic.  Dennis may even have endorsed empowered investors being 
able to further fetter their discretion outside the unanimous shareholder agreement.
1928
  The problematic 
implications of that are examined below as part of the discussion of Welling's third edition. 
 Dennis recommended that empowered shareholders incur the duty of care but be excused from the 
duty of loyalty, and be allowed to act in their own interests.
1929
  The justification was not elaborated upon 
beyond a statement that the purpose of the unanimous shareholder agreement was to "recognize the role of 
shareholders in the active management of the close corporation, by eliminating the requirement for 
directors".
1930
  How exactly it follows that the duty of loyalty need not apply is unclear.  Alternatively, 
depending upon one's premises, it might be unclear why the duty of care would apply, especially given his 
view that the prohibition on fettering discretion (a dereliction of that duty) did not.  In combination, the 
result was nonsensical; empowered shareholders would be allowed to make decisions to the detriment of 
the corporation only if they could prove a self-interested motive, rather than simple lack of care. 
 Scavone came to the exact opposite conclusion, removing almost entirely the duty of care while 
leaving the duty of loyalty largely intact.  This is at least defensible; the law tolerates the incompetent use 
of power more than its abuse.  Like the preceding two authors, he began by considering fettering discretion 
as an example of the larger uncertainties surrounding whether shareholders inherit the directors' duty of 
care and duty of loyalty.
1931
  Regarding that particular issue, he argued that since unanimous shareholder 
agreements allowed investors to overcome the rule against fettering directors' discretion, preventing them 
from fettering their own would bind them with "the very rule from which the legislation was intended to 
provide relief".
1932
  Although he found such a prohibition more consistent with the then-current wording of 
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 See a subsequent subsection of this chapter. 
1927
 Dennis, supra note 9, p. 125. 
1928
 Ibid, p. 125: "[T]he rule against fettering does not apply to directors to the extent that their powers 
have been restricted by unanimous shareholder agreement; nor does it apply to prevent shareholders having 
acquired powers of directors from fettering their own discretion." 
1929
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 129. 
1930
 Ibid, p. 129. 
1931
 Scavone, supra note 9, p. 344. 
1932
 Ibid, p. 344. 
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the statute, he argued that "it cannot be correct since it would too substantially undermine the very purpose 
of this section".
1933
  This reference to the "purpose of the section" was ill-explained,
1934
 although its 
subsequent amendment does give his assertion some retroactive credibility.
1935
 
 More generally, Scavone wrote, "Among the 'duties' imposed on such shareholders [in the 
wording of the provision] are surely the primary duties of honesty and good faith and the duty of 
care[....]"
1936
  They would therefore, when acting as primary decision-makers,
1937
 not be free to vote for 
their own benefit and would have to look to the interests of the company.
1938
  Scavone agreed with Disney's 
assertion
1939
 that there was a certain ridiculousness to having shareholders vote twice, first with the duty 
and then without to ratify their own breach of it, but countered that it was only the procedure that was 
problematic; it was what the law appeared to require and did have practical benefits.
1940
  A simple example 
was disclosure of conflicts of interest
1941
 but the duty of loyalty might also have advantages when 
shareholders' interests conflicted with creditors' or each other's.
1942
 
 Scavone concluded with a proposal that investors be free, in drafting a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, to specify what duties, if any, they would be subject to under it.
1943
  In the absence of such, he 
suggested the default rule be that: 
 
shareholders to vote only once and in their capacity as shareholders subject to a limited 
core of fiduciary duties which would cover director-like duties of loyalty (avoiding 
conflicts of interest, not appropriating corporate opportunities and so on) but not director-
like duties of care (acting in the best interests of the corporation).  Such a compromise 
would allow shareholders to continue to generally vote in their own best interests, as 
opposed to the best interests of the corporation except in those situations that were most 
                                                          
1933
 Ibid, p. 345. 
1934
 It is possible that the purpose of the original provision, at the time it was first enacted, was to 
allow for transfers of power to shareholders but not for specific corporate decision-making in the 
agreements. 
1935
 The addition of the current C.B.C.A. s. 146(6) gives retroactive credibility to Scavone's view of the 
legislative intent in creating the unanimous shareholder agreement.  Conversely, the existence of and thus 
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1938
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 Scavone, supra note 9, p. 345. 
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 Ibid, p. 346. 
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susceptible to abuse.
1944
 
 
 This is utterly self-contradictory, as inheriting the duty of loyalty, including specifically avoiding 
conflicts of interest, would seem the very definition of a prohibition on voting in one's own best interests 
(to the extent that those are in conflict with the company's).  How are the situations "most susceptible to 
abuse" defined, if not as those where the shareholders might put themselves ahead of the company?
1945
  
Either the duty of loyalty is preserved or it is not.  Scavone did not provide any justification for the offhand 
mention of removing the duty of care, except to the extent that the earlier discussion of fettering referred to 
a subset of that duty.  It is possible that he erroneously believed that it was the duty of care, and not the 
duty of loyalty, that prevented self-interested voting. 
 Like both Dennis and Scavone, Ewasiuk contrasted a literal reading of the statute (as it then was) 
with the view that imposing the duties of care and loyalty upon empowered shareholders might "negate the 
essential purpose of a unanimous shareholder agreement".
1946
  The latter perspective took this legal tool as 
a recognition that when shareholders are in agreement, it is artificial to maintain any distinction between 
their collective interests and those of the corporation, although he acknowledged this ignored creditors.
1947
  
Therefore, empowered investors should be free to "favou[r] their own interests over those of the 
company".
1948
  In wording the conclusion thus, Ewasiuk inadvertently highlighted the inherent flaw in this 
argument.  If the premises were correct, it would be impossible for shareholders to favour their own 
interests over those of the company because the distinction would no longer exist.  Their own interests 
would be the interests of the company, and vice versa.  Clearly, some distinction remains.  If nothing else, 
the analysis makes the error of conflating unanimity in enacting a unanimous shareholder agreement with 
unanimity in exercising powers granted by one.  Depending on the terms of the document, the latter need 
not be required, and therefore even if the unanimous will of the shareholders were equivalent to the best 
interests of the corporation, it does not follow that actions taken under the agreement represent either. 
 In Ming Minerals Inc. v. Blagdon,
1949
 Mercer J. entered the debate.  Unusually, he did so in order 
to determine whether specific business decisions in the document constituted restrictions upon the 
                                                          
1944
 Ibid, pp. 347-348. 
1945
 The description of the "fiduciary duties" as "limited" in this proposal may be due to Scavone 
assuming the phrase to normally include both the duty of loyalty and the duty of care, such that excluding 
the latter is the limit.  Due to focussing almost entirely on the duty of loyalty up until this point, his usage 
of the term "fiduciary duty" elsewhere is ambiguous as to whether the duty of care might also be included. 
1946
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 Ming, supra note 334. 
  
 
 
344 
 
directors, such that it would meet the criteria for a unanimous shareholder agreement;
1950
 this has 
commonly (although not quite universally) been taken for granted by the judiciary.  He began by quoting a 
passage from Disney setting out the question of whether empowered shareholders are subject to the duties 
of care and loyalty, and specifically the obligation not to fetter their discretion,
1951
 then noted that "Bruce 
Welling gives an affirmative answer to the latter question".
1952
  Yet again, the same influential passage 
from his book was reproduced.
1953
  But Mercer J. rejected that view and instead adopted a passage from 
Disney: 
 
24 I concur with Disney's view that the above analysis is not in accordance with the 
general view of legal practitioners, does not represent the statutory intent and leads to an 
absurd result: 
 
Although the Dickerson Report did not discuss the subject at great 
length, it seems reasonably clear that it intended to change the law so as 
to permit shareholders to agree unanimously, as they frequently wish to 
do, that (for example), the corporation will lease space from one 
shareholder at an agreed rent, obtain services at an agreed remuneration 
from another, buy widgets from a third at an agreed price, and so on.  
Applying the principle against fettering of discretion to shareholders 
acting under a unanimous shareholder agreement would generally make 
the agreement virtually useless.  Welling's interpretation is not required 
by the words of the CBCA.  Section 146(2) could be read as validating 
an agreement restricting the exercise of the powers of management 
normally allocated to the directors, regardless of whether these powers 
are exercisable by the directors, as is usually the case under the CBCA, 
or by the shareholders under a unanimous shareholder agreement.  The 
powers transferred to the shareholders pursuant to section 146(5) could 
be read as referring to such powers as restricted by the agreement.  
(Disney, p. 120) 
 
 Fitzwilliam cautioned that Ming was inconsistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's subsequent 
decision in Duha (albeit on a different matter) and was therefore, in his view, a weak precedent.
1954
  After 
noting that Ming had preferred Disney's interpretation to Welling's, Fitzwilliam argued that the former was 
simply inconsistent with the wording of the statute and that no ambiguity was to be found; however absurd 
the results might arguably be, they could not be abandoned unless a secondary meaning actually existed, 
and in his view, here it did not.
1955
 Under the then-current wording of the C.B.C.A.,
1956
 "the shareholders, 
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 Ibid, pars. 22-26. 
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 Ibid, par. 22, citing Disney, supra note 9, p. 119. 
1952
 Ming, supra note 334, par. 23. 
1953
 Ibid, par. 23, quote from Welling 2nd ed., supra note 1897, p. 453. 
1954
 Fitzwilliam, supra note 9, section 3. 
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 Fitzwilliam, supra note 9, section 3. 
1956
 Fitzwilliam was writing primarily about the importation of the unanimous shareholder agreement 
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having inherited the directors' duties and liabilities, will now become fiduciaries and cannot validly agree 
among themselves (as is usually provided for in a shareholder agreement) in advance as to how each 
shareholder will exercise his judgment in the future when voting on the Restricted Matters".
1957
  For that 
reason, he stated that the legislative provisions creating this tool fell short of fulfilling their assumed 
"rationale".
1958
  He recommended that Trinidad and Tobago not follow this example. 
 Finally, the Industry Canada Discussion Paper also considered whether all of the common law and 
statutory duties which directors owe to the corporation would be transferred intact to empowered 
shareholders.  Yet again, fettering discretion was presented as the leading example of this larger 
question.
1959
  The duties of care and loyalty were described as a "related issue".
1960
  The report considered 
that shareholders have traditionally been allowed to act in their own self-interest, but that this might be 
balanced by said self-interest only being given expression in the selection of directors
1961
 who were 
themselves bound to act for the corporation's benefit.
1962
  It therefore warned that investors assuming 
power without those obligations might result in them pursuing their own interests while leaving the 
company to bear the resultant liabilities.
1963
 
 The commentary on the pre-amendment C.B.C.A. contains some disagreement over whether or not 
shareholders were permitted to "fetter their discretion", but there was a general consensus that they should 
be and that only then would the alleged legislative intention for the unanimous shareholder agreement be 
fully met.  As discussed in the next subsection, the subsequent amendment to the Act has largely vindicated 
the last part of this position. 
 
4.(a)(ii) After the C.B.C.A. Amendments 
 
 In 2001, one of the amendments to the Canada Business Corporations Act, likely as a result of the 
aforementioned debate, was the following addition: 
 
146(6) Nothing in this section prevents shareholders from fettering their discretion when 
exercising the powers of directors under a unanimous shareholder agreement.
1964
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
in their native land, Canada. 
1957
 Fitzwilliam, supra note 9, section 3. 
1958
 Ibid, section 3. 
1959
 Industry Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 9, pp. 32-33. 
1960
 Ibid, p. 34. 
1961
 And voting on fundamental changes. 
1962
 Industry Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 9, p. 34. 
1963
 Ibid, p. 34. 
1964
 The same subsection was later included at O.B.C.A. s. 108(5.1), and a similarly worded section 
was added to the Q.B.C.A. s. 220.  The remaining statutes do not contain an explicit reference to 
shareholders "fettering their discretion" while exercising powers conferred through a unanimous 
shareholder agreement.  
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 As a result, when Welling produced his third edition of Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing 
Principles, he included an analysis of how the situation had changed, for the first time extending significant 
consideration to the wider questions of the directors' duties of care and loyalty.  He believed that the 
responsibilities which are transferred "plainly includes the s. 122(1)(a) duty to make management decisions 
'with a view to the best interests of the corporation.'  Thus, each managing party owes fiduciary obligations 
to the corporation."
1965
  These were unaffected by the new provision because: 
 
Section 146(6) was added in 2001, presumably to resolve the ongoing debate about 
whether shareholders under a unanimous shareholder agreement owed a fiduciary duty to 
the corporation.  It seems plain enough that the statutory answer is yes[....  I]t is clear that 
Parliament has statutorily authorized shareholders operating under a unanimous 
shareholder agreement to contract as to how they will manage.  It is also clear that 
Parliament did nothing more than that.
1966
 
 
 Welling warned that "lawyers' jargon"
1967
 may mislead some people into thinking that the freedom 
to fetter discretion broadly relieved shareholders of the entire duty of care and/or loyalty, but that that 
interpretation would ignore both the roots of the phrase and that Parliament could have explicitly removed 
those duties, but did not.
1968
 
 His objection that the statute's wording created a result that "doesn't work as planned"
1969
 was 
unrelated.  Curiously, even if one accepts his logic, he presented no evidence that this would be unplanned, 
and part of his argument was that the lawmakers specifically chose language that would have a narrow 
meaning, implying careful consideration of the results, although admittedly the consequences as Welling 
understood them are difficult to rationalize: the statute only authorizes investors to enter into binding 
contracts about the exercise of their new authority after the unanimous shareholder agreement is in force, 
rather than beforehand or in the agreement itself.
1970
  Any restrictions the shareholders decided upon before 
the unanimous shareholder agreement was already in effect would not be binding upon them.
1971
  Welling 
stated that "the statute does not appear to have authorized them to contract away [managerial] powers 
before they acquire them".
1972
  In fact, the statute does not authorize shareholders to fetter their discretion at 
all; it instead explicitly does not prevent it.  Unless this makes the subsection a nullity, their freedom to 
fetter must pre-exist it.  Furthermore, the investors would not be contracting away powers, but rather 
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1966
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contracting with regard to how they will exercise them, a point Welling's own analysis emphasizes 
elsewhere.  These errors aside, his interpretation may come down to having understood the latter part of the 
phrase "fettering their discretion when exercising the powers of directors" as modifying when investors 
may fetter, not what.  This is a counterintuitive reading, and the statutory language does not require it.  
Alternatively, he may have been drawing a distinction between "restricting of the powers of directors" and 
"exercising the powers of directors", with the former occurring at the time the agreement is created and the 
latter only subsequently.  The next subsection of this chapter explores how a restriction in a unanimous 
shareholder agreement can have identical effect to an exercise of the board's authority, which I refer to as a 
"pre-made decision".  If, for the sake of argument, the inclusion of such a term is nonetheless not 
considered "exercising the powers of directors" for the purposes of s. 146(6), then it follows that it must 
have been the act of shareholders qua (unempowered) sharehoholders, and it was thus not subject to the 
directors' normal responsibilities regardless, including the prohibition against fettering discretion.
1973
  For 
all these reasons, Welling's conclusion is unconvincing. 
 Commentary about the ability of shareholders to "fetter their discretion" has largely centred on the 
terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement itself and whether that legal tool can be used to make 
specific decisions or only to transfer powers.
1974
  It was the latter question that had originally caused 
Welling to begin this debate.  What he here concluded was that the opposite result had been achieved: the 
unanimous shareholder agreement could not set out specific decisions, but the empowered shareholders 
were subsequently free to fetter their discretion through additional contracts.  The first part is debatable, but 
the second appears unfortunately true. 
 Welling insisted that the shareholders' new ability to "fetter their discretion" referred solely and 
specifically to entering into contracts whereby they decide in advance how they will vote, which directors 
are normally prohibited from doing.
1975
  He noted that Parliament did not choose a wording to explicitly 
excuse shareholders from the general duty of care that directors owe, instead using this particular 
expression.
1976
  "Fettering their discretion" may be the term developed to describe directors contracting 
about how they would vote,
1977
  but whatever its historical roots, it is still perhaps debatable whether the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1972
 Ibid, p. 468. 
1973
 Earlier in Chapter Five, the question of whether directors' responsibilities in general can or should 
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phrase as used in the statute has that limited scope; Welling himself acknowledged that it is likely to be 
misunderstood.  But even if the language is read in that way, the result of this new subsection in the 
amended Act is still in effect one where the duties of care and loyalty have been gutted, because it allows 
for the easy and arbitrary manipulation of the law.  After a unanimous shareholder agreement has 
transferred the board of directors' powers to the shareholders, an individual cannot unilaterally decide in 
advance to vote in favour of a certain proposition, nor when the time comes vote arbitrarily without 
properly considering the issue.
1978
  Either would be a violation of the duty of care.  However, the same 
shareholders could enter into a contract wherein they promise to vote in favour or against, and apparently in 
so doing would free themselves from any duty of care.  Furthermore, they are not prevented from binding 
themselves to courses of action that also violate the duty of loyalty, and the very fact that they receive 
compensation would itself be a violation of that duty under other circumstances. 
 Nothing in the law currently precludes the contract being with a disinterested party for only 
nominal consideration; this would still be fettering discretion, which is now permitted (or not prevented).  It 
would therefore be prudent for shareholders who sought to exercise their power in a manner that would 
violate their duties to arrange to enter into such contracts for the specific purpose of avoiding liability.  
Even empowered investors who fully intended to meet those responsibilities would be prudent to do the 
same and enter into agreements confirming their votes, as they too would likely appreciate a liability shield.  
Even were this loophole closed and only "real" contracts- whatever that might mean- considered an 
acceptable excuse, it remains unclear what the policy rationale might be.  It is highly anomalous for a group 
of people to be allowed to avoid a duty they normally owe only if they are receiving an inducement to 
abrogate it.  It would be patently absurd, for example, to suggest a regime where corporate directors were 
excused from their duty of care
1979
 if they were being bribed for their vote.  And yet, this is exactly what 
the situation for empowered shareholders now appears to be. 
 This contradiction is inadvertently illustrated by Martel's recent positions on fettering discretion 
and the larger duties of care and loyalty.
1980
  He asserted that those duties were for the public good; it is not 
just shareholders but creditors and society generally who benefit from them, and it would therefore be 
                                                                                                                                                                             
O.J. No. 266 (Ont. Gen. Div. Mar 01, 1991) supports the use of this phrase to refer to directors contracting 
about how they intend to vote (pars. 101-105), while noting that unanimous shareholder agreements 
constitute an exception (par. 102). 
1978
 Cannot in theory, at any rate.  Enforcement is admittedly problematic. 
1979
 The decision to which the directors were committing might, on the facts, be a violation of the duty 
of loyalty as well, but the very fact that they were committing to it in advance would, of itself, be a 
violation of the duty of care in all cases.  That said, the fact that they were being compensated would 
always be a violation of the duty of loyalty. 
1980
 Martel and Martel, supra note 16, p. 372 included a general citation to Welling 3rd., supra note 
256, Disney supra note 9, and Ming, supra note 334, for further reading on this topic, without comment or 
explanation.  One might therefore conclude that these earlier analyses influenced their thinking in some 
manner, and that their analysis falls into the tradition under discussion. 
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surprising if we allowed investors to, simply by agreeing amongst themselves, act in their own interest with 
impunity and to the detriment of others.
1981
  Curiously, he limited this objection to agreements transferring 
power, not agreements regarding the use of that power.  On the one hand, he maintained that investors who 
assumed the directors' authority also took upon themselves obligations, including divulging conflicts of 
interest, refraining from voting upon them, and generally acting competently and in the best interest of the 
company.
1982
  Notwithstanding that, he did consider that investors might waive the duty of loyalty insofar 
as claims brought against each other were concerned, without affecting the rights of third parties such as 
creditors.
1983
  Properly understood, his suggestion would not alter or limit the duty of loyalty itself- which 
is always owed to the company- only who could bring a derivative action to enforce it.
1984
  However, 
Martel also acknowledged the recent statutory revision allowing shareholders to contract as to how they 
would exercise their new powers (fettering).
1985
  Nor was that made grudgingly; he believed that this 
preserved the (alleged) benefit of the unanimous shareholder agreement, as without it, investors would have 
to act in the best interest of the company rather than their own.
1986
  Paradoxically, that scenario was treated 
as a negative here.  The contradiction between recognizing the need to protect third party and societal 
interests from the self-interested or incompetent actions of empowered shareholders and lauding those same 
investors' freedom to fetter their discretion in a manner that by definition could not meet either the duty of 
care or loyalty seems obvious. 
 Simon v. Ramsay
1987
 touched upon this problematic new subsection, citing s. 146(6) as support for 
the proposition that "[a]s provided in section 122(2) CBCA, the directors are bound to act in accordance 
with the terms of a unanimous shareholders' agreement.  In dealing with the effect of such an agreement, 
section 146 CBCA does provide that the shareholders, acting as directors, may so bind themselves."
1988
  The 
exact consequences of this went unexplored- the principle did not apply in that case because there was no 
unanimous shareholder agreement
1989
- but it suggests that empowered shareholders, like directors, are 
bound to follow the restrictions in such an agreement.
1990
  This is at odds with Welling's interpretation, 
more similar to Martel's and my own (discussed below), but it is in accordance with all our prescriptive 
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goals.  Perhaps whatever defects there may be in this subsection's wording, its judicial interpretation will 
solve them.  Statutory reform should nonetheless occur, for greater certainty that shareholders are only 
permitted to fetter their discretion through clauses in the unanimous shareholder agreement itself, not 
subsequent contracts.  However, for reasons set out in the next section, this part of the C.B.C.A. could also 
simply be eliminated, as another amendment to the statute has already allowed for what was desired. 
 
4.(b) "Fettering Discretion" Versus "Pre-Made Decisions" 
 
 The current wording of the C.B.C.A. permits
1991
 a unanimous shareholder agreement to make a 
defined corporate decision or place a specific restriction upon the directors without in so doing transferring 
discretionary power to the shareholders.  I refer to these as "pre-made decisions".  But, contrary to what the 
commentary that preceded it might lead one to think, the crucial subsection that does so is not the one that 
now allows for shareholders to fetter their discretion.  It is instead the rewording of section 146(5) in the 
2001 amendment.  What once read: 
 
146(5) A shareholder who is a party to a unanimous shareholder agreement has all the 
rights, powers and duties of a director of the corporation to which the agreement relates 
to the extent that the agreement restricts the powers of the directors to manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation, and the directors are thereby relieved of their 
duties and liabilities, including any liabilities under section 119, to the same extent. 
 
 Now reads: 
 
146(5) To the extent that a unanimous shareholder agreement restricts the powers of the 
directors to manage, or supervise the management of, the business and affairs of the 
corporation, parties to the unanimous shareholder agreement who are given that power to 
manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the corporation have 
all the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a director of the corporation, whether they 
arise under this Act or otherwise, including any defences available to the directors, and 
the directors are relieved of their rights, powers, duties and liabilities, including their 
liabilities under section 119, to the same extent. 
 
 The critical difference between these provisions is that the former version automatically grants to 
(all) shareholders the rights, powers, and duties of a director when they are restricted, whereas the latter 
separates the concepts of restricting directors' powers (and therefore liabilities) from giving them to other 
parties such as shareholders.  The new wording therefore allows for the possibility that the board's powers 
will be restricted but said powers won't be given to anyone.  The restriction will be just that, a restriction, 
                                                          
1991
 On a literal reading of the wording. 
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rather than a transfer.
1992
  This is similar to the options available for inclusion in a corporation's articles and 
by-laws, but expanded to include any and every decision normally made by directors, arguably more 
effective at binding them, and significantly more entrenched if further changes also require unanimity.  
Such terms might take the form of either a specific decision or a general limitation on the board's 
authority.
1993
  The difference between these two categories is often blurred; the naming of a particular 
individual to a corporate office is simultaneously a specific decision to appoint that person and a limitation 
of the directors' ongoing power to subsequently remove them.  But in neither case do shareholders receive 
on an ongoing basis the authority they have removed from the board.
1994
 
 The courts, with only isolated exceptions,
1995
 had already adopted this perspective before the 
amendment and in jurisdictions without it.  Both types of pre-made decisions in unanimous shareholder 
agreements have been upheld and enforced,
1996
 without any indication they were being analyzed as if they 
transferred power to the investors (with the corresponding questions about fettering).  This is not to say that 
the judiciary has wholeheartedly embraced pre-made decisions.  It is no coincidence that virtually the 
entirety of the case law on directors breaching unanimous shareholder agreements concerns such terms.  
The contractual, directors' duties, and oppression models of enforcement can all be seen as ways to avoid 
placing a given power over the corporation into no one's hands.  They respectively grant the board the 
ability to circumvent a unanimous shareholder agreement at the cost of paying damages, when it is in the 
best interests of the company, or when no reasonable expectations are violated.  What the courts have not 
done is require that all restrictions be framed as transfers nor deem them as such. 
 It is clear in retrospect that the entire debate amongst commentators about the ability of 
shareholders to fetter their discretion was misguided, and unfortunately this error was not limited to 
textbooks and journal articles but has now manifested in an ill-advised change to the law itself.  Fettering 
discretion was never the issue; the types of permissible restrictions in a unanimous shareholder agreement 
was. 
 There has been consensus amongst the commentators that the legislative intent was to allow for 
specific restrictions and/or decisions without transferring discretionary power to make those choices to the 
                                                          
1992
 Contrary to the logic employed by Welling 3rd ed., supra note 256, p. 468, there is no need to first 
create a unanimous shareholder agreement that avoids any specific corporate decisions, in order to 
empower shareholders to subsequently make such choices.  The creation of a unanimous shareholder 
agreement is not the origin of the shareholders' ability to restrict the powers of the directors; it is the 
exercise of their statutory ability to do so.  A "pre-made decision" is conceptually a restriction upon the 
board that removes their authority to deviate from the position set out in the agreement.  It is therefore 
suitable for inclusion in a unanimous shareholder agreement. 
1993
 It is no longer controversial that the latter may be done, but there was some earlier debate in the 
commentary.  See the discussion of Sohmer in the earlier subsection of this chapter on "Pre-Made 
Decisions". 
1994
 See note 807 for a discussion of how this differs from the ultra vires doctrine. 
1995
 9109 CS, supra note 555; Couvre-Plancher, supra note 324; Ming, supra note 334. 
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shareholders.  While often poorly justified at best, this inference as to statutory purpose (and recognition of 
common practice) has apparently been vindicated by the aforementioned amendment to the Act.  Despite 
that, it is worth briefly questioning whether the assumption was actually correct.  The old wording was 
conspicuously explicit that all restricted directorial powers and duties passed to the shareholders; there was 
no necessity for such a provision, as the amended Act demonstrates.  It is plausible that the drafters of the 
original did indeed fear the possibility of a power vacuum or of decisions that were "locked in" and 
impossible to alter in the face of changing circumstances, and that they deliberately sought to avoid any 
outcome that would not allow someone to freely decide the best course of action for the company.  That a 
later Parliament came to a different conclusion does not necessarily imply anything about what motivated a 
previous session, nor does it automatically speak to the intent of the provincial and territorial legislatures 
that maintain some variation of the earlier form. 
 It is unfortunate that commentators did not frame the issue in the manner outlined above.  The 
reason was presumably that the wording of the old Act was clear: any restriction was automatically a 
transfer.  To suggest the possibility of restrictions that were not transfers was a non-starter, legally, except 
perhaps as an idea for reform.  (From a statutory perspective, at any rate; the case law was demonstrating 
otherwise.)  So, instead, from Welling on, they engaged in a two-step analysis that first treated any such 
term in a unanimous shareholder agreement as a transfer of power to the shareholders and second as an 
agreement amongst the shareholders as to how that power would be used.  If this analysis had successfully 
circumvented the problem, its popularity would be explicable.  But because of the rule against fettering 
discretion, this path was almost as treacherous.  Welling himself concluded that it was a dead-end; 
shareholders could not be bound by such a term, although its inclusion would not negate the validity of the 
agreement and hence the transfer of power.  Subsequent commentators have not been as quick to accept 
that the rule against fettering discretion should apply to empowered investors, although this has largely 
required ignoring a strict reading of the statute in favour of its alleged purpose; notwithstanding that the 
subsection placed all the duties of directors upon shareholders, without exception, the logic ran that the rule 
against fettering discretion must be excepted to allow for arrangements that the legislature was assumed to 
surely have intended to permit. 
 And yet, if the legislature surely intended to permit such arrangements, despite the language used, 
why not suggest that they simply permit such arrangements?  That is ultimately what has occurred in the 
recent amendments.  Before then, or in the provinces,
1997
 this line of reasoning could have been pursued 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1996
 Or not, but on other grounds. 
1997
 Currently, only Q.B.C.A., s. 214 is similar to the amended C.B.C.A. in specifying "parties to the 
unanimous shareholder agreement who are given those powers"; the other statutes continue to assume that 
any and all shareholders who are parties (in some statutes, shareholders who are deemed parties are 
specifically included as well) assume the powers and responsibilities that have been removed from 
directors.  See A.B.C.A., s. 146(7); M.C.A., s. 140(5); N.B.C.A., s.148(7); N.B.C.C.A., s. 99(5); N.L.C.A., 
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either as a suggestion for reform or even as a particularly elastic reading of the statute, rather than engaging 
in the two-step analysis and facing the rule against fettering discretion. The unfortunate consequence of 
this tradition is s. 146(6), which allows empowered shareholders to freely fetter their discretion.  It seems 
probable that this is the result, directly or indirectly, of the aforementioned academic obsession with this 
issue, which was referred to in the Industry Canada report.
1998
  This problematically now allows for them to 
fetter their discretion any way they like, and not just via the terms of the unanimous shareholder agreement 
itself.  Welling took this to the extreme position that investors may fetter their discretion only in separate 
contracts that are formed subsequent to the unanimous shareholder agreement; while that is a misreading, 
the statute is now permissive of such subsequent fettering, without a requirement of unanimity. 
 This misguided strand of analysis also tied the permissibility of pre-made decisions to the question 
of whether investors who assume directors' powers and liabilities should be subject to the duties of care and 
loyalty.  The "fettering of discretion" has been treated by some authors as an example of the shareholders' 
duty of care, and specifically how it is more limited than the directors' usual one.  No one has entirely 
conflated the two issues; the prohibition on fettering has been treated as a distinct sub-topic, and 
eliminating it not as necessarily synonymous with removing the rest of the obligations to the corporation.  
However, even if such an exception is treated as isolated and unique, it nonetheless requires that some 
distinction be made between the duties of directors and empowered shareholders, a distinction that the 
wording of the statute as it then was simply did not support.  This made it easier to assume that the 
investors were not really supposed to take on all of the board's duties to the corporation, only some of them, 
only whichever ones were appropriate.  Authors accordingly suggested some larger variation in the duties 
of empowered shareholders.  They may have taken that position in any event, but the link in their logic 
seems clear.  Replacing the concept of "fettering discretion" with one that directly permits pre-made 
decisions allows for consideration of the duties of care and loyalty on their own merits, rather than biased 
by the relatively uncontroversial utility of at least one reduction of their normal scope. 
 Before proceeding to that consideration, it should be determined whether there actually are any 
difficulties, from the perspective of the shareholders themselves, with allowing them to create pre-made 
decisions rather than receiving the directors' powers.
1999
  Such restrictions might later impede actions that 
the investors would wish the corporation to take, presumably due to changing circumstances or new 
information.
2000
  That is the necessary trade-off for allowing them to impede actions they do not wish the 
corporation to take.  The advantages of directors being free at any given moment to determine what is in 
the corporation's best interests must be weighed against the benefits of allowing shareholders to agree to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
s.245(8); N.T.B.C.A., s.148(7); O.B.C.A., s.108(5); S.B.C.A., s. 140(4); Y.B.C.A., s. 148(7). 
1998
 Industry Canada Discussion Paper, supra note 9, p.33. 
1999
 The problems this poses for other parties are considered below. 
2000
 Or because they never actually supported the original restriction and agreed to it only as a result of 
negotiations with shareholders who did. 
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decisions that could then be relied upon as largely unalterable.  Further, the use of unanimous shareholder 
agreements to determine issues in advance or to restrict the range of permissible options might serve as a 
form of minority protection; they could negotiate specific individual rights
2001
 or generally applicable rights 
could be arranged at a time when it was unknown who might later need to make use of them.  The utility of 
these tools might outweigh any lost flexibility, particularly given that such a bargain was one that all of the 
investors accepted. 
 This does rely upon accepting that the unanimous shareholder agreement signifies an increasingly 
contractual understanding of the corporation, a position whose merits and drawbacks are discussed 
throughout this work.  Pre-made decisions allow not just for designating new decision-makers, but for 
using the company's "foundational documents" to place some choices beyond any decision-maker's 
discretion, in a manner that may require further unanimity to reverse.  This goes beyond what can normally 
be achieved via the articles and by-laws.  That may explain why, of all the unusual power structures the 
unanimous shareholder agreement renders possible, pre-made decisions are the most problematic for 
reassigning the directors' duties and liabilities; they assume a contractual corporation that can be freely 
rearranged, and those responsibilities rely upon something at least analogous to the statutorily-defined 
power structure.  The degree to which pre-made decisions represent a rejection of the predefined entity 
model of the corporation may be why so many commentators have preferred the two-step method, although 
if so, it is a curious moment of traditionalism from analysts who largely favoured shareholder-driven 
"nexus of contracts" corporations. 
 
4.(c) The Duties of Care and Loyalty Generally 
 
 Fettering discretion aside, larger questions about the duty of care and loyalty remain relevant.  As 
discussed, the two issues have in recent years been heavily intertwined in the commentary.  But this was 
not always the case.  Several writers who preceded Welling's influential contribution demonstrated a 
different perspective.
2002
  Instead, a separate complication was present in most of their analyses.  Quebec's 
legislation formerly allowed empowered shareholders to retain their "voting rights" ("droit de vote").
2003
  
                                                          
2001
 Guaranteeing minority shareholders will hold certain jobs is a common example. 
2002
 In addition to the French-language authors discussed in this subsection, another commentator who 
preceded the general "fettering discretion" phase of the debate, McCarthy, supra note 8, p. 471, stated that 
the then equally new statutory duties of directors and unanimous shareholder agreements might combine in 
such a way that "[t]he minority shareholder may be able to upset the decision of the majority under a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, simply on the ground that the majority did not vote in the best interests 
of the company, even though no oppression has been alleged, still less any violation of a more specific 
duty".  Although possibly merely intended as descriptive, a criticism seems implicit. 
2003
 Quebec Companies Act, c-38 (hereinafter "Q.C.A."), as amended 1979, c. 31, s. 27; 1980, c. 28, s. 
14: 
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This element, since replaced with a "fettering discretion" clause similar to the one found in the C.B.C.A.,
2004
 
is now of only historical significance.  At the time, however, it was an active part of the question of 
empowered shareholder's duties in Quebec, and it naturally attracted the attention of French-language 
commentators. 
 Martel, for example, did touch upon the "fettering discretion" issue,
2005
 but did so completely 
separately from his analysis of the imposition of directors' responsibilities upon investors, including it 
instead as part of his discussion of the procedures governing empowered shareholder management;
2006
 he 
argued that it was permissible because the fundamental advantage of a unanimous shareholder agreement 
was that it displaced the requirement for independent management.
2007
  With regard to the duties of care 
and loyalty generally, Martel confusingly both asserted that the directors' statutory obligations to the 
corporation would be included in the transfer of their legal responsibilities to shareholders, specifically 
mentioning the need to divulge conflicts of interest and refrain from voting upon them,
2008
 while also 
arguing that under the legislation, particularly the Q.C.A. that allowed them to retain their "voting rights", 
empowered shareholders still retained the right to vote as they wished, rather than being obliged to do so in 
the company's best interest.
2009
   
 The position of Smith on the latter issue was similar.  He stated that empowered shareholders 
assumed the directors' duties to the company, among which he specifically included avoiding being placed 
in a conflict of interest, but he also took the position that since the Q.C.A. allowed them to retain their 
"voting rights", they still had the discretion they possessed as shareholders, rather than being obliged to act 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
123.92. The shareholders or the sole shareholder, as the case may be, shall then manage 
the affairs of the company as if they, or he, were its directors; they, or he, shall exercise 
the rights that have been withdrawn from the directors and assume the obligations from 
which the directors have been discharged.  The shareholders may, however, govern the 
exercise of their voting rights. 
2004
 Q.B.C.A. s. 220. 
2005
 Although the French term he uses, "engagement de vote" translates as approximately 
"commitment to vote", which while apparently covering the same ground as "fettering discretion", may 
have different connotations. 
2006
 Martel, supra note 11, p. 27.  Admittedly, elsewhere in that discussion of empowered shareholder 
management procedures, at p. 24, he did mention his view that shareholders would be able to exercise their 
vote freely, rather than subject to a duty to act in the best interest of the company as directors must, so the 
procedural discussion was not completely separated from duty of care analysis.  Notwithstanding that, he 
did not link the "fettering discretion" question directly to the duty of care. 
2007
 Ibid, p. 27. 
2008
 Ibid, at pp. 38-39 considered it uncertain whether the wording of C.B.C.A. '74-'75 permitted 
shareholders to delegate the powers they received under a unanimous shareholder agreement to others or 
whether that would be barred by delegatus non potest delegate, but he considered it certain that the Q.C.A. 
as it then was would prohibit such delegation.  See the discussion of Allard below. 
2009
 Ibid, pp. 24, 28. 
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independently in the best interest of the company.
2010
  The obvious contradiction went largely unaddressed, 
but Smith did provide an example of a duty not covered by "voting rights": the prohibition against 
delegation.
2011
  The value of such an obligation is doubtful if it exists only to keep power in the hands of 
those who may abuse it at will. 
 Although Turgeon acknowledged that directors must act in the best interests of the company, 
which is distinct from that of shareholders,
2012
 he considered it "manifestly obvious" ("manifestment") that 
this derived from the mutability of shareholdings and served to protect future investors.
2013
  He argued that 
this was not a concern for small enterprises, because new shareholders either buy in at prices reflective of 
the situation or are the heirs of the very individuals who created it for their own benefit.
2014
  He did not 
address that, if this were true, it would seemingly also be true for public companies.  Turgeon further 
insisted that the interests of the shareholders and the corporation did not have to conflict, since the 
company was created to serve the investors' common goals,
2015
 but he accepted that there are situations 
when the majority and minority are opposed.  So long as the results were not oppressive, he argued that the 
majority had the right to determine the best interest of the company.
2016
  There was no clear explanation for 
the contradiction with his earlier admission that the two were distinct. 
 Having thus established a conception of the duties that served the interests of the majority of 
shareholders, what followed was unsurprising.  Turgeon argued that assuming power did not remove their 
discretion when acting qua shareholder.
2017
  Directors must abstain from voting if they have a conflict of 
interest, but shareholders can ratify the directors' self-interested acts, and they have no duty of 
independence of their own to satisfy when doing so.
2018
  In order to remove what Turgeon called absurd 
results,
2019
 the power of shareholder ratification must remain even when a unanimous shareholder 
agreement had transferred power to them.
2020
  His conclusion was that any decision normally capable of 
ratification should, if carried out by empowered investors, be automatically treated as if it had been so 
ratified.
2021
  Every act they take is presumably one they would ratify.
2022
  Ratification is a power of the 
                                                          
2010
 Smith, supra note 228, p. 311. 
2011
 Ibid, p. 311. 
2012
 Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 244. 
2013
 Ibid, pp. 244-245. 
2014
 Ibid, pp. 244-245. 
2015
 Ibid, p. 245. 
2016
 Ibid, pp. 245-246. 
2017
 Ibid, p. 243. 
2018
 Ibid, pp. 243-244. 
2019
 He gave the example of a sole shareholder who was also the sole director entering into a self-
interested contract after being empowered by a unanimous shareholder agreement, and subsequent 
transferees trying to annul it (Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 244). 
2020
 Turgeon, supra note 9, p. 244. 
2021
 Ibid, p. 253.  He added that having the shareholders perform an official ratification might still be 
beneficial in helping insulate their decisions from attack (p. 254). 
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shareholders qua shareholders.
2023
  He therefore concluded that absent oppression, the minority did not 
have the ability to challenge a decision of the majority on the basis that it had not been in the best interests 
of the company.
2024
 
 Despite granting empowered shareholders broad leeway to pursue their own benefit free of duties 
to an abstract conception of the corporate interest, Turgeon still found the "voting rights" in the Q.C.A. to 
be a poor addition to the statute, not on the basis that they were a bad idea, but because the wording was 
"ill-advised and equivocal".
2025
  Finding it ambiguous whether this section only applied to decisions 
normally within the shareholder's authority or whether it included powers taken from the directors, he 
unsurprisingly made the suggestion for legislative reform that, even when exercising the board's normal 
authority, investors be allowed to act in their own interests.
2026
 
 Finally, Ratti merged the "voting rights" and "fettering discretion" discussions, as the former was 
winding down and the latter was just getting started.  His general position was that empowered 
shareholders would have the same duties as directors, including the prohibitions against delegation and 
against agreeing on their vote in advance; he quoted another extract from Welling on the latter point, 
although he did express some uncertainty regarding the earlier author's premise that directors themselves 
cannot make such contracts regarding their votes.
2027
  In the Quebec context, Ratti took the position that the 
retention of their "voting rights" reversed the situation, meaning that investors could agree in advance how 
they would use the powers taken from the board.
2028
 
 Despite this last-minute convergence with the English-language commentary and its intertwining 
of the "fettering discretion" rule with larger questions surrounding the duties of care and loyalty, the early 
French-language analyses provide an alternative perspective.  Unfortunately, the presence of "voting rights" 
in the Quebec legislation of the time created its own complications, presenting at least a potential (if not 
definitive) justification for excusing empowered shareholders from the full duties directors normally owe to 
the company.  Despite disagreement as to the exact meaning of these "voting rights", their inclusion at least 
explains why some commentators writing in that context found that only part of the duties of care and 
loyalty passed to empowered shareholders, not all of them. 
 More recent commentary upon this issue has been intertwined with the "fettering discretion" 
question, but it is notable that while there was a general consensus with regard to that specific topic,
2029
 the 
conclusions reached about the general duties were more mixed, and they largely lacked clear explanation.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
2022
 Ibid, p. 254. 
2023
 Ibid, p. 253. 
2024
 Ibid, p. 254. 
2025
 Ibid, p. 272, my translation of  "malencontreuse et equivogue". 
2026
 Ibid, pp. 272-273. 
2027
 Ratti, supra note 16, pp. 117-119, citing Welling 1st ed., supra note 250, p. 453. 
2028
 Ratti, supra note 16, p. 119. 
2029
 At least, there was a general consensus upon what the law should be, if not what it was. 
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The ability to "fetter discretion" in the current legislation is technically a narrow exception, theoretically 
severed from the larger duties.  Conversely, in practice, it can be abused to gut them entirely.  Despite both 
these extremes, the impact of the "fettering discretion" debate upon the wider commentary might be as 
nothing more than one reason for the belief that the full duties of care and loyalty require reconsideration 
before being placed upon empowered shareholders.   That is the closest one can come to a general 
consensus in the English-language literature.  It is the same conclusion reached by the early French-
language commentators.  Without the justification of "voting rights", though, how and why empowered 
shareholders' general duties of care and loyalty should differ from directors' is unclear and seemingly 
contrary to the legislation. 
 This consensus, further, is opposed by the small amount of case law on the subject, including a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada.  Judges have come to the conclusion that the responsibilities of 
directors are borne by investors when a unanimous shareholder agreement is in effect.  The contents of 
those decisions and their implications are discussed in the next subsection.  Following that, I will supply 
my own support for such a position, arguing that even in a shareholder primacy model of the corporation, 
the maintenance of these responsibilities will help achieve desired ends, an opinion that is only bolstered in 
the final part of this chapter when an expanded stakeholder approach is taken into account. 
 
4.(c)(i) Cases on Transferring the Duties of Care and Loyalty 
 
 What little reported case law deals with whether investors who assume power under a unanimous 
shareholder agreement inherit the directors' duties of care and loyalty appears unanimous that they do.  
Four judgments directly take this position, although only one actually found a shareholder liable for 
violating those duties.  In addition to these, the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Indalex Ltd., 
Re, while not addressing the topic directly, strongly implies further support when analyzed closely. 
 M.E.N. Electric Co. v. Rumble
2030
 actually held an empowered shareholder liable for violating his 
duty to the corporation.  A key employee had left his job, also resigning his position as a director, but he 
still owned shares of the company he had departed.
2031
  He subsequently began a competing business.
2032
  
The corporation sued him for breaching his fiduciary duty to it. 
 Perell J. determined that the respondent did owe an ongoing fiduciary duty to the company, in 
large part because he was a party to a unanimous shareholder agreement that gave him (in his capacity as a 
shareholder) the same duties to the corporation which a director would have, duties which were still in 
                                                          
2030
 M.E.N., supra note 1892.  This was actually a motion for an injunction.  Despite finding that a 
"fiduciary duty" did exist- although not necessarily that it had been violated, which was technically left as a 
matter for trial (par. 39)- the motion was denied on the balance of convenience test (pars. 38-44). 
2031
 Ibid, par. 20. 
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effect since he remained a shareholder.  The document may have confirmed that the parties to it were under 
all the same duties as directors,
2033
 but Perell J. made clear that even aside from that, such responsibilities 
would have arisen under the common law or "in equity" and were also imposed by the sections of the 
O.B.C.A. dealing with unanimous shareholder agreements: 
 
16 As will become clearer, more important than the non-competition clause, which, 
oddly, may not be operative when a shareholder competes against his own company, are 
the provisions in the agreement about the management of M.E.N. Electric.  Under these 
provisions, the shareholders were to manage and were to be subject to the same duties 
and liabilities to which the directors of the corporation would have been had the 
shareholders' agreement not been made. 
 
17 Pausing here, there is no doubt that based on the evidence presented on this 
motion for an interlocutory injunction that in January and February 2005, Mr. Rumble 
had a fiduciary duty to M.E.N. Electric.  His fiduciary duties arose at common law or in 
equity under the line of authorities associated with the famous cases of Canadian Aero 
Service Ltd. v. O'Malley (1973), [1974] S.C.R. 592 (S.C.C.) and Edgar T. Alberts Ltd. v. 
Mountjoy (1977), 16 O.R. (2d) 682 (Ont. H.C.), and they arose because under his 
shareholders' agreement he had taken on the fiduciary responsibilities of a director under 
the Ontario Business Corporations Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134. [...] 
 
21 Based on the evidence presented on this motion for an interlocutory injunction, 
Mr. Rumble's understanding that he had no ongoing responsibilities to M.E.N. Electric 
was from a legal perspective simply wrong.  As famously demonstrated by the Canadian 
Aero Service Ltd. v. O'Malley case, supra a fiduciary does not shed his or fiduciary 
obligations by simply resigning from his or her post.  And, in the immediate case, as 
noted several times, Mr. Rumble - to this day - remains a shareholder of M.E.N. Electric 
with a contractual obligation tied to the Business Corporations Act to act honestly and in 
good faith with a view to the best interests of M.E.N. Electric. See Ontario Business 
Corporations Act, s. 134. 
 
 The phrase "a contractual obligation tied to the Business Corporations Act" is awkward; while 
contractual obligations may have been imposed as well, those tied to the Ontario Business Corporations 
Act are themselves statutory, not contractual. 
 The most notable aspect is, of course, that the judgment found that the empowered shareholder 
was under a duty of loyalty to the corporation, as a result of both the provincial statute and common law 
and "equitable" principles.  Perell J. determined without much analysis that the statutory duty of loyalty 
applied, simply because it was an obligation of the directors and therefore passed to the shareholders 
according to the legislation.  As discussed, there was a general consensus among commentators that the 
actual wording of the statute meant that the duty of loyalty would apply to empowered shareholders, but 
equally common was that the analyst would immediately proceed to observe that this was self-evidently 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2032
 Ibid, par. 22. 
2033
 Ibid, par. 16.  The wording here was somewhat ambiguous as to whether this was explicit in the 
terms or simply part of their legal effect. 
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problematic, possibly even incorrect, because that would defeat some alleged purpose of the legal tool.  In 
an actual case, the judge made that first step, but apparently did not find the result so obviously flawed as to 
necessitate a deeper inquiry.  That is not to say what the results of such an inquiry might have been, but it 
does suggest that the prima facie meaning of the section may not be as troubling as has sometimes been 
thought.
2034
 
 The other striking aspect is the parallel drawn between the statutory duty of loyalty that is 
transferred from directors to shareholders when a unanimous shareholder agreement is involved and the 
common law fiduciary duty that would be imposed upon an empowered investor regardless.  One might 
take this as a reminder that the directors' duty of loyalty is not just an arbitrary feature of the corporate 
statutes; it derives from a larger body of law that imposes such fiduciary duties when the situation warrants 
them.  This, in turn, might be a principle to bear in mind when considering whether empowered 
shareholders should have similar duties.
2035
 
 The converse also holds; as with the directors' other responsibilities, they should not be imposed 
upon those who do not possess the corresponding powers.  Thus, in Piikani,
2036
 McIntyre J. found that the 
                                                          
2034
 It is also worth contrasting here Perell J.'s relative lack of explanation or justification for applying 
the prima facie meaning of the provision with the repeated tendency of commentators to assert an opposing 
legislative intent without explanation or justification.  The former derived from the wording of the statute, 
whereas the latter has no clear basis. 
2035
 See also Guinan v. Northwestel Inc., [1997] N.W.T.R. 149, 1997 CarswellNWT 9, 75 A.C.W.S. 
(3d) 651 (N.W.T. S.C. Jan 13, 1997).  Two shareholders alleged that the other shareholders had committed 
acts that, according to the statement of claim, violated duties "arising as a result of Sections 5.09 and 6.05 
of the USA and the Act, to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of NNCL and to 
exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable 
circumstances" (reproduced at par. 5).  When the defendants argued that shareholders did not have such a 
duty under Canadian law (par. 9), the plaintiffs revised their position to allege a common law fiduciary duty 
arising from the specific relationship of the shareholders (par. 11) and they were ordered to so amend their 
statement of claim (18), since the evolving state of fiduciary law meant that such a claim could 
theoretically succeed (par 19).  Since a unanimous shareholder agreement empowered the shareholders in 
some respects (par 4), this could have been an opportunity to consider whether that transferred the directors' 
statutory duties of care and loyalty to shareholders, but the possibility was left unaddressed.  (Breaches of 
obligations in the agreement were alleged, but not of the restrictions upon the directors (par. 5).)  
2036
 Piikani, supra note 234.  Piikani also included consideration of a related issue, whether there 
might be a conflict of interest for directors of the corporation who were also councillors of the Piikani 
Nation, which was the beneficial owner of the company and which received certain powers over it under 
the agreement.  McIntyre J. determined at par. 215 that "[b]y ratifying the Settlement Agreement, the 
Piikani Nation has made it clear that it is in its best interests to allow PIC and the Piikani Trust to function 
and to further the purposes for which they were created.  All Councillors are bound by this.  To the extent 
that this is inconsistent with other interests of the Piikani Nation, the ongoing effectiveness of PIC and the 
Piikani Trust must take priority."  Therefore, there was no irresolvable conflict of interest for councillors 
who were also directors, because their proper course of action was clear (par. 219).  This included 
obligations to the corporation that were not the exercise of powers transferred via the agreement (par. 216).  
These obligations were derived from acceptance of the terms of the agreement, not the result of a transfer 
of directors' duties.  McIntyre J. further stated that "[s]ince PIC, and necessarily its directors as well, must 
take direction from Council on certain matters outlined in Schedule 2 of the Trust Agreement, to the extent 
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shareholder-trustee did not owe fiduciary duties to the corporation, because while limits were imposed 
upon the board, the shareholder-trustee was not given any power to manage or supervise the company,
2037
 
and thus he did not owe a duty to it.
2038
.  McIntyre J. stated explicitly, if with inexact terminology, that 
"[u]nder the CBCA, a shareholder only owes a duty to the corporation if, by virtue of a USA, it steps into 
the shoes of a director".
2039
 
 In a pre-trial motion in Morton v. Asper,
2040
 the defendants sought, inter alia, an order that the 
company's president (one of the plaintiffs) be made to resign or, alternatively, an injunction barring various 
actions without their consent,
2041
 due to alleged violations of fiduciary duties.  The judge found that, 
"[h]ere, since the U.S.A. in effect delegates to the shareholders the responsibilities ordinarily those of 
directors, the shareholders become fiduciaries to each other".
2042
  Since the purpose of this part of the 
motion was to obtain the resignation of the president, the reference to the unanimous shareholder 
agreement is puzzling; his duties arising from his office would suffice to ground such an approach and 
would be more immediately relevant; the fiduciary duty of a president was also specifically referred to.
2043
  
It was also unclear how the powers of the shareholders were relevant to any of the impugned behaviour,
2044
 
unless their mere existence was sufficient to create a wide-ranging duty not to act against the corporate 
interest.  Also arguably incorrect was the reference to investors owing a duty to each other, rather than the 
corporation, although later in the judgment Scott A.C.J.Q.B. more accurately noted that in resolving these 
matters, it was appropriate to look to the interests of the corporation, not just the shareholder who 
complained of the other's violation.
2045
  It was determined that the fiduciary duty question would need to be 
settled at trial, so it was left unresolved.
2046
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
that the director is acting in relation to these matters, no conflict arises" (par. 214).  This did not explicitly 
address whether the Council's directives could be improper in that context, although it did make clear that 
the directors were obliged to follow them, so the two roles of a single individual wouldn't impose 
contradictory obligations; any conflict of interest would occur completely while the individual was in the 
role of "councillor" rather than arising as a result of multiple roles clashing. 
2037
 See discussion in Chapter Three on the status of this document as a unanimous shareholder 
agreement. 
2038
 Piikani. supra note 234, par. 190. 
2039
 Ibid, par. 185. 
2040
 Morton v. Asper, 1988 CarswellMan 229, 55 Man. R. (2d) 61, [1988] M.J. No. 424 (Man. Q.B. 
Sep 15, 1988) (hereinafter "Morton motion"). 
2041
 Ibid, par. 63. 
2042
 Ibid, par. 54. 
2043
 Ibid, par. 60. 
2044
 The shareholders do not appear to have assumed direct management power under the agreement.  
The investors were instead granted specified rights to elect half the directors, their unequal shareholdings 
aside.  The agreement also named corporate officers, which would presumably have satisfied the 
"restricting directors" requirement, although that was not made an issue in the judgment (Morton trial, 
supra note 323, par. 16). 
2045
 Morton motion, supra note 2040, par. 86. 
2046
 Ibid, pars. 81-83.  When the issue was revisited at trial, it was without reference to the idea of 
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 Another case that touched upon the possibility that empowered investors owe a duty of care is the 
trial judgment for Allard c. Myhill.
2047
  In analyzing the former version of the statute (already amended by 
that point, but still applicable to the case at hand), De Michele J.C.Q. determined that it only permitted 
directors' powers to be transferred to shareholders, not specified third parties.
2048
  Following from that, the 
judgment continued that general rules of corporate law would prevent any further delegation: 
 
156 Should it be concluded that directors' rights and powers may not be legally 
transferred to officers by a unanimous shareholder agreement?  Corporate law recognizes 
and applies the maxim delegatus non potest delegare (see Martel and Martel, La 
compagnie au Québec, Vol. 1, Les aspects juridiques, at page 25-1). 
 
157 The CBCA allows shareholders to appropriate certain powers otherwise reserved 
for directors.  However, the application of this maxim implies that shareholders are not 
allowed to delegate these powers to another party in turn. 
 
 The invocation of this particular rule is interesting, as it is not simply a prohibition on delegation 
of responsibilities, but specifically a prohibition against the further delegation of responsibilities that had 
already been delegated.  The logic therefore rests upon the premise that investors empowered through a 
unanimous shareholder agreement have not in so doing removed delegation from the equation; they are the 
holders of delegated powers (from whom might be debatable, but possibly from each other or from 
themselves in another legal capacity) and therefore subject to responsibilities in how they discharge them.  
Insofar as the prohibition against delegation is a part of the directors' duty of care, this is further judicial 
confirmation that some or all aspects of it apply to investors who have been granted power through a 
unanimous shareholder agreement. 
 The question was not directly addressed by Dalphond J.C.A. in the appeal, but the finding there 
that when a shareholder corporation assumed power it would inevitably have to express that power through 
human actors, who would in turn be de facto directors and bear their responsibilities,
2049
 was an implicit 
rejection or limitation of delegatus non potest delegare in this context. 
 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Indalex 
                                                                                                                                                                             
empowered shareholders; they were discussed either in terms of the actions of the president (Morton trial, 
supra note 323, par. 162) or simply in general terms, without reference to position (e.g. Morton trial, supra 
note 323, par. 159). 
2047
 Allard CQ, supra note 1726.  The case dealt with whether officers of a corporation whose sole 
shareholder had assumed control through a unanimous shareholder agreement were liable for unpaid 
wages.  They would be if they were operating as de facto directors.  Whether it would be a violation of the 
shareholder's duty of care to appoint them as such was not directly relevant to the case, so these remarks 
might have been made obiter.  Possibly, if delegation of the transferred powers and liabilities of directors 
were within the empowered shareholders' legal options, that might have helped the argument that the 
powers granted to the individuals in question were those of directors and not officers.  On the facts, it was 
determined at trial that the powers being exercised were those of officers, but this was reversed on appeal. 
2048
 Ibid, pars. 154-155.  See discussion earlier in this chapter. 
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suggested that empowered shareholders do, indeed, owe duties of care and/or loyalty to the corporation, 
albeit without addressing the question head-on.  Late in the sequence of events that gave rise to the 
litigation, the directors of the corporation resigned and a unanimous shareholder agreement
2050
 was created 
that appointed a specific individual to manage the firm.
2051
  The company brought a motion for an 
assignment in bankruptcy shortly thereafter.
2052
 
 A significant issue in Indalex was whether a conflict of interest existed due to the duties the 
corporation had assumed to pension beneficiaries being at odds with its other interests.  The bulk of the 
disputed actions had occurred prior to the aforementioned unanimous shareholder agreement, but the 
assignment in bankruptcy itself was specifically addressed in two of the judgments.  Deschamps J. did not 
mention it explicitly, but it was presumably covered in his general reference to "subsequent 
proceedings"
2053
 that did not, in his view, have a negative impact on the complainants' rights because they 
were predictable, typical, and subject to notice and representation.
2054
 
 Both Cromwell J. and LeBel J., the two who specifically discussed the motion to enter bankruptcy, 
did so in terms of the corporation's possible conflicts of interest between its obligations to the beneficiaries 
and its other corporate interests, i.e. its self-interest.  Normally, of course, self-interest is not a legitimate 
consideration for a fiduciary.  However, Cromwell J. had earlier established that the overall conflict of 
interest actually existed, in his view, at the level of the directors, stating, "As an employer-administrator, 
Indalex acted through its board of directors and so it was that body which owed fiduciary duties to the plan 
members.  The board of directors also owed a fiduciary duty to the company to act in its best interests."
2055
  
The conflict would therefore be one between two competing fiduciary duties, not between a fiduciary duty 
and self-interest.
2056
  Cromwell J. wrote with respect to the motion to enter bankruptcy: 
 
221. It was certainly open to Indalex as an employer to bring a motion to voluntarily 
enter into bankruptcy.  A pension plan administrator has no responsibility or authority in 
relation to that step.  The problem here is not that the motion was brought, but that 
Indalex failed to meaningfully address the conflict between its corporate interests and its 
duties as plan administrator. 
 
 The reference to "Indalex" looking after "its" corporate interests could be understood as an 
imprecise description of Indalex's directors looking after their duty to the corporation, except that at that 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2049
 See discussion earlier in this chapter. 
2050
 Here called a "unanimous shareholders' declaration" due to the single shareholder. 
2051
 Indalex, supra note 1775, par. 17. 
2052
 Ibid, par. 18. 
2053
 Ibid, par. 74.  "Subsequent" being relative to the events of April 8th. 
2054
 Ibid, par. 74. 
2055
 Ibid, par. 194. 
2056
 The distinction between these two conceptions of the situation is significant because the correct 
resolution of a conflict between a fiduciary duty and self-interest is well-established and uncontroversial; 
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point, Indalex no longer had directors.  It had a manager appointed by a unanimous shareholder agreement.  
Therefore, if the judge's reference to Indalex and its corporate interests is understood in the context of his 
earlier remarks about the obligations of the board, the result is that that individual must have had a duty to 
the corporation that was at least loosely similar to that owed by the directors 
 LeBel J. put the issue in similar terms, framing it as a conflict faced by Indalex itself, between its 
duties to the beneficiaries and its corporate self-interest.  Presumably, as with Cromwell J. and Deschamps 
J.,
2057
 the references to the company's self-interest as if it were a legal duty were intended to invoke the 
directors' duties to the corporation, although LeBel J. was not clear on that point.  Assuming that to be the 
case, the analysis of the motion to enter bankruptcy in Lebel J.'s judgment carries similar implications: 
 
274 I must also mention the failed attempt to assign Indalex in bankruptcy once the 
sale of its business had been approved.  One of the purposes of this action was essentially 
to harm the interests of the members of the plans.  At the time, Indalex was still wearing 
its two hats, at least from a legal perspective.  But its duties as a fiduciary were clearly 
not at the forefront of its concerns.  There were constant conflicts of interest throughout 
the process.  Indalex did not attempt to resolve them; it brushed them aside.  In so acting, 
it breached its duties as a fiduciary and its statutory obligations under s. 22(4) PBA. 
  
 One can see from how both Cromwell J. and Lebel J. treated the motion to enter bankruptcy that 
there must have been a presumption on each of their parts that the decision-maker at the time, the manager 
appointed by the unanimous shareholder agreement, was under a duty to the corporation that was at least 
similar to that normally owed by directors, which in turn formed the basis for imprecise references to the 
corporation having a legitimate need to look after its own interests even in the face of its fiduciary 
responsibilities to the beneficiaries.  If the directors' duties had terminated when the unanimous shareholder 
agreement had been made, rather than being transferred, then there would have been no conflict, because 
the only surviving duty would have been that owed to the plan beneficiaries. 
 All three sets of reasons for judgment failed to maintain a rigorous distinction between directors 
and the corporation itself.  Had they done so, they might have found that the board owed a duty to the 
company and it in turn owed a duty to the plan beneficiaries.  With all due respect to the Supreme Court, 
that would have been the correct framing, and one in which there would actually have been no conflict of 
interest at all.  Instead, the three judges conflated the parties and their obligations in various ways,
2058
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the former takes precedence.  The resolution when two fiduciary duties are in conflict is less clear. 
2057
 Deschamps J. at Indalex, supra note 1775, pars. 64, 67, and 73 explicitly wrote that the duties the 
corporation owed to the beneficiaries were in conflict with the duties that the directors owed to the 
corporation to manage it in its best interests. 
2058
 For Deschamps J., a duty owed by the directors somehow conflicted with a duty owed by the 
corporation; for Cromwell J., the duty owed by the corporation to the beneficiary was explicitly transferred 
to the directors, who found it in conflict with their duty to the company, although the judgment was written 
at points as if the opposite had occurred; LeBel J. proceeded as if the corporation had a legal obligation to 
protect its self-interest, which was either a new doctrine or an imprecise way of referring to the directors' 
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which obscured that, by the time of the motion to enter bankruptcy, the directors had been replaced via a 
unanimous shareholder agreement, and any duties that they had been under only continued to exist if they 
had been transferred.  That substitution went unremarked upon by two of the judges, who simply continued 
referring to the corporation itself when alluding to the duties owed by its decision-makers. 
 Whether the Court might have found it significant that the recipient of the board's powers was a 
designated manager, rather than the shareholder, is thus unfortunately unknown.  (Some conceptions of 
directors' duties attribute these responsibilities to their being agents of the shareholders, and a designated 
manager would be in an analogous relationship.
2059
)  On the one hand, no attention was drawn to this 
factor.  On the other, the general lack in all three sets of reasons for judgment of a clear distinction between 
directors' duties to the corporation and the corporation's own self-interest makes Indalex a poor basis upon 
which to draw any conclusions about those responsibilities.  There was no indication that either Cromwell 
J. or LeBel J. put any consideration toward the existence of a unanimous shareholder agreement at the time 
of the motion to enter bankruptcy, let alone its implications.  That said, their mutual assumptions imply 
continuing duties on the part of the corporate decision-maker to protect the company's best interests, ones 
that survived the unanimous shareholder agreement and its transfer of power, to form the basis of their 
references to the corporation's self-interest. 
 Regardless of commentators' trepidation, what little reported case law exists seems 
overwhelmingly to support the view that shareholders who assume power face the same duties of care and 
loyalty to the corporation as directors normally do.  Four cases discussed above explicitly confirm this, and 
the Supreme Court decision in Indalex, while more indirect, suggests further support. 
 
4.(d) Conclusion on the Duties of Care and Loyalty Generally 
 
 According to the wording of the statute, shareholders who assume the powers of directors under 
the C.B.C.A. also assume all of their duties and liabilities, with the sole exception of the recent allowance 
for fettering discretion.  The case law indicates that this should be taken literally to include the duties of 
care and loyalty, but commentators have suggested that this may be inappropriate.  As a prescriptive matter, 
should these responsibilities pass to empowered shareholders?  In the final section of this chapter, the full 
implications of this question with regard to the "stakeholder" component that has recently been attached to 
directors' duties will be considered.  Before that, it is worth examining the issue in the context of the 
shareholder primacy
2060
 approach that underlay the commentary discussed above and that continues to have 
                                                                                                                                                                             
duties to it. 
2059
 Recent Supreme Court rulings have clarified that this is not a correct understanding of the current 
state of corporate law in Canda.  See the discussion later in this chapter. 
2060
 See note 1674. 
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a significant impact upon corporate law.
2061
  In a shareholder primacy model, is it desirable for investors 
who have taken power to assume the directors' normal duties to the corporation?  Such a framework 
assumes that the purpose of those responsibilities is actually to serve the interests of the shareholders, so 
one argument against imposing them is that it would be a duty which they owe to themselves, and thus 
redundant.  This ignores the key point that unanimous shareholder agreements only require unanimity at 
the time they are entered into.  If the agreement transfers authority to shareholders,
2062
 then at the time 
power is actually exercised, unanimity may no longer be present.
2063
  Shareholders could therefore find that 
the corporation in which they have invested is subject to the decision-making of others and that their own 
ability to control the company is limited.
2064
  While the oppression remedy is one method whereby they can 
hold each other accountable, the directors' duties could also help fulfill this function.
2065
  It is self-evidently 
in the interests of any given shareholder for the other shareholders to be bound by duties of care and 
loyalty, or else the corporation runs the risk of having its crucial choices made in an incompetent or 
disloyal manner.  The trade-off for this is that the investors would also allow themselves be bound.
2066
 
 The full duties of care and loyalty normally borne by directors should apply to empowered 
shareholders.  The explanation for retaining the duty of loyalty will be addressed first, followed by the duty 
of care, and then the question of whether the duties could be waived by consent will be considered. 
 Removing the duty of loyalty eliminates one of the primary barriers to exploitation of the 
corporation by some of its decision-making shareholders at the expense of others.
2067
  Is allowing that in the 
best interest of shareholders?  Only if they personally come out ahead, exploiting more value than is lost 
due to the exploitation of others. 
 The best case scenario would be that such exploitation reallocates value among shareholders 
without reducing the overall value available to them collectively.  In other words, they would be fighting 
for larger slices of the pie without shrinking its total size.  In that case, the presence or absence of a duty of 
loyalty would make no difference to the shareholders collectively, but would affect them individually.  
                                                          
2061
 See note 2166. 
2062
 Restrictions that do not transfer powers were covered in the previous subsection. 
2063
 An agreement may require unanimity before some corporate action is taken, but that does nothing 
to solve the problem that dissent may exist; it simply alters the necessary victory conditions for each side, 
perhaps allowing a minority to veto the desire of the majority. 
2064
 Unless the corporation has only one shareholder. 
2065
 This assumes that the oppression remedy cannot be removed by a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, or at least that it has not been.  See note 1207. 
2066
 With regard to the duty of loyalty, Flannigan's "limited access" model of fiduciary duty only 
applies if it can be established that shareholders (here assumed for the sake of argument to be the 
beneficiaries) should grant each other power for such limited purposes, rather than agreeing to open and 
self-interested access.  See generally Robert Flannigan, "Fiduciary Duties of Shareholders and Directors" 
[2004] J.B.L. 277. 
2067
 The oppression remedy remains in place.  However, it is not a perfect substitute for the duty of 
loyalty.  Some of the differences between them were discussed in Chapter Four, albeit in another context. 
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Removing it would benefit those who had both the desire and the ability
2068
 to exploit the corporation 
(more than others) and harm those who did not.  As between these two groups, the role of the law has 
traditionally been to protect those vulnerable to exploitation from those who would exploit them, not to 
ensure that the latter are free from fear of punishment. 
 The alternative scenario
2069
 would be that widespread exploitation weakens the corporate entity to 
the point where its activities are compromised, harming all shareholders collectively
2070
 through a loss of 
profit-generation.  Individuals might still be able to exploit sufficiently to achieve a net personal benefit, 
but the logic for retaining a duty of loyalty is even stronger in such a case. 
 This does not mean that there can be no corporate activity that benefits an investor personally once 
a unanimous shareholder agreement is in place.  The corporation would still be able to, for example, enter 
into a contract with a company controlled by one of its shareholders.  But such arrangements would be 
subject to the same approval process as they normally are when the personal interests of a director are 
implicated in a decision, as set out in s. 120 of the C.B.C.A.; generally speaking, the shareholder must 
disclose the conflict and refrain from voting on the matter.  That would prevent shareholders from abusing 
their power for individual gain, while allowing for fair transactions in which they had an additional stake. 
 The Act also contains a section allowing, under certain conditions, for shareholder approval or 
confirmation of contracts in which directors have material interests;
2071
 it could similarly be used when 
empowered investors have the same.  Disney was critical of a two-step process, shareholders first voting on 
matters using the powers they acquired from the directors and then ratifying their own decisions.  While 
there is a certain artificiality to that procedure, it does not seem unreasonable to allow for the criteria 
outlined in s. 120(7.1) to serve as a second standard for votes on matters in which some shareholders have 
an interest; if the vote met the criteria set therein, it should be binding, without the need for a two-step 
                                                          
2068
 Majority shareholders would have an advantage, but not necessarily a definitive one. 
2069
 I would suggest that there is no plausible scenario in which allowing for exploitation of the 
corporation by empowered shareholders would strengthen it overall. 
2070
 Although, if the exploitation is particularly bad, only some shareholders might still be in a position 
to benefit from corporate profitability. 
2071
 C.B.C.A. s. 120(7.1):  Even if the conditions of subsection (7) are not met, a director or officer, 
acting honestly and in good faith, is not accountable to the corporation or to its shareholders for any profit 
realized from a contract or transaction for which disclosure is required under subsection (1), and the 
contract or transaction is not invalid by reason only of the interest of the director or officer in the contract 
or transaction, if (a) the contract or transaction is approved or confirmed by special resolution at a meeting 
of the shareholders; (b) disclosure of the interest was made to the shareholders in a manner sufficient to 
indicate its nature before the contract or transaction was approved or confirmed; and (c) the contract or 
transaction was reasonable and fair to the corporation when it was approved or confirmed. 
 
The provincial provisions allowing for shareholder approval of transactions in which the directors have a 
conflict of interest contain some variation.  See A.B.C.A. s. 120(8) and s. 120(8.1), M.C.A. s. 115(5) and s. 
115(7), N.L.C.A. s. 200, N.B.B.C.A. s. 77(7) and s. 77(9), N.T.B.C.A. s. 121(8), N.B.C.A. s. 121(8), O.B.C.A. 
s. 132(8), Q.B.C.A. s. 129 and s. 133, S.B.C.A. s. 115(7) and s. 115(8.1), and Y.B.C.A. s. 122(7). 
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process.
2072
  This approach could supersede the obligation shareholders would otherwise inherit from 
directors to refrain from voting if they faced a conflict.
2073
  This allows for additional flexibility and could, 
in particular, be useful for decisions in which all shareholders had some sort of personal interest. 
 A final possibility is that investors might wish to use a unanimous shareholder agreement to cause 
the corporation to enter into transactions that are not reasonable and fair in the legal sense.  For example, 
part of their deal might be that one of them would receive external contracts at rates far above the 
commercial norm.
2074
  It is best to explicitly cover those matters in the agreement as pre-made decisions, 
which would both ensure that all shareholders found the terms acceptable and thus avoid anyone being 
taken advantage of
2075
 and would remove these arrangements from the powers (and thus decision-making) 
to which the duty of loyalty and other statutory requirements applied.  Removing that duty in its entirety is 
overbroad for those purposes.  It could easily lead to unintended exploitation happening alongside whatever 
was anticipated, or for the anticipated exploitation to spiral beyond what was foreseen. 
 Whether it is in the investors' own interest to retain the duty of care when they assume power 
lends itself to a similar analysis.  Once again, it benefits any individual shareholder if the other 
shareholders discharge their duty of care by making decisions in a minimally competent manner, and this 
can be weighed against the disadvantage to those same shareholders of finding themselves subject to that 
duty.  Given the traditionally very low bar for the duty of care, it is easier to justify allowing them to hold 
each other even slightly accountable than to free them of any responsibility whatsoever.  The primary 
interest which the law has traditionally recognized shareholders as having in the corporation is its 
profitability.  Retaining the duty of care would align with that expectation, while dispensing with it would 
allow for extremely incompetent behaviour on the part of decision-makers that could harm the corporation's 
ability to function at even a minimum level of efficiency. 
 This obligation does have some key differences from the duty of loyalty that further strengthen the 
argument.  The first is that failing to meet it does not directly transfer value from the corporation to the 
offending shareholder;
2076
 there is, in other words, no direct benefit to one who fails to satisfy that 
responsibility.
2077
  Since a failure to meet this duty would not give rise to an action if it did not cause a 
harm, the inevitable conclusion is that a shareholder who has failed to meet the duty of care in an 
                                                          
2072
 The votes might also have to be re-counted, since shareholders qua shareholders have their votes 
counted by share, while empowered shareholders might have their votes counted some other way, such as 
by shareholder, depending upon the terms of their agreement. 
2073
 C.B.C.A. s. 120(5). 
2074
 Either as an act of goodwill or as part of some network of quid pro quo arrangements worked out 
between the shareholders (and possibly the corporation) that would prove difficult to justify in court as 
valid consideration for the increased rates. 
2075
 Assuming that consent prevents exploitation. 
2076
 If it did, it would be a violation of the duty of loyalty instead. 
2077
 That said, shareholders who shirk their duty of care obtain at least notional value from the effort 
they saved, and possibly actual value if they redirected that energy to some other profitable pursuit. 
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actionable sense has caused the company some measure of harm.  Since the losses of the corporation 
caused by a failure to meet the duty of care are not received by any shareholder, they are net losses of the 
shareholders collectively.  The duty can therefore be said to serve investors, even when it is they 
themselves who are making the decisions, because it provides additional incentive to put at least minimal 
effort into safeguarding their collective interests, in case their personal stake was not motivation enough.
2078
  
Alternatively, it provides a reason to decline authority if they do not believe they will be able to discharge it 
with at least some skill and diligence; again, this likely serves shareholders well, by avoiding incompetent 
management of the company in which they have invested. 
 Because whoever fails to meet the duty of care shares proportionally in that loss, with no 
accompanying benefit, they have already harmed not just the investors collectively, but their own interests 
as well, before any issue of liability arises.  If the duty of care functions well, even those who would have 
shirked in its absence may benefit from their own efforts to comply. 
 It might be argued that the unanimous shareholder agreement should nonetheless allow investors 
to agree to waive these duties.  Currently, the C.B.C.A. does not permit this.  The logic behind such a 
suggestion is that the freedom of shareholders to make their own arrangements should trump any attempt to 
enforce predetermined rules upon them, no matter how logical and justifiable those predetermined rules 
might be.  This is the variant of the "nexus of contracts" theory where to the greatest extent possible, rules 
should be defaults and not mandatory.  It might be beneficial to the shareholders to allow for specific 
exceptions to the duty of loyalty or duty of care to be agreed upon through this method.  These would 
receive the consent of all the other investors, who could both price the concessions and take appropriate 
steps to limit or counteract the harm they might cause.  It is doubtful, however, whether a shareholder can 
meaningfully consent to unknown, unlimited self-interested or incompetent behaviour by others who 
control the corporation in which they have invested.
2079
  Obviously, I would recommend that they not enter 
such arrangements voluntarily, and at the risk of paternalism, the law should step in to prevent this. 
 The duties of care and loyalty therefore continue to serve a function when shareholders assume 
direct control over a corporation, even if one believes that the sole purpose of those responsibilities is to 
serve the interests of the investors themselves.  Because the shareholders are not a unified group, they have 
a need to hold each other accountable for the decisions they are now in a position to make; the duties of 
care and loyalty continue to serve that function.  These benefits outweigh the drawback of that same 
accountability.  And, as discussed in the next section, shareholders may not be the only beneficiaries. 
 
                                                          
2078
 There is the danger of economic inefficiency here, if the value of the collective interest is less than 
the total cost of all shareholders individually meeting the requirements of the duty of care. 
2079
 The oppression remedy might still offer them some protection, but it is not a perfect substitute, 
particularly if the very fact that they have waived these duties is taken into account as part of their 
reasonable expectations. 
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5. Stakeholder Theory and the Duties of Care and Loyalty 
 
 The analysis up to this point of the duties of care and loyalty has assumed that they were an 
internal corporate matter, meant to protect shareholders rather than wider societal interests.  It was for that 
reason that they were treated separately from the other responsibilities which directors possess, because if 
the only goals they served were those of the investors themselves, then it was at least possible that they 
need not bind empowered shareholders, although that argument was rejected.  But if the duties of care and 
loyalty serve wider societal purposes too, such a distinction does not exist; there is no basis for not having 
them accompany the powers of directors, no matter who holds them.  Recent developments in the law have 
indicated that the duties of care and loyalty may be defined in just such a fashion, thanks to stakeholder 
theory. 
 The view that the interests of the corporation are synonymous with shareholder profit-
maximization has been challenged in recent years by stakeholder theory, an approach whose basic tenet is 
that there are groups other than shareholders who each have a "stake" (i.e. the capacity to be either helped 
or hurt) in corporate decisions and that this interest should receive some form of legal recognition.
2080
  It is 
impossible to define the larger theory much more precisely than that; which groups should qualify as 
"stakeholders" in this sense, which of their interests should receive legal recognition, and what form that 
recognition should take are far from settled questions even amongst supporters of stakeholder-centred 
reform.  But it is possible to be more precise when dealing with its influence on recent Supreme Court of 
Canada decisions and thus its role in contemporary Canadian corporate law.  Three judgments within the 
past decade have made clear that the duties of care and loyalty which directors must meet are not framed 
solely in terms of the interests and desires of shareholders, but instead include other stakeholder groups.  In 
the next subsection, those three cases are examined in depth. 
 Although this theory is now a part of the directors' duties, there are a variety of different ways that 
it can be integrated, including permitting but not mandating consideration of stakeholder interests, having 
an enforceable obligation to stakeholders, creating a duty to stakeholders but not granting them standing to 
enforce it, and subsuming the obligation to meet statutory requirements into the directors' duties to the 
corporation.  Each of these, and the ways in which they would interact with unanimous shareholder 
agreements, are considered in turn, with the conclusion that they are all problematic. 
 This leads to a wider theoretical discussion of stakeholder theory and the unanimous shareholder 
agreement, two elements of corporate law that proceed from different basic premises, whose co-existence is 
uneasy at best.  But the dilemma this poses is not unique to the implications of this statutory tool; the 
unanimous shareholder agreement is simply the most obvious manifestation of the shareholder primacy 
                                                          
2080
 Although some definitions of "stakeholders", including this one, include shareholders, for 
convenience the term "stakeholders" in the following discussion will sometimes be used to refer to other 
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model of the corporation that underlies much of our law. 
 
5.(a) Stakeholder Theory in the Supreme Court 
 
 To understand the importance of the stakeholder model in the Canadian context, one should begin 
with three judgments of our Supreme Court: Peoples, BCE, and Indalex.  It was these decisions that not 
only established stakeholder theory as having a role in our nation's corporate law, but specifically 
confirmed that the duties of care and loyalty were obligations owed to the corporation, not the shareholders.  
However, the protection they actually granted to stakeholders was limited at best. 
 The first of them, Peoples v. Wise,
2081
 established that when directors were determining the "best 
interests of the corporation" in the context of their duty of loyalty,
2082
 they were permitted, but not required, 
to look to interests other than maximizing shareholder value: 
 
We accept as an accurate statement of law that in determining whether they are acting 
with a view to the best interests of the corporation it may be legitimate, given all the 
circumstances of a given case, for the board of directors to consider, inter alia, the 
interests of shareholders, employees, suppliers, creditors, consumers, governments and 
the environment.
2083
   
 
 The court made clear that the best interests of the corporation were not synonymous with the 
interest of any single group of stakeholders, implicitly including shareholders.
2084
  Unfortunately, little 
guidance was given as to how directors should deal with situations where the interests of various 
stakeholder groups were opposed: 
 
In resolving these competing interests, it is incumbent upon the directors to act honestly 
and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation.  In using their skills 
for the benefit of the corporation when it is in troubled waters financially, the directors 
must be careful to attempt to act in its best interests by creating a "better" corporation, 
and not to favour the interests of any one group of stakeholders.  If the stakeholders 
cannot avail themselves of the statutory fiduciary duty (the duty of loyalty, supra) to sue 
the directors for failing to take care of their interests, they have other means at their 
disposal.
2085
 
 
 This instruction that the board should not favour any group's interests but should instead work to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
stakeholder groups, in contrast to shareholders. 
2081
 Peoples, supra note 809. 
2082
 Called by the Court their "statutory fiduciary duty" (Peoples, supra note 809, par. 32). 
2083
 Peoples, supra note 809, par. 42.  A slight variation of this list appears in BCE as "inter alia, 
shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment" (BCE, supra note 1143, 
par. 40). 
2084
 Peoples, supra note 809, par. 43. 
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create a "better" corporation is simply rephrasing the question.  What is a "better" corporation?  What 
factors go into determining that?
2086
  From the stakeholder perspective, then, this first half of the Peoples 
analysis is only a half-measure.  It confirms that directors who, in a given situation, take a course of action 
that is (relatively) favourable to one stakeholder group but perhaps (relatively) unfavourable to another, 
including the shareholders, are not in so doing placing the interests of a third party ahead of the 
corporation, which would be a violation of the duty of loyalty.
2087
  On the other hand, there is no particular 
obligation to safeguard the interests of any given group, merely permission to do so. 
 The next stage of Peoples turned to the duty of care, which was a similarly mixed bag for both 
sides of the stakeholder debate.  Major and Deschamps JJ. found that, based on the wording of the 
C.B.C.A., the duty of loyalty was specifically owed to the corporation, but the duty of care was a general 
one for which the list of potential beneficiaries "is much more open-ended, and it appears obvious that it 
must include creditors".
2088
  While the Court went no further explicitly, the logic certainly leaves open the 
possibility that other stakeholders might also be the beneficiaries of this duty.
2089
 
 Obstacles remain.  First, notwithstanding that Major and Deschamps JJ. found that, on the 
wording of the C.B.C.A., the duty of care is owed to a potentially wide-ranging list of beneficiaries, those 
groups do not have standing under the Act to bring a suit against the directors.  In Quebec, they can ground 
such standing in the C.C.Q.;
2090
 possibly some other provincial laws might have similar effect, but failing 
that, the Supreme Court has for the rest of the country seemingly recognized a duty that cannot be enforced.  
Second, even when it can be, the business judgment rule remains in effect,
2091
 realistically blocking almost 
any possibility that directors would actually be found liable. 
 In Peoples, the Supreme Court imported stakeholder theory into the directors' duties in three 
different ways: as a permitted but not mandatory element of the duty of loyalty, as a (technically) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2085
 Ibid, par. 47. 
2086
 Darcy L. MacPherson, "The Supreme Court Restates Directors' Fiduciary Duty- A Comment on 
Peoples Department Stores v. Wise" (2005) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 383, at p. 402 noted that Peoples contains "no 
meaningful guidance to allow directors to structure their decision making". 
2087
 See Peoples, supra note 809, par. 36, which invoked the idea of placing someone's interests ahead 
of the beneficiaries as a violation of the duty of loyalty; the relevance to the later analysis was not explicit, 
but would seem to be the logical reason why any of this was part of the duty of loyalty discussion. 
2088
 Ibid, par. 57. 
2089
 Jeffrey G. MacIntosh, "BCE and the Peoples' Corporate Law: Learning to Live on Quicksand" 
(2009) 48 Can. Bus. L.J. 255, at pp. 267-268 criticized this position for being in conflict with the history of 
the duty of care and the legislative intent, but he also interpreted it as meaning that the corporation itself 
was not the beneficiary of the duty, and thus could not bring suit to enforce it, leaving it unenforceable.  
While the decision was not totally without precedent, its interpretation of the duty of care was undoubtedly 
a shift in direction for Canadian law, but it nonetheless seems clear that the Supreme Court still intended 
for the corporation itself to be among the beneficiaries of the duty, and for it, at least, to always have 
standing to enforce it. 
2090
 Peoples, supra note 809, pars. 54-56. 
2091
 Ibid, par. 64. 
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enforceable part of the duty of care within Quebec, and as a part of the duty of care outside Quebec for 
which otherwise-potential claimants lack the standing to bring a suit.  In their next case to deal with the 
issue, they further complicated this model. 
 In BCE, the claim was not for breach of the duty of loyalty or care per se, but the analysis of the 
oppression remedy involved an examination of what those duties entailed.
2092
  The Supreme Court found 
that the duty of loyalty included a "fair treatment" component for stakeholders.
2093
  For applicable groups 
such as creditors, this in turn formed part of the reasonable expectations that ground the oppression 
remedy.
2094
  The Court restated the conclusions of Peoples:  
 
37 The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation originated in the common 
law.  It is a duty to act in the best interests of the corporation.  Often the interests of 
shareholders and stakeholders are co-extensive with the interests of the corporation.  But 
if they conflict, the directors' duty is clear - it is to the corporation:  Peoples Department 
Stores. 
 
38 The fiduciary duty of the directors to the corporation is a broad, contextual 
concept.  It is not confined to short-term profit or share value.  Where the corporation is 
an ongoing concern, it looks to the long-term interests of the corporation.  The content of 
this duty varies with the situation at hand.  At a minimum, it requires the directors to 
ensure that the corporation meets its statutory obligations.  But, depending on the context, 
there may also be other requirements.  In any event, the fiduciary duty owed by directors 
is mandatory; directors must look to what is in the best interests of the corporation. 
 
39 In Peoples Department Stores, this Court found that although directors must 
consider the best interests of the corporation, it may also be appropriate, although not 
mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or particular 
groups of stakeholders. 
 
 There is some elaboration here as to what constitutes the best interests of the corporation that 
                                                          
2092
 J. Anthony Vanduzer, "BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders: The Supreme Court's Hits and Misses in 
its Most Important Corporate Law Decision Since Peoples" (2010-2011) 43 U.B.C.L. Rev. 205, at p. 212, 
set out the following succinct summary of how the Supreme Court of Canada related the two areas (with 
which I agree): "[T}he Court confirmed that the oppression remedy is intended to protect reasonable 
expectations of shareholders and it is reasonable to expect compliance with the fiduciary duty."  Vanduzer 
elaborated at pp. 230-234.  MacIntosh, supra note 2089, pp. 261-264, was critical of the Supreme Court's 
combination of the duty of loyalty with the oppression remedy, but his understanding of exactly what 
occurred differed from the above, involving a greater and more bilateral conflation. 
2093
 BCE, supra note 1143, par. 36.  Vanduzer, supra note 2092, p. 213 fn 25, noted that while this 
discussion of "fairness" occurred in the context of the oppression remedy, the Court described it as a 
component of the duty of loyalty.  MacIntosh, supra note 2089, p. 264 noted that a fairness element 
required a determination beyond what the "best interests" of the corporation itself was, because it required 
weighing the treatment of shareholders.  The inclusion of such a factor within the duty of loyalty is 
puzzling, given that this obligation is designed to prevent self-interest.  One explanation could be that 
directors must not benefit themselves at the expense of any other stakeholders, even when shareholder 
interests were unaffected; this would fall under the umbrella of restraining self-interest, the subject of this 
responsibility.   
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underlie the duty of loyalty,
2095
 but the reference to statutory obligations as their minimum core is 
potentially problematic, depending upon how the passage is interpreted.  If the Court was intending to 
impose upon directors what their wording literally describes, an obligation to ensure that the corporation 
meets its statutory requirements, then that would have been more appropriately classified as part of the duty 
of care, which imposes actual standards of competence.  The duty of loyalty, instead, per Peoples and the 
overall history of the fiduciary duty from which it derives,
2096
 is designed to prevent directors from placing 
other interests- primarily, but not exclusively, their own- before those of the corporation.  It is possible to 
harmonize the two concepts, however, if one interprets BCE to mean that directors who cause their 
corporation to adhere to statutory requirements even when doing so would harm other corporate interests 
and/or stakeholders are not thereby placing a third party before the corporation, i.e. are not in violation of 
the duty of loyalty.  Alternatively, and more strongly, the passage could be read to mean that when 
statutory compliance is involved, the best interests of the corporation are defined as being said compliance, 
and placing any other considerations ahead of that would therefore be a violation of the duty of loyalty, 
even if the result would otherwise have been within the company's interests. 
 The Court also found that: 
 
66 The fact that the conduct of the directors is often at the centre of oppression 
actions might seem to suggest that directors are under a direct duty to individual 
stakeholders who may be affected by a corporate decision.  Directors, acting in the best 
interests of the corporation, may be obliged to consider the impact of their decisions on 
corporate stakeholders, such as the debentureholders in these appeals.  This is what we 
mean when we speak of a director being required to act in the best interests of the 
corporation viewed as a good corporate citizen.  However, the directors owe a fiduciary 
duty to the corporation, and only to the corporation.  People sometimes speak in terms of 
directors owing a duty to both the corporation and to stakeholders.  Usually this is 
harmless, since the reasonable expectations of the stakeholder in a particular outcome 
often coincide with what is in the best interests of the corporation.  However, cases (such 
as these appeals) may arise where these interests do not coincide.  In such cases, it is 
important to be clear that the directors owe their duty to the corporation, not to 
stakeholders, and that the reasonable expectation of stakeholders is simply that the 
directors act in the best interests of the corporation. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2094
 BCE, supra note 1143, par. 36. 
2095
 This and other passages in BCE have oft been criticized for their vagueness regarding exactly what 
the interests of the corporation are and how the interests of stakeholders should be balanced.  See e.g. 
Poonam Puri, "The Future of Stakeholder Interests in Corporate Governance" (2009) 48 Can. Bus. L.J. 427, 
at pp. 431-432; MacIntosh, supra note 2089, p. 256; Vanduzer, supra note 2092, pp. 236-237.  Mohammed 
Fadel, "BCE and the Long Shadow of American Corporate Law" (2009) 48 Can. Bus. L.J. 190, at pp. 201-
204 offered a different critique; he considered the Court's conclusion against the debentureholders to be at 
odds with the standards it was allegedly following, with the implication that it was actually more 
sympathetic to an American-influenced shareholder primacy in the context of takeovers, but was 
nonetheless contrained to pay lip service to the principles it set forth in Peoples. 
2096
  See Flannigan, supra note 1891, pp. 366-373.  As discussed at note 1891, Flannigan was critical 
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 Amidst the restatement of the distinction between the interests of any group of stakeholders and 
those of the corporation, the Court made the point that the duty may include an obligation to "consider the 
impact of their decisions on corporate stakeholders".  As in Peoples, this was framed permissively, rather 
than obligatorily.
2097
  However, as part of the oppression remedy analysis- one heavily tied to the duty of 
loyalty- it was found that "[t]he evidence, objectively viewed, supports a reasonable expectation that the 
directors would consider the position of the debentureholders in making their decisions on the various 
offers under consideration".
2098
  This must be understood in the context of this particular decision; the 
Supreme Court does not appear to have sought to translate either the oppression remedy or the duty of 
loyalty (or care) into a general requirement to consider creditor interests.  It instead found that, on the facts 
of this case, certain non-binding assurances by the directors had led to a reasonable expectation on the part 
of the creditors that their interests would be protected.
2099
  This was entitled to some legal recognition.  The 
Court chose to limit that recognition to a duty to consider the creditors' interests, but not a duty to protect 
them.
2100
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of aspects of the analysis in Peoples. 
2097
 Edward Iacobucci, "Indeterminacy and the Canadian Supreme Court's Approach to Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties" (2009) 48 Can. Bus. L.J. 232, at pp. 234-236 criticized the duty as described in the above 
passage on the basis that the corporation itself had no interests, only the various stakeholders.  He rejected, 
at p. 237, the view that the Court meant by the corporation the aggregate of all stakeholders, because while 
he found that a coherent position, it was not a plausible interpretation of the judgment.  Although the 
Supreme Court took pains to disequate the interests of the corporation from those of any given stakeholder 
group, the judgment was equally clear that the two were related.  While Iacobucci is correct that it is 
difficult to read BCE as defining the best interests of the corporation as those of the stakeholders in the 
aggregate, it seems plausible that the former term refers to some ever-shifting (and thus admittedly 
indeterminate) mix of stakeholder interests that, at any given moment, stand in for the corporation's. 
2098
 BCE, supra note 1143, par. 102. 
2099
 The judgment did not suggest that the representations that gave rise to this obligation were 
themselves promises to consider creditor interests; they appear to have been non-binding statements that 
the corporation would protect creditor interests within certain unspecified limits.  They were described as a 
statement of "commitment to retaining investment grade ratings [...] accompanied by warnings, repeated in 
the prospectuses pursuant to which the debentures were issued, that negated any expectation that this policy 
would be maintained indefinitely" (BCE, supra note 1143, par. 25).  That the Court would translate this 
into an obligation to consider suggests that such a duty is legally different in degree rather than kind from 
an obligation to act.  It could be a general response to scenarios where the relationship between a 
corporation and its creditors (and possibly other stakeholders, although at present not via the oppression 
remedy) is such that the interests involved are entitled to some legal recognition but not full enforcement, 
even if the idea of "considering" the interests was never discussed by the parties.  It remains as yet 
unknown whether BCE represents a relatively unique situation or whether it will set a pattern for 
widespread future findings that stakeholders had a sufficient relationship with the corporation that they 
were owed a duty of consideration but nothing more. 
2100
 The reason the Supreme Court did not extend the obligation in BCE beyond a duty to consider was 
also partly based on the facts of the case, those being "that there is no evidence that it was reasonable to 
suppose it [a deal that protected the creditors' interests while also profiting the shareholders] could have 
been achieved" (BCE, supra note 1143, par. 106).  If there had been such evidence, a greater duty might 
have existed (or, depending on how one frames it, the same duty might have had a different standard): one 
where the actual results achieved would be scrutinized.  This will be discussed in the next subsection. 
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 Most recently, in Indalex Ltd., Re, the Court was split into three judgments.  Those of both 
Deschamps J. and Cromwell J. confirmed that the duty of directors was to make management decisions in 
the best interests of the corporation,
2101
 while the dissent of LeBel J. referred more vaguely to "business 
obligations",
2102
 "corporate duties",
2103
 and similar language, without explicitly confirming the content of 
those duties or their beneficiaries, beyond that they were in conflict with obligations owed as pension 
administrator.  Cromwell J. restated the Peoples position that the directors' duty to the corporation is 
permissive of, but does not require, consideration of the interests of various stakeholder groups: 
 
194 This was the case for Indalex.  As an employer-administrator, Indalex acted 
through its board of directors and so it was that body which owed fiduciary duties to the 
plan members.  The board of directors also owed a fiduciary duty to the company to act 
in its best interests: Canada Business Corporations Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44, s. 
122(1)(a); BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 560, at 
para. 36.  In deciding what is in the best interests of the corporation, a board may look to 
the interests of shareholders, employees, creditors and others.  But where those interests 
are not aligned or may conflict, it is for the directors, acting lawfully and through the 
exercise of business judgment, to decide what is in the overall best interests of the 
corporation.  Thus, the board of Indalex, as an employer-administrator, could not always 
act exclusively in the interests of the plan beneficiaries; it also owed duties to Indalex as a 
corporation.   
 
 Because the company was in the midst of insolvency, the discussion of its interests directly 
invoked stakeholder groups other than shareholders.  All three sets of reasons for judgment were clear that 
there was, on some level, a conflict of interest between the plan beneficiaries and the corporation's other 
interests; given the facts, those cannot have been limited to shareholder value maximization.  Cromwell J. 
noted that the directors had not created a conflict between their duty to the plan beneficiaries and their duty 
to the corporation "when protective action was taken for the purpose of preserving the status quo for the 
benefit of all stakeholders",
2104
 and Deschamps J. referred to the board's decision to take action to avoid "a 
creditor start[ing] bankruptcy proceedings and in so doing jeopardiz[ing] ongoing operations and jobs".
2105
  
In both those passages, the directors were described as considering groups other than shareholders in 
determinations of the company's interests.
2106
 
 The stakeholder theory of the corporation has sometimes been referred to as "multi-fiduciary".
2107
  
                                                          
2101
 For example, at Indalex, supra note 1775, par. 67 and par. 194, respectively. 
2102
 Indalex, supra note 1775, par. 269. 
2103
 Ibid, par. 271. 
2104
 Ibid, par. 206. 
2105
 Ibid, par. 70. 
2106
 There are a number of other references in the judgment to stakeholder interests, but they are in the 
context of the goal of the legal proceedings being the protection of stakeholder interests, not the 
beneficiaries of the directors' duties. 
2107
 Joseph William Singer, "Jobs and Justice: Rethinking the Stakeholder Debate" (1993) 43 U. 
Toronto. L.J. 475, at p. 505 did not use that term but discussed the concept of directors owing fiduciary 
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Indalex illustrates why this terminology is not an accurate representation of current Canadian law, and 
moreover, why it would not be a viable development.  All three judgments held that due to the company's 
position as pension administrator, fiduciary duties were owed to the plan beneficiaries, and these created a 
conflict of interest with the normal obligations of corporate law, although the scope of that conflict was the 
subject of disagreement.
2108
  They also all agreed that when a conflict between two different duties of this 
nature arose, the correct solution was not to attempt to balance the interests, but to take steps to remove the 
conflict, such as transferring some responsibilities to another party.
2109
  Peoples, BCE, and Indalex are all 
unequivocal that the directors' duty of loyalty is owed to the corporation and only to the corporation, but 
that in determining the interests of the company, stakeholders might be taken into account.  While it might 
be possible to strengthen that protection, it must be done in a manner that avoids the sorts of conflict of 
interest that occurred in Indalex. 
 These three cases have made it clear that the duty of loyalty cannot be equated to an obligation to 
advance shareholders' interests alone.  Directors have the discretion to consider other stakeholder groups, 
but such consideration is not mandatory, merely permitted; the language in Peoples, BCE, and Indalex is 
consistent that directors "may" do so, not that they must.  That is relatively straightforward, if problematic, 
but it is not the whole picture.  Peoples went further with the duty of care, ruling that its beneficiaries are 
open ended and include stakeholders; the duty cannot be enforced, however, except in jurisdictions that 
specifically grant standing.  BCE subsequently added some complications of its own, placing within the 
duty of loyalty an obligation to obey statutes.  The following subsections will examine the practical 
difficulties of these four approaches, after which, the general conflict between the stakeholder theory of the 
corporation and the presumptions inherent in the unanimous shareholder agreement will be examined. 
 
5.(b) Permission to Consider Stakeholder Interests 
 
 All three decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada are clear that the duty of loyalty is owed to the 
corporation, not to any given stakeholder group, not even to shareholders.  Furthermore, they are consistent 
that the directors may look to any stakeholder(s) in determining the corporate interest, but there is no 
requirement that they consider the interests of any group, let alone safeguard them.
2110
  This can be labelled 
                                                                                                                                                                             
duties to multiple stakeholder groups.  Marleen A. O'Connor, "Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of 
Contracts: Recognizing A Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers" (1990-1991) 69 N.C.L. Rev. 
1189, at p. 1251 referred to these as "dual or conflicting fiduciary duties", classifying the directors' duty to 
majority and minority shareholders as an example (this is not the Canadian position) and noting that while 
generally forbidden, such conflicts are acceptable in agency law if both principals agree. 
2108
 Indalex, supra note 1775,  pars. 61-75, 184-222, 267-276. 
2109
 Ibid, pars. 66, 218, 272. 
2110
 MacIntosh, supra note 2089, p. 259, expressed confusion as to whether BCE generally presented a 
permissive ("may") standard or a stronger one, but that was because of his view that the court had totally 
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the "permissive" approach to incorporating stakeholders into the duty of loyalty. 
 Defining the duty of directors in a manner that permits them to take into account various groups 
without making them responsible to any of them raises a danger that opponents of stakeholder theory have 
long cited.
2111
  In a situation where the board have no defined obligation to any one group,
2112
 but license to 
consider a host of competing interests, they could end up accountable to no one but themselves.
2113
  It is no 
answer to say that their obligation is to the corporation itself, because without an established referent, they 
would be free to define the corporation's interests however they wished.  While it has been suggested that 
that might actually be desirable, freeing directors to behave in a socially beneficial manner,
2114
 it seems just 
as likely that it will encourage them to pursue their own self-interest in the guise of helping others.
2115
 
 There are at least two rejoinders to this concern, the first cynical and the second optimistic.  The 
cynical reply is that directors are already often accountable to no one but themselves.  Legal mechanisms 
are historically ineffective at reviewing the board's decisions due to the business judgment rule, barring the 
most blatant corruption, since it is generally possible to portray any course as at least potentially in the 
corporation's best interests.  In some firms, accountability may exist through the threat of replacement, 
rather than the enforcement of legal duties; in others, where replacement is unlikely, directors might have 
almost no accountability at all.  Such a line of reasoning suggests that freeing the board to consider 
stakeholder interests does no additional harm, because their legal duties would have been unlikely to 
                                                                                                                                                                             
conflated the duty of loyalty and the oppression remedy, and included reasonable expectations in the 
former.  Vanduzer, supra note 2092, pp.244-245, also argued that the inclusion of fairness within the duty 
of loyalty imported a mandatory element. 
2111
 At least going back as far as A. A. Berle, Jr., "For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A 
Note" (1931-1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1365. 
2112
 Directors potentially face other incentives to favour shareholder interests, which will be 
considered below. 
2113
 This possibility is frequently discussed by those on both sides of the debate.  e.g. MacIntosh, 
supra note 2089, p. 256; Singer, supra note 2107, p. 500-501; Hart, supra note 108, pp. 304-305; 
O'Connor, supra note 2107, p. 1233; Puri, supra note 2095, p. 432-433; James C. Tory, "A Comment on 
BCE Inc." (2009) 48 Can. Bus. L.J. 285, p. 286; Vanduzer, supra note 2092, pp. 227-228, 247-248, 252, 
and even conceded by E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., "Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate 
Managers Practicable?" (1934-1935) 2 U. Chi. L. Rev. 194, at pp. 206-207. 
2114
 e.g. E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., "For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?" (1931-1932) 45 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1145 generally; Einer Elhauge, "Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest" (2005) 80 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733 generally; Tuvia Borok, "A Modern Approach to Redefining 'In The Best Interests of 
the Corporation'" (2003) 15 W.R.L.S.I. 113 at the Conclusion; Bruce Chapman, "Trust, Economic 
Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary Obligation" (1993) 43 U. Toronto L.J. 547, at pp. 582-583 
discussed how managers (insulated from shareholder control) may feel more sympathetic to other long-
term stakeholders than to shareholders. 
2115
 Discussed by e.g. Vanduzer, supra note 2092, pp.207-208; Singer, supra note 2107, pp. 500-501, 
503-504; Ruth O. Kuras, "Corporate Social Responsibility: A Canada - U.S. Comparative Analysis" (2000-
2001) 28 Man. L.J. 303, at p. 310; Wai Shun Wilson Leung, "The Inadequacy of Shareholder Primacy: A 
Proposed Corporate Regime That Recognizes Non-Shareholder Interests" (1996-1997) 30 Colum. J.L. & 
Soc. Probs. 587; O'Connor, supra note 2107, p. 1233; MacIntosh, supra note 2089, p. 256. 
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meaningfully prevent such consideration in any event.
2116
 
 The optimistic reply is that directors are already experienced at balancing diverse interests, as 
shareholders may be divided in many ways: majority and minority, short-term and long-term, risk-prone 
and risk-averse, insiders and outsiders, et cetera.
2117
  But this likewise illustrates how competing 
beneficiaries make the directors' duties almost unenforceable and largely irrelevant.  The interests of 
shareholders that the law recognizes as legitimate are limited, and short of oppressive or self-interested 
conduct, it is difficult to conceive of, for example, a group of long-term shareholders convincing a court 
that the board had inappropriately favoured short-term shareholder interests to the degree that the duty of 
loyalty was violated.  Whatever balancing of competing shareholder interests is occurring, legal duties play 
little role in its outcome; either other incentives are motivating directors, or it is simply their discretion and 
hopefully good faith that determines whose agenda prevails. 
 Now the Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that the board are permitted to take into account not 
just various shareholders interests, but stakeholders as well.  At the very least, this has created a "shield" so 
that any directors who happened to decide, for whatever reason, to favour the interests of other groups 
would not be penalized for doing so, except by subsequent replacement.  By defining the duty of loyalty in 
this permissive manner, the Court may have been attempting to encourage a re-conception of directors' 
roles that would result in more attention actually being paid to stakeholder interests, notwithstanding the 
lack of any legal obligation to do so.  
 The unanimous shareholder agreement stands in opposition to such efforts.  In a regime where 
directors are not required to consider stakeholders but are legally protected should they choose to do so, a 
unanimous shareholder agreement has a very significant impact.  It can completely circumvent this move 
away from shareholder primacy. 
 If investors assume power, then by law they are subject to all the corresponding responsibilities.  
But in the scenario under consideration, directors have no duties to stakeholders; they only have permission 
to consider those interests, at their discretion.  The shareholders would inherit that discretion,
2118
 but its 
significance in their hands would be changed. 
 Corporate directors are often in a position of relative immunity from accountability to 
                                                          
2116
 Jonathan R. Macey and Geoffrey P. Miller, "Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective" 
(1993) 43 U. Toronto L.J. 401, at p. 403; Iacobucci, supra note 2097, p. 242; Elhauge, supra note 2114, 
generally argued that this has been the current state of American law.  
2117
 Iman Anabtawi, "Some Skepticism About Increasing Shareholder Power" UCLA School of Law, 
Law-Econ Research Paper No. 05-16, online: http://ssrn.com/abstract=783044, generally; Macey and 
Miller, supra note 2116, pp. 403, 413; Hart, supra note 108, pp. 307-308.  Geoffrey G. MacIntosh, 
"Designing an Efficient Fiduciary Law" (1993) 43 U. Toronto L.J. 425, at pp. 458-460 argued that this 
balancing act among investor interests was already problematic and that directors should only owe duties to 
the interests of non-preferred shareholders.  Dodd, supra note 2113, at p. 201 noted that if shareholders 
have divergent interests, corporate activity cannot necessarily profit all of them. 
2118
 Possibly further protected by their ability to fetter it. 
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shareholders.  It has been argued that, beyond negative effects such as agency costs and self-interest, this 
freedom may have positive aspects.
2119
  The board might be more likely to make decisions that benefit 
stakeholders or society generally (i.e. corporate social responsibility) because they have a hands-on 
understanding of the business, they have more direct exposure to the needs of other stakeholders, and they 
experience reputational costs and gains.
2120
  They therefore might look past profit maximization and pursue 
other goals.  This is not necessarily magnanimous of them; generosity is easy if someone else pays the 
price.
2121
  Further, were they truly insulated from oversight, it is entirely possible that they would primarily 
seek to benefit themselves, even granting that they might make some efforts to help other groups along the 
way; the two are not mutually exclusive.
2122
  Nonetheless, if directors have the freedom to advance 
stakeholder interests, they probably will do so at least occasionally even if there is no personal benefit.  To 
the extent that they are insulated from shareholder reprisals (and assuming that the difference in returns 
from whatever shares they own would be minimal), there is really no reason for them to always make 
decisions in the investors' interests; this is the very essence of the "agency costs" that shareholder advocates 
warn against. 
 It would be arbitrary and inconsistent to assume that, on the one hand, directors relieved from 
accountability would use that freedom to help stakeholders, and on the other, that were shareholders to take 
the reins of power for themselves, they would behave entirely selfishly.  There is plenty of evidence that 
some portion of shareholders do not solely consider their own profit and would prefer corporations to 
recognize stakeholder interests and/or corporate social responsibility.  So-called "ethical investment" is a 
growing field.
2123
 
 To better understand the potential effects of a unanimous shareholder agreement, one therefore 
should consider the relative costs and benefits that directors and empowered investors face if they are 
permitted, but not required, to favour stakeholder interests at the cost of diminished profits.  This sort of 
                                                          
2119
 See note 2114. 
2120
 Elhauge, supra note 2114, pp. 743, 797, 838. 
2121
 David L. Engel, "An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility" (1979-1980) 32 Stan. L. Rev. 
1, at p. 22 noted that it is managers, not shareholders, who feel personal gratification from corporate 
charity, and even suggested, at pp. 22-23 fn 65, that this may be part of their compensation.  Elhauge, supra 
note 2114, raised this objection and provided a number of counterarguments to the effect that the concern, 
while not completely unfounded, is overstated: managers receive more immediate benefits from 
profitability, such generosity must take the place of self-interested behaviour (pp. 740-741, 805-807, 835-
836), other forces constrain managers (p. 808-810, 840), and any choice they make will please some 
shareholders and disappoint others, either those who prefer profits alone or those who have other 
considerations (785).  Elhauge nonetheless advocated legal limits (pp. 841-857). 
2122
 Particularly given that the board may identify some stakeholders whose interests happen to align 
with theirs and use that group as "cover".  Macey and Miller, supra note 2116, p. 412, gave the example of 
blocking a take-over by referring to the employees' desire not to relocate. 
2123
 Protecting stakeholder interests will sometimes also result in financial benefit for the shareholders.  
MacPherson, supra note 2086, pp. 393-398, referred to this as "enlightened shareholder value", a term 
borrowed from the United Kingdom.  The present discussion refers to situations where these goals conflict. 
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economic analysis is a simplification; there is a disconnect between the abstract rational actor and real 
human behaviour.  But it makes a useful starting point. 
 Corporate net income directly increases the value of shareholders' investments.
2124
  Directors 
participate in such increases if they are also shareholders, and they additionally may benefit in other ways: 
bonuses, empire-building, and increased status in the market for management.
2125
  Despite those qualifiers, 
it seems likely that, unless directors are particularly skilled at diverting profits into their own pockets, the 
bulk of any increase in value would fall to the shareholders collectively.  It therefore becomes relevant how 
many shareholders there are and their proportions of the gain.
2126
  The higher that is, the greater their 
incentive to favour profits over stakeholders. 
 The "costs" of ignoring (unprofitable) stakeholder interests are moral and reputational.
2127
  The 
moral objections would be the same for either empowered investors or directors, assuming similarly sized 
and informed groups.  If the shareholders are a significantly larger group, they may face lesser moral costs 
if they can convince themselves that their individual votes don't make a difference,
2128
 or if they vote 
without informing themselves about the issue, in order to avoid unpleasant truths (something that might be 
permissible if they are not bound to the same duty of care as directors).
2129
  Similarly, the reputational costs 
might differ between the groups, depending upon whether empowered investors remained more anonymous 
than the directors they replaced and whether they had more or less use for a reputation for treating 
stakeholders well.
2130
 
 It is therefore impossible to make a general determination regarding the relative levels of incentive 
that directors and shareholders have to favour corporate profitability.  It is of course possible that 
shareholders would have the greater one, e.g. where the directors were nominees with no direct investment 
in the company.  It is also possible that they would have not, e.g. when their shareholdings were minimal.  
Perhaps the directors would be investors themselves with about average holdings, which would align their 
incentives quite closely with those of the general shareholders, or even that the directors and shareholders 
                                                          
2124
 Unless they are diverted. 
2125
 Including renegotiation with the firm that already employs them. 
2126
 Also relevant is what the decision-making procedure for the empowered shareholders is; voting by 
shareholding, for example, could lead to a different outcome than a system that allowed each investor an 
equal vote regardless of shareholdings. 
2127
 Elhauge, supra note 2114, pp. 752-756 referred to these as "moral" and "social", and included in 
the latter category the general unpleasant experience of social sanctions, beyond the utilitarian cost of 
reputation loss. 
2128
 Elhauge, supra note 2114, p. 742 raised this specifically in the context of tendering during a 
takeover despite objecting to the proposed purchaser's anti-stakeholder practices. 
2129
 Ibid, pp. 758-759, 798-799. 
2130
 Stone, supra note 153, p. 371, noted that the importance of intra-firm reputation for managers is 
lessened in situations where they experience high turnover, as the newcomers are granted a "clean slate".  
This observation has applicability to the current discussion; the relative reputational costs faced by 
directors and empowered shareholders for mistreating stakeholders are tied to their respective rates of 
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might be co-extensive groups, literally identical and therefore possessing identical interests.
2131
 
 Regardless, the presumed logic of the Supreme Court was that the board are not automatically 
inclined to prioritize shareholder interests over other stakeholders, and the aforementioned judgments 
ensure that there is no legal requirement that they do so.  To the extent that the shareholders themselves 
prefer their own interests, if they assumed power, they would be free to benefit other groups but would not 
do so to their own detriment.  Indeed, if the directors were commonly exercising their discretion in favour 
of stakeholders, that could lead to increasingly dissatisfied investors using unanimous shareholder 
agreements precisely to assert the centrality of their interests.  This legal tool thus represents an obstacle to 
using the "permissive" approach to stakeholder rights as a means, however tepid, of making them a larger 
factor in corporate decision-making. 
 Investors could also use a unanimous shareholder agreement to restrict the board from considering 
any interests other than theirs.  The theoretical permissibility of such a term rests upon the precise scope of 
the legal endorsement for consideration of stakeholders.  The approach in Peoples- incorporating a 
permissive view of stakeholder interests within a mandatory duty to the corporation- possibly prevents this.  
But when the principle was later restated in BCE, it was as follows: "[T]his Court found that although 
directors must consider the best interests of the corporation, it may also be appropriate, although not 
mandatory, to consider the impact of corporate decisions on shareholders or particular groups of 
stakeholders."
2132
  Consideration of stakeholders was there listed as separate from consideration of the best 
interests of the corporation, rather than subsumed into it; the following paragraph, however, once again 
placed the former within the context of the latter.  Hypothetically, if the existing duty did not preclude 
taking stakeholders into account, but also did not directly include consideration of their interests within a 
larger mandatory obligation, then there would appear to be no reason why a unanimous shareholder 
agreement could not eliminate that permission.  In other words, if the extent of the legal protection of 
stakeholder interests could be summed up as "by default, the duties imposed by law do not prevent 
directors from taking stakeholders into account", it might be possible to create a unanimous shareholder 
agreement that did just that; the entire point of the tool, after all, is restricting directors' powers by placing 
limitations upon their decision-making that otherwise do not exist. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
turnover. 
2131
 Directors might also belong to some other stakeholder group, such as creditors or employees, or 
even to multiple groups simultaneously, and that might also affect their interests.  Given that the board are 
elected by shareholders, however, it appears most likely that their interests would reflect shareholder 
interests, absent circumstances that would pose their own difficulties.  Shareholders have obvious reasons 
to elect directors who they believe will favour them and to replace those who do not; directors, already 
having been selected for their perceived inclination to favour the shareholders, will be further motivated by 
the desire to retain their position.  If board members who belong to other stakeholder groups favour their 
interests over shareholders, it indicates a possible failure of the director election and removal processes as 
mechanisms for holding them accountable.  The potential problems that poses are discussed in this chapter. 
2132
 BCE, supra note 1133, par. 39, emphasis in original. 
  
 
 
383 
 
 Even if stakeholder interests were included within those of the company itself, it might still be 
possible to create a unanimous shareholder agreement designed to mitigate that, by drafting something to 
the effect of "where multiple options are all within the corporation's best interests, the one most beneficial 
to shareholders must be chosen".
2133
  If this tactic was permitted, it would place pressure on the board to 
favour investors above other groups, lest they be forced to justify why not doing so was the only option in 
the corporation's best interests.
2134
  Enforcing such clauses could penalize directors who deviated from 
shareholder profit maximization, the very thing that Peoples allowed.  Of course, it might be determined 
that such agreements were contrary to public policy, but prior to the law
2135
 closing this hole, it would seem 
to be logically permissible. 
 A restriction upon the directors designed to force them to prioritize shareholder interests need not 
be so explicit in its rejection of stakeholder theory.  A "pre-made decision" might be included in a 
unanimous shareholder agreement that benefited equity investors at the expense of other groups.  For 
example, a term requiring the payment of dividends would leave fewer funds available for wage increases, 
environmentally-friendly technologies, et cetera.   Where the law only permits, but does not require, 
consideration of stakeholder interests, pre-made decisions favouring the shareholders are apparently 
valid,
2136
 even though their effect is to render that permission ineffective.  It would be difficult, perhaps 
impossible, to prevent pre-made decisions from undermining the board's permission to consider various 
stakeholder groups, unless such terms were forbidden entirely. 
 The fundamental assumptions of the unanimous shareholder agreement and stakeholder theory are 
at odds.  The "permissive" approach to the duty of loyalty, which the Supreme Court of Canada has 
endorsed in three recent decisions, allows for a particularly easy illustration of this conflict, and one in 
which the unanimous shareholder agreement, with its implicit endorsement of investor-centrality, emerges 
the practical victor.  Put simply, if on one side there is only permission granted to the board that they "may" 
consider stakeholder interests, and on the other shareholders have a tool that allows them to directly control 
corporate decision-making either by restricting directors' options or assuming power themselves, then the 
fight is hardly fair. The continued centrality of shareholder interests is assured.
2137
 
                                                          
2133
 Elhauge, supra note 2114,  pp. 862-863, pointed out that, in American states where directors were 
permitted to consider stakeholder interests, he was unaware of any company attempting to use a charter to 
force the board to prioritize profit-maximization.  The danger may therefore be theoretical. 
2134
 Or, more precisely, that all options within the corporation's best interests would have had similar 
impact. 
2135
 Either through precedent or statutory reform. 
2136
 Assuming that "pre-made decisions" are acceptable otherwise. 
2137
 A half-step above a merely permissive regime is one where the corporation, in the form of its 
directors, is legally required to consider the interests of some group(s) of stakeholders in its decision-
making, but the actual decisions themselves are not subject to any standard.  In other words, the directors 
have fulfilled their duty if they can present evidence that they took into account that their decisions would 
harm the relevant stakeholder group, even if they then proceeded to do exactly that. 
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In BCE, the Court concluded that the directors were under such an obligation.  Jeremy D. Fraiberg, 
"Fiduciary Outs and Maximizing Shareholder Value Following BCE" (2009) 48 Can. Bus. L.J. 213, at p. 
217 declared that following BCE, it will now be important for directors to keep records showing they 
considered stakeholder interests and expectations.  Iacobucci, supra note 2097, p. 243, concluded that, "[i]t 
is not entirely clear [from BCE] whether directors have an obligation to consider as a procedural matter the 
interests of stakeholders even if there is no substantive obligation to act in their interests", and he argued 
that a simple permissive approach would be preferable, because considering all stakeholders is unfeasible 
(p. 244).  MacIntosh, supra note 2117, pp. 444-445 criticized a duty-to-consider standard for its 
incoherence and uncertainty.  My own view is that, while certainly problematic (as discussed below) this 
obligation arose in BCE both "on the facts" and in the context of reasonable expectations under the 
oppression remedy, and thus was not made a part of the directors' duties to the corporation. 
 
For analytic completeness, however, it is worth considering as a variation of the "permissive" approach, 
one where the consideration of stakeholder interests is mandatory but actually protecting them is merely 
permitted.  (This must be distinguished from models including both a procedural duty to consider and some 
substantive standard for the outcome, e.g. the proposal of Poonam Puri and Tuvia Borok, "Employees as 
Corporate Stakeholders" (2002) 8 Journal of Corporate Citizenship 49.)  When there is a legal duty to 
consider the interests of stakeholders, then shareholders who take power through a unanimous shareholder 
agreement would be bound by that duty.  As with the permissive model, shareholders arguably have a 
greater incentive than directors to put investor interests (their own) ahead of those of other groups.  If a 
duty to consider stakeholder interests is intended not simply as a pro forma acknowledgment of their stake 
before a contrary decision is reached, but instead to result in such interests occasionally winning out in 
whole or part, then this might be even less effective if shareholders have assumed power.  The treatment in 
BCE implied the former, so it would make little difference if this passing acknowledgment of the interests 
being harmed was made by directors or shareholders.  Even if the duty to consider is nothing more than a 
hollow procedural requirement, it can still pose problems for shareholders who have assumed power.  If the 
onus is upon them to prove that they have discharged it, they will have to be careful to keep evidence to 
that effect.  That applies to directors as well, but investors may be dispersed enough, informal enough, or 
otherwise have a strange enough procedural system for exerting control that it is difficult or impossible to 
prove what they did or did not consider.  In order to protect themselves, they would need to ensure that they 
kept records they otherwise might not have.  Shareholders who assume power in a corporation have the 
ability to "fetter their discretion"; it is unknown how this might interact with any duty to consider 
stakeholder interests.  Even reading this ability as only applicable to shareholders entering into contractual 
agreements with regard to how they will vote, it would create a conflict.  Since the "fettering of discretion" 
through contract by definition precludes further consideration, it would seem to always prevent the 
satisfaction of any duty to consider stakeholder interests.  One doctrine or the other must triumph, but the 
two cannot be reconciled.  If investors use a unanimous shareholder agreement to issue a specific order to 
the corporation, then they are restricting the powers of the directors with respect to that decision.  The 
wording of the statute suggests that in doing so, shareholders bear all responsibilities the board would with 
respect to that order, including any duty to consider stakeholder interests.  If the pre-made decision 
restricted directors' powers on an ongoing basis, a duty to consider would prove difficult to apply.  At the 
time of the unanimous shareholder agreement's formation, stakeholder interests that would ultimately be 
affected by the restriction might be unknown, making it impossible for the shareholders to consider them.  
But once the agreement is in place, directors bound by it cannot meaningfully consider interests they no 
longer have the power to affect.  This assumes that the duty to consider should be meaningful, i.e. those 
doing the considering must have the power to influence the outcome.  If the duty to consider was seen 
instead as an act of acknowledgment and recognition rather than a true decision-making process, possibly 
to serve some abstract moral purpose, then directors might still "consider" harms they had no power to 
avert.  Indeed, it would then be possible to construct a unanimous shareholder agreement that permitted 
(even instructed) directors to consider the interests of other stakeholders but to nonetheless always 
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5.(c) Enforceable Duties to Stakeholders 
 
 While Peoples established that the duty of loyalty was owed only to the corporation, the duty of 
care was found to have a wider range of potential beneficiaries, albeit subject to some standing issues.  The 
contents of the latter obligation, however, apparently did not include safeguarding stakeholder interests per 
se; the Court found that it had been discharged in that case because the steps taken were legitimate business 
decisions for the company, and they thus fell within the business judgment rule, despite the harm they 
caused to creditors.
2138
  The apparent result is that, if directors have acted in a manner that fails to meet 
their standard of care as it pertains to the corporation's interests, and if they have also thereby done harm to 
stakeholder interests, then in jurisdictions such as Quebec where standing is allowed, the stakeholders 
could sue for compensation. 
 If the duties owed to the company can, for virtually all purposes, be satisfied by courses of action 
that are in the interests of the shareholders, then this responsibility is not of much concern to empowered 
investors; assuming they are motivated to act in their own interests, the only drawback would be being held 
to a legal standard in so doing. Some investors might balk at that, even one as lax as the duty of care, 
preferring to avoid any responsibility.
2139
 
 If, on the other hand, the corporation's interests are sufficiently distinguishable from shareholders' 
that actions taken to advantage the latter could fail to meet the directors' duties, then the situation is more 
complicated.  This goes a step further than the judges in Peoples and BCE were willing, but it is consistent 
with their logic and worth exploring, particularly as it is possible that that is the direction that the law is 
heading.
2140
  To make such a proposal realistically enforceable presents difficulties due to the diverse and 
often conflicting interests of stakeholders.  Some method would need to be used to synthesize the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
completely prioritize the interests of shareholders. 
2138
 Peoples, supra note 809, pars. 70-71. 
2139
 Unanimous shareholder agreements that only restricted the board without empowering 
shareholders create more interesting technical problems.  Directors might be limited to options which 
would ordinarily not satisfy the duty of care, with one(s) that would meet it "off-limits".  In such a 
circumstance, it would be unfair to hold them liable for failing to take that option, which would suggest that 
the shareholders should be accountable under a transferred duty of care.  But if the decisions that created 
the restrictions were evaluated to see whether they met the duty of care when they occurred, then they 
might be found to have been acceptable or even beneficial at the time.  This is a specific instance of the 
dilemma that pre-made decisions pose for the transfer of directors' responsibilities. 
2140
 Singer, supra note 2107, p. 501 argued that, absent a belief that managers are sincerely motivated 
to protect stakeholders, statutes designed to recognize the interests of those groups cannot have been 
intended to be merely permissive and thus ineffectual, but should instead be taken to have created 
enforceable rights.  The origin of this particular strain of stakeholder rights in Canada, however, was 
judicial, not legislative, albeit based in expansive readings of existing statutes, and thus Singer's logic 
would be largely inapplicable. 
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"corporate" interests (in order to determine if the directors' actions were in line with them), although 
perhaps one might, for example, instruct the board to consider Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, where the 
foreseeable harm done to any group of stakeholders would need to be outweighed by the benefit to 
another.
2141
  This would be difficult to apply to many business decisions, where the gains and losses of 
various stakeholders are difficult to estimate, but for more easily quantifiable situations such as the one in 
BCE, it could serve as a method for determining which group's agenda should prevail.  Or one might create 
a hierarchy of interests to guide the directors,
2142
 or simply leave finding the best balance to their 
reviewable judgment.
2143
  Whatever form it took, such an obligation would not necessarily achieve much in 
practice, due to the difficulties of bringing a successful action.  At present, shareholders have a difficult 
enough time enforcing the duty of care, due to the business judgment rule, and the board would find it even 
easier to hide behind such discretion if they had multiple constituencies' interests to balance. 
 Whether or not it could be made to work as intended, such a legal regime would designate 
directors as essentially mediators among competing stakeholder interests.
2144
  As discussed in the previous 
subsection, a variety of factors might encourage them to favour shareholders,
2145
 including their own 
investments and the nature of their elected positions,
2146
 but the assumption of the Supreme Court appears 
                                                          
2141
 A Kaldor-Hicks standard (and the similar Paretto one) was considered by MacIntosh, supra note 
2117, pp. 440-442; Edward S. Adams and John H. Matheson "A Statutory Model for Corporate 
Constituency Concerns" (2000) 49 Emory L. J. 1085, at pp. 1113-1114; Leung, supra note 2115, pp. 605-
608. 
2142
 Puri and Borok, supra note 2137, proposed that directors should look first to the interests of 
shareholders and employees, and only thereafter to those of other stakeholder groups.  MacPherson, supra 
note 2086, pp. 394-395, discussed (but rejected) the position that certain harms (such as loss of life) are 
unquantifiable and that avoiding them should have first priority in corporate decision-making before any 
cost-benefit analysis. 
2143
 This would not be the same as creating separate obligations owed to each stakeholder group.  As 
Indalex demonstrated, that would simply create conflicts of interest, rather than putting directors in a 
position to mediate conflicting interests. 
2144
 See generally Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout, supra note 68; Adams and Matheson, supra 
note 2141, p. 1106; Leung, supra note 2115, pp. 603-605; Elliott J. Weiss, "Social Regulation of Business 
Activity: Reforming the Corporate Governance System to Resolve an Institutional Impasse" (2000) 49 
Emory L. J. 1085, at pp. 426-427 provided a (partly prescriptive) analogy between directors and judges. 
2145
 Directors might also, in some cases, belong to other stakeholder groups, such as creditors or 
employees, and might therefore have incentive to favour those interests. 
2146
 Contrast certain European jurisdictions, where employees elect some directors.  Obviously, such a 
system would be difficult to reconcile with the nature and function of unanimous shareholder agreements, 
absent heavy revision to them.  The presumptive purpose of additional constituencies participating in the 
selection of directors is to allow them to have an influence over the ultimate decision-making authority in 
the corporation.  This goal would be undermined if the shareholders could use a unanimous shareholder 
agreement to override the board's normal authority.  One possible solution would be to require that all the 
members of any stakeholder group entitled to select directors would also have to be parties to any 
agreement restricting the board.  Another would be to limit the effectiveness of the restrictions imposed by 
a unanimous shareholder agreement, so that rather than restricting the collective powers of the board to 
manage the corporation, they instead restricted the votes that the specific directors elected by the 
shareholders were able to cast; this would be in contrast to the current state of the law regarding unanimous 
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to have been that these would not necessarily prove conclusive and that directors could have sufficient 
impartiality that they might consider other stakeholders.  Nonetheless, the reasons for these judgments were 
clear that the board could not consider their own benefit qua directors as part of the best interests of the 
company, as that would constitute a violation of the duty of loyalty;
2147
 only if their interests "innocently 
and genuinely coincide with those of the corporation",
2148
 such as because they were also shareholders or 
because they were being paid a reasonable salary for their work,
2149
 are they permitted to profit from their 
decision-making.
2150
  Directors as a class are conspicuously absent from the lists of possible stakeholders in 
Peoples, BCE, and Indalex,
2151
 although in a technical sense, they are stakeholders too.  The expansion of 
their duties to allow for stakeholder interests was not intended to include self-interested behaviour; 
assumptions of impartiality, however naive, can only go so far.  Especially given the lack of a clear 
standard for how competing agendas should be balanced, letting directors favour directors as a class when 
calculating the corporate interest would open the door to impermissible abuse.
2152
 
 When shareholders assume direct control, then they are in that very position of mediating amongst 
stakeholders while their own interests constitute valid factors in the decision-making.  To favour 
themselves would thus not be a violation of the duty of loyalty.  Only the duty of care would constrain 
them; they could be judged as to whether they were serving the overall corporation sufficiently well.  As 
Peoples illustrated, it is relatively easy to take courses of action that both meet the duty of care by being "a 
reasonable business decision"
2153
 and that primarily end up serving shareholder interests to the detriment of 
other groups.  Barring a complete, clear, and enforceable overhaul of the system to guarantee that, in some 
determinable circumstances, other stakeholders prevail, forcing directors to balance various interests rather 
than merely permitting them to consider those factors might have limited effect.  Letting investors take 
direct control of the corporation through unanimous shareholder agreements exacerbates (or at least brings 
out into the open) those problems by allowing for self-interest as a valid consideration.
2154
 
 Limiting the board's powers without transferring them also conflicts with placing directors in the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
shareholder agreements in companies with multiple share classes. 
2147
 Peoples, supra note 809, pars. 34-39. 
2148
 Ibid, par. 39. 
2149
 Ibid, par. 39. 
2150
 MacIntosh, supra note 2089, p. 266, argued that, if acting in the shareholder's interests was not 
automatically required of directors, then since the board are elected by them, making decisions that favour 
shareholders can be seen as self-interested, and thus would violate the duty of loyalty. 
2151
 See discussion earlier. 
2152
 Query, however, abuse of whom?  The corporation, legally, but if the corporation's interests 
actually do include the directors', then advancing their interests may be acceptable and no abuse occurring. 
2153
 Peoples, supra note 809, par. 68. 
2154
 Allowing shareholders to fetter their discretion, as they currently can, makes this even more 
difficult.  They could use that ability to bind themselves against any course of action that might harm their 
interests but benefit other stakeholders.  This freedom would therefore have to either be qualified or 
removed. 
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role of mediators between stakeholder interests.  It would again likely be impermissible for shareholders to 
explicitly prevent directors from favouring the interests of other groups; a unanimous shareholder 
agreement might still be able to contain a general restriction that forced the board to choose from amongst 
any set of equally valid options the one that most favoured investors.  If the legal protection of stakeholder 
interests was sufficiently great, such a clause might nonetheless be seen as an attempt to circumvent the 
directors' statutory duties and thus impermissible.  What remains viable are restrictions that do not 
explicitly refer to favouring shareholder interests, but have the same effect.
2155
  As previously discussed, it 
would be difficult to enforce the duty of care against restrictions created before any problems arose, unless 
such restrictions automatically violate it.  Any limitation on directors' powers has the potential to affect the 
interests of stakeholders, so one cannot prohibit restrictions on that basis alone unless one discards pre-
made decisions entirely, but one could create a doctrine that restrictions on the board's authority whose 
intention or primary purpose was defeating stakeholder interests (in favour of shareholders) were 
impermissible attempts to negate the directors' legal duties. 
 
5.(d) Duty Without Standing 
 
 One of the more peculiar applications of stakeholder theory is imposing upon corporations (and/or 
their directors) a duty to some group(s) of stakeholders, but not granting that particular group legal standing 
to bring suits.
2156
  According to Peoples, this actually is the case with regard to the directors' C.B.C.A. duty 
of care, at least outside of Quebec. 
 In practice, identifying stakeholders as the beneficiaries of a duty that they lack the ability to 
enforce seems rather similar to a regime that is merely permissive of granting their interests consideration.  
Where the unanimous shareholder agreement is concerned, however, there is a minor difference.  A 
permissive regime might allow for such discretion, depending upon how it was conceived, to be narrowed 
or erased.  By contrast, if stakeholders are owed a statutory duty, even an unenforceable one, then 
presumably such a duty could not be superseded by a unanimous shareholder agreement, as discussed in the 
preceding subsection. 
 If shareholders transfer power to themselves, they are subject to the same duties that directors 
face, including the unenforceable ones.  While it is doubtful that it was the legislative intent, a possible ex 
                                                          
2155
 For example, forcing the company to pay out retained earnings as dividends.  This would prevent 
those funds being used to raise wages, improve environmental standards, et cetera. 
2156
 Vanduzer, supra note 2092, pp. 248-252, was critical of the Supreme Court's position on standing 
to enforce the directors' duties, in part because the Court's proposed supplement of the oppression remedy 
had its own statutory limits on who may bring claims, but ultimately he concluded that standing to bring 
claims without an enforceable standard to base them on would be of little use. 
  
 
 
389 
 
post justification for this situation is similar to that of a permissive model;
2157
 it might influence the 
corporation toward considering stakeholders without mandating it.  The earlier discussion about the 
incentives shareholders and directors face in balancing the profitability of the corporation against other 
interests would apply. 
 
5.(e) Statutory Compliance 
 
 In BCE, the Supreme Court of Canada established that ensuring statutory compliance was part of 
the duty of loyalty.
2158
  The general principle behind that duty is that it identifies for whose benefit the 
directors must work; to prioritize the benefit of any other party instead, including but not limited to 
themselves, would be a violation of it.  Thus, while the passage in BCE was ambiguous in some respects, 
its implication is that directors must prioritize statutory compliance over competing interests.  Given that a 
derivative action to enforce the duty of loyalty would be a highly unlikely path for statutory enforcement, 
this would in practice be more likely to serve as a "shield" than a "sword", but it represents nonetheless an 
important principle: directors are expected to ensure statutory compliance first and foremost.   Since 
legislation is, in at least some cases, designed to protect the interests of stakeholders, this is another avenue 
whereby the directors' duties are indirectly to them, not to profit-maximization for the shareholders' benefit. 
 This joins any number of statutory provisions that seek to hold the board directly accountable for 
the company's misdeeds, including the criminal law.  Even one of the foremost advocates of the 
shareholder primacy, profit-seeking model of the corporation, Milton Friedman, acknowledged that there 
was a limitation on that goal: legal compliance.
2159
  Despite this, firms do sometimes break the law and 
incur fines as if they view these penalties to be nothing more than the price of doing business.  It is 
"rational" to violate statutes if the profits earned in so doing outweigh the costs.  However distasteful this 
behaviour is, there are arguments to support it, much like there are in favour of "efficient" breaches of 
contracts.  Firstly, if the penalties are correctly priced and the gains still outweigh them, then it actually is 
socially beneficial to violate the law, because the net benefit for all parties combined is positive.
2160
  If the 
result is genuinely a net detriment to society, then the penalties were incorrectly priced and should have 
                                                          
2157
 Or a duty-to-consider one.  See note 2137. 
2158
 Iacobucci, supra note 2097, pp. 238-239, warned this could lead to overdeterrence, a critique 
based upon the possibility that a statute might conflict with the best interests of the corporation.  My own 
analysis herein avoids that problem by making the two synonymous by definition. 
2159
 In the famous quote, "So the question is, do corporate executives, provided they stay within the 
law, have responsibilities in their business activities other than to make as much money for their 
stockholders as possible?  And my answer to that is, no they do not." (Milton Friedman, interview with 
John McClaughry, "Milton Friedman Responds" Chemtech (February 1974), at p. 72.) 
2160
 Engel, supra note 2121, pp. 51-52, and generally. 
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been higher.
2161
  The counter-argument is that legal penalties cannot be made arbitrarily large, and further 
that the intent behind them is often not to create a precisely calculated offsetting cost but to actually prevent 
undesirable behaviour.
2162
  A second argument in favour of allowing companies to break the law if they are 
willing to pay the penalty is that an individual faced with such a choice would do so (were they the 
theoretical rationally self-interested actor), and thus corporations should not be prohibited from doing what 
a natural person could.  The counter-argument is that the difficulties of achieving perfect legal compliance 
do not mean that no steps should be taken to encourage what compliance is possible; just because a human 
might break the law is no reason to allow a corporation to do so. 
 If the shareholders have transferred control to themselves, would they be more likely than 
directors to cause the company to violate statutes?  They would face the same potential personal liabilities, 
which can be significant for some breaches but are minimal or nonexistent for others, yet these penalties 
may not be greater than the potential gains.
2163
  Thus, if statutory compliance was truly made primary in the 
duty of loyalty and that duty were somehow enforced, it leads to a significant consequence.  Failing to meet 
it would not be a permissible exercise of business judgment, nor even a demonstration of unacceptably poor 
decision-making (i.e. a violation of the duty of care); it would be the favouring of another interest over that 
of the corporation, in contravention of the duty of loyalty, and thus subject to one established element of 
that particular obligation, the disgorgement of any profit realized in its violation.  That would lessen the 
financial incentive shareholders have to disregard statutes, although given imperfect enforcement, it would 
not eliminate it entirely.  This might even place empowered investors into a worse position than the 
directors, although technically it shouldn't, since favouring self-interest could be easier to see as a violation 
of the duty of loyalty than placing third-party interests (as the shareholders technically are to the board) 
ahead of the beneficiary (the corporation, whose deemed interest here would be statutory compliance). 
 The question of whether profit-maximization would be more likely to motivate shareholders or 
directors to violate statutes is otherwise essentially the same as the earlier one about which group would be 
more prone to ignoring stakeholders in favour of revenue.
2164
 
                                                          
2161
 Ibid, pp. 44-47, dismissed the idea that the criminal law was intended to absolutely eliminate acts 
regardless of cost, but at p. 43 fn 141 he acknowledged a variety of reasons for legislative reluctance to set 
high fines. 
2162
 For contracts, such counter-arguments are not as readily made.  The assumption of proponents of 
"efficient breach" that damages are an adequate substitute for performance can be better justified since they 
are, at least in theory, specifically set by a court to achieve that result.  Even putting aside the judicial 
inability to achieve perfect outcomes at all times, there remains a problem when the contractual terms 
breached were ones designed to keep the corporation from engaging in risky endeavours, the violation of 
which have caused the company to become insolvent and therefore unable to pay damages. 
2163
 And are always nonexistent for the corporation's contractual breaches, unless they have provided 
personal guarantees. 
2164
 Moral and reputational costs for violating statutes might be seen as higher than for harming 
stakeholder interests, perhaps, but that applies to both directors and empowered shareholders.  Regardless, 
the analysis of shareholder and director incentives for profitability is the same. 
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5.(f) Conclusion on Specific Stakeholder Models of the Directors' Duties 
 
 Stakeholder interests are included in the notional "corporation" to which directors owe their duties, 
as has become clear from recent Supreme Court cases.  This does not cease to be true when a unanimous 
shareholder agreement empowers investors, and it is then the shareholders who bear responsibilities that at 
least permit, and possibly require, consideration of those groups.  But there are reasons to be wary of such a 
scenario.  If those duties permit consideration of stakeholders without mandating it, mandate it without 
granting them standing, or mandate it in a manner that will still de facto leave the outcome to the 
empowered shareholders' discretion, the outcome is likely to be the same: the shareholders will have 
greater incentive to prioritize their own interests. 
 It is not necessary to caricature investors as ruthlessly single-minded in the pursuit of their own 
profit for this to raise concerns.  Indeed, it likely that moral and reputational factors will occasionally lead 
them to behave well toward other groups.  But they cannot be said to be anything resembling neutral 
mediators of the corporate interest, when among the groups whose potential gains and losses constitute 
valid considerations are they themselves. 
 The only interest which the law is currently effective at elevating above profit-maximization is 
statutory compliance.  Incorporating this into the duty of loyalty, while initially counter-intuitive, makes it 
a component of the corporate interest that must take priority over competing considerations.  Because this 
method has the virtues of both clarity and certainty, it would still be effective should shareholders assume 
control, at least to the extent that the statutes themselves are clear.  Unfortunately, it would be difficult to 
extend this to any further protection of stakeholders, unless specific interests could be identified that should 
always take priority.  So long as some degree of ambiguity or discretion remains as to what interests must 
be prioritized in what circumstances, and so long as there is judicial reluctance to second-guess corporate 
decision-making (the "business judgment rule"), empowered shareholders would remain free in practice to 
disregard agendas other than their own. 
 It is worth querying, however, whether directors themselves are any different.  Unlike empowered 
investors, they are not allowed to pursue their collective self-interest (qua directors), but they are elected by 
shareholders, are frequently shareholders themselves, and are allowed to favour the interests of 
shareholders.  Indeed, there is a legal tradition that they are expected to do so,
2165
 from which stakeholder 
theory is a departure.  By exploring the practical problems of asking empowered investors to consider other 
interests in addition to their own, we are also exposing the limitations of asking directors to consider 
                                                          
2165
 See e.g. MacPherson, supra note 2086, who at pp. 388-389 cited various authorities in support of 
the proposition that, prior to Peoples, "the weight of Canadian authority on the subject equated 'the best 
interests of the corporation' with 'the best interests of the shareholders collectively'" (p. 389). 
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stakeholders as well as shareholders.  The next subsection expands upon this, going beyond the drawbacks 
of specific stakeholder-inclusive models of the duties of care and loyalty to the general conflict between the 
assumptions of stakeholder theory on the one hand and the unanimous shareholder agreement on the other. 
 
5.(g) Stakeholder Theory Versus Unanimous Shareholder Agreements 
 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement does not mesh well with the Supreme Court's tentative 
steps toward including stakeholder theory in Canadian corporate law.  The previous subsections illustrated 
how the specific stakeholder-driven elements of the Court's model of directors' duties might be rendered 
(even more) ineffective by the use of this tool.  But the problems run deeper than the practical difficulties 
of reconciling two specific legal mechanisms; the unanimous shareholder agreement derives from an entire 
way of thinking about the corporation that is directly at odds with stakeholder theory.  Nor is it unique in 
that; many facets of our law are based on a tacit assumption that the corporation exists to serve 
shareholders,
2166
 not a conception of corporate interests that includes a variety of stakeholder concerns.  
The obviousness of the incentive empowered investors have to maximize profits regardless of the 
consequences for others only serves to bring out into the open the underlying conflicts between the legal 
recognition of stakeholder theory and the law's continuing tendencies toward shareholder primacy, conflicts 
which exist even for companies where no such agreements are in place. 
 The apparent justification for the unanimous shareholder agreement is the view that the 
corporation exists to serve investors.  As such, the election of directors to run it is merely a convenient 
method whereby shareholders select agents to manage on their behalf, and such delegation is unnecessary if 
they (unanimously) agree to retain the power for themselves.  Similarly, proceeding from the premise that 
directors' powers are delegated from them, when the shareholders wish to set specific limits to those 
powers, they may do so, and when they wish to provide a specific order to the directors, they may do so, 
and when they wish to retain some powers but delegate others, they may do so, and so on and so forth. 
 By contrast, in the strongest form of stakeholder theory, the shareholders' place in the corporation 
is not an especially central one; they are merely one constituency whose interests must be balanced against 
those of others.  The list of potential stakeholder groups is quite large.
2167
  One definition of stakeholder is 
                                                          
2166
 It is shareholders who have the power to elect and remove the board, confirm directors' self-
interested acts, amend the articles, approve "fundamental changes", et cetera. 
2167
 There has been criticism (e.g. Alan Hyde, "Ownership, Contract, and Politics in the Protection of 
Employees Against Risk" (1993) 43 U. Toronto L.J. 721, at pp. 721-722, 726-728) that, while the interests 
of these groups might separately warrant legal recognition, tying them together into one general 
"stakeholder" class rather than analyzing each claim separately is of relatively little utility.  If the rights 
each group are entitled to are distinct and presumably arise from the natures of their respective 
relationships with the corporation, then the term "stakeholder" has no practical legal significance and may 
result in confusion.  It potentially also creates a sense of equivalence that could be objectionable if one 
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anyone the corporation can affect, anyone who has a proximate interest in its decisions, who is either likely 
or certain to draw a benefit from the company or be harmed by it.
2168
  Another definition emphasizes 
groups who have contributed to the corporation in some way,
2169
 and their status is therefore based not on a 
gratuitous moral obligation but on the fairness of some quid pro quo. 
 Using either definition, shareholders are simply one group of stakeholders among many.  They 
supplied capital on equity terms,
2170
 just as others supplied debt capital, labour, tax breaks, clientele, et 
cetera.  They look to it for dividends and capital gains, just as others do for wages, repayment with interest, 
goods and services, the avoidance of pollution, et cetera.  Shareholders should therefore have no special 
ability to assume further powers nor otherwise limit the authority of the directors who run the corporation 
on behalf of all its stakeholders.  There is no provision, after all, for a "unanimous employee agreement" 
nor a "unanimous creditor agreement".  But this objection raises a parallel consideration; if one accepts 
stakeholder theory, why are shareholders the only group who elect the board?  If they are but one 
constituency and the duties of directors are not owed to them, why should shareholders have the unique 
ability to select those who wield ultimate power in the corporation?   
 There is an argument that, even accepting that other groups have a legitimate "stake" in corporate 
governance, nevertheless the aims of all stakeholders are best achieved when the corporation is successful 
                                                                                                                                                                             
believes that some would-be stakeholders are entitled to greater protection than others.  Nonetheless, there 
is utility in a general term for groups who may have rights against the corporation, even if such rights are 
varied and thus the term does not represent a single coherent doctrine, but a collection of separate ones. 
2168
 The terminology for this definition is varariable.  e.g. Puri and Borok, supra note 2137, referred to 
this as a general definition of "stakeholder"; Vanduzer, supra note 2092, pp. 240-241, appears to have 
treated this as the implicit definition of stakeholder.  Jeffrey Bone, "Legal Perspectives on Corporate 
Responsibility: Contractarian or Communitarian Thought?" (2011) 24 Can. J. L. & Jurisprudence 277, at 
pp. 290-293 called this "communitarian" theory, which he considered a contrast to stakeholder theory; 
Ronald Daniels, "Stakeholders and Takeovers: Can Contractarianism Be Compassionate?" (1993) 43 U. 
Toronto L.J. 721, at pp. 329-331 called it "communitarian protectionism"; Kuras, supra note 2115, p. 306 
defined "communitarian" corporate social responsibility in essentially this way.  Adams and Matheson, 
supra note 2141, pp. 1108-1109 referred to this as the "ethical responsibility" of the corporation. 
2169
   Again, while this concept is in common usage, terminology or the lack thereof is not entirely 
standardized.  e.g. Bone, supra note 2168, at pp. 287-288 defined stakeholders in this manner, saying that 
"stakeholder theory" is a less shareholder-focussed offshoot of contractarian models of the corporation; 
Adams and Matheson, supra note 2141, p. 1110 referred to this; Roy Jones, "The Stakeholder Approach to 
Corporate Governance: A Wider Perspective" (1999), OECD, USAID and World Bank Joint Conference 
on Corporate Governance in Russia, online: www.corp-gov.ru/projects/1/jones.pdf, at p. 3 defined 
stakeholders as "those who have contributed firm specific risk-bearing investments" of any sort; Leung, 
supra note 2115, p. 589 defined stakeholders as those who have contributed to corporations in a manner 
that is not legally recognized.  Puri and Borok, supra note 2137, described employees as "investors" of 
human capital, ones who are especially undiversified compared to other stakeholders.  Daniels, supra note 
2168, pp. 331-340 called these "implicit contracts", a phrase that other authors have used more narrowly to 
refer to the expectations inherent in a long-term employment relationship; he challenged the position that 
such "implicit contracts" should be honoured in the takeover context by pointing out that they can be 
violated during normal operations, but the obvious answer to this critique would be to protect them 
elsewhere as well. 
  
 
 
394 
 
in some generic sense, which in turn is often taken to mean that its profits are maximized.
2171
  In general, 
shareholders are the only group with a theoretically unlimited interest in maximizing the corporation's 
wealth, and according to the simplistic but useful assumptions of economic rationality, they are thus the 
most industrious in the pursuit of profitability.  Therefore, it would make sense that directors be 
accountable to shareholders, both through the election process and the enforcement of their duties, because 
that group has the strongest incentive to monitor their performance towards that end.
2172
  For the same 
reason, allowing investors to affect corporate decision-making or even assume complete control of the 
company through a unanimous shareholder agreement would be even more efficient at maximizing wealth, 
since the party with the greatest incentive would be making the decisions with no agency costs.  This helps 
insure that all parties with claims ahead of the shareholders, i.e. all creditors, are paid off to the greatest 
degree possible, that shareholders themselves profit to the greatest degree possible, and that the business is 
as economically productive as possible, bringing the most benefits at the least cost to society at large 
through mutually beneficial transactions with external parties.
2173
  Assuming one accepts this line of 
reasoning,
2174
 it explains why, even if stakeholder interests are recognized, directors should still be 
primarily accountable to shareholders and why investors should be able to take power through a unanimous 
shareholder agreement. 
 But that treats profit maximization as the sole or at least primary goal of corporations.  
Stakeholder theory offers several critiques of this premise.
2175
  One is that the argument that increasing 
residual wealth is a rising tide to lift all stakeholder boats relies upon the simplistic belief that they can all 
be treated as "creditors" who desire only to be repaid for existing debts.  The harms that many stakeholders 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2170
 See the explanation in Chapter Two comparing equity and debt financing. 
2171
 e.g. Vanduzer, supra note 2092, p. 239. 
2172
 Macey and Miller, supra note 2116, pp. 416-419, argued that shareholders, being residual 
claimants, are the group least able (in a theoretical sense) to negotiate complete contracts to protect their 
rights, and it is for that reason that they instead are the beneficiaries of the directors' duties. 
2173
 The last item invokes some further contested ideas about the benefits of the free market that may 
fail in practice for a variety of reasons. 
2174
 It is, of course, a highly contested claim; e.g. Leung, supra note 2115, p. 599 summarized but 
rejected this logic. 
2175
 Even accepting profit maximization for the residual beneficiary as the primary goal of corporate 
activity, or at least as an efficient proxy for the goal of productive economic activity that is assumed to 
benefit all stakeholders, one must consider that it is arbitrary that shareholders receive the unlimited surplus 
wealth of the corporation.  This was, of course, their understanding when they invested, and- assuming no 
redistributive goals- it would be problematic and unfair to change it without compensation.  But, as a 
hypothetical, one could limit equity investors' share of the increased wealth to perhaps a fivefold increase 
over their original investment every year, with any surplus beyond that to be divided evenly amongst the 
employees of the company.  It would then be the employees who would have the incentive to foster 
unlimited corporate wealth.  This is a radical notion, and no doubt some would object that no one would 
invest under such onerous conditions and the entire capitalist system would shortly collapse.  But if the 
only reason for shareholder primacy were to insure that there existed a group with unlimited profit potential 
whose interests could stand in for those of the corporation, then such an alternative arrangement would 
  
 
 
395 
 
seek to avert are not unpaid debts.  They might, for example, want to avoid the severance or radical 
restructuring of their relationship with the corporation.
2176
  Granted, a company with extra funds is in a 
better position to continue affording the costs of its existing relationships, but the two goals are not always 
compatible; the increased profitability may be the result of just such a severance or restructuring.  
Similarly, the corporation may be deriving profits at the direct expense of stakeholders, by causing harms 
for which it will not be fully compensating the aggrieved parties.  Even if the company's profits are greater 
than the harm done,
2177
 of which there is no guarantee, there might be no legal avenue for redress or the 
transaction costs of obtaining it might be too great.
2178
  Further, even if compensated, not everyone finds 
money an adequate answer for the wrongs they have suffered.
2179
 
 Maximizing residual wealth may also encourage courses of actions with high risks but high 
potential rewards.  Diversified shareholders would favour that, but individuals with less diversified interests 
would not.  Unless the corporation is already causing inadequately compensated harm, no other stakeholder 
group receives an obvious benefit from a course of action likely to cause the company to go bankrupt or 
drastically curtail its operations if a risk fails to pan out; it renders the business unable either to maintain its 
existing relationships or to pay for harms it causes, ensuring the same two problems previously discussed in 
the context of solvent companies.
2180
  Even a "diversified" stakeholder- say, a creditor who has loaned 
funds to multiple companies or a customer who regularly purchases substitutable products from multiple 
sellers- appears to have more to lose than to gain from half the corporations with which they associate 
doing extremely well and the other half going broke.
2181
  But a shareholder with multiple investments 
would rather that half become worthless and half triple in size than that all remain stable. 
 There are, of course, many potential benefits to the pursuit of profit.  Truly wasteful activities can 
be eliminated and socially beneficial ones discovered to take their place, all because of it.  At best, 
innovation and prosperity are the result.  But it is a mistake to confuse maximizing residual wealth in 
general with its more positive side effects.  The result is often courses of action which are "efficient" only 
in that they are cheaper.  Even aside from the most obvious harms- pollution, unsafe products, exploitation 
of labour, et cetera- the smallest effects might be pernicious to stakeholders.  Cutting back a customer 
                                                                                                                                                                             
present no difficulty. 
2176
 A common example is workers, whose interest in continued employment extends beyond their 
current contract, let alone unpaid wages owing, and may include implicit promises of a long-term wage arc.  
See e.g. Singer, supra note 2107, pp. 480-481 and generally; Stone, supra note 153, pp.364-369 and 
generally; Robert Howse and Michael J. Trebilcock, "Protecting the Employment Bargain" (1993) 43 U. 
Toronto L.J. 751, at p. 755 and generally. 
2177
 i.e. it is Kaldor-Hicks efficient. 
2178
 See generally Coase, supra note 1137. 
2179
 A problem not unique to this corner of the legal system, of course. 
2180
 Howse and Trebilcock, supra note 2176, pp. 756-757; Macey and Miller, supra note 2116, pp. 
408-409 worked through some mathematical examples illustrating how the risks and returns of a given 
corporate act create conflicting preferences for shareholders and creditors. 
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service department could have no appreciable effect on sales, harming both customers and (former) 
employees while raising returns for shareholders. 
 Incentives for the corporation to harm stakeholder groups in the pursuit of profit exist even when 
no unanimous shareholder agreement is in place.  Directors are elected by shareholders, after all, and on 
that basis alone are likely to look out for their interests.
2182
  But the position of the Supreme Court of 
Canada is that nonetheless the board might have sufficient impartiality to consider other stakeholders.  The 
unanimous shareholder agreement, however, makes it that much more difficult to believe that the interests 
of the corporation might be held distinct from those of its investors.  In practice, of course, empowered 
shareholders will not behave with ruthless greed at every turn.  But it strains credibility that they are 
anything resembling unbiased arbiters as between their own self-interest and the interests of other 
stakeholders, absent far more compelling legal protections for those groups than currently found in 
Canadian law.  The unanimous shareholder agreement is essentially legislative recognition that 
shareholders have the right to cause the corporation to promote their own agenda ahead of other 
stakeholders if they so choose.
2183
 
 A unanimous shareholder agreement is, for practical reasons, likely to be found only in a small 
corporation.
2184
  But the C.B.C.A., all territorial, and most provincial equivalents place no such limitation.  
Assuming the statutes can be taken at face value, the possibility of entering into a unanimous shareholder 
agreement and the theory of the corporation it represents apply to all federal and territorial and most 
provincial corporations.  The existence of this tool is a legislative endorsement for the understanding that 
corporate power derives from the shareholders.  This is incompatible with stakeholder theory, where equity 
investors are just one constituency. 
 When courts consider granting recognition to stakeholder interests, they usually do not make 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2181
 Unless the creditor can put in place exaggerated risk premiums. 
2182
 Singer, supra note 2107, p. 502; Leung, supra note 2115, pp. 617-618; MacIntosh, supra note 
2089, p, 256.  Borok, supra note 2114, advocating a stakeholder-friendly definition of "best interests of the 
corporation", pointed out that that the shareholders' ability to elect directors would allow them to retain a 
"priority position", although curiously framed that as a defence of his proposal rather than a flaw in it.  
O'Connor, supra note 2107, p. 1234 made a similar point, that large amounts of unprofitable stakeholder-
friendly activity render a firm vulnerable to takeover, which in turn usually leads to replacement of the 
board, thus motivating them to limit such behaviour in favour of profitability. 
2183
 Furthermore, why should shareholders be free to fetter their discretion if directors are not?  As 
discussed earlier, this may have been intended to allow for the creation of pre-made decisions, following 
the commentators' debate, but the actual provision went substantially beyond that and could effectively 
allow empowered shareholders to avoid the duties of care and loyalty.  Arguably, imposing lesser duties on 
them than directors suggests a legislative perception that there is less need for them, which in turn might 
imply that those were duties designed to protect investors and thus they are not as necessary when 
shareholders are directly empowered, despite the Supreme Court's decisions to the contrary. 
2184
 More precisely, a corporation with a small number of shareholders.  Even a private company with 
few shareholders can still be a large firm, involving many individuals, numerous assets, and significant 
operations. 
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reference to the theoretical basis of the unanimous shareholder agreement, a facet of corporate law that 
likely seems irrelevant without such an agreement in place, nor vice versa.
2185
  There are some limited 
exceptions to this.  In J.L. Deslières et Fils inc. c. Colabor inc.,
2186
 Trahan J.C.S stated: 
 
48 Il est clair, à la lecture des articles 102 et 146(2) de la Loi, qu'une telle 
convention restreint les pouvoirs des administrateurs de gérer les affaires de la société.  
Par une convention unanime d'actionnaires, ceux-ci "se protègent" pour l'avenir en 
limitant le droit des administrateurs d'agir dans le seul intérêt de la société: ils doivent 
aussi tenir compte de l'intérêt de tous les actionnaires.  De telles conventions obligent 
donc les administrateurs et les actionnaires de reconnaître le droit à la dissidence d'un ou 
de plusieurs des actionnaires. 
2187
 
 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement was here openly described as a means of forcing directors 
to look beyond the interests of the company, to those of the shareholders.  In context, that was probably 
only meant as an affirmation that that method could be used to protect the rights of minority investors, not 
to assert the primacy of shareholders over other stakeholders.  Nonetheless, the line is easily blurred.  
Terms meant to protect the minority from the majority might easily have secondary costs upon other 
groups.  If unanimous shareholder agreements had the effect Trahan J.C.S. set out, superseding the best 
interests of the corporation as a whole, they could supplant consideration of stakeholders. 
 The reported case that comes the closest to directly placing a unanimous shareholder agreement 
into conflict with stakeholder rights is Casurina Ltd. Partnership v. Rio Algom Ltd.
2188
  A parent company 
created an agreement governing a subsidiary in order to shift assets from it to elsewhere in the corporate 
group; the directors of the subsidiary insisted upon that mechanism in order ensure that any liability rested 
with the parent company and not them personally.
2189
  This act was found to be oppressive of the owners of 
convertible debentures issued by the subsidiary.
2190
  Although not the determinative factor, Spence J. stated 
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 In Indalex, supra note 1775, where such an agreement actually did exist at one point, nothing was 
made of it by any of the judges. 
2186
 J.L. Deslieres & Fils inc. c. Colabor inc., 2003 CarswellQue 1703, J.E. 2003-1458, REJB 2003-
45273 (C.S. Que. Jul 07, 2003) concerned whether a shareholder had, as part of purchasing additional 
shares, agreed to be party to an agreement to terminate the existing unanimous shareholder agreement; it 
was found that he hadn't. 
2187
 My translation: "It is clear, from reading sections 102 and 146(2), that such an agreement restricts 
the powers of the directors to manage the affairs of the company.  Through a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, the shareholders protect themselves by limiting the right of the directors to act in the sole 
interest of the company: they must also bear in mind the interests of all the shareholders.  Such agreements 
therefore oblige the directors and the shareholders to remember the right to dissent of one or more 
shareholders." 
2188
 Casurina, supra note 1209.  The document was referred to as a "unanimous shareholder 
resolution".  These issues were not dealt with in the appeal, Casurina Ltd. Partnership v. Rio Algom Ltd., 
181 O.A.C. 19, 2004 CarswellOnt 180, 40 B.L.R. (3d) 112, [2004] O.J. No. 177 (Ont. C.A. Jan 21, 2004). 
2189
 Casurina, supra note 1209, par. 83. 
2190
 Ibid, par. 213.  Despite this conclusion, due to the terms of the debenture agreement, they were 
found to have waived the right to bring the claim (par. 239). 
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that the use of a unanimous shareholder agreement rather than obtaining board approval (which might have 
required alleviating the directors' concerns about the transaction) was among the elements that raised 
questions as to whether the parent company was disregarding the interests of the debenture-holders.
2191
 
 Both of these cases alluded to, and Casurina in particular demonstrated, the tension that exists in 
Canadian corporate law between the unanimous shareholder agreement and the role of directors as 
guardians of the corporation's own interests.  The former allows shareholders (and shareholders alone
2192
) 
to impose their will upon the company, while the latter increasingly assumes some element of stakeholder 
theory.  Even in corporations without such an agreement in place, the theoretical implications of this legal 
tool cast a shadow.  Although the existence of unanimous shareholder agreements does not preclude some 
legal recognition for stakeholders- the law already includes contractual rights, labour law rights, oppression 
remedy rights, et cetera, and additional protections could easily be added to this list- it does affirm the 
centrality of investors as the source of corporate power, which is incompatible with the strong form of 
stakeholder theory that equalizes shareholders and other groups. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
 At first glance, allowing investors to restrict directors' powers through a unanimous shareholder 
agreement, even transferring those powers to themselves, might seem straightforward.  They, after all, elect 
the board, and so already exert indirect power over the company.  But directors are not merely a means 
through which shareholders control the corporation.  They are bound by a complex set of legal duties and 
liabilities that serve a variety of purposes, and these must be given at least as much respect as empowering 
shareholders.  Legislative bodies have recognized this by providing that the duties of directors would be 
transferred along with their powers.  This too might initially seem straightforward; it is anything but.  It is 
an attempt to combine legal principles that were developed in the context of the statutory default corporate 
power structure with a tool designed to rearrange that structure. 
 The sheer versatility of the unanimous shareholder agreement's ability to restrict directors has 
many advantages, but attempting to reconcile that flexibility with the transfer of responsibilities is no easy 
task, and the statute provides little guidance.  On the one hand, possible arrangements include the splitting 
of powers between shareholders and directors, the establishment of a "supervisory" relationship between 
the two, or making specific decisions or placing restrictions upon the board that do not transfer ongoing 
authority.  On the other, directors can face liabilities arising from their actions, their failure to act, or simply 
                                                          
2191
 Ibid, pars. 198-201. 
2192
 Non-shareholders may be parties to the creation of a unanimous shareholder agreement, but their 
participation is not required, and no other constituency has the ability to create such an instrument without 
the participation of all of the shareholders. 
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by virtue of their offices.  The outcomes from combining the possible factors are uncertain at best, and 
while the reported case law does not indicate that this is causing widespread problems, it is a deeply 
unsatisfactory situation for the theorist. 
 Applying the principle that liability only serves its purpose when attached to the relevant decision-
maker, I analyzed a variety of scenarios and made recommendations as to how they might be handled.  
Whatever merits or flaws my specific suggestions have, the result is both complex and imperfect.  What 
this illustrates, more than anything, is that directors' liability and unanimous shareholder agreements are 
both complicated, and the provision that currently attempts to merge them borders on the glib in its failure 
to engage with that. 
 Pre-made decisions in the unanimous shareholder agreement are particularly problematic.  While 
these have been the source of a lengthy, and possibly misguided, discussion in the literature centring on the 
prohibition on "fettering discretion", that can easily be solved by re-conceiving of them simply as 
restrictions on the directors with no corresponding empowerment of shareholders.  That does, however, 
mean promoting a contractual model of the corporation (wherein such decisions can be included in the very 
essence of the company) over anything even remotely resembling the default model found in the statute 
(which assumes identifiable decision-makers).  This in turn leaves almost unsolvable certain questions of 
liability, as neither the directors, the original shareholders, nor the current shareholders seem good 
candidates for those responsibilities. 
 The related controversy on whether empowered shareholders should inherit the duties of care and 
loyalty seems quite easily solved by recognizing that these obligations have a continuing function in 
ensuring that the investors manage the company for, at the very least, their collective benefit.  That 
conclusion is only strengthened by the inclusion of stakeholder theory into these responsibilities, as the 
Supreme Court of Canada has recently, if tepidly, done.  But analysis reveals that such an obligation to 
consider stakeholders might amount to little in the face of shareholders' de facto freedom to favour 
themselves over other groups.  Only a form of stakeholder rights far stronger than has been adopted to date 
could overcome that, but that would require a scrutiny of corporate decisions that is not only a departure 
from tradition, it would likely prove unworkable unless these groups' interests were granted a priority akin 
to the various statutes that currently set the boundaries within which directors exercise their business 
judgment.  The difficulties of combining unanimous shareholder agreements with stakeholder theory only 
serve to highlight an underlying issue: the problem of reconciling this theory with the rest of Canadian 
corporate law, which still largely rests upon implied notions of shareholder primacy, manifested among 
other ways in their unique ability to elect directors. 
 While unanimous shareholder agreements are a niche topic, restricted in practice to only a tiny 
subset of companies, this is perhaps their greatest significance to our understanding of the law generally: 
they represent a "stress test" of sorts for it.  They illustrate the ways in which shareholder primacy 
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continues to be a significant theme, one which comes into conflict with stakeholder theory or even general 
notions of corporate accountability.  They demonstrate that a contractual model that freely rearranges 
corporate decision-making powers would be problematic for the controls that society has imposed upon 
companies, particularly through the placement of duties and liabilities upon directors, but also through the 
statutory obligations placed upon the firm itself to which the board are tasked with making the company 
adhere.  To solve these problems, if indeed they can be solved, requires a thorough consideration of the 
general bases of directors' liability, the function that their duties serve in safeguarding shareholders, the role 
that stakeholder theory should play in corporate decisions, and the purpose of unanimous shareholder 
agreements themselves.  Just as a clear understanding of the underlying principles is necessary to answer 
questions about the transfer of directors' responsibilities when their powers are restricted, so too can 
understanding the way that unanimous shareholder agreements work (or should work) tell us much about 
the larger principles they reflect.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement is a formidable tool.  It allows shareholders to restrict or 
assume the authority of the directors, potentially enabling them to exert direct control over corporate 
decision-making.  This stands in contrast to the traditional power structure of the corporation, a form of 
representative democracy wherein the board are entrusted with ultimate authority over the business and 
affairs of the company, subject to legal duties and the threat of replacement, but not to limitation or 
override by investors. 
 For such a major innovation, the statutory provisions creating the unanimous shareholder 
agreement are notoriously vague in key respects.  Throughout this dissertation, issues arising from that 
ambiguity have been considered, ranging from whether amendments must be unanimous to how the 
responsibilities of directors should be relocated when their powers are reconfigured in complex ways.  
Confronting these uncertainties has often required a fresh examination of the larger legal principles 
underlying them.  This is not a one-way process; the interaction between the unanimous shareholder 
agreement and other aspects of corporate law can tell us as much about the latter as the former.  The new 
situations this tool can create and the questions it raises form a sort of "stress test", exposing new 
dimensions in everything from the definition of "shareholder" to the purpose of the oppression remedy to 
the obstacles facing stakeholder theory.  One cannot understand how the unanimous shareholder agreement 
fits into corporate law without understanding the corporation itself.  And perhaps one cannot understand the 
corporation without understanding the unanimous shareholder agreement.
2193
 
 Nowhere is this more apparent than in the one question that has recurred most often throughout 
this dissertation, seeming to underlie or affect almost every other dilemma encountered.  Does the inclusion 
of the unanimous shareholder agreement in Canadian law represent a shift away from the corporation as an 
entity whose existence is derived from and defined by a statutory framework, toward the "nexus of 
contracts" theory that equates the company with a web of voluntary agreements?  The unanimous 
shareholder agreement obviously adds another level of customizability to the corporation.  However 
significant that option is, it is hardly unprecedented.  The statute is full of ways that the corporation can be 
tailored.  But there is clearly something about this legal tool- whether it is the contractual mechanism 
through which it is enacted or the fundamental importance of rearranging the corporate power structure 
itself- that has seen it both lauded and resisted as exceptional, sui generis in its capabilities and potential.  It 
has been claimed that the unanimous shareholder agreement represents "a shareholder-chosen contractual 
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model of corporate governance formerly absent from Canadian law".
2194
  If true, this would have 
significance reaching far beyond the relatively small portion of companies that have such a document 
actually in place.  Our understanding of what a corporation is would have to change to accommodate this 
development. 
 The "nexus of contracts" is a way of understanding corporations in the abstract, not a suggestion 
that they are literally composed of contracts.  Despite the claims of its proponents, the theory fails to 
adequately explain all of the entity's quintessential features, in particular limited liability.  The statutes do 
not merely facilitate a complex web of notional contracts; they grant, by concession, a fundamental element 
not otherwise available.  Unless that trait is removed, the corporation can never truly be reducible to 
contracts, even hypothetical ones.  Notwithstanding the flaws in their metaphor, some advocates of the 
theory argue that this allegedly "contractual" nature means that the corporate structure should be far more 
malleable than it traditionally has been.  It is this prescriptive vision of an almost entirely renegotiable 
"contractual" corporation that is in conflict with the interpretation of it as an entity defined by an often rigid 
statutory framework. 
 Does the unanimous shareholder agreement represent a radical change in Canadian corporate law, 
an embrace of that "nexus of contracts" paradigm? 
 No. 
 The creation of the unanimous shareholder agreement is obviously a shift toward a corporation 
more based upon the common preferences of its specific investors and less upon a mandatory form set out 
in advance by the legislature.  The original justification for this tool also does seem to have been influenced 
by a conception of the corporation roughly in line with the axioms of the "nexus of contracts" theory, and it 
can legitimately be seen as having moved the law a step in that direction.  But the unanimous shareholder 
agreement, as it currently exists, is a far cry from allowing investors to freely negotiate the corporate 
arrangement.  These documents can do more than just restrict the powers of directors, but they can only 
deviate from the default corporate structure in limited ways.  The recommendations of some commentators 
that this tool be expanded far beyond its current capabilities remain nothing more than dreams. 
 The reception that these agreements have had in the courts further emphasizes that Canadian law 
is far from accepting of the "nexus of contracts" theory.  Although judges have often strictly interpreted the 
distinctly contractual (and anomalous for corporate law) unanimity requirement, the effect has been to 
avoid facilitating the alteration of the corporate structure.  This is reflected in the similar inclination among 
the judiciary- including the Supreme Court of Canada- to enforce the statutory criterion that a unanimous 
shareholder agreement must restrict the directors in order to be valid, and in extreme cases to narrowly 
define what restrictions are acceptable.  That is consistent with it being a tool included in the legislative 
framework for a specific purpose, but runs counter to treating it as the manifestation of a freely 
                                                          
2194
 Disney, supra note 9, p. 118. 
  
 
 
403 
 
renegotiable corporation. 
 The enforcement of unanimous shareholder agreements further demonstrates a collective 
ambivalence in the judiciary toward them.  Some cases do apply the "corporate constitutional" model, 
wherein the agreement truly reshapes the company's power structure and removes authority from the 
directors.  While this method does not require a "nexus of contracts" understanding to function, it is 
compatible with that theory.  It co-exists, however, with three other approaches, which reject or ignore the 
possibility that the unanimous shareholder agreement can cause a fundamental rearrangement of the 
corporation.  The contractual model of enforcement externalizes the agreement, classifying it as a contract 
existing alongside the entity, while the directors' duties and oppression remedy methods integrate 
unanimous shareholder agreements into pre-existing corporate rights and remedies.  Despite the wording of 
the legislation, then, there is not even legal consensus that the restrictions in these documents genuinely 
remove power from the board.  This, more than anything, indicates the entrenched judicial resistance to the 
idea that a Canadian corporation is nothing but a "nexus of contracts", its fundamental terms renegotiable. 
 The transfer of responsibilities that accompanies a unanimous shareholder agreement also reveals 
the problems that arise when these documents interact with a legal framework that remains largely 
premised on the default corporate form.  Unusual power arrangements create unclear and sometimes 
unsolvable questions of liability.  Although a shareholder primacy conception of the directors' duties of 
care and loyalty indicates that it would be beneficial if they continued to bind empowered shareholders- a 
further refutation of the totally renegotiable corporation- the inclusion of stakeholder interests complicates 
matters considerably.  This recent trend in Canadian law, supported by the Supreme Court, is 
fundamentally at odds with a tool designed to let investors exert direct control over a company in pursuit of 
their own ends.  (Realistically, however, this might be no more problematic than expecting shareholder-
elected directors to give any real consideration to the interests of other groups.)  The law is already being 
stretched, perhaps past the breaking point, to accommodate even this degree of corporate flexibility. 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement allows investors to affect various aspects of the company's 
structure, most notably by restricting the power of the directors.  But the ability of these instruments to alter 
the corporation is limited, has faced resistance from the judiciary, and has caused as yet unresolved 
problems in its interaction with other legal principles.  While some positions consistent with a "nexus of 
contracts" interpretation of the unanimous shareholder agreement have merit- I endorsed the corporate 
constitutional approach to enforcement on other grounds, and the unanimity requirement may also be 
justifiable- on the whole, the unanimous shareholder agreement can and should be treated as a tool within 
the statutory entity framework.  Its inclusion in the C.B.C.A. and various provincial and territorial 
equivalents does not indicate that Canadian corporate law now runs on "nexus of contracts" principles. 
 The unanimous shareholder agreement has significant potential to affect corporate decision-
making in this country.  It can allow for myriad variations of companies' default power structures: 
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transferring authority totally to investors, giving them only partial or supervisory power, or allowing them 
to set out specific pre-made decisions.  The goals that empowered shareholders could then pursue range 
from increased profitability to greater corporate social responsibility.  To an extent, this is already 
occurring; the cases discussed in earlier chapters illustrate some of the ways that this tool is currently being 
used.  Unfortunately, legal confusion still surrounds the unanimous shareholder agreement and may be 
preventing its possibilities from being fully realized.  It is hoped that this dissertation has helped shed light 
on the many uncertainties plaguing these agreements.  In time, the law may evolve, to clarify their technical 
workings and guiding principles.  Only then will the unanimous shareholder agreement achieve its full 
maturity as a component of Canadian corporate law.
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